Assessment of the Impacts of Intervention by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in 2019/20 in the Frame of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

APSA IMPACT REPORT 2019/20

Institute for Peace & Security Studies Addis Ababa University

Supported by giz Deutsche Zusammenarbeit
List Of Contributors:

Research Team:

Research Support:
Davis Makori & Kidest Dawit

Supervisors:
Nothando Maphalala & Jesutimilehin O. Akamo

Team Members:
Abdel Aziz Dicko

Quality support in final report:
Fortune Agbele & Jason Franze

Editorial support in final report:
Fana Gebresenbet, Ph.D & Lettie Tembo Longwe

Editorial support:
Leonardo Steinfeld

Design:
Blaine Gidey

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Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Addis Ababa University
P.O. Box 1176
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
T +251 1 11 245 660
info@ipss-addis.org
www.ipss-addis.org
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGA</td>
<td>African Governance Architecture</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All Progressives Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARDUF</td>
<td>Afar Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASWJ</td>
<td>Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammaa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC-PCRD</td>
<td>African Union Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>National Council for Defense of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNL</td>
<td>National Freedom Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Coronavirus disease 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWARN</td>
<td>ECOWAS Warning and Response Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPSC</td>
<td>European Union Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of DR Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC-G5S G5</td>
<td>Sahel Joint Force established by Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali and Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (The Mozambique Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Development Cooperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>Government of National Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCB</td>
<td>Heidelberg Conflict Barometer</td>
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HIIK  Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
IDPs  Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IS  Islamic State Jihadist Group
ISIS-WA  Islamic State West Africa
ISGS  Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
JNIM  Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin
LAS  League of Arab States
LCBC  Lake Chad Basin Commission
LNA  Libyan National Army
MNJTF  Multinational Joint Task Force
MINUSCA  United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA  United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUSCO  United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
MPLA  People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OLF  Oromo Liberation Front
PCRD  Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PDP  People’s Democratic Party
PSC  African Union Peace and Security Council
PSO  Peace support operation
R-ARCSS  Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
RECs  Regional Economic Communities
RENAMO  Resistência Nacional Moçambicana [Mozambican National Resistance]
RMGs  Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SAPMIL  SADC Preventive Mission in Lesotho
SARS  Special Anti-Robbery Squad
SLPP  Sierra Leone People’s Party
SPLM/A  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition
SRF  Sudan Revolutionary Front
SSOMA  South Sudan, the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance
TMC  Transitional Military Council
TNLA  Transitional National Legislative Assembly
TPLF  Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UN  United Nations
UNAMID  United Nations African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAMS</td>
<td>UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCA</td>
<td>United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDP</td>
<td>Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland</td>
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Executive Summary

The APSA Impact Report assesses interventions within the African Peace and Security Architecture framework by the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) on conflicts in Africa. Employing an internally designed and developed methodology, the interventions’ quality – AU/RECs’ role relative to that of other actors and cooperation with other international actors – and effectiveness, that is, whether the desired result was achieved and its contribution to the de-escalation of conflict, are assessed. Findings from the assessment form the basis for policy recommendations, contributing to research-based policy development for conflict and crisis prevention, management, and transformation on the continent.

The security situation in Africa remained fragile in 2019 and 2020. Data from the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer (HCB) shows that the number of violent conflicts and wars increased. An increase of 25% was recorded for war level conflicts from 2018 to 2020. Also, the years under review were marked by upsurges in insurgency activities, contentious elections, and unconstitutional changes of government, with 2020 alone registering eight coup attempts, of which six were successful. These conflict dynamics place the prospect of the continental-wide agenda of Silencing the Guns (STG) and the required peace for sustainable development at risk of underperformance or failure.

In 2019 and 2020, 39 and 41 conflict units were selected for the assessment. The assessment captured AU and RECs interventions in 17 conflicts in 2019 and 19 conflicts in 2020. These interventions were deployed through either diplomacy, mediation, or Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Over 50% of the conflicts assessed across both reporting years were not directly addressed by AU/RECs, most of which were on the intensity level of violent conflict. Specifically, 77.3% of the assessed conflicts which were not intervened were violent conflicts, while the rest were limited wars. In the case of war-level conflict, all the conflicts which were studied received a direct intervention from the AU. The above implies that limited war and war levels of conflict are more likely to be intervened compared to violent conflict. While this may be explained by the fact that the number of limited war and war level conflicts is far less than violent conflicts, it also follows trends of previous years in which AU/RECs intervene in more limited war and war level conflicts than violent conflicts. This observed pattern also implies a focus on conflict management rather than preventive interventions, continuing from the patterns from previous years.

The study identified some explanations to understand AU/RECs’ inability to intervene in all conflicts on the continent. Key among these is the principle of non-interference, which translates into the need to recognise and respect the sovereignty of member states. This implies that the AU cannot simply interfere in all crises, particularly if the crises are deemed an internal affair, helping to partly explain the AU’s limited intervention in the crisis in Cameroon for example. Closely linked to the effect of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference is the respect for the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity, which means that the AU relies on the comparative advantage of the regional bodies to intervene in some conflicts. The assessment also found that although the AU/RECs did not directly intervene in some conflicts, the ‘spillover effect’ from intervening in another conflict in the same country indirectly impacted the non-intervened conflict. Such effects were found in Libya, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

Interventions assessed in this report spread across 14 countries. Across both reporting years, 47% of all interventions were made in violent conflicts. Limited wars received 29% of interventions
in 2019 and 21% in 2020. Interventions aimed at war level conflicts account for about 24% of all interventions in 2019 and about 32% in 2020. Disaggregated by instrument types, diplomacy was deployed in 15 conflicts in 2019 and 17 in 2020. Activities reviewed under this intervention entailed AU/RECs issuing a communique to condemn attacks or deteriorating humanitarian conditions, expressing support for other actors’ efforts, holding extraordinary meetings on the conflict, or establishing routine fact-finding visits. This instrument also captures the authorisation of the deployment of an election observation mission and, in extreme cases, suspension of countries from AU/RECs activities when an unconstitutional change of government occurs, as was in Mali and Sudan. Mediation as an instrument was deployed in nine conflict situations in 2019 and ten conflicts in 2020. It entailed establishing a delegation to initiate dialogue, supporting the mediation efforts, visiting a country for mediation purposes, and undertaking election monitoring missions. In the case of PSOs, interventions include authorising or mandating the deployment of military forces, renewing the mandate, formalising a Peace Support Operation (PSO) with a transitional government, and deploying a military force. These interventions were utilised in four conflicts in 2019 and 2020. There was a limited deployment of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) interventions in both report years.

Findings from the assessment suggest a marginal decline in the overall quality and effectiveness of AU/RECs intervention in 2019 and 2020 compared to 2018. While none of the interventions was rated as high quality, 53% of the intervention assessed in 2019 and 45.5% of the evaluated intervention in 2020 were of medium level. The remaining 47% of interventions assessed in 2019 and 54.5% in 2020 were of low quality. Compared to 2018 which had about 75% of interventions rated as either high or medium quality, the proportions of interventions rated medium quality in 2019 and 2020 reduced by about 25%. Like non-intervention, the low-quality rating is partly explained by the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, as found in the situation of Cameroon and Mozambique, and the principle of subsidiarity found in Burundi.

Medium-quality rated interventions were those in the AU/RECs who took on a lead role. Most of this level of quality was deployed to violent level conflicts, using three main intervention instruments: diplomacy, mediation and PSOs. The assessment found the highest level of diplomacy to be deployed in three conflict situations: the Somalia-Al-Shabab conflict and the opposition conflicts in Mali and Sudan. In the cases of the opposition conflicts, the AU and the respective RECs suspended the countries for the unconstitutional changes of government. In addition to the South Sudan-Opposition conflict, these two conflict situations saw the deployment of the highest level of mediation. While the mediation processes in Sudan and Mali were aimed at establishing a transition back to democratic rule, the process in South Sudan was aimed at reaching a compromise on assembling, screening, training, unification, and deployment of forces following the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict. Four PSO interventions were assessed, with two rated with the highest level of intervention. One of the highest levels of intervention was deployed to the Somalia-Al-Shabab conflict. Interventions entailed operations by AMISOM to degrade Al Shabab and efforts to enhance governance and institution-building processes.

In most of its interventions, the AU and RECs cooperated with other international actors. High cooperation was found in Sudan and South Sudan, where AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) aligned their efforts to expedite the return to civilian government and implement the Revitalized Peace Agreement, respectively. Also, significant AU cooperation
with other international actors was observed in the drawdown and termination of the UNAMID mandate in Sudan and in Somalia regarding the AMISOM operation. Similarly, in Mali, the AU and other actors cooperated with each other. For instance, the AU undertook a joint field mission with the European Union Peace and Security Council (EUPSC). Also, consultative meetings with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to strengthen Council-to-Council engagement were held. The assessment also found that the conflict situation in Libya, which has lacked significant AU involvement and collaboration with other key players, did change in 2020, with the AU being more involved in efforts in the management and transformation of the conflict.

Outcomes of the effectiveness assessment, like the quality, show an overall decline in the successes of AU/RECs interventions. None of the interventions were rated as an overall success. Again, fewer than 50% of interventions assessed across both reporting years were judged ‘partly successful’. For both 2019 and 2020, only one of the partly successfully intervened conflicts de-escalated, that is the Sudan opposition conflict. Interventions by AU and IGAD directly contributed to de-escalating the crisis from a limited war in 2019 to a violent conflict in 2020. Both institutions effectively deployed their highest-level instruments of diplomacy and mediation, steering the country onto a path of restoring democratic rule.

AU/REC’s response to the threats in 2019 and 2020 have been mainly reactive and inadequately employing conflict preventive mechanisms, particularly in responding to political crises which have erupted on the continent. A more proactive approach, acting on early warning signs and adopting preventive diplomacy to engage actors on the ground would have contributed to conflict de-escalation. Prioritising early warning mechanisms and appropriately responding to emerging or ongoing threats would require effectively harnessing the synergies between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and APSA and demonstrating the political will to address political crises, particularly those rooted in governance deficits. The AU also needs to rethink its limited focus on addressing intrastate conflicts, particularly intercommunal violence, as they are increasingly being used by jihadist groups to gain ground. AU/RECs’ engagement to provide the necessary support for state interventions to defuse tensions and engagements with the local actors to build their capacity to manage or de-escalate local conflicts adequately is required. And dealing with the surging presence of jihadists on the continent, there is the need to avoid unrealistic quick-fix counterterrorism plans and employ a blend of long-term security and political plans that address structural issues.
Methodology

The APSA Impact Report assesses interventions on conflicts in Africa by the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Since adopting the AU Peace and Security Protocol in 2002, APSA has been the key mechanism for promoting peace, security, and stability. It serves as the central framework for conflict prevention, management, resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) interventions. APSA is based on a horizontal and vertical interplay between various actors. Measures and interventions within the framework are deployed through its pillars, of which the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the main one. As the AU’s standing decision-making body for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, the PSC has the responsibility to respond to conflict and crises.

In line with the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity, the AU relies on the comparative advantage of the eight RECs in responding to conflicts in the respective regions. Among others, the proximity of RECs to conflict countries implies a better awareness of the local issues and nuances, which better places them to lead mediation processes. Similar structures to APSA exist at the levels of individual RECs, such as the early warning systems. However, the level of development of such structures differs across the RECs. For instance, while analysis from ECOWAS Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN) feed into the AU’s CEWS, implementation of this mechanism in still in progress in other RECs.

Regional Mechanisms, particularly the ad-hoc regional security coalitions, have been a modality for security operations over the last decade. Though not formally part of the APSA framework, they have been critical in addressing security crises. This year’s APSA Impact Report focuses on two joint security coalitions, the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) and the G5-Sahel Joint Force. While the MNJTF is an ad-hoc coalition between Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin, operating in the Lake Chad Basin, the G5 Sahel Joint Force is also an ad-hoc coalition between Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, operating in the Sahel.

The report’s methodology measures the quality and effectiveness of the interventions deployed by APSA actors, starting by mapping interventions. Since its inception, APSA actors have employed a diverse toolset of intervention, constituting military and non-military tools. Peace Support Operations (PSO) as a military tool are utilised in AU-Led Initiatives such as AMISOM in Somalia - now replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), AU-UN hybrid PSO in Sudan - UNAMID, which transitioned into UNITAMS - and ad-hoc regional security coalitions such as the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin, and the G5-Sahel Joint Force in the Sahel. As illustrated in the report, the predominant APSA non-military instrument involves preventive diplomacy and mediation and, to some extent, PCRD. Within the context of conflict prevention and the early warning measures of APSA are some interlinkages with the AGA. This overlap is pronounced when the continent’s current security dynamics and outlook discussed in the report are viewed from the lenses of the required preventive diplomacy and mediation interventions. Interventions via military and non-military tools are identified and recorded using

1. The other pillars are the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.
2. The eight RECs are Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC)
a methodological tool called ‘Indicative Table of Interventions’ [See Annex I]. The table captures statements, decisions or actions undertaken by AU/RECs. These interventions are categorised under diplomacy, mediation, PSO or PCRD and intensity rated on a scale of 1 to 3, with 3 being the most intense engagement.

A section on conflict dynamics precedes the mapping of intervention. The discussion provides an insight into the various conflicts, looking at the background, actors, and conflict progression. The section also enlists the key peacebuilding activities by other international actors such as the United Nations [UN], the European Union [EU], and the United States [US]. Data for this section is sourced from several datasets and websites, including the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer (HCB). Worthy of note is that the report utilises the HCB dataset as the primary source for conflict identification, conflict drivers and conflict intensity categorisation. Though not done in this year’s report, the report in the previous year had a section on clustering conflict units. Conflicts are clustered using three criteria: (i) whether conflict actors are interrelated, (ii) whether the conflict dynamics and drivers are linked, and (iii) whether APSA treats these conflict units as connected or as separate. Although analysis for this current report dwelled very little on the clusters, the linkages between conflicts by common actors (jihadists) or shared drivers (elections, coups, COVID-19) are highlighted in the discussions found in sections 1.3 and 1.4 of the report. These interlinkages are again in the assessment of intervention in section 2.

The assessments of the quality and effectiveness of interventions by AU/RECs and RMs are done separately and under the various instruments of interventions – diplomacy, mediation, PSO and PCRD. The assessment begins with the quality of interventions which focuses on the process, nature, and involvement of AU/RECs. This is followed by the effectiveness of the intervention, which assesses the outcomes and results.

The quality of intervention is assessed with three main lines of enquiries: (i) Relative contribution by APSA interventions, analysing AU and RECs contribution relative to the contribution by other international actors. In other words, it looks at whether AU/RECs played a lead or minor role and whether the role played was as expected and in line with their mandates. (ii) Cooperation between actors involved in conflict prevention and transformation. This explores internal cooperation, i.e., the degree and quality of cooperation between the AU and RECs, and external cooperation between AU/RECs and other international actors. In examining this dimension of quality, the analysis considers whether the actors involved explicitly endorsed each other’s efforts, worked together coherently, or did their efforts to undermine each other, and what the degree of coordination between the actors was. (iii) Analysis of the appropriateness of the degree of engagement of the AU/RECs about the intensity of the conflict. Like the effectiveness assessment, available data sources documenting the interventions conducted by AU and RECs, the conflict situation, and the impact of the interventions are analysed by researchers. Again, judgements on the quality are drawn from the analyses of each instrument used [diplomacy, mediation, PSOs, and PCRD], using three categories: overall high quality for good assessments with some minor shortfalls and medium quality for somewhat good review with major shortfalls, or ‘mostly low quality.

Effectiveness assessment answers two main questions: (i) Did the interventions lead to their desired results? (ii) Secondly, do these results contribute to a de-escalation of the conflict? This line of inquiry ascertains the intended effects of the interventions carried out, whether the results were achieved or how much progress was made in achieving them. Researchers, in providing the analysis, utilised a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. This entails data from HCB on conflict intensity levels and an analysis of expert opinions on de-escalation that occurred and whether this can be linked to the APSA interventions. These lines of inquiries are provided for each instrument [diplomacy, mediation, peace support operation]. An overall judgment is
delivered at the end of the assessment, and each instrument is deployed. Judgement categories assigned use one of the four scale ratings, namely, ‘overall successful’ for a clear positive effect of the intervention on the outcome; ‘partly successful’, for positive and negative effects with the outcome falling in a grey zone; ‘rather unsuccessful’, where an apparent negative effect of the intervention; and ‘too early to tell’, when it is too early to ascertain the impact of the intervention.

The HCB categorises conflicts into five intensity levels: ‘disputes’ (level 1), ‘non-violent crisis’ (level 2), ‘violent crisis’ (level 3), ‘limited war’ (level 4) and ‘war’ (level 5). The first two levels are ‘non-violent conflicts’, whereas the last three are ‘violent conflicts’. The APSA impact report only considers conflict with an HCB intensity level of 3 upwards. The decision to use HCB as a baseline is a methodological one. The annual nature of the HCB enables a consistent year on year measure of violent conflict and lessens subjectivity in the selections of cases to study. It also lends itself to a cross-time comparison, where a cross-sectional insight of the number of conflicts and intensity levels can be assessed. This also helps the assessment as one can compare a drop or otherwise in the quality and effectiveness of APSA interventions across time. Beyond this, the HCB provides a comprehensive report of conflicts globally but, more importantly, of the African continent and, as such, provides a starting point for the APSA methodology.

Unlike the APSA impact report from previous years, where analysis covers one year, this year’s report assesses interventions for two years, 2019 and 2020. Again, strict adherence to the conflict intensity levels is observed in that conflicts within the levels of violent crises, limited war and war level are considered; thus, if a conflict was on the level of dispute or non-violent crisis in 2019 but escalated to violent crises, limited war, or war level in 2020, that conflict is not considered.

