



IPSS

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PEACE & SECURITY REPORT

CHAD CONFLICT INSIGHTS

APRIL 2021



The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to national, regional and continental decision makers in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments. The opinions expressed in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

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SITUATION ANALYSIS

FIGURE 1. COUNTRY PROFILE AND DEMOGRAPHICS

POPULATION	HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI)¹	GDP PER CAPITA
15.5M	INDEX: 0.401 RANK: 187/189	\$1,745
NEIGHBOURS	LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YRS)	RECS
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LIBYA SUDAN CAMEROON NIGER NIGERIA	54.0	ECCAS

ⁱ UNDP, Human Development Index 2019. Available at : <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TCD>

The Republic of Chad is a landlocked country in north-central Africa and a home to over 150¹ different ethnic and linguistic groups. Besides its rich ethnic and linguistic diversity, French and Arabic are the two official languages of the country, with the most popular religion being Islam (at 53-58%), followed by Christianity (at 35-40%).² Chad has been in a state of almost constant instability and protracted conflict since achieving independence in 1960. The legitimacy of President Idriss Déby Itno's government is being strongly contested on both political and socio-

economic fronts. It experiences recurrent political violence which revolves around contestation for power during and after elections and recurrent attempted coups. Ethnic and religious rivalries, as well as socio-economic crisis, further intensify the ongoing political grievances throughout the country. In addition, Chad is surrounded by conflicts from neighboring countries. Conflict dynamics in these neighboring countries exacerbates internal crises in Chad, making the conflict-prone country vulnerable to both national and regional instabilities.

¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Chad/Plant-and-animal-life>

² <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/pw136-debys-chad-political-manipulation-at-home-military-intervention-abroad-challenging-times-ahead.pdf>

CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

Centralization of Power

Although Chad has held regular presidential elections since 1996, none of them has ever produced a change in power. President Déby has dominated Chadian politics since ascending to power in 1990. He overwhelmingly won elections in 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 despite alleged electoral irregularities and successive opposition boycotts. The amendment of the constitution in 2005 and more recently in 2018 to consolidate power has triggered the country's political crisis and internal power struggle. Moreover, the fact that members of the Zaghawa ethnic group from the north, who are a demographic minority, have been in control of Chad's military, political and economic systems since the 1990s³ has created a serious discontent among most people. While southerners hold few ministerial positions in the current government, they have largely been excluded from political power, leading to ethnic tensions and increased violence in political and social relations.⁴

Socio-Economic Challenges

One of the structural causes of the current security situation in Chad is related to the country's socio-economic challenges. Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world with about 46.7%⁵ of the country's population living below the poverty line. Malnutrition (2.2M ppl.) and food insecurity (3.7M ppl.),⁶ as well as limited access to basic services such as health care and education have created seething resentment towards the government. They have caused unrest in the country and non-state armed groups have exploited these vulnerabilities to mobilize individuals discontented with livelihood insecurities. In addition, the resettlement of the northerners in the southern areas of the country has led to frequent clashes and violence between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities over land use rights. It has also placed mounting demographic pressure on the limited resources, eventually resulting in inter-community fighting and sectarian conflicts.

Spillover from Conflicts in Neighboring Countries

Chad's geo-strategic location makes the country subject to cross-border instability and spillover from conflict dynamics in neighboring countries. Conflicts in Sudan, Libya and the Central African Republic resulted in about 500,000 refugees and displaced persons being relocated to Chad.⁷ These refugees place additional pressure on the country's poor social services and systems. They heighten pressure on scarce resources and exacerbate tensions in the country. Moreover, the violent operations of Boko Haram affect countries in the region of the Lake Chad Basin, notably Chad, resulting in persistent insecurity in the country. Although the country has become a leader in the fight against terrorism under President Déby's rule, the resurgence of attacks by Boko Haram on Chad's western border with Nigeria still poses a major threat to national security.

