



Towards a New Geopolitical Architecture in the Horn of Africa

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Executive Summary

The Horn of Africa is the most complex geopolitical phenomenon in the world, with a plethora of cross-border conflict systems, which give it a strategic location in global geopolitics. However, the great geopolitical potential of the Horn of Africa is undermined by a lack of consistent and unified geopolitical architecture due to contradictory ideologies, colonial legacies, state fragility, ethnic and religious extremism, and inconsistent and contradictory models of regional integration. There is need for a new geopolitical architecture (NGA) that includes a coordinated preventive security architecture (PSA) among the various countries of this conflict-prone region. This preventive security architecture is premised on a new conception of security anchored on three crucial pillars: inclusive political and economic participation; state cohesion; a robust regional integration or cross-border cooperation. This new paradigm for geopolitics and security combines hybrid elements of both negative (armed interventions to secure peace or territorial integrity) and positive peace, considering security not as an event but as a process just like nation-building. The policy brief will address issues of contested states, sovereignty, competing geopolitical interests and ineffective and contradictory regional integration frameworks, relying on African-centered solutions. The major policy recommendation is for the Horn of Africa countries to cooperate in the utilization of the strategic resources such as the Nile, Lake Victoria, the Red Sea, cross-border infrastructure, new RECs architecture, and human capital—demographic dividend, tourism and security framework.

Key Points

- The Horn of Africa is one of the most strategic regions in global geopolitics;
- Lack of a consistent and unified geopolitical architecture ;
- Contradictory ideologies, colonial legacies, state fragility, ethnic and religious extremism undermine full political and economic integration;
- Inconsistent and contradictory models of regional integration pose a threat to peace and security in the Horn of Africa;
- A new geopolitical architecture (NGA) is needed that includes a coordinated preventive security architecture (PSA), inclusion; state cohesion; and cross-border cooperation;
- Need to rely on African-centered solutions; and
- Cooperative use of strategic resources.

Introduction: Horn of Africa: Mapping complex geopolitics

The Horn of Africa is a contested geopolitical entity, with the most complex security and political risks in the world.¹ The Horn of Africa can be considered as a microcosm of the entire African continent: “Recent research in paleoanthropology has given rise to the belief that the Ethiopian section of the African Rift Valley was the original home of humanity.”²

No decade passes without major security, political and humanitarian crises in the Horn of Africa and its close neighbor the Great Lakes Region. From a geopolitical perspective, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region are interconnected.

The countries of the Horn are: Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and DRC.³ If we put into consideration the Nile as a key geopolitical resource of this region, then Egypt should be included. The countries that constitute the Nile Basin are: DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, and Egypt. This is an area of 2.9 million square kms—about 10% of the African continent. The fact that the Nile starts from Uganda and from Ethiopia, makes a compelling case for redefining the Horn of Africa to include all the countries of the Nile Basin.

Countries of this region face similar common external and internal threats: 1) colonial history that left arbitrary borders that are a cause of separatist movements; 2) state fragility; 3) neo-patrimonialism and economy of affection (governing countries through a mish-mash of formal and informal institutions, and using public resources for private gains, that some call corruption or graft);⁴ 4) over-dependence on export of primary commodities; 5) ethnicized

politics of exclusion; 6) terrorist attacks; 7) cross-border conflicts; and 8) geopolitical rivalry. While there are RECs such as IGAD, EAC and COMESA, that try to promote regional integration and peace in the Horn of Africa, unity and security have remained elusive.

Geopolitics refers to the role of geographical factors in impacting power (economic and political) relations among nations. For the Horn of Africa, significant geographical and other factors that shape its geopolitics include: global superpower rivalry; proximity to the Middle-East conflict zone; diverse and complex colonial history; enclosure between the Red Sea, Suez Canal and the Bab el Mandeb; enclosure between the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden-Indian Ocean to the East and the Nile Valley to the West; geology--Great Rift Valley, Volcanism, which are major sources of tourism in the region; paleontology and archeology.

Reasons why the Horn of Africa enjoys such great geopolitical advantage and complexity in addition to the above factors include: 1) the Oil-rich Arab nations would like to dominate the region both militarily and economically; 2) western powers such as the US, and Europe want to ensure the region’s security to safeguard their commercial and military interests, including the security of Israel which is a major ally of the West; 3) Israel’s problems with the Arab world necessitates that she gets non-Arab allies in the Horn of Africa; 4) once in a while conflicts among Arab states spill over to the Horn of Africa; and 5) proximity to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. To these add the crucial factor that the Horn of Africa is a sanctuary of refugees from Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, DRC, South Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi.

From a cultural point of view, the Horn of Africa is also very strategic. First, it is where the main Abrahamic faiths converge: Islam, Christianity and Judaism, with Ethiopia being where these faiths co-exist harmoniously.⁵ To this add African

traditional religions that blend well with these other religions. When not handled, these religions have led to extremist movements such as the Lord's Resistance Movement and Al-Shabab. Second, the Horn of Africa is home to the major dominant tribes or races of Africa: Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic, Omotic, Semitic and Hamitic. The other major fault-line is the Nile River, which, for historical reasons has been a source of tension among the Riparian states with regard to the use of its waters, as a result of unjust colonial treaties.