The rest of the report is structured into three broad sections. Section 1 provides an overview of the conflict situation in Africa for 2019 and 2020. It is divided into four sub-sections: sub-section 1.1 analyses the conflict trends compared to global trends and trends from 2018. Sub-section 1.2 looks at the main drivers of the various conflicts. Sub-section 1.3 focuses on the security dynamics and future risks for conflicts on the continent. Specifically, it discusses the upsurge in insurgencies, violent and contentious elections, and unconstitutional changes of government on the continent and how these undermine efforts by the AU and other stakeholders to silence the guns. The section ends with an assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on conflict situations and potentially undermined AU/REC interventions in sub-section 1.4. Outcomes of the evaluation of interventions are presented in section 2. It begins with an analysis of the quality and effectiveness of the interventions of AU/RECs and RMs, offered in sub-section 2.1. Sub-section 2.2 delves deeper into the assessment by looking at each intervention instrument – diplomacy, mediation, and PSOs. Sub-sections 2.3 cover peace agreements signed in 2019 and 2020. The section concludes with a discussion of conflicts that were not intervened in, exploring whether, in the absence of direct intervention by AU/RECs, interventions into other conflicts may have had ripple effects on non-intervened conflicts. The report concludes with a presentation of key findings and recommendations in section 3.
Watch Out! We Leave No One Behind

Human rights (and inclusion) remain irrefutably relevant to APSA, and they are constant highlights when assessing the causes and impact of conflicts. They have also become salient issues in conflict prevention, peacebuilding efforts, and the implementation of various conflict interventions.

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) began reviewing its APSA Impact Report methodology to mainstream human rights-based approaches (HRBA) and have a more inclusive data and analysis that informs the APSA Impact Report. IPSS collaborates with the World Bank Group (WBG), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the African Union in this regard. Against this backdrop, data sets, indicators and analytical frameworks incorporating a human rights and inclusive approach will inform subsequent Reports. Hence, IPSS and its partners anticipate the support of key stakeholders and consumers towards leaving no one behind in future reports.
Section ONE
Overview of Peace and Security in Africa in 2019–2020

1.1. Conflict Trends

Compared to the 2018 figures, there was no net increase in the number of conflicts fought globally and in Africa for the years under review (2019–2020). According to the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, the number of conflicts recorded globally in 2019 and 2020 is 358 and 359, respectively. These represent a 4.3% and 4% reduction from the 374 conflicts fought in 2018 (see figure 1). Displayed in figure 2 is the distribution of conflicts fought in Africa, with a concentration of conflicts and crises in the eastern, central, and western parts of the continent. In 2019 and 2020, 95 and 98 conflicts were recorded, representing a reduction of 6.9% and 3.9% relative to 2018. In 2018, the share of conflicts in Africa to global conflicts was 27.3%. This remained stable in 2019 and 2020, i.e., at 26.5% and 27.3% (figure 1).

Out of the 95 conflicts identified by HCB in 2019, 18 of them, representing 19%, were rated on the level of limited war (11) and war (7). Most of the conflicts (50) were measured as violent conflicts, while the remaining conflicts were ranked as non-violent crises (12) and disputes (15). A disaggregation of the 2020 conflict figures shows a minimal variance from 2019. Of the 98 conflicts reported by HCB, 22 representing 22.45%, were ranked as limited war (10) and war (12). Again, more than half of the conflicts in 2020, i.e., 52, were rated as violent conflicts, with the remaining being non-violent (9) and dispute (15).

Two new conflicts were started in Africa in 2020; these are the Ethiopia (TPLF/Tigray) conflict and Nigeria’s EndSARS conflict. Ethiopia’s (TPLF/Tigray) war was triggered by TPLF’s attack on the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces Base in Tigray. In response, the Ethiopian government launched a large-scale military offensive in Tigray and a subsequent shut down of communication and transport routes in that region. Actions by the Ethiopian government were supported by Eritrean military forces.4 In Nigeria, EndSARS, which started as a social media protest over the brutality of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), evolved into nationwide mass protests demanding the dissolution of SARS and an end to police brutality.

Figure 1: Comparative overview of conflicts in Africa and Globally

High-Intensity Conflicts

Globally, the number of highly violent conflicts, which is the sum of limited war and war, marginally decreased (figure 3). There was an initial decline in 2019 when the total number of limited war and war level conflicts reduced from 42 in 2018 to 38 in 2019. These then increased by one in 2020 to 39 but still reflect a net reduction compared to the 2018 figures. However, this pattern differs in Africa, with the number of highly violent conflicts increasing in 2020. Out of the 38 highly violent conflicts recorded in 2019 globally, 18 were fought in Africa, representing 47.4%. This figure increased in 2020 when out of the 39 highly conflict wars fought globally, 22 (i.e., 56.4%) were found in Africa. This increase in 2020 is accounted for by the number of wars increasing from seven in 2019 to twelve in 2020 (figure 4).
The sub-Saharan African region experienced the most significant increase in war-level conflict between 2018 and 2020. Despite a drop from nine in 2018 to seven in 2019, war-level conflict increased to twelve in 2020. Out of the seven war-level conflicts fought in 2019, three of them were due to escalations of limited wars. The first of the three is the conflict between the government of DR Congo (DRC), supported by the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) and the Ituri militias groups in the eastern part of DRC over subnational predominance and resources. The second is the conflict involving the Armed Forces of DR Congo (FARDC), supported by MONUSCO and the various local armed groups in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, Maniema, and Tanganyika, over subnational predominance and resources. The third is the cross-border conflict involving Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger (G5 Sahel) with support from France and other governments against Jihadist militant groups such as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).5

The other four war-level conflicts in 2019 remained on the same level of conflict intensity as the preceding year. These are the conflict between the government of Egypt and militant groups over ideology and subnational predominance over the Sinai Peninsula; the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya, and the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) over control

5. The Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin comprises several subgroups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and its regional affiliates Ansaroul Islam, and various other Islamist militant groups.
of national power, resource and orientation of the political system; the cross-border conflicts involving Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger against Boko Haram; and the Somalia and Kenya governments against al-Shabaab over national power and the orientation of the political system.

In 2020, the number of war-level conflicts increased to twelve. The increase is accounted for by the eruption of the war in Ethiopia (TPLF/Tigray) and escalations in limited wars from 2019. As earlier noted, the Ethiopia (TPLF/Tigray) conflict erupted in November 2020 following tensions between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government over the orientation of the political system in Ethiopia. Beyond this new conflict, escalations of existing conflicts increased the number of war-level conflicts. The limited war between the government of DRC supported by MONUSCO and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) over the orientation of the political system, subnational predominance, and resources escalated to a war level in 2020.

Similarly, the Ethiopian intercommunal rivalry and contest over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic groups, mainly in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, escalated. In Mozambique the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the religious extremist militia Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) and the Mozambique government in the northern province of Cabo Delgado intensified. Further escalation occurred with the South-Sudan intercommunal rivalry conflict between the Murle, Dinka and Nuer communities over subnational predominance and resources.

Some of the conflicts also de-escalated from war to limited war for the period under review. For instance, in 2019, the conflict between the Central African Republic (CAR) government, backed by MINUSCA and the anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka militias de-escalated. The same with the violent conflict between farmers and pastoralists in Nigeria. In 2020, there was a de-escalation of the conflict between the government of Egypt and militant groups from war-level conflict in 2019 to limited war in 2020.

**Limited War-Level Conflicts (Level 4)**

Unlike the war-level conflicts, not much variance is observed in the number of limited wars fought across the years under review. In 2019, eleven limited wars were recorded by the HCB. Most of these conflicts were at the same intensity level 4 in 2018. These include the intertribal rivalry conflict in Libya and South Sudan (SPLM/A-IO) conflicts. The conflicts between the Cameroonian government and English-speaking minority; and Mali’s intercommunal rivalry conflict between the Dogon and Bambara communities and their self-defence groups, on the one hand, the Fulani communities, on the other, have also been at the level of limited war in 2018 and remained on the same level in 2019 through to 2020. The only two limited wars escalating in the observed period were the above-mentioned ADF conflict in the DRC and the intercommunal rivalries in South Sudan.

Three of the limited wars recorded in 2019 were due to the escalation of violent conflicts from 2018. These three are Sudan’s intercommunal rivalry conflict between cattle-herding communities, the conflict involving the government of Sudan and opposition groups, and the Mozambique-ASWJ conflict. Three other limited wars were fought in 2019. There were, however, wars that de-escalated in 2019. These include conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Nigeria and the conflict between the government of the CAR and the anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka militias.

In 2020, ten limited wars, according to the HCB, were fought. This is a reduction by one from the 2019 figures. Of the ten limited wars, six did not change from the 2019 conflict intensity level of limited war. These include the conflicts between the government of South Sudan and the opposition; the conflict between the ethnic African armed groups organised under the alliance
Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the Arab-affiliated Sudanese; the conflict in the CAR; and the conflict between the farmers and pastoralists of Northern Nigeria.

There was also the escalation of three violent conflicts to the limited war. These include the Tigray conflict, Oromo conflict between the Ethiopian National Defense Force and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), and the intercommunal rivalry conflict in Burkina Faso. The other limited war in 2020 is the product of the de-escalation of the war between the Egyptian government and the militant groups.

Other Violent Conflicts (Level 3)

As measured by HCB, violent conflicts account for more than 50% of the conflict globally and on the continent. In 2019, 50 of these conflicts were recorded in Africa, marking about a 2% drop from the 2018 figure of 51 violent clashes. The numbers, however, increased to 52 cases in 2020, representing a 4% rise. Most of these conflicts have remained on this level. Out of the 52 medium-intensity violent conflicts recorded in 2020, 34 (i.e., 65.4%) have been at this level since 2018. These include the opposition and government disputes in Algeria, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Gambia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Tunisia. A few of these violent conflicts (including Burkina Faso-intercommunal rivalry, Ethiopia-intercommunal rivalry, OLF/Oromia, and opposition conflicts) in 2019 did escalate in 2020. In the same vein, some of the conflicts in this category also de-escalated, namely, the conflict involving the opposition parties and the governments in Gabon and Guinea Bissau; and the Sudan-SPLM/A-North/South Kordofan, Blue Nile conflict.

Despite the marginal increase in 2020, the number of violent conflicts somehow follows a downtrend from 2016 and 2017, where 65 and 57 violent conflicts were recorded, respectively.

The nature and drivers of violent conflicts have largely evolved around national power and subnational predominance issues with political actors contesting for political power. Thus, the core of most of these conflicts involves opposition political parties. For the years under review, at least 21 of the violent conflicts on the continent involved the main opposition political party of the conflict countries. These include Algeria, Chad, DRC, Sierra Leone and South Africa.

1.2. Conflict Drivers

Globally, the top drivers of conflict in 2020 as per the HCB are system & ideology, the contest for resources, national power, and subnational predominance. As displayed in figure 5, these account for 26.9%, 15.9%, 15% and 13.2% respectively. Across sub-Saharan and North African regions, the trend does not vary greatly. Figure 6, which illustrates the distribution of conflict drivers in Africa in 2020, shows the dominance of national power, system & ideology, and subnational predominance. In 2019, they accounted for 28% [national power], 20% [system & ideology], 19% [subnational predominance]. Figure 7 also shows the contest for resources as another driver accounting for 16% of conflicts across sub-Saharan and North African regions. These proportions did not significantly vary in 2020. As shown in figure 8 below, the contest for national power accounted for 28%, followed by system & ideology (23%), subnational predominance (18%) and resources (14%). Most of them are recorded in conflicts at intensity levels 3 to 5.

The least conflict items entail conflict over territories, international power, secessions and autonomy, of which in 2020, they accounted for 2%, 3%, 5%, and 7%, respectively.
Figure 5: Overview of Drivers of Conflict Globally and in Africa in 2020

Figure 6: Distribution of HCB conflict by item across Africa in 2020, with size determined by the intensity.
As used by HCB, national power denotes conflicts over the struggle for the power to govern a state. These struggles are usually between political actors, specifically political parties if the conflicting states are democratic. This is found in countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, and Mali.

In the case of subnational predominance as a driver of conflict, these have largely included intercommunal rivalry between ethnic groups and communities and mostly over who controls local territory and the resources. As used by HCB, subnational predominance denotes conflict that ‘focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government or a non-state actor
over a territory or a population'. Some of the intercommunal rivalry conflicts considered in the years under review are found in Burkina Faso, mainly between the Mossi, Foulése, and Bella communities and Fulani communities. The Mali intercommunal rivalry conflict between the Dogon and Bambara communities, on one side, and the Peuls (Fulani) and other pastoralist communities, on the other side, is another instance. Similar forms of intercommunal rivalry conflict exists in DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Sudan.

As found in parts of Sudano-Sahel, West and Central Africa, these intercommunal conflicts often have the contest over access to arable land and water in common. For instance, in the cases of both Mali and Burkina Faso, the intercommunal conflict is a conflict between the farming communities and pastoralists over arable land.6 In Sudan, although other reasons such as the unresolved status of Abyei exist,7 at the heart of the intercommunal conflict between the Ngok Dinka and the nomadic Misseriya has been the issue of grazing rights for cattle.8 The same can be said of DR Congo since the intercommunal conflict between Bena Nshima vs Bena Kapuya and Bena Mwembia has been due to tensions over arable land.9 A conflict of a similar nature is emerging in the North-West of Cameroon between the Mbororo Fulani group and secessionist militias fighting for self-determination in anglophone Cameroon.10

A characteristic of the conflicts driven by the quest for subnational predominance, with specific reference to those found in the Sahel region, is the formation of self-defence groups. These include the Koglweogo and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) self-defence militias engaged in the inter-communal rivalries in Burkina Faso. The same can be said of the intercommunal rivalry conflict in Mali between the Dogon and Bambara communities, on one side, and the Peuls (Fulani) and other pastoralist communities, on the other side, which resulted in the creation of the Dozo self-defence militias. These communities have also had to deal with violent extremists.

As earlier noted, system & ideology as a conflict item accounted for 23% of conflicts in 2019 and 20% in 2020. These are conflicts occasioned by the quest to “change the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or the regime type itself”.11 The reasons for these types of conflicts are therefore not homogenous, in that whereas some of these conflicts could be occasioned by the aspiration to change to the religious-oriented political system and governance, others may be due to socioeconomic reasons.

Some broad categories can be derived from system & ideology conflict items. One group of conflicts centres around political contestations involving political opponents. In Tunisia, the conflict between civil society groups, opposition groups and the government, for instance, has been over the orientation of the political system. Though not in its exact form, the Morocco-opposition conflict and the Ethiopian-TPLF/Tigray conflict are also about political contestations involving political actors seeking to change the political system. Another group of conflicts are accounted for by socio-economic reasons. These include the two conflicts in South Africa (socioeconomic protests and xenophobia).

The third group of conflicts under the system & ideology conflict item is inspired by the quest for a religious-oriented political system of governance. Jihadist activities by groups such as Boko Haram and its affiliate groups in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria and the ASWJ in Mozambique are conflicts being waged to change

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6. UN News, Mali’s ‘self-defence’ groups must face justice after deadly intercommunal attacks, 26 March 2019
7. Foreign Policy, Conflict in Abyei Could Reignite South Sudan’s Civil War, 6 June 2018.
8. BBC News, Sudan: Abyei ethnic clashes mar peace deal, 26 February, 2011
9. Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2020, p. 82
10. The Africa Report, Cameroon: The tense relationship between Fulani and anglophones, 21 July 2020
11. Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2020, p. 8
the orientation of the political system. These are conflicts against secular and liberal values, particularly Western education and democratic systems. As discussions in a proceeding section will show, these conflicts are on the rise, especially in the Sahel region of Africa, with a potential threat to long-term peace and security.

Placing the above-discussed conflict items into a broader perspective, coupled with a reflection of the socioeconomics of the continent, helps to understand why the contest for national power, system and ideology, subnational predominance and resources are the topmost drivers of conflict. In the first place, three of the four top drivers of the continent, namely national power, subnational predominance, and resources, are interlinked. The contest for national power and subnational predominance always entails controlling resources. The contest for resources here is used in a much broader sense, going beyond the contest over the possession of arable land and water. With the continent being one of the least economically developed, conflicts over power and resources are expected. According to the World Bank’s 2020 Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report, poverty reductions in sub-Saharan Africa have been slower than in other regions. The report suggested an increase in the extremely poor in the region, accounting for 63% of the global poor. This further gives credence to existing theories on why conflicts occur. For instance, the propositions of greed, grievance and mobilisation of the discontent by Gurr (1970) and Unmet human needs by Burton (1997) and Maslow (1981) point to the facilitating role of inequality and poverty in conflict. In other words, poverty and inequality engineer socioeconomic grievances, making a state vulnerable to conflict. The above also raises the question of the prospects of silencing guns on the continent, a topic explored in the next subsection.

1.3. Africa’s Security Dynamics and Future Risks

The security situation in 2019 and 2020 on the continent and, in particular, the conflict countries remained fragile, with increases in fatalities and displaced people. Despite the decrease in the number of conflicts from 2018 to 2020 (see section 1.1), the number of violent conflicts and wars fought on the continent increased. The rise came with an increase in the number of refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs), increasing by more than 92% in 2020 relative to 2019. According to the UNCHR, the number of refugees increased from around 6.4 million at the start of 2020 to around 6.6 million. While Southern Africa recorded a 3% decrease from the previous year, the East and the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions recorded an increase of 3% (122,800 people). Also, West and Central Africa recorded an increase of 12% (148,800 people).

Figure 9 gives an overview of the regional dynamics, including the originators and receivers of displacement refugees and IDPs. As can be inferred from the figure, one of the top originators of refugees is South Sudan, sending more than 1.5 million conflict-induced refugees to both Uganda and Sudan between 2019 and 2020. More than 800,000 refugees fled DRC to Uganda during this period, while about 700,000 refugees moved from Sudan and South Sudan to Chad and Ethiopia, respectively. Similarly, more than 600,000 refugees fled from Central African Republic to Cameroon, and more than 500,000 fled from Sudan and Somalia to South Sudan and Kenya, respectively. It is interesting to note that countries like Ethiopia and Sudan, which

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12. World Bank Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report, 2020
17. UNHCR, Global Trends -Forced Displacement in 2020
18. ibid
have huge IDP populations, are among the destinations of the refugee flows.

