The rise and dominance of the liberal peace thesis may have led many peace and security researchers to neglect the guardrails that Hans Morgenthau offered in his seminal book, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Staying cognisant of those guardrails has become fundamental in our pursuit of peace in Africa.
The liberal peace thesis contends that we can engineer peace by promoting and spreading liberal values. These include democracy, human rights, market economies, and international institutions. The assumption is that introducing these values in conflict-prone or conflict-affected societies will produce peace. This theory reached its peak prominence in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, and has since dominated key reference points in peace and security discourse.
The liberal peace thesis has been the vehicle through which institutions such as the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Regional Mechanisms advance their agenda for integration, peace, and stability. That is why these buzzwords will always sound familiar: democratic governance, rule of law and human rights, constitutionalism, free market and trade, strong international institutions, and statebuilding, among others. Subsequently, many researchers working on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) have ploughed this path in search of ways to achieve sustainable peace in Africa. They are attempting to offer the much-needed intellectual support to the AU, RECs/RMs, and their member states.
Various arguments have emerged that critique the premises and origins, approaches, and compatibility of the liberal peace thesis, some of which informed the hybrid and post-liberal peace ideas. Yet, the liberal peace thesis endures and continues to define the policy and programme design of APSA institutions, as well as their respective implementation approaches. The establishment of APSA institutions was largely premised on the ideas and interpretations of the liberal peace thesis, in relation to pressing peace and security issues on the continent. Conflict realities on the continent in the 1990s that drove the need to establish APSA, and in the 2000s, arguably APSA’s earliest formative years, coincided with the peak of the liberal peace thesis’s influence. At this juncture, it is important to recognise that the AU has operated in a hybrid space wherein its approach, beyond its overt engagements, often falls at the intersection of power politics and liberal ideas: a constant pressure worth acknowledging.
The interaction between APSA and the liberal peace thesis was not merely coincidental. Examine the AU Constitutive Act, adopted on 11 July 2000 and entered into force on 26 May 2001; the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, adopted on 9 July 2002 and came into force on 26 December 2003; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the Panel of the Wise (PoW); the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG), and some others. Their themes can be traced back to mitigating plans or solutions (to peace and security challenges), rooted in the liberal peace thesis that dominated intellectual and policy discourse around the time these documents came into being.
Regardless, Morgenthau’s guardrail was clear. The power struggle cannot be divorced from domestic and international politics, even though their manifestations differ. Morgenthau argued for 3 basic observable patterns that may be adopted as analytical tools to guide thinking and questioning, without necessarily being a full steward of classical realism. These patterns are: keeping power, increasing power, and demonstrating power, and they apply at all levels of analysis and to state and non-state actors.
In modern-day Africa, violent extremists in the Sahel often seek to increase and keep power for greater resources and leverage to confront African states. At the same time, they demonstrate it to instil fear towards citizens. In eastern DRC, while some armed groups seek to consolidate what they have to keep the flow of finances they derive from mining, others seek to challenge the status quo to increase it. The same goes for the highly fragmented armed non-state actors in Libya, particularly in the context of oil. These three patterns are also useful tools for understanding foreign policy dynamics among Horn of Africa and Nile Basin countries, primarily involving Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Gulf countries. Overall, failing to identify which pattern is at play poses a risk of designing incomplete interventions or interventions that are not fit-for-purpose altogether.
Morgenthau names these patterns as follows: the policy of status quo, the policy of imperialism, and the policy of prestige. He further offers how to detect them and warns about the dangers of misanalysis. Unfortunately, many researchers miss the point and engage in their analyses and policy recommendations without due consideration of this critical element.
For state actors, misanalysis may lead to foreign policy failure or inefficiency. For non-state actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs) and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), misanalysis will prevent them from accurately assessing their limits and leverage relative to other actors. For intervening actors in peace and security contexts, misanalysis makes it more difficult to understand what drives conflict actors and their methods, as well as where they are least opposed to a peaceful resolution. Misanalysis may precipitate impasses, conflict re-escalation, failed negotiations or agreements, or the entrenchment of historical injustices, among other outcomes.
On this note, Morgenthau emphasises the need to accurately distinguish among those who seek to maintain the power structure, upset it to their advantage, or demonstrate it (sometimes to serve the first two). How we assess the actors in a conflict-intervention dynamic constitutes a significant portion of what we recommend and the approaches we propose to implement those recommendations. Our misanalysis may therefore be the difference between prevention and outbreak, or resolution and escalation. Ergo, avoiding misanalysis of which actor(s) seek to maintain, increase, or demonstrate power is imperative if our work is to equip policy- and decision-makers to effectively confront the daunting realities they face during peace efforts.
The liberal peace approach has undoubtedly done substantial good for humanity. However, fixation on peace solely through the lens of the liberal peace thesis may constitute a fundamental flaw that Morgenthau warned against: actor misanalysis. Thus, while the liberal peace thesis has brought us closer to sustainable peace, the guardrails Morgenthau offers must not be ignored.
Morgenthau focused on military, economic, and cultural dimensions, and largely on inter-state relations. However, modern realities dictate that we must account for the digital dimension, as it is inevitable to ignore the advantages the digital advancements offer armed actors in the context of armed conflicts. Our assessments must also include non-state actors.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Insight reflect the perspectives of the contributor and do not necessarily represent the official position of Institute for Peace and Security Studies.
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Contributed by Jesutimilehin O. Akamo Research and Policy Analysis unit Coordinator |