3 ICG, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir>, 2019.

4 Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/chad/freedom-world/2020>,


5 OCHA, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Chad---Country-profile---September-2019-.pdf>

6 UN WFP, <https://www.wfp.org/countries/chad>, 2019.

7 <https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/unicef-chad-humanitarian-situation-report-1-january-30-june-2019>

ACTORS

FIGURE 2. ACTORS MAPPING



The Government

Chad is a presidential republic whereby the President serves as both the Head of State and Government. The ruling political party, Patriotic Movement of Salvation (MPS), and allied parties have been governing the country since 1996. They control majority of the parliament and ministerial positions with 117/188 seats⁸ at the unicameral National Assembly.⁹ The government's 2030 vision aims at making Chad an emerging country by then. In this regard, the government generally implements policies to advance security and uses its armed forces of an estimated 20,000 - 50,000¹⁰ troops of the Chadian National Army (ANT) and General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (DGSSIE) to curb unrest and maintain national integrity.

The Chadian armed force equally participates in three major anti-terrorist operations thus becoming one of the most respected armies in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions. It is a key contributor to the Multinational

Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel. The Chadian army is also the largest troop contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with more than 1,400 soldiers.¹¹ It is a member to several regional and international organizations such as the UN, OIF, AU, ECCAS and many others. Chad also maintains strong diplomatic ties with countries such as France and the USA.

Opposition Parties

There have been more than 150 opposition parties¹² in Chad since the reintroduction of the multi-party electoral system in 1996. The objective of these opposition parties is to attain national power and put an end to the long standing regime. The main opposition party is the National Union for Democracy and Renewal (UNDR), founded in 1992. The party has a strong representation and support in the southwest, Mayo-Kebi east and west, Kelo, Tandjilé as well as Moundou and Sarh. It is also the largest opposition party in the Parliament with 10 seats at the National Assembly. Its leader and the 2016 presidential elections

8 http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2061_E.htm

9 Legislative elections have not been held since 2011 and are expected to be held in April 2021.

10 USIP, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/pw136-debys-chad-political-manipulation-at-home-military-intervention-abroad-challenging-times-ahead.pdf>, 2017.

11 <https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFKCN21V0HT-OZATP>

12 <https://tsep.africa.ufl.edu/the-party-system-and-conditions-of-candidacy/chad/>

Runner-up (13% of the votes), Saleh Kebzabo, is the head of the country's opposition. The Union for Renewal and Democracy (URD) is the second largest opposition in parliament with 8 members at the National Assembly. Following the 2016 presidential elections which the opposition described as "an electoral coup," a coalition of 29 opposition parties formed the New Opposition Front for Change (FONAC). Opposition parties have repeatedly boycotted elections, protesting against alleged electoral irregularities and Déby's continuing tenure.¹³

The Civil Society

Since 2014, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), including sector-based pressure groups and campaigners for human rights, democracy and development, have been active in mobilizing street protests to decry living conditions, impunity and President Déby's continuing grip on power. In 2016, in particular, several civil society platforms such as Enough Is Enough and the Iyina youth movement protested during the presidential electoral campaign, demanding political change. Security forces, in March 2016, responded by arresting members of the Union of Trade Unions of Chad.¹⁴ Chadian authorities also arrested the spokespersons of Enough is Enough and Iyina youth movement. They were charged with "incitement to an unarmed gathering," "disobeying an order" and "disturbing public order."¹⁵ Popular discontent at the rising fuel and cooking gas costs again resulted in prolonged protest in 2018, while January 2020 saw public-sector workers strike as economic conditions continued to worsen in the country. Although CSO's protests have always dwindled to nothing, they nevertheless proved that popular discontent over livelihood conditions could rapidly lead to widespread demonstrations and demands for political change.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a jihadist militant organization founded in 2002 in Northeastern Nigeria by the late cleric Muhammed Yusuf. The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), faction of Boko Haram which operates in Chad, is engaged in large scale assaults primarily targeting military structures.¹⁶ Boko Haram began to spill over into the borders of Chad in 2014 and violence by the group rapidly escalated in the Lake Chad region throughout 2015, causing the death of hundreds of Chadians.¹⁷ The

Islamist group notably attacked the police headquarters and national police academy in N'Djamena in June 2015, killing 37 people and wounding more than 100 others.¹⁸ The Chadian government further witnessed the biggest military loss in Chadian history in March 2020 when Boko Haram combatants attacked a Chadian military base at Bohoma, killing 98 Chadian soldiers.¹⁹

