Contemporary Africa is experiencing a rapid expansion of digital public services, intelligent infrastructure, and innovation hubs. While these developments promise greater connectivity and economic opportunity, they also raise pressing question of data sovereignty, economic autonomy, and long-term developmental sustainability. Across the continent-from Lagos and Accra to Addis Ababa and Nairobi, major infrastructure projects financed or operated by Chinese and American actors are reshaping the digital landscape. This paper argues that Sino-US models of technological expansion generate distinct yet overlapping forms of dependency. A comparative examination of Chinese state-backed projects in East Africa and US corporate infrastructure in West Africa reveals how these approaches configure and influence African agency in different ways.
Africa’s digital expansion is accelerating. Chinese companies, led by Huawei, have built a large share of the continent’s telecommunication backbone, including an estimated 70 percent of 4G networks. Through the Digital Silk Road component of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has financed fibre-optic cables, data centers and smart-city systems across dozens of countries. At the same time, American technology firms are extending their reach through private investments in subsea cables and cloud infrastructure. Observers have described this intensifying competition as a ‘digital cold war’ with Africa emerging as a battleground.
In Ethiopia, Chinese-built smart cities and 5G networks illustrate one clear model. These projects deliver tangible connectivity gains and modern administrative tools in contexts where infrastructure was previously limited. Yet, they also raise concerns about long-term technological dependence, data flows to external actors, and the integration of surveillance capabilities into urban systems. Ethiopia’s experience shows how state-financed, Chinese-built infrastructure can create pathways of influence that extends well beyond connectivity itself.
Neighboring Kenya presents a more hybrid picture through its vibrant ‘Silicon Savannah’ ecosystem in Nairobi. Homegrown successes such as the M-Pesa mobile money platform have flourished alongside global investment. The United States maintains strong diplomatic and commercial ties-recently designating Kenya as a major non-NATO Ally. Infrastructurally, Chinese firms have contributed to Kenya’s fibre backbone projects. The result is an environment in which local innovation coexists with competition for talent, startups, and standards. This hybrid model suggests greater scope for African agency, even as it remains embedded within the global tech power dynamics.
On the western side of the continent, the emphasis shifts towards private-sector infrastructure. Google’s Equiano subsea cable, which became operational in 2022 with a landing in Nigeria, has significantly increased capacity and is projected to lower internet prices, boost speeds, and contribute to GDP growth and job creation. Equinix’s 2022 acquisition of the Nigerian firm MainOne, followed by further investments in data centers across Lagos and Accra and planned facilities in Port Harcourt-Nigeria, has strengthened US-linked control over critical data infrastructure, connection, and interconnection points. While these projects bring clear benefits in access and speed, they also concentrate digital influence in the hands of global technology corporations. Control over subsea cables and major data centers creates chokepoints for data traffic and positions US platforms to dominate cloud services, search, and emerging digital markets.
Taken together, these cases illustrate two primary pathways of dependency. First, Chinese investments often involve long-term financing and technology standards that can lock countries into specific ecosystems, raising questions of debt sustainability and technological sovereignty. Second, US corporate strategies, by contrast, leverage network effects and data accumulation, enabling platform capitalism to extract value while shaping how Africans interact with the digital economy. Although both powers frame their involvement as development partnership, the underlying logic frequently reinforces historical core/center-periphery relationships in new technological form. In the literature, scholars have framed these dynamics through concepts such as tech imperialism, digital/data colonialism, and platform capitalism- conceptualized as processes through which external actors control communication networks, extract value from data, and influence economic and social life. The comparative picture across East and West Africa suggests that neither model is neutral, as each carries significant implications for Africa’s governance, security, and long-term digital autonomy.
African governments and regional organizations are not passive recipients of these dynamics. The East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), together with national policymakers, can strategically engage both powers. By negotiating robust local-content requirements, data localization rules, skills transfer, and open standards, they can extract better terms from the competition. Going forward, broader continental efforts towards digital sovereignty, including data protection frameworks and investment in local technological capacity will be decisive in determining whether external competition in Africa’s digital ecosystem becomes a source of leverage or renewed dependency.
The digital infrastructure now being laid across Africa will shape economies, societies, and political possibilities for decades. Understanding the distinct imperial formations emerging from Sino-US competition is therefore essential. With evidence-driven analysis and deliberate strategy, African stakeholders can turn Sino-US competition in Africa’s digital ecosystem into an opportunity to build more resilient, sovereign, and inclusive digital futures.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Insight reflect the perspectives of the contributor and do not necessarily represent the official position of Institute for Peace and Security Studies.
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Contributed by Thomas Chukwuma Ijere (PhD) ARUA Fellow |