Similarly, IDPs increased in 2020, with major internal displacements occurring in the DRC with 2.2 million IDPs in 2019 and 1.7 million in 2020. In 2020, the Ethiopia (TPLF/Tigray) conflict accounted for a rise in the number of IDP in the East and the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions. According to the UNHCR, the conflict resulted in a full-scale humanitarian crisis, with more than 2.7 million IDPs at the end of 2020. The conflict also led to 45,449 refugees fleeing from Ethiopia’s Tigray into Sudan and another 100,000 internally displaced in the Tigray region. Also noteworthy are the IDP movements in Burkina Faso, where about a million were displaced in 2019–20 combined, and in Mozambique, where 590,000 people were displaced in 2020.

These displacements in Burkina Faso and Mozambique occurred against a relatively small stock population and thus a sharp divergence from previous trends of huge IDP stock population. For instance, the new IDP flows in Somalia, the Sudan, CAR, Mali, and Libya were all six-digit but dwarfed by their huge IDP stock populations.

In Nigeria, attacks by Boko Haram in 2019 accounted for nearly 2400 deaths, marking a 20% increase in the number of deaths (2000) recorded in 2018. The North-West of Nigeria has also seen an increase in the activities of bandits. Incessant attacks, including cattle rustling, kidnapping, rape, torching, looting and torching villages, and killings were conducted by bandits in Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kaduna, Niger and Kebbi.

Activities by Boko Haram and these bandits resulted in a severe humanitarian situation in the states within which they operate. About 7.7 million people need humanitarian assistance, with 1.5 million people needing access to freshwater due to damaged water and sanitation infrastructure. Also, camps for the Internally Displaced People are overcrowded, contributing to cholera outbreaks in the region.

Other countries under the attack of religious extremists, such as Cameroon, also recorded an increase in the number of attacks. About 234 attacks by Boko Haram were recorded in Northern Cameroon between late 2019 and 2020, most of which (59%) have been against civilians. The attacks have been in the form of raids, kidnapping for recruitment and ransom, and looting of villages and displaced persons’ camps. Between January and November 2019, at least 275 deaths were recorded due to attacks by Boko Haram, of which 225 were civilians in the far-North of Cameroon.

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19. ibid
21. UNHCR, Global Trends -Forced Displacement in 2020
22. Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2019, p. 83
23. ACAPS, 2020, Nigeria Banditry violence and displacement in the Northwest. Short Note
24. ACAPS, Crisis Update, Nigeria, March 2022
25. Relief web, Nigeria – Overcrowded Internally Displaced People Camps, 8 February, 2019; Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2019, p. 83
27. Amnesty International, Cameroon: Victims of Boko Haram attacks feel abandoned in the Far North, 11 December, 2019
Also worth highlighting are the interconnections between the different conflicts that were fought on the continent. Figure 10 below maps the interconnectedness of conflicts through the involvement of the same actors, deduced from the intensity of conflict, and the relative strength and importance of the connections. For example, the graph highlights the Libyan civil war’s internationalisation and the Ethiopian civil war. It also shows the clustering of jihadist conflicts and the linkages between the jihadi groups (e.g., the orange Sahelian one and the lila Nigerian one). It foreshadows the trend of integration between ISGS and Boko Haram. Figure 10 also highlights conflicts that are relatively isolated from the broader dynamics, such as the opposition conflicts in West Africa (Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau) or Southern Africa (Zimbabwe, South Africa).

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28. Figure is generated based on UNHCR and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) data.
1.3.1. The threat of Jihadists in Africa

The continuous rise of jihadist activities in Africa, particularly the sub-Saharan region, poses threats to the long-term peace and security of the continent and, as such, makes the continent a frontline in the war against terrorists. As noted by the US State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, there is a shift in the operations of IS and al-Qaeda from Syria and Iraq to their affiliates in West and East Africa.29 This observation corresponds to a rise in jihadist attacks with related death on the continent. In 2019, while death from terrorism declined by 15.5% globally, the continent’s death/losses slightly increased from 4,523 in 2018 to 4,635 in 2019. Seven out of the ten countries with the largest increases in death from terrorism from 2018 to 2019 are African countries.30 The highest increase was recorded in Burkina Faso, recording a difference of 507 deaths between 2018 and 2019. Other African countries with the largest increase in the number of deaths linked to terrorist attacks are Mozambique (186), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (149) and Mali (148).31

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29. BBC News, Is Africa overtaking the Middle East as the new jihadist battleground? 3 December 2020
30. Global Terrorism Index 2020
31. ibid
Terrorist activities are concentrated in certain parts of the continent. North Africa has since the early 2000s been a hub for terrorist groups on the African continent. Between 2019 and 2020, however, a general decline in the number of terrorist attacks was noted by the Global Terrorism Index. For instance, Algeria in 2019 recorded no death due to terrorist attacks, and this was the first time since 2011. In Libya, however, the presence and activities of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have continued to undermine political stability, as attacks by the Islamic State resulted in 22 fatalities.

Since terrorist groups began their activities in the mid-2000s in the Lake Chad region and the broader Sahel regions, there have been incessant attacks against citizens, government and security officers and property. Activities by insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and its breakaway group, the ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA), and others such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslinin (JNIM) and ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) have rendered volatile the political and security conditions in countries like Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Burkina Faso.

For decades, the presence of Al Shabab in Somalia did not only affect the peace and stability of that country but also that of Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mozambique. In Mozambique, for instance, the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammaa (ASWJ), an al-Shabab militia with no relation to Somalia’s al-Shabab terrorist group, have since 2017 carried out brutal attacks in Cabo Delgado, a northern province in Mozambique. The group in 2020 moved its operation beyond Cabo Delgado, conducting cross-border attacks into the Mtware district in Tanzania. Many of the clerics associated with the insurgency were trained in Tanzania, and analysts have long speculated that armed religious extremists arrived in Mozambique from Tanzania following a Tanzanian government effort to root out a budding insurgency in Kibiti and Rufiji districts in 2017. The attacks in Tanzania and the accompanying propaganda videos claiming a presence in Tanzania indicate a more international focus and a broader ambition than the insurgency had previously shown since 2017.

One characteristic of local jihadist groups on the continent is the forging of allegiance with international jihadist movements. Local jihadist groups across regions with jihadist activities on the continent have forged alliances with the Islamic State and al-Qa’ida. In the Sahel region, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslinin (JNIM) and ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) are affiliated to al-Qa’ida and ISIS. Boko Haram at the infant stages was affiliated with al-Qa’ida. The Islamic State’s West Africa Province, which broke away from it in 2015, identifies with ISIS. In Mozambique, the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammaa (ASWJ) is affiliated with ISIS.

Alliances between local terrorist groups on the continent and international terrorist groups have serious implications for conflict management and resolution. Firstly, it introduces multiple actors with potential divergent and incompatible agendas, which could result in power struggles and breakaways. Such complexities have been seen in the case of Boko Haram and its breakaway group, ISWAP. The imposition of a new ISWAP leadership in 2019, for instance, speaks to the existence of power struggles within that group. Such power struggles, as was in the case of Boko Haram, resulted in the splintering of the group and the creation of ISWAP, a group that has been deadlier and wreaking more havoc on antiterrorism efforts in Africa.

32. Crisis group, How the Islamic State Rose, Fell and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb, 24 July 2017
33. DW, Terror threat morphs in Mozambique, 24 February, 2022
34. Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2020, p.80
35. Ibid
36. ACLED, Cabo Ligado Weekly: 12-18 October 2020, October 20, 2020
38. US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020
39. Githing‘u and Hamming 2021, p. 39, 45
41. The defencepost, Islamic State enforced leadership change in West Africa province, audio reveals, 15 March 2019
Secondly, such alliances have also advanced the capacities and nature of attacks. As has recently been noted, the local jihadist group in Mozambique has grown in strength and seized larger territories.\(^{42}\)

Another worrying dimension to jihadists’ growing presence and activities on the continent is their growing interlinkages with intercommunal conflicts. The influence of jihadist attacks on the intercommunal conflicts between communities and ethnic groups is observed in Mali and Burkina Faso. The intercommunal rivalry conflict in Burkina Faso between the various ethnic groups, such as Mossi, Gourmantché et al., with their Koglweogo self-defence militias and Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP), on the one hand, and violent extremist groups who recruit young members from Fulani communities. This contributed to the escalation of the conflict to limited war. This influence is observed in Mali, Where extremist groups have exerted influence over the intercommunal clashes between the Dogon and Bambara communities and the Fulani.\(^{43}\) The phenomenon has also deepened prejudice and forms of collective punishment of Muslim Fulanis, as they are often assumed to be complicit in terrorist activities. The spread of intercommunal conflict has also led to the creation of self-defence groups by the affected communities, implying increased circulation of arms in these areas. There has been a recent recognition among actors, including the AU, RECs and the UN, of this growth trend and the need to rethink how military support is provided to strengthen the state’s presence in peripheral areas.\(^{44}\)

The growing presence and activities of violent (religious) extremists undermines conflict prevention, management, and resolution efforts in Africa. They are exploiting the economic and political grievances on the continent to expand and establish their hold. Beyond the havoc they wreak on lives and property, their activities enflame intercommunal conflicts, threatening long-term peace and security on the continent.

### 1.3.2. Elections in Africa and its related contestation

Elections in Africa continue to be clouded in tension and violence. Even in countries with better democratic credentials, elections largely tend to be filled with tension, as the electoral cycle has become a period where competing political actors pursue conflicting needs and interests. In 2019 and 2020, national and sub-national level elections were held in 33 African countries (figure 11).\(^{45}\) Some of the violent incidences discussed in this report occurred during some of these elections. In Mozambique, incidents of violence increased in the run-up to the 2019 elections, with groups linked to political parties waging serious attacks against rival supporters. Clashes between RENAMO and FRELIMO supporters peaked in September. The insurgent group, ASWJ, also took advantage of the volatile political situation and disrupted voter registration by attacking voter registration posts and civilians, leading to the closure of registration posts in Macomia.\(^{46}\) The violence during the 2019 election has been the most violent in the country’s history.\(^{47}\)

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42. Ibid
43. Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2019, p. 77
44. UN News, Special Representative Stresses Urgent Need to Address Causes of Conflict between Farmers, Herders, as Security Council Considers West Africa, 16 December, 2019
45. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
46. Ibid
47. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Mozambique Conflict Insight, Peace and Security Report (1), April 2020
As has been the case in previous elections in Nigeria, the 2019 election was marked by violent incidents resulting in fatalities, though not as many as was recorded during the 2015 election.\textsuperscript{48} The 2019 general election was held on 23 February 2019 to elect the President, Vice, House of Representatives, and the Senate. The election, which was postponed from February 16, saw the participation of 70 candidates, with the race between the incumbent candidate, Buhari of the All-Progressives Congress (APC) and former vice president Atiku Abubakar of the main opposition People’s Democratic Party [PDP].\textsuperscript{49} About 626 deaths were recorded from the beginning of the campaigns in 2018 to the end of the election period in 2019.\textsuperscript{50} Out of this figure, 39 of them alone were recorded while the country awaited the election outcome.\textsuperscript{51} Except for Kano and Kaduna states in the north of the country, the majority of states where the violence occurred were in the south.\textsuperscript{52} The worst incident occurred in Abonnema in Rivers State, around 14 kilometres west of the main oil industry city of Port Harcourt, where the army said seven people died in a shoot-out between an unidentified gang and Nigerian soldiers.\textsuperscript{53}

In Burundi, the conflict involving the National Freedom Council (CNL) National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) intensified in the 2020 general elections. Violent clashes

\textsuperscript{48} Shenga and Pereira, 2019, The Effect of Electoral Violence on Electoral Participation in Africa
\textsuperscript{49} ISS, Roots of Nigeria’s election violence, 4 March, 2019
\textsuperscript{50} SBM Media, Election violence in numbers, 13 March 2019
\textsuperscript{51} Reuters, Dozens killed in Nigeria poll violence: observers, 24 February, 2019
\textsuperscript{52} Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2019, p. 82
\textsuperscript{53} ibid
were reported between members of the two parties resulting in several dead people on both sides. The election campaigns period was marred by violence, arrests of opposition members, crackdowns on free speech, and several human rights violations. Local government actors supporting the ruling party CNDD-FDD carried out attacks against political targets throughout the country in coordination with party militia Imbonerakure. The attacks included targeting civilians attending opposition party meetings, vandalism, and looting political party buildings, homes, and farmland. In the year preceding the election, 281 election-related deaths occurred. By September 2020, 205 killings were recorded. Many of the killings were allegedly committed by agents of security services or members of Imbonerakure. While the UN Commission of Inquiry reported that political violence decreased immediately after the 2020 elections, the political climate remained highly intolerant of dissent. The opposition continued to suffer repression as the new government sought to consolidate its power.

Factors accounting for elections as a potential trigger of violence on the continent can have deeply rooted structural or proximate causes. While factors such as electoral systems and economic inequalities are deep-rooted, others, such as deficiencies in the electoral process, are less rooted. Though contested, a majoritarian system, for instance, is thought to fuel election violence, as it leads to winner takes all, with power and access to the country’s resources being vested in the hands of the party that wins the election. With most countries on the continent utilising this system, coupled with the contestations associated with such a system, electoral cycles will continue to be a potential trigger of violence and conflict.

Economic inequalities as a driver of conflict explains why elections continue to trigger conflicts in Africa. It also underscores the contest for resources as one of the topmost drivers of ongoing conflicts, as discussed in a preceding paragraph (sub-section 1.2). A look at the various socioeconomic and development indexes shows the continuous low ranking of the continent. For instance, the sub-Saharan African region ranked the lowest on the 2020 Human Development Index (0.547). Again, the sub-Saharan African region closely trails the MENA region in the 2022 World Income Inequalities. With socioeconomic inequalities accounting for grievances, coupled with the continent’s slow pace of poverty reduction, places into perspective the continent’s vulnerability to conflict and, as such, the prospect for long-term peace and security of the continent into question.

Improving electoral processes to be transparent and more credible, thereby enhancing trust in the electoral process and outcomes, can deactivate elections as a trigger. In the case of Congo, as cited above, the series of violent protests which ensued during the 2018 election cycle is partly accounted for by the lack of trust in the process to deliver a credible election outcome. Reports by Human Rights Watch pointed to widespread irregularities, voter suppression, and serious human rights violations against opposition leaders and supporters, pro-democracy and human rights activists, and journalists.

Observations of similar nature were made during the 2020 election in Burundi. A United Nations Commission of Inquiry reported serious human rights violations during the elections.

55. ACLED, Widespread violence rises ahead of Burundi’s 2020 election, May 20, 2020
58. A key element across existing theories on conflict is economic inequalities. The Greed and grievance theory by Collier, Greed, Grievance and Mobilization of Discontent by Gurr and Galtung’s theory on structural attempts to explain conflict as tensions that arise from the contest for scarce resources.
59. UNDP, 2020 Human Development Index 2020
60. World Inequality Lab, 2022 Income Inequalities, p. 31.
61. World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020
62. Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo Events of 2018
including summary executions, torture, and sexual violence.\textsuperscript{63} Authorities also restricted independent reporting and blocked access to social media platforms throughout the country. International election observer missions were barred from the election.\textsuperscript{64} For instance, the AU was not permitted to send an observer mission, while observer missions from the East African Community were told they would be placed under a 14-day quarantine as a COVID-19 safety measure, which eventually implied they would not be able to observe on the election day. All the above, including the absence of an international observation mission, cast doubts on the credibility of the process. As discussed in the proceeding section, election observation missions play a pivotal role in elections on the continent, particularly in conflict-prone countries. Hence, the AU and the various RECs embark on these missions to build trust among the parties involved in the electoral process and make recommendations for reform as conflict prevention measures based on their observations.

1.3.3. Political Instability and Unconstitutional change of powers

A common consensus and concern among observers of African politics is the recent upsurge in the unconstitutional change of governments on the continent. The third wave of democratisation in the 1990s saw the return to constitutional rule in several African countries. Despite the occasional incidence of military coups, the resort to elections as the mode to select or change government became the norm. In the last couple of years, however, the unconstitutional change of government via military interventions has been frequent, a phenomenon that will derail the democratic stability gained over the past couple of decades. Since 1950, 486 coup attempts have been recorded globally. Out of this, 214 (44\%) of them were carried out in Africa.\textsuperscript{65} While 108 of these coup attempts failed, 106, almost 50\%, were successful. Since 2020 alone, there have been 8 coup attempts (see figure 12).\textsuperscript{66} Six of them were successful. The last one and a half years alone have seen coup attempts in Burkina Faso (23 January 2022), Sudan (25 October 2021), Guinea (5 September 2021), Mali (24 May 2021, preceded by the 18 August 2020 coup) and Chad (21 April 2021).

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{63} UN News, Human rights violations continue in Burundi under new Government: UN report, 17 September, 2020
    \item \textsuperscript{64} DW, OHCRC: Burundi’s elections aren’t ‘credible and free’, 20 May 2020, Human Rights Watch, Burundi Events of 2020
    \item \textsuperscript{65} Megan Duzor and Brian Williamson | VOA News, February 2, 2022.
    \item \textsuperscript{66} ibid
\end{itemize}
Unlike the others, the coup in Chad is a covert unconstitutional transition of government. Immediately after the death of President Idriss Derby, the military took power and announced the 37 years old son of the late president, General Mahamat Idriss Deby, as the head of the interim government, without proper recourse to the country’s constitutional provisions for transition. Article 81 of the 2018 constitution provides that in the case of vacant power, the president of the National Assembly should be appointed as interim president with a presidential election held at least 45 or 90 days at most after the seat of government becomes vacant. The constitution also, in Article 67, sets the minimum age for the presidential candidate that is 45 years of age and states that candidates who are members of the armed forces must first be placed on extended leave. Thus, the transfer of power proceeding after the death of Idriss Derby in April 2021 was in total disregard for the country’s constitutional provisions.