Non-state Armed Rebel Groups

Chad has experienced the proliferation of rebel groups as a result of armed opposition politics that shaped successive governments in the post-independence era. These groups, mostly led by defectors from Chad's government and military,²⁰ aim at overthrowing the regime of President Déby. The Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), which emerged in 2006 under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri, was one of the largest Chadian rebel groups. It mainly operated in eastern Chad and had an estimated 2,000 - 3,000 militants²¹ under its command. In 2006, the UFDD led an unsuccessful offensive on Chad's capital, N'Djamena, in order to overthrow the government. The Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) is another alliance of rebel groups founded in 2009 and led by Timane Erdini. It receives strong support from the Zaghawa people²² (their estimated 4000 members consist mainly of Zaghawa fighters) and maintains close ties with Darfuri groups like the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).²³ The UFR tried to overthrow the government in 2019 but the attempted coup was aborted following French intervention. Moreover, a number of rebel groups unified under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri and Mahdi Ali Mahamat in 2016, forming the Front for the Change and Unity in Chad (FACT). FACT is a splinter group of the former UFDD and has an estimated 1000 combatants.²⁴ Several other Chadian rebel groups such as the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR), founded in 2016, equally seek to overthrow the government of President Déby.

13 Chad's opposition led a large-scale nationwide shutdown on 24 February 2016 to protest Déby's continuing tenure. The nationwide strike brought many of Chad's towns and the capital N'Djamena to a halt.
14 <https://www.civicus.org/index.php/fr/medias-ressources/112-news/899-media-statement-on-chad-release-civil-society-activists-ahead-of-april-10-elections>
15 Ibid
16 ISS, <https://issafrica.org/research/books-and-other-publications/factional-dynamics-within-boko-haram>, 2018
17 OCED, <https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/Eizenga-2018-OECD-chad.pdf>

18 Ibid
19 Daniel Eizenga, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chad-escalating-fight-against-boko-haram/>, April 2020.
20 USIP, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/USIP_1208_5.PDF
21 <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/tables-maps/HSBA-Chadian-Rebels-February-2008-1B9.pdf>
22 ICG, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir>, Feb 2019.
23 <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/archive/sudan/darfur/armed-groups/armed-opposition-groups/JEM/HSBA-Armed-Groups-URF.pdf>
24 USIP, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/pw136-debys-chad-political-manipulation-at-home-military-intervention-abroad-challenging-times-ahead.pdf>

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Since independence, Chad has experienced recurring instability, periodic violence, civil wars, coup d'états, authoritarianism and weak democratization fuelled by groups competing for political power and access to resources. Although President Déby reintroduced multi-party system in 1996, the elimination of presidential term limits in the 2005 constitutional referendum was the turning point for the more recent phase of the country's political crisis. The amended constitution, which enabled President Déby run and win a 4th term in 2011, was viewed by the opposition as clear evidence of his intention to keep himself in power. Opposition groups have since then questioned the legitimacy of President Déby's government and repeatedly protested against the regime, boycotting the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections. Following the 2011 presidential election boycotts, several national dialogues between the presidential majority parties and the political opposition were held, resulting in some political reforms.

President Déby, however, faced mounting disapproval in public opinion and strong electoral challenges during the 2016 presidential elections. The opposition organized mass protests in N'Djamena and other major cities on 24 February 2016 against Déby's bid to contest for a fifth term in office. These protests were triggered by the kidnapping and gang raping of the teenage daughter of one of the opposition candidates on 8 February.²⁵ It led to the emergence of a coalition of anti-regime civil society groups demanding political change. Chadian authorities suppressed the movement by banning scheduled demonstrations and arresting the civil society leaders who planned the rallies.²⁶ The 2016 presidential elections did not only portray the main dynamics that characterized the relationship between the government and those seeking democratic change in Chad, but also underscored the extent to which President Déby had consolidated political power. This was further apparent with the 2018 constitution which gave President Déby the opportunity to remain in power until 2033. This law only exacerbates political violence in Chad and further jeopardizes the current regime's ability to claim political legitimacy nationally. Moreover, legislative elections have been routinely postponed since 2011. In

fact, Chad does not hold regular legislative elections, a defining feature of democratic rule, government accountability and political legitimacy.²⁷

