Peace and security instruments of the African Union, including its Constitutive Act, relevant charters, protocols, and communiqués, contain an inherent assumption that preventive and response interventions can yield constructive outcomes. If they had anticipated failure from the outset, they would not have provided the basis for repeated commitments, mediation, diplomacy, and peace support efforts. Ergo, should we not be circumspect in contributing to its progress, instead of its fall?
The central concern is not criticism itself, but criticism that bypasses evidence, ignores institutional limits, or erodes confidence without offering a path to improvement. Criticism of the AU is necessary, but it should be evidence-based, constructive, solution-oriented, and not kill optimism.
Thought Frame
Optimism is a positive disposition or confidence in a favourable outcome or in its possibility. It should not be conflated with naivety. Optimism helps generate political will, mobilise resources, and sustain engagement when success appears uncertain. When persistent pessimism portrays the AU as irrelevant without fair contextual assessment, it may weaken member-state buy-in, reduce internal institutional confidence, discourage external support, and undermine local trust in AU interventions.
The AU’s own practice suggests that criticism has a place in its work. Its communiqués, charters, protocols, and policy debates repeatedly identify gaps, reaffirm commitments, and call for corrective action. The AU Commission conducts regular engagement with think tanks and experts from various disciplines, commissions studies, and hosts dialogues, enabling introspection and third-party assessments to diagnose the dearth and provide options to address it at strategic, policy, and operational levels, including within its internal bureaucracy. These are platforms through which stakeholders assess problems and propose solutions.
However, the challenge is whether wider public and expert criticism remains within a constructive normative limit: does it help clarify the problem, strengthen accountability, and improve intervention, or does it simply weaken confidence in the AU’s ability to act? Herein lies the conundrum with what may be referred to as unguided criticism. Unguided criticism is not about censoring what can be said or what opinion can be had about the AU. Rather, they are criticisms that are not rooted in holistic empirical premises or context, lack a clear rationale, and do not offer sound recommendations for improving the subject of critique or its results. Its value depends not only on what is said, but also on its evidence, intention, proportionality, and usefulness. It is often a methodological question, especially regarding how the criticism is conducted and communicated.
In this regard, there is a useful lesson from Aristotle’s work on the Nicomachean Ethics. To present it in the form of a reflection tool, here are a series of questions to consider: When is criticism good? Is it good because of our intent? Is it good based on what we observe during the process? Or is it good because of the outcome? Does the usefulness of your criticism to the subject of the criticism matter, and to what extent does it matter?
Concerning the African Union
Is the African Union (AU) relevant today?
Questioning the AU’s relevance often emerges in various discourses across various levels. However, like every multilateral institution, the AU has limitations, some self-inflicted and others shaped by structural and geopolitical constraints. This section presents some useful data to consider when judging the AU’s relevance. The data is drawn from the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Impact Assessment report produced by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). The data showed mixed results across successful, partially successful, and failed Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation efforts from 2015 to 2020.
Concerning preventive diplomacy, 2015–2016 was a relatively balanced period. In 2015, with 29 missions, nearly a third of cases (29%) were successful, the majority (53%) were only partially successful, and fewer (18%) were unsuccessful. By 2016, with 27 missions, the share of successes rose to 37%, while partial successes declined to 41%. Unsuccessful outcomes increased slightly to 22%. This period shows a modest improvement in success rates, though partial outcomes remained dominant. 2017–2018 witnessed a decline in success and a rise in failure. In 2017, there were 27 missions, but successful outcomes dropped sharply to 18%, while unsuccessful cases surged to 41%, equalling partial successes. The downward trend continued in 2018 (31 missions), with only 13% successful, 45% partially successful, and 42% unsuccessful. These years mark a turning point: failures began to rival or surpass successes, suggesting growing challenges in achieving intended outcomes. By 2019 and 2020, which had 15 and 17 missions, respectively, there was no successful case. 2019 outcomes were split between 47% partially successful and 53% unsuccessful, while 2020 outcomes were split between 41% partially successful and 59% unsuccessful. The overall progression showed that most cases ended unsuccessfully, with partial success as the best possible outcome.
The mediation trajectory showed a similar trend with preventive diplomacy: progressive erosion of success. In 2015, the outcomes from 17 missions were largely positive: 41% successful, 53% partially successful, and only 6% unsuccessful. The success rate dropped to 22% in 2016 with 14 missions, while partial success rose slightly to 57%, and unsuccessful outcomes increased to 21%. In 2017, success rebounded to 39% with 13 missions, partial success held at 46%, and unsuccessful cases were 15%. The gains from 2017 were not consolidated in 2018 with 14 missions. Success fell sharply to 14%, partial success was 43%, and unsuccessful outcomes surged to 43%. By 2019, there were no successful cases with 9 missions. Instead, 89% were partially successful, and 11% unsuccessful. In 2020, success remained at 0% with 10 missions, with 80% partial and 20% unsuccessful.
On the one hand, the above figures demonstrate that the AU not only has the tools to fulfil its peace and security mandate. It also reveals that unguided criticism of the AU, as defined in the thought frame, would be detached from reality. On the other hand, we must note that if the AU was relevant on multiple counts, preventing or resolving conflicts, its inability to do so in contexts where it fails should raise questions about why and how to plug the gap; rather than engaging a process that will prove to be analytically unmoored. Notably, also, successes and failures in preventive diplomacy and mediation are multifactorial.
The AU also intervened in fewer cases than were needed. This is often a symptom of resource shortages, political constraints beyond its sphere of authority, access limitations, and geopolitical complexity, rather than simple institutional irrelevance. Thus, evidence of underperformance should guide reform; it should not automatically justify questioning the AU’s relevance altogether.
Furthermore, available data may also understate the AU’s full engagement. Some efforts occur through quiet diplomacy, often off the record and behind closed doors, to preserve political credibility and sustain the trust of belligerents. Although such efforts are difficult to measure, conversations with AU experts and Addis-based think tanks suggest that covert engagement can be effective when the AU finds entry points to prevent or de-escalate conflict. Lack of publicity, therefore, does not necessarily mean absence of action.
Against this backdrop, judging the AU only by visible outcomes risks missing the institutional, structural, and geopolitical constraints that shape how it intervenes or why it sometimes does not. A more useful approach asks whether the AU had a mandate, resources, political access, member-state support, and a realistic entry point. Without these questions, criticism may become analytically weak even when it is morally understandable.
Conclusion
Criticism must be disciplined by evidence. The AU should therefore continue to treat criticism as an opportunity for reform by strengthening accessible channels through which citizens, experts, and policy actors can offer evidence-based feedback. Such platforms would help distinguish constructive criticism from unguided ones and convert public concern into institutional learning. At the same time, optimism must not whitewash the AU. This is a moral burden Africa’s knowledge community must bear with a deep sense of responsibility.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Insight reflect the perspectives of the contributor and do not necessarily represent the official position of Institute for Peace and Security Studies.
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Contributed by Jesutimilehin O. Akamo Research and Policy Analysis unit Coordinator |