To some extent, the recent wave of military coups on the continent signals dissatisfaction with the state of governance in many of the countries. As rightly noted by the African Union Peace and Security Council, unconstitutional changes of government on the continent often originate from “deficiencies in governance” along with “greed, selfishness, mismanagement of diversity, mismanagement of opportunity, marginalisation, abuse of human rights, refusal to accept

67. Article 81: In case of vacancy of the Presidency of the Republic for any cause, or of definite incapacity as declared by the Supreme Court, referred to by the Government, and deciding with the absolute majority of its members, the duties of the President of the Republic, except the powers specified in Articles 85, 88, 95 and 96, are provisionally exercised by the President of the National Assembly and, in case of incapacity of the latter, by the First Vice President. In every case, it proceeds to new presidential elections at least forty-five (45) days and ninety (90) days at most after the vacancy is opened.
electoral defeat, manipulation of the constitution[s], as well as an unconstitutional review of the constitution[s] to serve narrow interests and corruption.”68 Many of the coups on the continent so far have been preceded by widespread protests by the citizenry fuelled by extreme poverty,69 perceptions of economic mismanagement70 and frustrations against undemocratic practices, including acts of constitutional coups. In the case of constitutional coups, some incumbents have utilised subservient legislatures to alter their country’s constitutions, eliminating term and age limits to stay in power.71 Some of these countries include Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Togo, and Uganda.72 This act of autocratic outreaching and the erosion of democratic norms in some countries has resulted in the military takeover. The 2021 coup d’état in Guinea is one such incident. Despite the outcome of a survey showing strong public support for two-term limits,73 Alpha Condé amended the country’s constitution and ran for a third term. This, coupled with economic mismanagement and corruption, resulted in Condé being deposed by the military.74

Beyond these triggers, other factors include the failure of the government to ensure the security of its people. For instance, in Mali, the protracted conflict in the north of the country, largely caused by jihadist activities, has partly been the reason for protests and subsequent intervention by the military. The coup was in opposition to what the military “saw as a weak response to a growing separatist insurgency by Tuareg rebels in the country’s north.”75 Similarly, in Burkina Faso, protests preceding the January 2022 coup were partly to protest against the insecurities caused by insurgent attacks. Many people were reported to have taken to the street following an attack on a military base by terrorists linked to al-Qaida, which killed more than 49 military personnel.76

The military’s so-called “saving of the country” has been rejected by the AU/RECs in no uncertain terms. As the discussions in the subsequent section would show, both the AU and the RECs do not relent in deploying the highest form of sanctions against countries where an unconstitutional change of government occurs. However, the question remains whether these sanctions are deterrent enough to safeguard against the unconstitutional change of government again becoming the norm on the continent, threatening long-term peace and security.

1.4. Effect of COVID-19 on Conflict Dynamics and Interventions

Unlike previous reporting years of the APSA impact assessment, conflicts and related interventions, particularly in 2020, occurred during a global pandemic and, as such, were not isolated from the potential influence of the pandemic. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019 and its subsequent spread across all countries shaped human interactions. In conflict contexts, there was an anticipation that the pandemic would create incentives for

68. AU PSC, Press statement of the 432nd meeting of the PSC on ‘Unconstitutional changes of Governments and popular uprisings in Africa’, 29 May 2014
69. Council on Foreign Affairs, What to Know About the Crisis in Mali, 12 August 2020
70. CSIS Guinea: The Causes and Consequences of West Africa’s Latest Coup, 18 September, 2021
71. The Brookings Institution, Threats to democracy in Africa: The rise of the constitutional coup, 30 October 2020
72. ibid
73. Afro barometer, Guineans voice strong support for two-term limit for president, 21 September 2019
74. CSIS Guinea: The Causes and Consequences of West Africa’s Latest Coup, 18 September, 2021
75. Council on Foreign Affairs, What to Know About the Crisis in Mali, 12 August 2020
76. VOA News, Hundreds March in Street Protests in Burkina Faso, 22 January 2022
some conflict parties to promote further division and turmoil, thereby escalating violence and entrenching ongoing wars.77

Although the number of conflicts in 2019 and 2020 declined in Africa, the number of violent conflicts and wars fought increased with a related increase in fatalities. Data provided by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) showed a rise in attacks by violent armed groups in 2020, with clashes between groups also growing by 25%.78 In Mozambique, attacks by ASWJ increased dramatically throughout the first several months of 2020, with militants conducting raids on district capitals in Mozambique.79

Initial COVID-19 containment measures such as lockdown and restrictions on social gatherings were deemed to have had an initial effect of halting mass protest movements but soon exacerbated existing tensions. Human rights conditions worsened in African countries during the implementation of those measures with enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions stripping citizens of their civil liberties in many countries, including Nigeria.80 The government’s perceived heavy handedness posed further threats of tension and violence by eroding public trust in some governments. In Nigeria, for instance, the danger of COVID-19 temporarily united communities and helped impelled collective action to demand better governance.81

Over time, the economic ramifications stemming from the response to the pandemic posed further economic hardship and weakened social cohesion. COVID-19 preventive measures, including movement restrictions, disrupted income-generating activities and increased food prices. The World Bank estimated the economic fallout of COVID-19 on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa to fall to -3.3% in 2020, with a corresponding increased debt burden.82 In West Africa, a 34% increase in the number of people unable to meet their basic food needs was recorded.83 The World Economic Forum also revealed that the already vulnerable economies of conflict-affected countries such as Libya, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia contracted by 7.5% in 2021 due to COVID-19 containment measures.84

Another effect of COVID-19 is the intensification of the humanitarian situation in most conflict areas. The prevalence of undernourishment in Africa grew from 18% in 2019 to 21% 2020.85 The FAO report noted, compared to 2019, about 46 million people in Africa were affected by hunger. The dire humanitarian crisis on the continent was partly attributed to COVID-19 as it exacerbated pre-existing drivers of food insecurity and access to food. For instance, in the northeast of Nigeria, the area with large-scale population displacements and massive humanitarian needs due to insurgent activities were also badly impacted by COVID-19. Prevention measures, including lockdowns, disrupted food and service delivery systems. Acute food insecurity was recorded in the north-eastern states, particularly in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. About 3.4 million people in those states had high food consumption gaps with marginal ability to meet food needs.86 In the Liptako Gourma Region of the Sahel region, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also noted the constantly changing front lines and the deteriorating security and  

77. UN News, COVID-19 threatening global peace and security, UN chief warns nurses and healthcare workers outside at a hospital in New York City demand better protection against the COVID-19 virus, 10 April 2020  
78. ACLED, The pandemic has shifted patterns of conflict in Africa, 22 June 2020  
80. CIPESA, One Year In: COVID-19 Deepening Africa’s Democratic Regression, 24 April 2021  
81. Mercy Corp, An in-depth look at how COVID-19 intensifies conflicts, 30 August 2021  
84. World Economic Forum, Fragile and conflict-affected economies are falling further behind, 16 February 2022  
86. Global Network Against Food Crisis, 2021, Global Report on Food Crises
humanitarian conditions exacerbated by the pandemic. The pandemic disrupted humanitarian aid flows and peace operations despite these worsening humanitarian conditions.\(^87\)

The pandemic also caused delays to interventions and peace talks, posing significant threats to maintaining international peace and security. In the Central Africa Republic instance, follow-up mechanisms of the Khartoum Political Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation between the government and 14 armed groups were suspended following the COVID-19 outbreak. With the restrictions that the pandemic posed on physical gatherings, meetings by international conflict management bodies had to be held virtually. The AU, for instance, moved all its conferences and summits online.\(^88\) Moving meetings online facilitated meetings, making them faster and cheaper.

In some cases, however, it also caused delays. For instance, the crucial talks between the AU and EU were postponed from 2020 to 2021. Similarly, the AU’s extraordinary summit on ‘Silencing the Guns’ had to be delayed.\(^89\) Also, it made it nearly impossible for the lobbying that comes with multilateral diplomacy meetings to occur since these would require behind-the-scenes interactions.

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87. Crisis Group, The Covid-19 Pandemic and Deadly Conflict
88. ISS, The AU navigates the COVID-19 storm, 1 October, 2020
89. ibid
Section TWO
Interventions by AU and RECs in Violent Conflicts

Discussions in this section focus on the outcome of the quality and effectiveness assessment of the interventions by the AU/RECs. Specifically, it explores diplomatic and mediation initiatives and peacekeeping activities in response to conflicts of medium to high-intensity levels, that is, conflicts ranked as violent crises, limited war, and war. Structured into four parts; the first part begins with an overview of AU and REC interventions in 2019-2020. It also includes quality and effectiveness assessments, delving into the quality of AU/RECs engagements and whether they were successful, particularly in leading to a de-escalation of the conflict. The second subsection delves further into quality and effectiveness assessment probing into the three main APSA instruments used: diplomacy, mediation, and peace support operations (PSOs). It also assesses efforts in the area of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The remaining two subsections look at peace agreements mediated by the AU and RECs, focusing on those that lasted for more than one year and non-intervention by the AU and RECs.

2.1. Overview of AU and REC Interventions in Violent Conflicts in 2019–2020

Due to the peculiarity of this year’s report by way of assessing interventions for two reporting years, it deviates from previous years by focusing on selected conflicts. Specifically, conflict units of intensity levels 3, 4 and 5, namely violent, limited war and war conflicts, are considered for this assessment, excluding disputes and non-violent crises conflicts. Conflict units in 2019 and 2020 were studied, spreading across 14 countries.

Of the conflicts assessed, less than half of the violent-to-war level conflicts received direct interventions from AU or the RECs. In 2019 and 2020, 17 and 19 conflicts, respectively, assessed were intervened within the established framework for conflict prevention, management, and resolution on the African Continent. This represents a representation of 43.6%.

In 2019, out of the 25 violent conflicts studied, only eight (representing 32%) were intervened (Figure 13). Regarding limited wars and war level conflicts, while the AU/RECs responded to five out of the nine conflicts, all the four war level conflicts studied were intervened. Three war-level conflicts involve the fight against insurgent groups, namely, JAS-Boko Haram, JNIM AQIM, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In 2020, out of the 23 violent conflicts studied, nine, (representing 39%) were intervened. Again, four of the limited wars assessed were intervened by AU/RECs, while six of the eight war-level conflicts were intervened (Figures 7b and 7c). In addition to the three war level conflicts which evolved around jihadist activities, the conflict of the ASWJ in Mozambique was also fought at war-level intensity.

90. Violent crisis, limited war and war level conflicts are HCB ranked conflicts of levels 3, 4 and 5.
Figure 13: Violent Conflict, Limited War and War conflicts

Violent Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Non-Intervention</th>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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Limited-War Level Conflict

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<th>Not Studied</th>
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<td>2019</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

War Level Conflict

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<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Non-Intervention</th>
<th>Not Studied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nature of Interventions

Recalling Article 17 of the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations, the AU prefers and prioritises political solutions, leaving the use of armed peace support operation as an instrument of last resort. For both reporting years (2019 and 2020), diplomatic statements were the most deployed intervention by the AU and RECs. In 2019, diplomatic interventions accounted for 56% of interventions, while mediation and PSOs accounted for 31% and 13%, respectively (Figure 14). Table 1 displays a disaggregation of the instruments by conflict intensity levels. The figures show that while diplomacy and mediation as intervening tools are most likely to be deployed in violent conflicts, PSOs are more likely to be used in war level conflicts. In 2019, for instance, almost half of the conflicts in which diplomacy was deployed were violent conflicts. The same can be inferred from the 2020 figures, where ten of the 21 conflict situations where diplomacy was deployed were violent level conflicts.

As indicated in section one of this report, this level of conflict largely borders on contests over national power and subnational predominance issues. These are government and opposition conflicts and intercommunal rivalry conflicts. For intercommunal rivalry conflicts, the AU/RECs issued statements that condemned violent incidents, expressed concern over deteriorating humanitarian conditions, or urged conflict parties to come to the negotiating table. For opposition conflicts, diplomacy and mediation as tools have also entailed issuing statements condemning attacks or urging conflicting parties to negotiate. It has also involved deploying election observation missions in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Mozambique or even issuing sanctions against countries where an unconstitutional change of power has occurred, such as in Mali.

In war-level conflicts, PSO as a tool was deployed in 2019 and 2020. Examples include the PSO in Somalia in the fight against Al-Shabaab and the renewal of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) mandate in November 2019. This level of conflict has also had diplomacy and mediation interventions deployed. In Libya, for instance, the AU did issue a statement condemning attacks and continuous deterioration of the security situation. In Ethiopia’s intercommunal conflict, the Chairperson of the AU Commission also issued a statement strongly condemning the killing of innocent civilians, calling on all stakeholders to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric, and encouraging political actors to engage in an inclusive national dialogue. IGAD, also about the Ethiopian-Tigray/TPLF conflict, issued a statement expressing its concern regarding the situation in the Tigray region.

In most of the conflicts assessed in this report, AU/RECs deployed a mix of instruments, simultaneously deploying either diplomacy with mediation, diplomacy and PSO, or diplomacy, mediation and PSO or diplomacy, mediation, and PRCD. A blend of diplomacy and mediation was deployed in eight conflict situations. In three conflicts, a combination of diplomacy and PSOs was deployed: the Somalia-Al-Shabab, Nigeria et. al.-JAS-Boko Haram, and Mali- JNIM, AQIM et al. conflicts (see Annex IV). Three conflicts saw the deployment of three instruments – diplomacy, mediation and PSOs.
Table 1: Intervention Type Disaggregated by Conflict Intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>PSO</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Violent Conflict</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited-War</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Conflict</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited-War</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2. Quality of Intervention 2019 and 2020

Outcomes of the assessments of the quality of interventions deployed by AU/RECs are presented in this sub-section. In all, interventions in 21 conflicts are assessed, spreading across thirteen countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan and Sudan.

The quality assessment of the interventions is based on three indicators: (i) Relative contribution by APSA/RECs to the role played by other international actors like the UN, EU, and other countries. (ii) Cooperation between actors involved in the management and transformation of the conflict, precisely, the degree and quality of cooperation between the AU continental level and the RECs and between AU/RECs and other international actors. (iii) Appropriateness of the degree of engagement of the AU/RECs in proportion to the conflict’s intensity (and type). A four-scale measure is applied: ‘overall high’, ‘medium’ or ‘mostly low’ quality.
Assessments of the interventions deployed by AU/RECs show an overall medium level quality across both reporting years, deviating from the outcome of the 2018 assessment. None of the 17 assessed conflicts that the AU/RECs responded to in 2019 was judged high quality. While nine, representing 53%, were rated ‘medium quality, the other 47% were judged as ‘mostly low quality’ (Table 2). The same outcomes apply to the intervention assessment deployed in 2020, where nine representing 45.5% of the interventions were judged as medium level quality while 54.5% were rated mostly low quality. Like in 2018, none of the quality assessment of the interventions in 2019 and 2020 was deemed to be ‘too early to tell’.

However, in 2019 and 2020, none of the 17 and 19 interventions was rated high quality, compared to the 5 high quality rated interventions in 2018. It is also worth noting that the proportion of the interventions rated as mostly low quality in 2019 and 2020 (47% and 52.6%, respectively) significantly varies from 2018 (25.8%).

Table 2: Overall Quality of interventions by Intervention Type- 2019-2020

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>PSOs</th>
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<td>Overall High quality</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Medium quality</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Low quality</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Intervention</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>PSOs</th>
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<td>Mostly Low quality</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Medium Quality Intervention and Conflict transformation

A disaggregation of the quality of intervention by conflict intensity levels shows that most of the medium-quality rated interventions were deployed to violent level conflicts. Four of the ten medium-quality rated interventions in 2019 were deployed in the conflicts with an intensity level of violent conflict. While two were deployed in a limited war, three were deployed to war level conflicts. In 2020, the pattern did not significantly vary. Out of the nine medium quality interventions, three were deployed to violent conflict, limited war, and war level conflicts (Annex II).

The AU and IGAD took on a lead role in the Sudan-opposition conflict as they deployed their highest-level instruments of diplomacy commensurate with the severity of the situation in Sudan.1 Under IGAD, mediation efforts of the AU Commission and Ethiopia, coupled with the strong diplomatic response by the AU PSC, were instrumental in propelling the formation of a civilian-led transitional government. The AU reiterated its rejection of the unconstitutional change of government and suspended Sudan. The suspension served as a strong diplomatic response that reiterated AU’s position against military takeovers and underscored the primacy of civilian rule. The suspension catalysed the resumption of negotiations and provided the impetus to the IGAD mediation efforts. Despite criticism over the initial lack of coordination of the AU and Ethiopian mediation efforts, the joint mediation successfully resulted in the formation of a civilian-led transitional government. These efforts also aligned with the international response.

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1 As noted in the methodology, the intensity of interventions is rated on a scale of 1 to 3, with 3 being the highest level of engagement.
to the coup and the condemnation of the repression against protests raised by actors such as the EU and the Troika. The AU PSC and the AUC also played a lead role within APSA in transitioning from the AU-UN hybrid peace support operation UNAMID to UNITAMS.

Unlike the opposition conflict, the AU and IGAD were less engaged in the Sudan-Darfur conflict during the same period. For instance, the Juba peace talks, which were one of the key processes to engage the parties to the conflict, were not initiated by the AU. The talks were hosted by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir, with the AU providing diplomatic support. Parties to the agreement requested the AU to issue a new mandate on peace negotiations. Following several rounds of the peace negotiations, the Juba Peace Agreement was signed on October 3, 2020, and on October 12, the sovereign Council and cabinet approved the Agreement and its incorporation into the constitutional declaration on October 18. The Juba Peace Agreement sought to redress the historical imbalance between the country’s centre and periphery by devolving power and wealth away from Khartoum and paving the way for armed and unarmed opposition groups to join the transitional government. Ilit attempted to address essential questions about land rights and political representation in Darfur but did not have two of the largest armed groups on board, namely, the SLM-AW and SPLM/A-Al-Hilu. Also, it contributed to an increase in violence in some areas, particularly the north, where predominantly Arab communities have feared losing out in any political reorganisation. The violence resulted in the escalation of the conflict to limited war.