The struggle for political power also led to the emergence of several rebel groups that have attempted on several occasions to overthrow the government. In February 2008, three rebel groups (UFDD, RFC and FUC) joined forces and launched an attack on N'Djamena and that almost overthrew the government of President Déby. Following the attack, the Chadian government declared a state of emergency and enacted security measures to guard the capital against possible future coup attempt. France's intervention equally came in support of the Chadian authorities and forced the rebels to retreat. The 2008 coup attempt symbolized the collapse of the Sirte Peace Agreement which was signed on October 25, 2007 between the Chadian government and rebel groups.²⁸ A group of Chadian rebels (UFR) again tried to overthrow the government in February 2019. The plan was aborted following France's intervention (Operation Barkhane) on 3-6 February 2019 at the request of Chadian authorities. While most Chadians are against coup attempts and condemn the incursions of rebel groups into their territory, many have also criticized the support given by France to the government.²⁹

Other conflicts such as those in the eastern regions of Chad particularly in Ouaddai (bordering Darfur), where inter-communal fighting persists, threaten Chadian stability.³⁰ Chad's northern border with Libya and its recurrent closure due to insecurity has also been one of the serious security concerns. Raids across Chad's southern border into CAR and the artisanal gold mining sites in Tibesti region have proven very challenging to the Chadian government to control and have been plagued by lawlessness and rebel financing.³¹

Compounding this is the emergence of insurgency groups particularly in the Lake Chad region where Boko Haram continues to present a security problem. This caused the National Assembly to establish a state of emergency in the Lake region, effectively placing it under military administration in November 2015. The government also

25 Newsweek, Chad Opposition Protests, 25 February 2015.
26 OECD, <https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/files/Eizen-ga-2018-OECD-chad.pdf>

27 OECD, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/the-unstable-foundations-of-political-stability-in-chad_508844d3-en, 2018.

28 <https://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24430>

29 ICG, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/au-tchad-lincursion-des-rebelles-devoile-les-fragilites-du-pouvoir>
30 Aljazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/9/chad-intercommunal-conflict-national-concern-after-37-killed>, 2019.

31 Luca Raineri, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/003932729.2020.1833475?scroll=top&needAccess=true>, Nov 2020.

reinstated death penalty for terrorist crimes and increased police presence in N'Djamena. The threat posed by Boko Haram also led to the reactivation of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with its headquarters based in N'Djamena. Boko Haram's attack on a Chadian military base at Bohoma in March 2020, however, resulted in the death of 98 Chadian soldiers³², the biggest military loss in Chadian history. In response to this military loss, the Chadian armed forces launched a major offensive against Boko Haram in April 2020 leading to the death of at least 1000 Boko Haram fighters.³³

32 Daniel Eizenga, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chad-escalating-fight-against-boko-haram/>, April 2020.

33 Aljazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/chadian-troops-kill-1000-boko-haram-fighters-lake-chad-200409183528130.html>, April 2020.

CURRENT RESPONSE ASSESSMENT

The African Union

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU PSC) called on the government and the opposition to unconditionally renounce the use of force and engage in constructive dialogue aimed at finding a peaceful and lasting solution to the problems facing Chad.³⁴ The AU PSC also renewed the mandate of the MNJTF for another period of twelve (12) months, effective 31 January 2020.³⁵ The AU further authorized the deployment of an Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) in Chad to oversee the April 2016 Presidential Elections while the AU Chairperson issued a diplomatic statement on 24 March 2020, following Boko Haram's attacks in Nigeria and Chad.³⁶

The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)

As Boko Haram's activities extended across the Lake Chad Basin Region, concerns over regional security increased pushing countries towards collaborative military engagement. This led to the reactivation of the MNJTF by the LCBC on 30 April 2012 with an additional mandate to encompass counter-terrorism operations. The MNJTF was later given a clearer mandate against Boko Haram on October 7, 2014 at the Extraordinary Summit of LCBC member states and Benin.³⁷ Formally authorized for deployment by AU PSC on 29 January 2015, the MNJTF had troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin among other countries.