The Somalia-Al-Shabab conflict was another medium-quality intervention to which AU was responsive. The AU and, to a lesser extent, IGAD took several swift and responsive decisions throughout 2019 and 2020 concerning developments of the conflict and the persistent attack by Al-Shabaab in some of the key areas of Somalia. Besides this, the prevailing terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab against civilians from all walks of life, including women and children, humanitarian actors and security forces, were condemned by the AU PSC and the AU Commission. Most of the communiqué condemned attacks by Al-Shabaab and the AU-led African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia. Furthermore, the communiqué pinpoints AMISOM’s challenges, cherishes, and underscores its successes through the peace support operation. Generally, AMISOM provided space for political dialogue and reconciliation between Somali political elites. It also provided the security foundation that enabled most international diplomatic and humanitarian communities to operate out of Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. Throughout 2019 and 2020, AMISOM provided the local population with significant access to medical facilities and humanitarian relief supplies, including water and rations, and facilitated other aid agencies’ activities. However, AMISOM is still criticised for not providing a robust response and adequately guaranteeing general security. This is evident from the high levels of violence. Al-Shabaab remained a threat across Somalia in 2019 and 2020, frequently conducting large-scale attacks inside and outside Somalia.

Mostly Low-Quality Interventions

Ten of the conflicts in which AU/RECs intervened were of low quality (Annex IV). In those conflicts, the AU and the respective RECs did not play lead roles in managing the conflicts for several reasons. For instance, in the Ethiopia-TPLF/Tigray and Cameroon-Anglophone conflicts, the AU’s ability to intervene is explained by the principles of national sovereignty (non-interference) and subsidiarity. More on these principles is discussed in a succeeding sub-section. Similarly, the AU’s ability to intervene in the crises in Mozambique is restricted by the country’s aversion to any external support that could potentially open the door for multilateral foreign intervention. Concerning the conflict involving the ASWJ, the government’s initial was to characterise

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93. Rift Valley Institute, What next for the Juba Peace Agreement? Evolving political and security dynamics in Darfur, February 2022
insurgency as an ordinary violent crime rather than an act of terrorism, with Maputo opting to contract private military contractors from Russia and South Africa to fight the insurgency rather than negotiate support from SADC. Experts have also argued that Mozambique’s prioritisation and focus on a military solution to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado likely disincentivised other SADC member states from getting involved. SADC is not taking on a lead role, which does translate into a hesitation on the side of the AU to intervene.

The AU and EAC have also been criticised for inaction in the political crises that ensued in Burundi in 2019 and 2020. The thrust of the criticism is that the AU capitulated to the Burundian government’s intransigence after the 2015 crisis and delegated responsibility to the EAC, lacking the capacity and political will to resolve the crisis in Burundi, rendering it ineffective while prolonging the conflict. After the 2015 crisis, former president Nkurunziza alienated and frustrated the AU and the UN, rejecting special envoys and forbidding UN human rights investigators from working freely in the country. After African Heads of State shot down the proposal for an AU-led intervention force in Burundi in January 2016, the AU delegated responsibility to the EAC, which took the lead role under the principle of subsidiarity.

However, EAC-led mediation through the inter-Burundi dialogue collapsed in 2018 largely due to the Burundian government’s unwillingness to negotiate with the opposition because some elements had taken up arms. In February 2019, the facilitator of the collapsed inter-Burundi dialogue, former Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, presented his report to the EAC heads of state summit, noting that the situation remained “worrying”, especially as Burundi prepared for the 2020 elections. Mkapa had been concerned about attempts to change the constitution by Nkurunziza and reminded the EAC presidents of the need for their engagement in getting the Burundi government to commit to a serious dialogue without preconditions. While EAC leaders pledged to conduct further internal consultations to determine the next step in resolving the Burundian crisis and designated the presidents of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to take the matter forward, there has been no significant follow-up. In the face of EAC inaction, Mkapa resigned shortly after the Summit.

The failure of the EAC has been attributed to numerous reasons. Experts observe that the EAC, as a forum primarily focused on economic integration, was not equipped for the task, lacking the requisite experience in complex political mediation or sufficient resources. In particular, escalating tensions between Uganda, the chair of the Burundi Peace Talks, and Rwanda, the EAC chair, due to reports of Burundi, the DRC and Uganda arming and training Rwandan rebels strained relations between Rwanda and Burundi. There was also a lack of political support for the dialogue from EAC heads of state, with historical differences and animosities between the leaders preventing consensus on dealing with Burundi. This was exacerbated by the government’s constant refusal to participate in the mediation in good faith and successfully pitting the EAC, AU and UN against each other. Six EAC summits failed to persuade the CNDD-FDD to attend talks chaired by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and mediated by former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. Even after the collapse of the dialogue, EAC
heads of state have been reluctant to hand over mediation to either the AU or UN.¹⁰⁶

Despite calls from civil society organisations for the AU to take a more active role in Burundi and monitor the political developments in the country, the AUC only issued statements calling for a safe and secure environment for the elections.

**Cooperation between AU/RECs and Other International Actors**

Beyond conflict transformation, the dimension of the cooperation between actors and the quality of interventions is interesting to explore. In most of its interventions, the AU and RECs cooperated, working together with other international actors. High levels of cooperation were found in three conflict countries (Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan). While some level of collaboration exists in Mali and Nigeria, no significant cooperation between actors in Cameroon, Libya, and Mozambique was found. The discussions in the ensuing paragraphs on the level of cooperation focus on between the AU and the REC and between AU/REC and other international actors. Cooperation is assessed on two levels: cooperation between AU and RECs, referred to as internal APSA cooperation, and external cooperation between AU/RECs and other international actors.

**AU and RECs:** Internal APSA cooperation between the AU and RECs was found in some cases in this assessment, with cooperation between AU and IGAD in Sudan and South-Sudan being high, and some level of cooperation between AU and ECOWAS in Mali and Nigeria as well as the ad-hoc arrangements between states (the G5 Sahel Force and MTNJTF), operating in the Sahel region and the Lake Chad Basin.

In Sudan, AU and IGAD aligned on the primacy of civilian rule and the urgency to expedite the return to civilian government. As the political transition unfolded in 2019, the AU PSC, upon endorsing the AUC Chairpersons’ statement in response to the April 2019 coup, requested the AUC Chairperson “liaise closely with the IGAD to enhance synergy and coherence in bringing together the Sudanese stakeholders back to dialogue, and to put in place a civilian-led Transitional Authority.” Also, the AU and IGAD aligned their efforts on the mediation processes in Sudan as the AU and Ethiopian joint mediation facilitated negotiations between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). Despite the initial lack of coordination between the mediation envoy of AU and IGAD, the mediation tracks of both institutions were merged with their collaboration leading to the breakthrough agreement that led to the formation of the civilian-led transitional authority.

Close cooperation between the AU and IGAD was found in their responses to the situation in South Sudan, as both bodies shared a common objective and aligned on the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). The AU PSC explicitly endorsed and acknowledged the role played by IGAD, while IGAD, in turn, also endorsed the PSC’s decisions and acknowledged the role played by the AU in supporting the South Sudan peace process. Also, during the mediation process, the AU PSC, the AUC, and the Ambassadors of the AU High-Level ad-hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5) explicitly acknowledged and commended IGAD’s lead mediating role in the peace process and deployed its instruments of diplomacy to support the IGAD mediation. Significantly, the AU PSC endorsed the decision to extend the deadline for forming the revitalised transitional government in May and November 2019 and committed to supporting IGAD’s efforts. The AU PSC also supported IGAD’s diplomatic efforts, including urging parties to commit to the South Sudan peace process unconditionally and impose sanctions or call for international partners to consider punitive measures against those who continue to undermine the peace process.

¹⁰⁶ Jobson, Elissa & Van de Walle, Nelleke, AU Heads of State Summit needs to whip Nkurunziza back into line, The East African, 10 July 2019
Though not as high as in Sudan and South Sudan, some level of cooperation was found between the AU and ECOWAS. In the political crises that ensued in Mali, resulting in the unconstitutional change of government, the AU and ECOWAS were united in their objection and response to the unconstitutional change of government. The AU commended and fully supported ECOWAS’ efforts, including the mediation process deployed in Mali following the August 2020 coup. Months later, this support did not wither as the June 2021 statement by the AU expressed its endorsement of the decision taken by ECOWAS and requested the Chairperson of the Commission to continue to closely coordinate with the ECOWAS special envoy and mediator to Mali. The AU also constituted an evaluation mission to engage with the ECOWAS special envoy and mediator to identify areas in which the AU could support Mali, particularly in implementing the transition programme and holding elections.

AU and Other International Actors: Significant AU cooperation with other international actors was observed during AU/REC’s interventions in 2019 and 2020. One such cooperation manifests in the drawdown and termination of the UNAMID mandate in Sudan, as the AU supports the UN mission. The AU PSC endorsed the Special Report of the AUC Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General on the Strategic Assessment UNAMID in June 2019 and supported the extension of the UNAMID mandate to 31 December 2020 and its termination. The PSC also commended “UNAMID for successfully and diligently discharging its mandate since its inception in 2007” and for “being a pioneering hybrid AU-UN deployment to support the effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of Sudan.”

A similar level of cooperation is observed with the AU mission, AMISOM, in Somalia. The mission could not have been sustained without considerable international assistance. External actors such as the UN and EU, provided the mission with vital support in logistics, financing, and security force assistance (covering training, equipment and advising for personnel). The UN, including its missions UNSOM and UNSOS, has played the leading role in providing logistics support, and the EU paid the mission’s allowances and offered other forms of support. Despite some challenges, support from bilateral partners, particularly the US and UK, have provided security force assistance to AMISOM’s contributing countries. There have also been various parallel military operations in south-central Somalia conducted by Kenya, Ethiopia and the US, supporting AMISOM’s efforts.

In Mali, the actors involved in resolving and transforming the conflict, including the UN and EU, cooperated. In 2019, for instance, the AU undertook a joint field mission with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) in November to assess the security situation in the region and ascertain the needed support. Also, the UN Security Council and the AU’s Peace and Security Council have since 2007 held annual consultative meetings to strengthen Council-to-Council engagement. Both organisations have also increased their operational cooperation and coordination, working hand in hand to support peace processes in conflict countries, including Mali. On September 30, 2020, a virtual consultative meeting was held during which members of the UN and AU Security Councils discussed, among others, the situation in Mali and the Sahel sub-region. Again, on October 16 2020, the United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security held its nineteenth consultative meeting via a virtual platform. Senior officials reviewed the partnership status between the UN and the AU and discussed peace and security challenges in Africa and cooperation supporting electoral processes. In addition to the joint engagements between the AU and UN, resolutions by the UN

107. AU Communiqué of 1001st meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on the situation in Mali, 1st June 2021
110. Security Council Letter
111. Security Council Report
On United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) receive affirmations from the AU.

As shown in figure 15, African countries contribute to UN, AU, and REC peacekeeping operations. It shows critical troop contributions to missions such as MONUSCO, MINUSMA, and MINUSCA, with troops from neighbouring countries constituting more than half the troops. This speaks to the AU-UN interdependence, which sometimes leads to the complementarity of PSO efforts. That said, the significant troop contributions from neighboring countries intricately enmesh countries in the broader politics of intervention in that escalations of one conflict may move an affected country to recall its troops from PSOs in other conflicts on the continent. This linkage becomes critical if interstate conflicts between troop contributors and receivers escalate, as happened in the case of Ethiopia-Sudan (prompting Sudan in 2021 to push for the withdrawal of Ethiopian peacekeepers from UNISFA in Abyei, who practically account for the whole mission.)

Figure 15: African troop contributions to peacekeeping missions in Africa in 2020

Although this has not always been the case in Libya, some attempts were made to enhance cooperation between actors, particularly between the AU and the UN. This has not always been
the case since some members of the AU and UN have held divergent positions since the onset of the crisis in Libya, with frictions within and between the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) over how to deal with the war in Libya. These differences are evident in the diverse position held regarding the UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) in response to the first civil war and the subsequent NATO-led intervention ousting President Muammar Qaddafi. In recent years, there have been efforts by the AU and UN to better coordinate their work in Libya. A joint communiqué by the AU Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General during the third AU-UN Annual Conference on May 6, 2019, noted how imperative a single roadmap for Libya is while acknowledging the complementary roles of both organisations and regional actors. In March 2019, the Libya Quartet met in Tunis on March 31. This is a high-level meeting of the Arab League, AU, EU and UN. As announced by the UN Secretary-General, the meeting led to “intensified forms of cooperation among our four organisations to work more and more together in support of a Libyan-led political process”, the outcome of the joint AU–UN visit and subsequent actions could address these issues and pave the way for the 2019 reconciliation forum. Several such meetings have been held. In December 2020, President Cyril Ramaphosa presided over a UN high-level debate on “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations with a specific focus on the UN and the African Union (AU)”. There were cases where no considerable cooperation was observed. In Cameroon, for instance, except for the tripartite mission, little information exists on joint activities and collaboration between international actors to manage the conflict. The trilateral mission, as earlier noted, was undertaken by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Secretary-General of the International Organization of la Francophonie, and the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth from 26 to 28 November 2019 to engage and encourage actors involved in the conflict on the ongoing national efforts for the implementation of the conclusions of the Grand National Dialogue.

2.3. Effectiveness of Interventions 2019 and 2020

An assessment of the effectiveness of AU/REC’s interventions answers two questions: Did the interventions lead to their desired results? And did these results contribute to a de-escalation of the conflict? In other words, can the transformation of the conflict be attributed to the use of APSA instruments? The discussions in this subsection are based on the outcome of the assessment of interventions in 19 conflicts, spreading over fourteen countries.

Tables 4a and 4b display outcomes of the overall effectiveness of the intervention and disaggregation by type of intervention. In 2019, of the 17 overall interventions assessed, equal numbers of interventions (eight), representing about 47% each, were judged ‘partly successful’ or ‘rather unsuccessful’, while the Sudan Darfur conflict was classified as ‘too early to tell.’ Further disaggregation of the 2019 data shows that out of the interventions judged as partly effective, three were applied to violent conflict, while two and three were applied to conflicts of limited war and war level of intensities (Annex III). Also, interventions that were judged ineffective were found in four violent conflicts, i.e., the opposition conflicts in Burundi, Egypt and Mozambique, and the South Africa-xenophobia conflict. The remaining four unsuccessful interventions were...
found with three limited wars (Cameroon-English minority conflict, Mozambique-ASWJ and the intertribal conflict in Libya) and one war (Libya-Opposition).

The same pattern as in 2019 applies to 2020, where none of the interventions was judged as overall successful (Table 3). Also, eight of the overall measures of effectiveness were judged as ‘partly successful’, while ten were ‘rather unsuccessful’ and one is ‘too early to tell’. Like in 2019, ‘partially successful’ interventions spread across the three levels of conflict intensity. While three were applied to violent conflicts, two and three applied to conflicts on the level of limited war and war, respectively (Annex III). In the case of unsuccessful interventions, six were found in violent conflict, one in limited war and three in war level conflicts.

Table 3: Effectiveness of interventions by Intervention Type- 2019-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total-15</th>
<th>Overall Effectiveness</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>PSOs</th>
<th>PCRD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall successful</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partly successful</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rather unsuccessful</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Too early to tell</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall successful</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partly successful</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rather unsuccessful</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Too early to tell</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contribution to De-escalation of Conflict

As earlier indicated, the assessment of the effectiveness of the intervention ultimately looks at whether the intervention achieved the aim of de-escalating the conflict. For 2019 and 2020, only one partly successfully intervened conflict de-escalated (Table 4). Specifically, the Sudan opposition conflicts de-escalated from limited war in 2019 to violent conflict in 2020. As much as total de-escalation is desirable it may be impracticable within just one calendar year – an observable indicator includes the long-term nature of interventions’ frameworks.

An assessment of interventions in 2019 and 2020 shows that AU and IGAD directly contributed to key de-escalation points of the conflict in Sudan, as both institutions effectively deployed their highest-level instruments of diplomacy and mediation. The protests that began across Sudan in December 2018 escalated in the first three months of 2019, increasing the frequency and intensity of violent confrontations between security forces and protestors and growing casualties. A key escalation point was between April 6 and 9, when the largest protests were staged across the country, resulting in more than 150 peoples’ deaths. On April 11, security forces opened fire on protestors staging a sit-in outside Khartoum’s military headquarters.
Following the April 11 coup and the announcement of the Transitional Military Council, the AUC Chairperson issued a statement expressing that “the military takeover is not the appropriate response to the challenges facing Sudan” and urging all parties to exercise calm and utmost restraint. On April 15, the AU PSC endorsed the AUC Chairperson’s statement, condemned the coup and rejected “the seizure of power by the Sudanese military and its plan to lead the transition for two years” while demanding that the military step aside and hand power over to a transitional civilian-led political authority within 15 days.

In response to the escalation, the AU and IGAD deployed instruments of diplomacy and mediation with an intended outcome for the TMC to hand over power back to a civilian-led transitional authority. By invoking the relevant instruments – the AU Constitutive Act, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of governments – the AU suspended Sudan from the AU and engaged in a joint mediation process with IGAD, negotiating between the TMC and FFC, resulting in the military being compelled to hand power over to the civilian-led authority. This combination of diplomacy and mediation added momentum to the talks between the TMC and FFC, leading to the June 17 agreement and eventually the swearing-in of civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok as the head of the Sovereign Council. This key de-escalation point was followed by the AU PSC lifting Sudan’s suspension and urging the international community to support the transition by lifting economic, financial, and other sanctions on Sudan and offer debt relief.

Table 4: Overall Effectiveness of Intervention and Conflict Transformation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De-escalations</th>
<th>Escalation</th>
<th>No-Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partly Successful in 2019 and 2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Opposition)</td>
<td>4 to 3</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan: (Opposition)</td>
<td>3 to 4</td>
<td>Nigeria (APC - PDP supporters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan: (Intercommunal Rivalry)</td>
<td>4 to 5</td>
<td>Sudan, South Sudan (Abyei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - ex-Séléka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia - Kenya (Islamist actors, Al-Shabaab/ISS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partly successfully in 2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (opposition)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM, AQIM et al.)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rather Unsuccessful</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya (opposition)</td>
<td>3 to 5</td>
<td>Cameroon (English-speaking-minority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique: RENAMO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4. Assessment of APSA Instruments

To gain in-depth insights into the effectiveness and subsequent success of the intervention deployed AU/RECs in addressing the conflicts on the continent, discussions in this section dive into the intervention instruments utilised.