International Partners

France intervened in 2006, 2008 and 2019³⁸ to prevent coup attempts in Chad while the UN Security Council issued a statement in May 2009, condemning the military incursions in eastern Chad by armed groups.³⁹ The US equally issued a joint statement with other diplomatic representatives in Chad in 2017 on the detention of civil society activists.⁴⁰ In addition, the EU Force in Chad (EUFOR) and UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) have both concentrated on the protection of civilians in and near refugee camps.⁴¹ International partners such as the UN, EU, US, France, Britain, China, Canada, Israel and Turkey have also provided financial and humanitarian support, training, military advisors as well as intelligence and surveillance capabilities to the MNJTF.

34 AU, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-peace-and-security-council-chad-1>

35 Ibid

36 AU, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200324/communique-chairperson-boko-haram-attacks-nigeria-and-chad>

37 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14200.pdf>, 2017.

38 ISPI, <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publicazione/chad-frances-role-and-political-instability-23842>

39 UN, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF-CF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sudan%20SPRST200913.pdf>

40 <https://td.usembassy.gov/joint-local-declaration-european-union-embassy-federal-republic-germany-embassy-france-embassy-united-states-2/>

41 USIP, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/USIP_1208_5.PDF

Best Case Scenario

The best case scenario would be a peaceful overturn of power through political and institutional reforms that would put in place a controlling mechanism on the executive government and help the promotion of representative government in the legislature as well as independence in the judiciary. Power changes in Chad usually came about through military coups with a host of authoritarian regimes following one another. A drift away from such a tradition would, however, help to create a clear and institutionalized pathway by which political power could be transferred peacefully. This would result in the opening up of political space for increased democratization in Chad and mitigate future conflict with armed groups. It would also lead to the reduction of ethnic and religious tensions that are triggers of violence in many parts of the country.

Similarly, the decimation and total defeat of Boko Haram in Chad and other countries affected by the group's insurgency would be a best case scenario. If this occurs, it will prevent the spread of Boko Haram's operations in other regions of the country that are not directly affected by the group's violent attacks. This scenario will also enable Chad to deploy more resources to deal with the root causes of its internal conflicts.

Worst Case Scenario

The worst case scenario for Chad would be an escalation of violence and subsequent collapse of the government as political elites and rebel groups continue to be at odds with each other in trying to secure power. In the case of Boko Haram, the worst case scenario would be the expansion of the Islamist group's operations to other regions of Chad. Under this worst case scenario, political and economic instability will worsen while on-going humanitarian crisis will deepen. This scenario could also have a negative impact on the achievement of the country's Vision 2030, 'The Chad We Want.' It could also make the implementation of continental development frameworks such as the African Union Agenda 2063, 'The Africa We Want', and the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda a clear impossibility in Chad.

Most Likely Scenario

The most likely scenario is the continuation of cyclical internal conflicts. Under this scenario, the country will experience economic crisis, fragile peace and a series of insecurity problems, without necessarily descending into full-scale civil war. It is, therefore, likely that political violence and coup attempts will be recurrent until Chadian opposition groups and rebel groups see alternatives to violent transfer of power. The Chadian government will also continue its campaign against Boko Haram although this may not lead to a total defeat of the group. Boko Haram will likely remain a threat to national and regional security as it will continue to demonstrate its ability to carry out significant terrorist attacks in the Region of the Lake Chad Basin.

STRATEGIC OPTIONS

To the National Government

- Enhancing and promoting democratic practices are all within the purview of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). In line with this, the government of Chad should vigorously implement the ACDEG to improve the democratic governance and human rights situation in the country.
- The government of Chad, as per Article 3(f) of the PSC Protocol, should ensure that security operations aimed at preserving national stability are conducted with full respect to international and regional laws to which it is signatory.
- Chadian authorities should define a clear policy for rehabilitation and reintegration of former Boko Haram fighters in order to prevent an unending cycle of violence in a country that has already witnessed decades of civil conflicts that predate the Boko Haram insurgency.

To the African Union and RECs

- The AU, ECCAS, and LCBC should redouble their collaborative efforts towards mobilizing additional resources and support to the MNJTF in order to strengthen its operational capacities. This will be in line with Article 7(j) and Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, as well as Article 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU and RECs.
- Although the principles of sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity are enshrined in the statutes of the AU and RECs, there is a need for the AU and/or RECs to reconcile the warring factions in Chad and press for internal political reforms. This will prevent further escalation and spillover of Chad's internal crisis into the region.