2.4.1. Diplomacy

As a conflict prevention, management, or transformation instrument by the AU/RECs, diplomacy entails several activities. For this year’s report, some of the activities reviewed entailed AU/RECs issuing a communiqué with cautionary wording, such as ‘condemn’ and ‘strongly condemning’ attacks or deteriorating humanitarian conditions. It also covers AU/RECs expressing support for other actors’ efforts. Also considered are extraordinary AU/RECs meetings on the conflict, the establishment of routine fact-finding visits by envoys or special representatives, or authorisation to deploy an election observation mission or a pre-election assessment. And in extreme cases where an unconstitutional change of government occurred, such as in Mali and Sudan, a country’s suspension from AU/RECs activities is applied.

The AU/RECs deployed diplomacy in 15 conflicts in 2019 and 17 conflicts in 2020. In taking the 2020 interventions, for instance, in close to half of the interventions where diplomacy was deployed, the overall quality of the interventions was judged as ‘medium-level quality’ while the other half were judged as ‘mostly low quality.’ The same applies to the overall effectiveness, where seven of the ten conflicts where diplomacy was used were judged as partly successful, while the remaining were deemed unsuccessful. This implies that diplomacy as a stand-alone intervention did not contribute to the overall success of the intervention. Rightly so, data displayed in Table 5 shows that in all the 17 interventions where diplomacy was used as a tool, it was simultaneously deployed with either mediation (seven times), PSO (five times) or even the three together (four times).

AU/RECs applied the three levels of diplomacy in responding to conflict situations in 2019 and 2020. Level 1 diplomacy was applied in the Ethiopia-Sudan conflict and the opposition conflicts in Burundi, Mozambique, and Egypt (Annex IV). Level 2 diplomacy, involving strong wording or threats to use coercive means, was applied to nine conflicts (Ethiopia-TPLF, South Africa-Xenophobia, Libya-intertribal and Cameroon English-speaking minority conflicts, as well as the opposition conflicts in South Sudan, Nigeria and Libya, and the jihadist conflicts in Nigeria et al., and Mali et al.). The highest level of diplomacy (level 3), involving coercive means (e.g., sanctions, embargoes) or the setup of monitoring missions, was applied in three conflicts. In one of the conflicts, i.e., the Somalia Al-Shabab conflict, the AU reiterated its commitment to continue working with its Member States and partners in the fight against terrorism and pursue efforts to stabilise the situation in the country through AMISOM. In the other two interventions, sanctions, in the form of suspension, were applied over the unconstitutional change of government in two of the conflicts (Sudan and Mali).

In the case of Mali, as was in Sudan, the AU, together with ECOWAS, responded to the disposition of the sitting government through a coup d’état by sanctioning the country. Following the August 18, 2020, coup in Mali, the AU issued a statement in which the Chairperson of the Commission strongly condemned and rejected the unconstitutional change of government and called for the respect of the country’s institutions. It further called on the combined efforts of the ECOWAS, the UN, and the entire international community to oppose any use of force to end the political crisis in Mali. On the following day, the PSC acting under the relevant AU instruments – the AU
Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the 2000 Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Governments and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, as well as the Ezulwini Framework for the Enhancement of the Implementation of AU Measures in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2009) – immediately suspended the participation of Mali in the activities of the AU until the restoration of constitutional order in the country. The suspension served as the highest form of the instrument of diplomacy to propel the return to constitutional governance.

ECOWAS, on its part, also engaged the highest level of diplomacy in response to the situation in Mali. In response to the coup, ECOWAS issued a statement strongly condemning the undemocratic change of government, stating that it goes against the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and suspended the country. Though the sanctions were later lifted, they were again reimposed after the second coup in 2021 and further upheld as the military leaders proposed a later date, December 2025, to conduct presidential elections, a duration which would imply a transition period of five and a half years (5.5) years.

With the recent upsurge of coups on the continent (see discussion in section 1.3), political observers have leaned in on the debate of the AU and REC’s response to the crisis in Mali. Some have questioned the sanction approach adopted by the AU, including the inconsistency putting the Mali and Chadian cases side-by-side. To many, despite the need to reject coups to change governments, the AU/RECs mechanism should not completely close the door to engaging the actors. This is particularly needed since the growing influence of the support of external powers in reducing the impact of sanctions by AU and RECs and signaling an emerging weaning willingness to enforce anti-coup norms. Some have also raised concerns about the inconsistency in the AU’s implementation of its legal and policy standards, where the AU intervenes in some crises and not others, something that the AU itself recognises. The AU’s lack of response to attempts by incumbents to alter their countries’ constitutions to eliminate term limits is a case in point. Some of the recent coups on the continent come on the back of protests by citizens against such constitutional coups and electoral manipulations. However, these attempts are not responded to by AU nor RECs, partly due to the principle of non-interference. Not responding to these undemocratic practices but then reacting to unconstitutional changes of governments signals double standards. If unconstitutional changes of government are rejected, then tempering with constitutions should also be rejected.

2.4.2. Mediation

AU/RECs deploy mediation as an APSA instrument to mediate between conflict parties to enable an agreement. The mediation process entails establishing a delegation to initiate dialogue, fully supporting the mediation efforts even when not serving as a chief mediator, and visiting a country for mediation purposes, including fact-finding missions. It also involves undertaking election monitoring missions and engaging stakeholders.

AU/RECs employed mediation in nine conflict situations in 2019 and ten in 2020. Of these ten mediation interventions deployed in 2020, one was rated as high quality, while seven were rated medium quality, with the remaining two rated as mostly low quality. Similarly, two of

119. ECOWAS, ECOWAS Leaders to meet Again on the Socio-Political Situation in Mali, 27 August, 2020
120. Reuter, West African leaders lift sanctions on Mali, 6 October, 2020
121. ECOWAS 4th extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS authority of heads of state and government on the political situation in Mali
122. African Center for Strategic Studies, Africa’s Coups and the Role of External Actors, 7 December 2021
these interventions were judged as partly successful, while the remaining two were ‘rather unsuccessful’. The highest level of mediation was deployed in three conflict situations, namely, the opposition conflicts in Mali, Sudan and South Sudan.

In South Sudan, following the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict (R-ARCSS) agreement in 2018, the AU and IGAD in 2019 mediated between the parties to compromise on the cantonment, screening, training, unification, and deployment of forces. The mediation process also determined the number and boundaries of the state and facilitated consultations with holdout groups to support the implementation of the agreement. IGAD’s Special Envoy to South Sudan, Ambassador Ismail Wai, in February and March 2019, met with opposition leaders General Thomas Cirillo and Paul Malong to discuss a framework for engagement with the R-ARCSS. As the end of the pre-transitional period approached in May 2019, IGAD’s special envoy convened the parties to review the agreement’s implementation, where the parties agreed to extend the pre-transitional period by six months to November 2019. A further 100-day extension was mediated by IGAD on 7 November 2019 when Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni hosted President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in Entebbe at a Tripartite Summit as part of the IGAD Mediation.

IGAD witnessed the signing of the Rome Declaration of the Peace Process between the government of South Sudan, the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), the SPLM/A-IO and NDM, in which signatories committed to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of December 2017 and to avoid confrontation between the signatories and non-signatories of the peace agreement. Ahead of the deadline for the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government in February 2020, IGAD special envoy requested the intervention of IGAD and C5 heads of state to mediate between the parties to prevent the collapse of the agreement, and on 20 February 2020, the parties reached an agreement to form the transitional government. IGAD continued to mediate between the parties after the formation of the government to implement transitional tasks fully. This includes establishing and operationalising the expanded Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA), allocation and appointment of Governors of the States, and elaboration of the Transitional Constitution as necessary preconditions for a successful transition and organisation of credible national election.

The AU also supported the IGAD mediation through the visit of the South African Special Envoy to South Sudan, to Entebbe in November 2019 and Juba in December to facilitate consultations between the parties to the agreement, as well as agreeing to host the parties to the R-ARCSS for a retreat as part of confidence-building measures. Mabuza proposed that the rival parties form a transitional government by February 22 and leave the issue of states and their boundaries to an arbitration mechanism to resolve the dispute later.

The AU and IGAD also mediated between the TMC and FFC in Sudan. In 2019, the AU supported the Ethiopia-led joint mediation between the TMC and FFC as the political crisis escalated following the outbreak of protests and the April 2019 coup. After the coup, the AUC Chairperson visited Khartoum to consult with the parties to the crisis, but following the collapse of the talks on June 3, IGAD Chairman Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia held talks between the TMC and FFC in Khartoum. The mediation efforts by the AU and Ethiopia initially lacked coordination. However, following complaints from the TMC about the divergent proposals, both the AU and Ethiopia combined their proposal and mediation efforts. The AU and Ethiopia combined and coordinated mediation efforts, resulting in the 5 July announcement of a power-sharing agreement between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the FFC. It led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement and a constitutional declaration. The AU lifted Sudan’s suspension following the formation of a civilian-led transitional government on 5 September 2019.
The AU and IGAD also supported the Juba peace talks. Following the formation of the transitional government, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan facilitated and hosted numerous rounds of peace talks in Juba between the government and armed groups from the Two Areas of Darfur. After multiple delays, the Juba Peace Agreement was signed in October 2020 between the government and members of the rebel coalition, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), despite two of the largest armed groups refusing to sign the deal.

2.4.3. Peace Support Operations

Peace support operations (PSOs) interventions include authorising or mandating the deployment of military forces, renewing the mandate, formalising a peace support operation with a transitional government, and deploying a military force. Interventions by the AU/RECs considered in this year’s report take the form of AU peacekeeping missions, namely, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Sudan (UNAMID), or authorising ad-hoc regional security joint forces, namely the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Unlike AMISOM and UNAMID, the AU did not assume oversight responsibility for the G5 Sahel Force and MNJTF. This is done by participating states. Although the AU does not play a lead role in these security operations, the AU’s authorisation enhances the legitimacy of the operations of these joint forces and funding options. The EU, for instance, provided financial support to the MNJTF after the AU authorised the force.125 For the years under review, the AU renewed its authorisation for these two joint forces.

Assessment of PSO interventions in 2019 and 2020 shows interventions in four conflicts, two of which were rated level 3 (Somalia-Al-Shabab and Sudan-Darfur Conflicts), while one each on level 2 (Mali-JNIM, AQIM et al.) and level 1 (Nigeria-JAS-Boko Haram). Of the two conflicts to which PSO intervention level 3 was deployed, one was of war level conflict, i.e., the Somalia-Al-Shabab, while the Sudan-Darfur conflict was a limited-war level conflict.

In 2019 and 2020, AMISOM operations in Somalia to degrade Al Shabaab continued along with efforts to enhance governance and institution-building processes. AMISOM’s support went into the (a) the finalisation of the Constitutional Review and support to other governance processes; (b) the finalisation of the new Somali Transition Plan to reprioritise key milestones towards the handover of security responsibilities to Somalia; and [c] assisting the efforts and objectives of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS), including on the 2021 elections. It created an enabling environment for political processes in Somalia and supported the government in providing security and stability across its area of operation. At the 2020 annual PSC meeting, the AU PSC assured that there had been remarkable progress towards reconciliation in Galmudug State, including inter-clan and intra-clan reconciliation, and prospects for the conduct of credible regional elections serve as a good basis for long-term stability. The reconciliation process in Dhusamareeb, supported by the deployment of AMISOM troops in August 2019, which included all clans and key political stakeholders of Galmudug State, enabled discussions on the future of the state and the type of relations they want to establish. The Dhusamareeb process is a commendable step that can be built on and aligned adequately to fit the contexts of other states to facilitate reconciliation across Somalia.

Despite these contributions, AU’s intervention was rated as partly successful and of a medium level quality. The partial success of AU’s PSO in Somalia is explained by the mission’s inability to achieve its intended result of attaining lasting peace in Somalia,126 partly explained by the challenges it faces. The AMISOM remains an under-resourced mission with important gaps...

in its capabilities – particularly in logistics and supplies required to conduct effective military operations and deal with the new security threats posed by Al-Shabaab. Also, there was poor coordination among the peacekeeping forces, affecting AMISOM operations in Somalia. Each of the main contributing countries to AMISON forces, Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, has its authority who, in principle, is to answer to AMISOM’s military chief. Finally, the idealistic exit plan set forth by the AU and the UN for the transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to national security forces is a challenge.

The highest level of PSO was again deployed in Sudan, where the AUPSC and UNSC jointly reviewed the decision to end the UNAMID mandate in response to the political developments in the country. As a follow up to the request made in 2018 to review UNAMID’s mandate to end in 2020, the AU PSC in June endorsed the UNSC’s decision to extend UNAMID’s mandate to October 2020. The endorsement was in line with the special report of the AUC Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General that recommended the drawdown and ending of UNAMID’s mandate and repurposing it to support the ongoing political transition in Sudan on the premise that the transitional government would take responsibility for security in Darfur. The PSC decided on 14 June to close eight inactive UNAMID sites but to ‘consolidate the remaining mission strength to continue protecting the civilians under threat.’ The AU also decided to ‘develop a political strategy that helps address the remaining political challenges. While the situation in Darfur had not been substantially affected by the political transition, this decision was in response to the de-escalation of the conflict after the successful formation of the transitional government and the Juba Peace Agreement. In 2020, the AU PSC endorsed the decision to extend and eventually terminate the UNAMID mandate on 31 December 2020, marking the end of UNAMID’s mandate and the transition to the newly formed UNITAMS.

In 2019, the AU PSC took steps to begin the drawdown and liquidation of the UN-AU hybrid peace support operation UNAMID, initially endorsing the closure of inactive sites and relocation of troops and resources to where they were needed. While the end of UNAMID’s mandate had initially been set for July 2020, the political situation in Sudan and the ongoing humanitarian situation in Darfur compelled the AU, the UN and the government of Sudan to reassess the drawdown of UNAMID and how to deploy it best to support the transition. The shared priority was to transition from a peacekeeping to a peacebuilding operation. The main obstacles to the transition included the political uncertainty due to the military takeover and the concerns that the planned withdrawal of UNAMID would increase insecurity in an already restive Darfur, where many questioned the government’s preparedness and capability to provide security. Shortly after the April coup, the TMC passed a decree on 13 May 2019 calling on UNAMID to hand over assets to the RSF. The AU PSC rejected this decree on 13 June 2019, reiterating that UNAMID’s exit should not create a vacuum and that UNAMID should not hand over security responsibility to the RSF. In October 2019, following the formation of the transitional government and the opening of the Juba peace talks, the AU and the UN published a joint special report that presented the parameters for a new political strategy and options for a follow-up presence to UNAMID that laid the framework for the eventual transition to UNITAMS.

The deliberations between the AU, the UN, and Sudan’s government on the transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS progressed rapidly after October 2019. All parties shared a consensus on the need to support a successful and sustainable political transition. A meeting of the Tripartite Coordination Mechanism on UNAMID was held in November 2019, followed by a visit to Sudan of a multidisciplinary team in December 2019. In March 2020, the AU PSC encouraged the government of Sudan, in collaboration with the UN, to agree on a comprehensive UNAMID withdrawal roadmap. This is to ensure that the process is carefully managed and sequenced, conditions-based, and aligned with the priorities and timelines of the government.

127. Human Right Pulse, Has The African Union Peacekeeping Mission Contributed To Peace In Mogadishu? 19 August 2021
128. AUPSC, The 856th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the activities of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the situation in Darfur, 14 June 2019
In May 2020, the AU PSC appealed to the UN Security Council to ensure any future deployment of a mission in Sudan should be under Chapter VI and proposed extending the UNAMID mandate to 31 December 2020 “in light of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on UNAMID’s troop movement and guided by the Mission’s obligation to protect civilians under threat in Darfur, while continuing to implement the exit strategy for the termination of the Mission (21 May 2020).” The AU PSC communique broke the deadlock between members of the UN Security Council over whether to end the UNAMID mandate on October 2020 or to extend the mandate to May 31, 2021, as a security buffer while the transitional government increased its capacity to protect civilians. The UN Security Council endorsed the AU PSC decision, and on 3 June 2020, adopted the resolutions on the end of the UNAMID mandate and the establishment of UNITAMS. Following further negotiations over the termination of the UNAMID mandate as requested by Sudan’s transitional government, the UN and AU issued a joint special report in November 2020 that presented the recommendation to terminate the UNAMID mandate on 31 December 2020 and fully operationalise UNITAM’s presence, highlighting the spikes in fighting between armed movements and state security forces as well as increasing intercommunal violence.

The announcement of the pending withdrawal of UNAMID drew protests from thousands in Darfur. Displaced women and children staged demonstrations against the decision by the UN Security Council to terminate the mandate days before the exit.129 The governor of Central Darfur warned of increased violence and crime after the scheduled UNAMID exit.130 It echoed concerns from human rights groups such as Amnesty International that had earlier appealed to the Security Council to extend the UNAMID mandate “in light of failure by government security forces to protect civilians in recent months.”131

However, the AU was not responsive to concerns over the prospects of increased insecurity after the UNAMID exit and the preparedness of the Sudanese government to provide security in Darfur. Insecurity grew with an escalation of the conflicts from non-violence in 2019 to limited war in 2020, hence a medium-level effectiveness assessment of the intervention. Despite the political transition and the signing of a peace agreement between the transitional government and an alliance of Sudanese armed groups in Juba on 3 October 2020, there was an uptick in local-level clashes involving rebel elements, intercommunal violence, and civil unrest in Darfur. Areas under the influence of groups that have not joined the peace process remain volatile. Darfur also remains particularly affected by high inflation and a scarcity of fuel and other commodities. Hence, it is too early to assess the effect of the transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS.