- Cynthia Happi (2020). Violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin Region: Evolution and Impact of Boko Haram. Available at: <http://ipss-addis.org/download/violent-extremism-in-the-lake-chad-basin-region-evolution-and-impact-of-boko-haram/>
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CONFLICT TIMELINE

1960–2021

1960 – Chad gains independence from France on 11 August 1960 under the leadership of François Tombalbaye.

1963 – François Tombalbaye bans political parties and this triggers violent protests in the Northern region of Chad.

1965 – Muslims in the north, led by the National Liberation Front of Chad (French: Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad, FRONILAT), begin a civil war.

1975 – Tombalbaye is overthrown and killed. He is succeeded by Félix Malloum, a military general who ruled until 1979.

1979 – Goukouni Oueddei succeeds Félix Malloum as leader of Chad and rules until 1982.

1982 – Hissène Habré seizes control of government through a coup d'état. He leads a one-party dictatorship government until 1990 when he is overthrown by Idriss Déby.

1990 – Idriss Déby Itno and his party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement, ascend to power.

1996 – Idriss Déby Itno wins Chad's first multi-party presidential election.

2001 – Idriss Déby Itno runs for a second term and overwhelmingly wins presidential election.

2005 – Constitutional amendments allow President Idriss Déby Itno to stand for a third term in 2006.

2006 – Rebel groups seeking to overthrow President Déby's government launch an assault in N'Djamena on 13 April 2006. Chad cuts diplomatic ties with Sudan, accusing it of backing the rebels.

2006 – President Déby is declared winner of presidential elections in May. The main opposition parties boycott the poll.

2007 – UN Security Council authorizes UN-European Union peacekeeping force (EUFOR) to protect civilians from violence spilling over from Darfur in neighboring Sudan.

2007 – The Sirte Peace Agreement is signed on 25 October 2007 between the Chadian government and rebel groups.

2008 – Rebel groups join forces and launch an attack on N'Djamena which almost overthrows the government of President Déby.

2010 – Chad-Sudan border reopens seven years after Darfur conflict forced its closure. An agreement for the restoration of harmony between Chad and Sudan, signed 15 January 2010, marks the end of a five-year war.

2011 – Déby runs for fourth term and wins presidential election boycotted by opposition.

2013 – Leaders of political parties constituting both the political opposition and presidential majority sign a political accord in an effort to improve the electoral process.

2014 – Spillover of Boko Haram's insurgency into Chadian borders with thousands of Nigerian refugees seeking shelter in the Lake Chad Region.

2015 – Boko Haram suicide bombers simultaneously attack the police headquarters and national police academy in N'Djamena in June 2015 killing 37 people and wounding more than 100 others.

2016 February – The opposition organizes countrywide protests on 24 February 2016 against President Déby's bid to contest for a fifth term in office.

2016 April - President Déby is declared winner of the presidential elections.

2018 - A new constitution expanding the president's powers is approved by the National Assembly and signed into law by President Déby.

2019 February - Chadian rebels attempt to overthrow President Idriss Déby's government. The plan is aborted following French military intervention on 3-6 February 2019.

2020 March - MNJTF's raid on 23 March results in the death of 92 Chadian troops killed by Boko Haram militants, the biggest military loss in Chadian history.

2020 April - Chadian armed forces launch a major offensive against Boko Haram leading to the death of at least 1000 Boko Haram fighters.

2020 July - Electoral Commission and National Framework for Political Dialogue (CNDP) publish election calendar, scheduling presidential election for 11 April 2021 and legislative elections for 24 Oct 2021.

2021 April 19 - Electoral officials declared President Deby the winner of the April 11 presidential election.

2021 April 20 - President Deby dies on frontline

Peace and Security Reports

Although key continental and regional institutions have their own early warning reporting systems, policy making within these institutions also benefit from a number of analytical and periodic reports generated by think tanks and research institutes. The Research Unit at IPSS provides brief and critical analyses of the state of peace and security in different African countries as well as critical appraisals of interventions by various African actors. The reports will cover African countries showing positive signs as well as those undergoing negative developments.



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