2.4.4. Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)

In 2019 and 2020, limited PCRD was undertaken by AU and IGAD. For the conflicts on intensity levels of violent conflict to war, only one PCRD intervention was launched, which is about the intercommunal rivalry conflict in South Sudan, from a limited war in 2019 to war in 2020. The PCRD intervention deployed was assessed as level 1. In 2019, IGAD’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) hosted a three-day training for the South Sudan Mediation Committee and its Secretariat to enhance its capacity as hosts for the mediation between actors of the ongoing war in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile regions. The MSU also convened a Strategic Thinking Workshop for Women from South Kordofon Regions of the Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains to provide a platform for the women from various sectors to dialogue. The workshop was also aimed at generating a common position toward an agenda for increased inclusion, participation, and representation of the different spheres of the nation-building efforts.

2.3. Peace Agreements Mediated by the AU and RECs

Beyond the quality and effectiveness assessment, this report explores peace agreements mediated by the AU/RECs. The discussion focuses on mediated peace agreements that lasted for more than one year, i.e., that was not violated for a minimum of a year. Since this report is for the period between 2019 and 2020, it presents enough time to meet the minimum duration for the assessment.

Of the conflicts assessed in this report, 19 peace agreements were negotiated (Annex V). Only five of these agreements were mediated by the AU/REC, of which three have been held. These agreements were negotiated concerning the Sudan and South Sudan opposition conflicts. The tripartite summit on the Revitalised Agreement on Resolution of the conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was held in Entebbe on November 7, 2019, to discuss the implementation of the R-ARCSS.132 The meeting, attended by the President of the Republic of South Sudan and the President of the Transitional Sovereign Council of Sudan, was hosted by the President of the Republic of Uganda. An extension to the pre-transitional period for one hundred days was agreed to take effect from November 12, 2019, and to review progress after fifty days. Also, the parties at the meeting agreed to establish a mechanism between the guarantors and the parties to supervise the implementation of the critical tasks.

The Rome Declaration on the peace process in South Sudan was facilitated by the community of Sant’Egidio and witnessed by IGAD. The meeting brought the non-signatories of the Revitalized Agreement on board, resulting in the parties signing the Rome Declaration and committing to the cessation of hostilities.133 IGAD formally confirmed the lifting of travel restrictions on Riek Machar as the government and National Salvation Front (NAS) continued talks in Rome.

The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan between the Transitional Government of Sudan and the parties to the peace process was mediated by South Sudan and supported by the AU and IGAD. The agreement covers elements such as land reform and security sector reform. These provisions directly threaten the core interests of the transitional government [Mil-T G] and its supporters. Thus, as earlier noted, the agreement was deemed to have contributed to an increase in violence in some parts of the Arab communities since they feared losing out on any political reorganisation.134

2.4. Non-intervention by the AU and RECs in High-Intensity Conflicts

Discussions thus far have focused on conflict situations in which AU/RECs intervened. Like previous years, the AU and the RECs did not explicitly intervene in all conflicts on the continent. This even applies to conflicts of high-intensity levels. Across the two reporting years, only in about half of the conflicts with medium to high intensity did the AU/RECs intervene. Of the

132. Communiqué on the occasion of the tripartite summit on the Revitalised Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in Republic of South Sudan
133. UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 26 February 2020
134. Rift Valley Institute, What next for the Juba Peace Agreement? Evolving political and security dynamics in Darfur, February 2022
39 and 41 conflicts in 2019 and 2020 assessed, 22 of them each year were not intervened. These conflicts cut across violent, limited war and war conflicts.

Across both years, most of the non-intervened conflicts were violent conflicts (figure 16). Of the 22 conflicts which were not intervened in 2019, 17, representing 77.3%, were violent conflicts, while 4 (18.2%) and one (4.5%) were limited war and war level conflicts. A similar trend is seen in 2020, where about 63.6% of the conflicts not intervened were violent conflicts while 27.3% and 9.1% were limited war and war level conflicts.

Figure 16: Overview of Conflicts not Intervened

The war level conflict in 2019 which was not intervened in is the conflict in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt between militant groups and the government over ideology and subnational predominance. The conflict overlaps with the local affiliate of the Islamic State (IS), the Wilayat Sinai militant group. The militant group carried out several attacks against the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and the Egyptian National Police (ENP), targeting key economic sectors largely controlled by the military, such as tourism and construction. Despite the high levels of violence in 2019, neither the AU nor the Arab League directly and visibly intervened. The Egyptian military has led counterinsurgency campaigns against the group with support from Israel. Al-Sisi’s strategy to eradicate insurgents in Sinai has been criticised as fuelling insurgency instead of addressing the local population’s grievances.

In South Sudan, despite the overall reduction in armed violence after the signing of the R-ARCSS, violent confrontations and casualties among and between Murle, Dinka and Nuer militias increased in 2019 and 2020. The sharp increase in intercommunal violence is built on years of polarisation among communities and the destruction of livelihoods due to years of conflict. Also, the leadership vacuum at the state and substate levels due to delays in the appointment of state governors exacerbated intercommunal tensions. ACLED reported that intercommunal violence was responsible for more than half of the total fatalities in South Sudan in the first five months of 2020. The most heavily affected parts of the country were central and southern Jonglei State and the lowland, oil rich Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). The cycle of attacks and revenge attacks among and between militias allied to the Murle, Dinka and Nuer continued throughout 2019 and escalated in 2020 despite the combined efforts by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the government to address the violence. However, the AU PSC, on its part, only acknowledged the increase in intercommunal violence in Central Equatoria, South Sudan, in their communique on 15 September.

A constraining factor to AU/REC’s non-intervention includes the contradiction of principles. For example, sovereignty and non-interference on the one hand, and non-indifference on the other – see Article 4a and 4g versus 4h of the AU Constitutive Act. The recognition and respect for the sovereignty of member states imply that the AU cannot interfere in crises, particularly if the crises are deemed an internal affair. This is the case of Cameroon.

For the two reporting years, the degree of AU’s engagement relative to the intensity of the Anglophone crisis is not appropriate. In 2019 and 2020, the two regions in Cameroon, i.e., the south-west and north-west, were gravely destabilised by attacks by parties to the conflicts. Despite the insecurities, coupled with the threat of terrorism by Boko Haram, the AU PSC and ECCAS refrained from responding to the crisis. The only intervention by the AU was a statement made by the Chairperson of the AU Commission to welcome the initiation of the national dialogue. Also, there was a tripartite mission embarked on by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Secretary-General of the International Organization of la Francophonie, and the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. As the institution with the mandate committed to conflict management and prevention of the continent, a much more prominent role is expected of the AU. That said, as can be inferred from the reaction of the government of Cameroon to France, the government regards the conflict as an internal issue, hence limiting AU’s response. On February 22, 2020, French President Macron was reported to have said he would put “maximum pressure” on President Biya to end violence in Anglophone regions.137 Two days later, the government of Cameroon was said to have denounced France for interfering in its internal affairs. With the crisis tagged as an internal affair, both the AU and ECCAS are limited in making pronouncements.138 This is the case, although the mandate of PSC does include a ‘collective early warning arrangement’, to ‘facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crises in Africa’.

The respect for the principle of national sovereignty again comes into play in many other crises in 2019 and 2020 where the AU nor the RECs did not manage to intervene. A case in point is the Burundi case, where the AU was not granted the permission to send an election observer mission, and though an observer mission by AU and EAC could have helped to ease tension and improve the credibility of the outcome of the election, the AU and EAC could not bulldoze their way through to observe the election once the national government did not approve of it.

Closely linked to the effect of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference is the respect for the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity. As noted at the beginning of this section, the AU relies on the comparative advantage of the regional bodies to intervene in some conflicts, particularly conflicts in the regions of the respective RECs. Despite its strength, the principle, in some cases, limits the AU’s ability to intervene in some conflicts directly. As recognised by the AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, the principle did limit the AU’s ability to intervene in the political crises in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire.139 Specifically, these crises were about the phenomenon of constitutional and unconstitutional coups discussed in the preceding section. Under the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity, the primacy of regional organisation, which in this case, ECOWAS, is recognised to lead interventions in member states.

Although the AU/RECs did not directly intervene in some conflicts, the ‘spill-over effect’ from intervening in one conflict in the country indirectly impacts the non-intervened conflict. For 2019 and 2020, these linkages are found in Libya, Mali and Burkina Faso.

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137. Crisis Group, Tracking Conflict Worldwide
138. ISS, Why the PSC should discuss Cameroon, 25 April 2019
139. ISS Today
The AU has generally not been at the forefront of the management of the conflicts in Libya. Since the uprising and subsequent ousting of Moammar Gadhafi, Libya plunged into conflicts on two fronts: the intertribal conflict between tribes in southern Libya over subnational predominance and resources and the conflict on the national level between the internationally recognised Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), and the opposition Arab Libyan Armed Forces (ALAF, previously known as Libyan National Army).

The AU until 2020 played a limited role in the conflict management efforts in Libya. Partly, this is explained by the fact that some of the warring parties view some AU member states as sympathetic towards the former leader, Muammar Gaddafi, accounting for the lack of acceptance of some members of the Union by all Libyan stakeholders.\(^{140}\) Also, the AU’s approach as lacking a common position on responding to the conflict has been cited as another factor. A case in point is creating different entities, i.e., the 11-member High-Level Ad-hoc Committee on Libya and a Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the Commission to Libya, seemingly overlapping mandates on the crisis.\(^ {141}\) At the same time, other offices such as the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Libya, and the Head of the Liaison Office are all directly involved in the peace process.\(^ {142}\) However, the February 2020 PSC meeting is deemed instrumental to the AU asserting itself in the mediation process. The meeting saw the outlining of subsequent actionable steps, including collaborating with the UN to send a fact-finding mission comprising defence chiefs from the five regions to Libya. However, these efforts by AU have been limited to the conflict between national actors, with the intertribal conflict receiving little to no attention.

The AU’s interventions in the conflicts between the national actors, though limited, somehow indirectly contribute to the conflict management efforts of the intertribal conflict. This is due to the interlinkages between the two conflicts. One of the dynamics of the two conflicts in 2019 is the forging of an alliance between actors of the two conflicts. Alliances were formed between the various tribes with either GNA or LNA. For instance, the Arab Awlad Suleiman and parts of the Zuwaya tribes have aligned with the LNA and have supported LNA advances.

Similarly, the tribes of Tebu and a majority of the Touareg have aligned with the GNA. A consequence of the alliance of the tribal groups with the national actors is the increase in the offensive by the national warring parties against the tribes. Also, the tribal territory in the south became a focal point for offensives by the LNA.

Some of the AU’s communiqué referred to the overall level of violence, which signals a view that a political solution to opposition conflict could ease or serve as a precondition for further de-escalation of the intertribal conflicts. A strong unity government could help contain and address intertribal crises. The interlinkages between the two conflicts, particularly the transformation process, were made pronounced in 2020 when stakeholders recognised the importance of the tribal leaders in ensuring peace. Following the failed attempt at peace negotiation between the GNA and the LNA at the Berlin conference on 19 January, international actors, including Algeria and Tunisia, highlighted the importance of including all tribal leaders in peace talks to support intra-Libyan political processes. Following this recognition, the Supreme Tribal Council was formed on 19 February after a tribal meeting, in which 3,000 tribal representatives, including Tebu, Touareg, and Awaqir, all attended.

The spillover effects of one conflict management on another are observed in Mali and Burkina Faso, where the intercommunal conflicts in those countries are interlinked with jihadist conflicts. In Mali, the intercommunal rivalry conflict between the Dogon and Bambara communities and their Dozo self-defence groups and the Fulani community is interlinked with the fight by

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140. ISS-PSC Report, Africa’s place in resolving Libya’s quagmire, 19 February 2020
141. ibid
142. ibid
jihadist groups. Although decades-long rivalries and later contest over access to resources have generated tension between the communities, jihadist activity in the region exacerbated the tension since the Fulani communities are perceived as collaborators of the jihadists. Similarly, in Burkina Faso, the intercommunal rivalry conflict between the ethnic groups of Mossi, Foulse, and Bella against the Fulani also involves jihadists. Like in Mali, the conflict in Burkina Faso emerged over access to resources between the various ethnic groups and the Fulani ethnic group but escalated due to the activities of religious extremist groups. Attacks in some communities in both countries increased due to the jihadist group justifying their activities on the lack of state capabilities to protect them. 2019 saw the increased involvement of the Dozo in the fight against armed jihadist groups.

There were no direct interventions by the AU or ECOWAS in the intercommunal rivalry conflict in Burkina Faso and Mali. However, responses to the ongoing jihadist activities in the Sahel force by the G5 Sahel force and the Lake Chad Basin by the MTNJTF indirectly impact the intercommunal rivalry. Beyond AU’s communique in 2019 and 2020 condemned attacks by jihadist groups operating within the Sahel and the Lake Chand regions, the AU’s extension of the authorisation of the operation G5 Sahel force and the MTNJTF aims at combating the insurgency.

143. Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, 2019, p. 74
144. Atalayar, The problem of the "ethnicity" of the self-defence militias in the Sahel, the main perpetrators of violence in Burkina Faso and Mali, 5 October 2020
145. Antonin Tisseron, 2021, Pandora’s box. Burkina Faso, self-defense militias and VDP Law in fighting jihadism
The APSA Impact Report aims to provide data and analyses on the state of conflict in Africa as well as on the quality and effectiveness of the interventions conducted by the AU and RECs in deescalating or resolving these conflicts.
Assessment of the Impacts of Intervention by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in 2019-20 in the Frame of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Section THREE
Conclusion and Recommendations

3.1. Key Findings

The number of violent conflicts and wars fought on the continent increased, including a rise in jihadist activities. These increases corresponded with increased fatalities in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Mozambique. Also, despite a decline in jihadist activities globally and in the North African region, the Sub-Saharan region experienced a rise in insurgency with jihadist groups such as the ASWJ, expanding their attack beyond their base countries. An implication for counterinsurgent efforts and the long-term stability of Africa is the observed trend of alliances being forged between local jihadist groups and international jihadist movements. Also worrying are the growing interlinkages between insurgent attacks and intercommunal conflicts in the Sahel, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. This year’s report also takes note of the surge in the unconstitutional change of governments on the continent. The unconstitutional changes were triggered by protests against economic mismanagement and undemocratic practices, but also, as found in Mali and Burkina Faso, these were the effects of jihadist activities. Be it a covert unconstitutional transition of government as in Chad or direct military takeovers as in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan, these developments threatened the peace and security, and political stability in Africa.

AU’s response to crises, particularly political crises, resulting in unconstitutional changes of government has been reactive. The AU and RECs deploy the highest-level instruments of diplomacy and mediation, which in the case of Sudan and Mali, involves AU and REC’s membership suspension and a delegation of heads of state-led mediation to the country. There were very few instances of preventive conflict management, particularly in periods preceding the coup, thus rendering the deployment of APSA’s instruments reactive, and not focusing on addressing the structural issues which account for the crisis. These further questions the conflict preventive and early warning mechanism of APSA, i.e., the failure of the mechanism to pick up on the near-coup sign or failure on the side of AU and RECs to respond early.

Focus on national and cross-border conflict with limited APSA intervention in intercommunal and intertribal rivalry conflicts. AU’s interventions in conflict situations have primarily focused on national (involving opposition parties) and cross-border (insurgencies) conflicts. Conflicts of intercommunal, interethnic and tribal rivalry received little to no interventions from AU/RECs. These intercommunal conflicts which are found in Burkina Faso, Mali, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan are of intense nature. Also, they foreshadow a trend of growing interstate tensions in 2021. Several protracted intercommunal conflicts are transnational in nature and dense in border triangle areas such as the Liptako-Gourma region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the Tibesti region between Chad, Libya and Niger, the Ilemi triangle between South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya, the Mandera triangle between Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, the al-Fushqa triangle between Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as the border triangles between CAR-Chad-Sudan, CAR-South Sudan-DRC, and between the countries adjacent to the Kivu. These triangles are often at the same time hosts of insurgent groups as well as contested in interstate territorial disputes, increasing the risk of conflict spill-over as occurred in the 2020 al-Fushqa clashes between Sudan and Ethiopia.

Despite the intense nature of these intercommunal conflicts, state responses to some of these
conflicts have been slow. Similarly, AU/RECs responses to these conflicts, so far, has been inappropriate. For instance, IGAD, since its revitalisation, has broadened its mandate to resolve conflicts, including inter-clan or ethnic disputes, but its intervention is still marginal. Within the framework of APSA, the AU/RECs have the potential to contribute to transforming these conflicts. Even if the AU cannot directly intervene due to principles of non-intervention, the REC could proactively engage.

Diplomacy and mediation were the most frequently used instruments by APSA. The involvement of heads of state in diplomacy and mediation has been consequential in the de-escalation of conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan. APSA, on the other hand, played a minor role in ongoing PSOs in the continent. Its role in the operations of the joint forces in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin has been primarily limited to the authorisation of the force compared to its engagement with the PSOs in Sudan and South Sudan (UNMISS and UNAMID). APSA engagement in Somalia is also noticeable. In 2020 alone, the situation in Somalia was discussed several times. These meetings focused on the elections, the future of AMISOM, and the renewal of AMISOM’s mandate. There were no significant PCRD interventions.

Reduced overall qualities of AU/REC’s Intervention in 2019-2020 relative to 2018 but improved levels of internal and external cooperation found in APSA Interventions: Assessments of the interventions deployed by AU/RECs show an overall medium level quality across both reporting years, deviating from the outcome of the 2018 assessment. While none of the assessed conflicts was judged high quality, most medium-quality rated interventions were deployed to non-violent conflicts. Also, AU and RECs were found to have aligned responses to some of the conflicts. Conflict situations resulting from the unconstitutional change of government, as was the case in Mali and Sudan, were found to have drawn high levels of internal APSA cooperation. Significant external cooperation in the form of AU/REC cooperating with other international actors was observed. One such cooperation manifested in the drawdown and termination of the hybrid UN-AU UNAMID mission mandate in Sudan. A similar level of cooperation is observed with the AU mission in Somalia, AMISOM. External actors, such as the UN and EU, provided vital support to the missions. Also, in Mali, the AU undertook a joint field mission with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) in November to assess the situation in the region and ascertain the required support for the promotion of peace, security, and stabilisation in the Sahel region.

For the conflicts assessed, AU and RECs interventions effectively contributed to the de-escalation of the Sudan opposition conflict. Relative to the previous reporting year, the overall effectiveness of APSA intervention decreased in 2019 and 2020, with an equal proportion of interventions judged partly successful as those judged to be unsuccessful. Among the cases assessed, only interventions deployed in response to the Sudan political crisis were effective in contributing to de-escalating the conflict. The highest-level instruments of diplomacy and mediation were deployed by the AU and IGAD with an intended outcome of handing power back to a civilian-led transitional authority, an intended outcome which was achieved.
3.2 Recommendations

The security situation in Africa in 2019 and 2020 remained fragile, marked by increased violent conflicts and emerging threats to political stability, peace, and security. Faced with an upsurge in insurgencies, violent and contentious elections, and unconstitutional changes of government, it is critical now more than ever for the conflict and crises preventive elements of the APSA to be engaged. Thus far, AU/REC’s response to the threats has, in some cases, been reactive and inadequate in dealing with the structural issues. Adopting a more proactive approach to these conflicts would ensure that early warning signs are dealt with early enough. In such cases, instead of waiting to employ sanctions in a context where a political crisis degenerates into an unconstitutional change of government, AU/RECs adopting preventive diplomacy would proactively engage with relevant actors on the ground to prevent crises or de-escalate them.

Prioritising early warning mechanisms and appropriately responding to emerging or ongoing threats to political instability in a timely and effective manner would require not just improving the nexus and synergies between the APSA and African Governance Architecture (AGA) but also demonstrating the political will to call out and deal with incumbents seeking to manipulate their countries constitutions. AGA as a framework addresses governance issues and their related challenges, seeking to entrench a political culture of respect for democratic and human rights values and change of power based on regular, transparent, and credible elections. Effectively harnessing the synergies between AGA and APSA paves the way for a more structural approach to addressing political instability and crisis. At the 2021 high-level roundtable meeting, practical modalities for operationalising the synergy between AGA and APSA were discussed. However, effective implementation would require harnessing the political will to call out incumbents seeking to manipulate their country’s constitution or electoral process to stay in power, even with the limitations posed by the need to respect the principle of sovereignty and non-interference.

The growing interlinkages between intercommunal conflicts and jihadist activities require a rethinking of AU’s limited focus on addressing intrastate conflicts, particularly intercommunal conflicts. As observed in Mali, Burkina Faso and other countries with simmering intercommunal conflicts, conflicts of this nature are protracted, with the potential to escalate, and as such, have served as grounds for the growing number of armed self-defence groups. The growing number of self-defence militias has been necessitated by the need to fill gaps in providing local security, which has come at the expense of civilian lives. More worrying is the linkages between intercommunal conflict and jihadist activities, taking the form of framing Fulani ethnic groups or instigating and committing attacks blamed on them, which then fuel counterattacks by opposing ethnic groups. The potential for this conflict type to transform into interstate territorial disputes demands that actions are taken early enough to prevent their escalation. This requires making good on the provisions by APSA, either by engaging with the relevant RECs or providing the necessary support for state interventions to defuse tensions. Engagements with the local actors could also entail interventions to build their capacity to manage or de-escalate local conflicts adequately.

Insurgencies are growing on the continent, particularly in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions and countries like Somalia, Mozambique, and neighboring countries. As the preceding paragraph has shown, this is a more complex phenomenon, as jihadist activities have been woven into the communal conflicts, rooted in local grievances, competition for resources, and a lack of state capacity to resolve the issues. The jihadist groups also exploit grievances caused by poor governance and a lack of economic opportunities, particularly for the youth. Addressing such requires avoiding unrealistic quick fixe-counterterrorism plans and employing a blend of long-term security and political plans that address structural issues. Thus far, AU/RECs’
counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin have been limited. Even though a decision was taken in February 2020 to deploy a 3000 strong force to help combat terrorism in the Sahel, plans have so far, not been fully implemented. There is therefore the need to address the political reasons for the increased jihadist presence on the continent. For instance, in the Sahel, ECOWAS is well placed to coordinate efforts not only to combat jihadist violence but also to seek common ground to address the growing dissatisfaction among citizens on issues of poor political and economic governance.
The annual APSA Impact Report is a relevant reference tool that captures the efforts and challenges faced by the AU, RECs/RMs and member states in their regional and continental efforts in conflict prevention, management and transformation.
## Annex I: Indicative table of Interventions with levels of engagement

### Diplomacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of instrument</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description of possible interventions at different levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Diplomacy (diplomatic measures taken by PSC or the equivalent in a REC)** | 1 | • Cautionary wording in a PSC/AU/REC communiqué to parties in a conflict (e.g. ‘grave concern’, ‘deeply concerned’)  
• Special/extraordinary AU/REC meeting on the conflict situation  
• Appointing envoys / special representatives, appointing Joint Special Representatives and Head of Missions (f.e. UNAMID)  
• Routine’ fact-finding visits/missions by envoys/special representatives; possibly also Panel of the Wise (e.g. trust missions to Tunisia in 2013)  
• AU/REC express support to other actors’ efforts (‘other actors’ refers both to other elements of APSA; i.e. the AU expressing support to IGAD; or ECOWAS expressing support to the AU, or other actors, such as the UN or EU)  
• AU/REC asks for support by other actors (if it addresses other important key multilateral bodies, such as the UN or other elements of APSA; i.e. not AU/REC asking the international community in general for financial support, but includes AU/REC asking the UN or other donors for financial support to a specific interventions)  
• Specific mention of the country in reports / communiqués of the Panel of the Wise  
• Panel of the Wise is briefed on the situation in a country  
• Calling for the establishment of an International Contact Group/Forum on the country (e.g. Burkina Faso)  
• Publication of a draft or interim report (e.g. presentation of the interim Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan)  
• Authorizing the deployment of an election observation mission or a pre-election assessment mission  
• Urging parties to facilitate and support for smooth operation of humanitarian assistance  
• Reaffirming commitment to AU Constitutive Act (including Article 4 (a)) and the relevant provisions of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union  
• Decision to deploy military experts to verify/monitor processes of disarmament; or human rights observers  
• Welcoming the extension of a UN mandate or the strengthening of a UN mandate (e.g. UNMISS in South Sudan)  
• Calling for the resumption of the cooperation between a peacekeeping mission and the national military (e.g. between MONUSCO and FARDC in DRC)  
• Agreeing to deploy a PSO if needed (e.g. South Sudan) |
### Diplomacy (diplomatic measures taken by PSC or the equivalent in a REC)

- Use of the words 'condemning' 'strongly condemning', or 'strongly reject' or 'extreme concern' by Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Union Commission (AUC), the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government
- Extraordinary AU/REC meeting at heads of state level
- Establishment of a country-specific office / task-force / international contact group / commission on the country; also for region (e.g. MISAC for CAR and Central Africa);
- High-level fact-finding mission by the AUC Chairperson/ PSC / Peace and Security Commissioner / Panel of the Wise
- Deploying an election monitoring mission; Deciding not to deploy election observation mission because necessary conditions are not met.
- Deployment military experts to verify/monitor processes of disarmament
- Deployment of human rights observers
- Threatening with sanctions / setting ultimatum
- coning the parties to return to negotiations/ political processes immediately/without delay/with specific timeline
- Supporting and calling for a non-AU military action
- Calling for and welcoming the UNSC to impose sanctions
- Calling for the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry; or an AU/REC Commission of Inquiry (e.g. AU Commission of Inquiry for South Sudan) and taking necessary steps to prepare the establishment.
- Publication of a report by a Commission of Inquiry
- Calling for the ‘withdrawal of the (unconstitutional) ruling party’, urging for withdrawal of armed groups and all allied forces or troops; demanding armed belligerents to end all acts of violence
- Calling for an international observation and security force
- Asking for deferral of ICC prosecution or indictment
- Recalls principled position on the total rejection of unconstitutional change of government and the recourse to armed violence to advance political claims
- Reach an agreement from a government on allowing peace support operations to operate on a country’s territory (e.g. LRA in DRC)
- Welcoming a UN SC resolution mandating a peace-keeping operation (e.g. Mali)
- Declaring an organisation, a terrorist group (e.g. LRA) or welcoming UN declaring a group a terrorist organisation
- Formation and/or active participation of the AU/RECs in International Contact Group / Forum on the country
- Requests the strengthening of the mandate of a peace support operation (e.g. DRC, CAR; MINUSMA)
- Calling for the authorization of an international (e.g. UN) mission or for the authorisation of an African led mission (e.g. MNJTF)

### Additional Diplomatic Measures

| 3 | • Suspension from decision-making bodies - re-admitting / lifting suspensions  
• Issue sanctions - lifting suspension  
• Implementation of UNSC resolutions with sanctions (asset freezing, travel/visa bans, etc)  
• Issuing an arms embargo  
• Barring a politician from being eligible for elections  
• Declaring null and void all measures of constitutional, institutional and legislative nature taken by the military authorities following a coup d’État  
• Establishing a Commission of Inquiry (e.g. AU Commission of Inquiry for South Sudan)  
• Extending the mandate of Commission of Inquiry (e.g. AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan)  
• Establishment of peace agreement monitoring mission (e.g. MVM in South Sudan)  
• Decides not to deploy a PSO (cf. Burundi and MAPROBU) |
### Mediation activities

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediation activities undertaken by the AU/REC/RMs.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1 | • AU/REC establishes a delegation to initiate dialogue or appoints a mediator  
• Initial visit to the country / initial discussions held by a AU/REC/RM  
• Consultations held with relevant parties in preparation for mediation meetings  
• Consultations by EOM with stakeholders (government, CSO, political parties) before elections  
• Consultations held for the implementation and follow-up of a peace agreement [e.g. Mali Algiers Peace Agreement]  
• AU/REC availing a budget for mediation activities |
| 2 | • Appointing a high-level mediator [e.g. former and/or current president]  
• Numerous visits to a country for mediation purposes (including fact-finding missions, for mediation purposes)  
• Consultations held with both parties with the aim of reaching an agreement  
• Fully supporting the mediation efforts when not itself being the chief mediator  
• Formation and/or active participation of the AU/RECs in an inter-institutional body to deal with mediation  
• AU delegation/representative is mandated to take the lead role in a mediation team  
• Agreeing on a road map to end a crisis [e.g. CAR], or a draft agreement for negotiations [e.g. Sudan]  
• Organising a workshop to help identify the practical steps to be taken by the AU in support of a peace agreement |
| 3 | • Mediation is led by the AU/RECs, or the AU/REC is playing the key role in the mediation efforts  
• AU/REC/RM representative in high-level mediation team  
• Through AU/REC mediation, or with its active support, a key peace, power sharing or security agreement is reached  
• Extending mediation activity [e.g. African Union High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP)] |

### Peace Support Operations

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace support operations (including ASF and its precursors)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1 | • Preparatory meetings for a peace support operation  
• Needs assessment mission for stabilization purposes  
• Convening of a resource mobilisation meeting/conference for conflict transformation / stabilisation  
• AU/RECs attending ceremonies marking the handover of troops to PSO  
• Request the AU Commission to undertake contingency planning [...] |
| 2 | • Authorizes or mandates the deployment of a peace support operation  
• Formalisation of peace support operation with the transitional government  
• Formalizing formal directives [strategic directives, rules of engagement, operational procedures, etc] [e.g. LRA]  
• Providing financial assistance by the AU/RECs to conflict transformation / stabilisation |
| 3 | • Deployment of a peace support operation  
• Extending mandate of a peace support operation |
## Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development

### Engagement of PRCD actors from AUC/RECs

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>• Meeting on PCRD organized/attended by the AU/REC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• PCRD Assessment mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capacity building workshops are organized and led by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the AU/REC (e.g. counterterrorism workshops in Algeria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR) and Tunisia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>• Establishment of a multi-actor committee/office/institution on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCRD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Donor conference on PCRD organized by AU/REC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>• AU/REC PCRD programmes or Quick Impact Project implemented by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AU/REC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Commission implements recommendations from PCRD Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment Mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not a comprehensive table of all interventions. It is a table with typical interventions, and is used to as a calibration tool, to maintain consistency throughout the countries.
## Annex II: Quality of interventions by Conflict Intensity Level

### 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Limited War</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium Quality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (opposition)</td>
<td>Sudan (Opposition) SPLM/A-ID vs. Government</td>
<td>JAS-Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mali (JNIM, AQIM et al.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan: (Opposition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mostly Low Quality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa-Xenophobia</td>
<td>Cameroon- English-speaking-minority</td>
<td>Libya-Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi- Opposition</td>
<td>Libya- intertribal rivalry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique- RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique- ASWJ</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt- Opposition</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Limited War</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium Quality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali opposition</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td>JAS-Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Opposition)</td>
<td>South Sudan: (Opposition)</td>
<td>Mali (JNIM, AQIM et al.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2020- Mostly Low Quality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia and Sudan</td>
<td>Cameroon- English-speaking-minority</td>
<td>Libya-Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa-Xenophobia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea, Ethiopia and TPLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi- Opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique- ASWJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique-RENAHO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya- intertribal rivalry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt- Opposition</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex III: Effectiveness of interventions by Conflict Intensity Level

### 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Limited War</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partly Successful</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria-APC - PDP supporters</td>
<td>Sudan (Opposition)</td>
<td>JAS-Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan: (Opposition)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mali Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM, AQIM et al.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan: (Opposition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unsuccessful</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa-Xenophobia</td>
<td>Cameroon (English-speaking-minority)</td>
<td>Libya (opposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi- Opposition</td>
<td>Mozambique-ASWJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique- RENAMO</td>
<td>Libya- intertribal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt- Opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent Conflict</th>
<th>Limited War</th>
<th>War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partly Successful</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (Opposition)</td>
<td>South Sudan: (Opposition)</td>
<td>JAS-Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Opposition)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mali Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM, AQIM et al.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Too Early to Tell</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unsuccessful</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia and Sudan</td>
<td>Cameroon- English-speaking-minority</td>
<td>Libya-Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa-Xenophobia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea, Ethiopia and TPLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi- Opposition</td>
<td>Mozambique- ASWJ</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique-RENAMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya- intertribal rivalry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt- Opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Annex IV: Master Table of Overall Assessment of Interventions 2019-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of conflict cluster</th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>PCRD</th>
<th>PSO</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia and Sudan - TPLF</td>
<td>AU-1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa - Xenophobia</td>
<td>AU-2/IGAD-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-3/IGAD-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia - Al-Shabaab, Kenya and Government</td>
<td>AU-1/EAC-1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-2/ECA-1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi - Opposition</td>
<td>AU-1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique - RENAMO</td>
<td>AU-3</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-2/IIGAD-3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya - Opposition</td>
<td>AU-3/IIGAD-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-2</td>
<td>ECOWAS-1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan - Opposition / SPLA/M</td>
<td>AU-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-3/ECA-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria - APC - PDP supporters</td>
<td>AU-2/IGAD-1</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-2/ECOWAS-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali - opposition</td>
<td>AU-3/IGAD-2</td>
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<td>AU-2/ECOWAS-2</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon - English-speaking minority</td>
<td>AU-2/ECA-2</td>
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<td>AU-2/ECOWAS-3</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/Movement</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Medium Quality</td>
<td>AU-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Opposition</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique - ASWJ</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic - Anti-Balaka, ex-Seleka</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AU-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan, Darfur</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
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## Annexe V: Overview of Peace Agreement 2019–2020

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of agreement</th>
<th>AU/REC mediated?</th>
<th>Held &gt; 1 year?</th>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>18. 02.2019</td>
<td>Agreement on the Demands of the Equatoria Non-Allied Force (ENAF) Yei State</td>
<td>Yes/no</td>
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<td>Government NSS/ISB and EPC Peace Desk and Communique</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>16. Mar 19</td>
<td>Resolutions of Mukaya County Peace and Reconciliation Conference (Yei River State)</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>21. Mar 19</td>
<td>Kupera County Peace and Reconciliation Communique</td>
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<td>01. Nov 19</td>
<td>1st Review of the Marial Bai Agreement on Cattle Seasonal Movement, Wau State</td>
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<td>Communique on the occasion of the tripartite summit on the Revitalised Agreement</td>
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<td>on Resolution of the Conflict in Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>12. Jan 20</td>
<td>Rome Declaration on the peace process in South Sudan</td>
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<td>06. Mar 20</td>
<td>Pageri Peace Forum Resolutions</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>09. Apr 20</td>
<td>SSOMA Response to UN Secretary General Call for Immediate Global Ceasefire in</td>
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<td>Armed Conflict Countries Related to COVID-19</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Internal Cattle Migration Conference</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>6 Aug. 2019</td>
<td>Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation, <a href="https://maputoaccord.org/">https://maputoaccord.org/</a></td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>08. Oct 20</td>
<td>Fulani and Dogon communities from Barani and Kombori communes reached peace</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>Jan 01</td>
<td>Ceasefire agreement Local armed groups from Tebu, Tuareg, and Arab tribes</td>
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<td>nominally allied to Tripoli-based Presidency Council (PC) vacated military bases</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Joint communique by the chairs of the ten (10) communities to resolve the</td>
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<td>farmer-herder conflict in Benue State[1]</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Ceasefire agreement Local armed groups from Tebu, Tuareg, and Arab tribes nominally allied to Tripoli-based Presidency Council (PC) vacated military bases in Sebha.</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>17th July 2019</td>
<td>Political agreement on establishing the structures and institutions of the transitional period between the Transitional Military Council and the Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces</td>
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<td>Juba Declaration for Trust-building Measures and Pre-negotiation Principles</td>
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<td>Political Declaration between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>19 Jan 2019</td>
<td>Agreement between the Peul and Bozon communities of Kewa commune for the lifting of the blockade on Kouakourou (Mopti region). <a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/conflict/92/Mali%3A+Dogon-Fulani+and+other+local+conflicts+%282015+-%29">https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/conflict/92/Mali%3A+Dogon-Fulani+and+other+local+conflicts+%282015+-%29</a></td>
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