Discussion

Any discussion of the geopolitics in the Horn of Africa has to take cognizance of the impact of the post-cold war multipolar global system on the entire African continent. The Horn of Africa is intimately linked to the colonial state-formation process due to the continued relevance of colonial ties. Somalia has both British (Somaliland) and Italian ties, Eritrea was colonized by Italy, and Italy had a brief period of occupation in Ethiopia (the only African country that was not colonized). Djibouti is a former French colony and currently hosts military bases of the world's major powers. Uganda, Kenya and Sudan were colonized by Britain; while Tanzania was colonized by Germany but was later added to the British sphere of influence after Germany's defeat during World War II. DRC, Rwanda and Burundi were colonized by Belgium but with great influence from France.

When the bipolar world took shape and East-West cold-war rivalries ended, Africa lost its strategic importance. This partly explains state collapse in Somalia, conflict in the then Sudan, upsurge of armed rebel groups in the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. There was relative disengagement of major powers from Africa. On the other hand, Africa could not be ignored completely since the new armed conflicts. The influx of refugees and

market failure caught the attention of the international community as potential causes of state break-down that would in turn disrupt the global system.

Geopolitical Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa have led to a large number of refugees that have settled in the Horn of Africa from South Sudan, Eritrea⁶, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Somalia, and even from outside the region such as Yemen. The recent estimate puts the number of refugees in Ethiopia at 800, 000—making Ethiopia home to the second largest number of refugees in Africa after Uganda that has over 1 million refugees, mainly from South Sudan. The security and political risk that large numbers of refugees pose to the region, cannot be underestimated. Governments within the region have been overthrown by refugees who fled their countries decades ago, and cross-border incursions are a common phenomenon.

Types of Geopolitical Security and Humanitarian Crises in the Horn of Africa

Ethiopia: War with Eritrea - Territory (1998/2000)

Rwanda: Genocide - Ethnicity and politics (1994)

Sudan: Armed rebellion in Darfur - Racial, territory - religion (1980s to the present)

Somalia: Civil war and armed violence - Clan and politics (1990s to the present)

Burundi: Civil war and armed violence - Ethnicity (1990s to the present)

DRC: Armed rebellions - Resources (copper, coltan, diamonds, gold, cobalt) (1997 to the present)

Kenya: Terrorist attacks - Islamic extremism by Al Shabaab in Somalia (1998 to the present)

Uganda: Influx of refugees from South Sudan - Civil in South Sudan (1990s to the present)

South Sudan: Civil war and armed rebellion - Racial and religious intolerance (1980s to the present)

Tanzania: Influx of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi - Ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi (1990s)

A close look at the major conflicts in the Horn of Africa reveals a certain pattern of both centrifugal and centripetal geopolitical forces at work. While the latter involves tendencies to move to the core of some nativist identity such as tribal, religious and nationalist identities coupled with regime survival, the former tends to move away from the center to embrace a broader vision of regional integration and pan-Africanism.

Just to cite an example of how a country of the Horn can maximize its geopolitical advantage. Eritrea used the Red Sea and the civil war in Yemen to ally itself with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by offering its port of Assab as a base for operations in Yemen, but also acquiring funds from the EU for its refugee crisis.⁷ The tangled politics of the Horn of Africa easily serves the geopolitical interests of the region's countries, but often times to the detriment of the region's peace and security. It is not surprising that Eritrea has been supporting Islamists in Somalia and has consequently withdrawn from IGAD—short term geopolitical gains at the expense of regional security.

Soft Geopolitics in the Horn of Africa

Countries of the Horn of Africa such as Uganda and Ethiopia are hailed as models of hospitality for refugees, despite their own internal security

and economic challenges. Furthermore, some of these countries are heavily involved in peace-keeping missions across Africa. Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda have strategically positioned themselves geopolitically and are to attract foreign aid and military support in exchange for their contribution to peace missions.⁸ Both Uganda and Ethiopia have adopted a refugee policy that is very progressive and enables refugees to be integrated into the host country and hence become eligible to get jobs. Refugees will henceforth be seen as catalysts of regional integration from below and not just as victims of protracted conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

Just like the rest of the continent, the Horn of Africa boasts of, what has been dubbed, “demographic dividend” but what this means concretely is yet to be teased out. Having 65% of the population in Africa is under 30, presenting both enormous challenges and opportunities. Under soft geopolitics are issues of youth, women and culture that are taken seriously in AU's Agenda 2063 and African Governance Architecture (AGA). AU has initiated both normative and institutional frameworks that aim at involving youth in democratic governance processes, such as the African Governance Architecture—Youth Engagement Strategy (AGA-YES).⁹ AU's Constitutive Act Article 4(g) provides for popular participation, while Article 4(c) provides for participation of African people in the activities of the AU—African people include youth. But so far, only Uganda has a special category of youth as members of parliament. If youth are not engaged in economic development and governance, they become easy targets of recruitment among extremist, terrorist and rebel groups. Moreover, Africa's aspirations for 2063 include: “An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth...”¹⁰ Youth are becoming increasingly innovative in their use of social media and Information Communication Technology (ICT). This mode of communication

and mobilization is key to promoting regional integration from the ground. Social media as a tool for political mobilization and advocacy has been widely observed, particularly during the Arab Spring.

The other element of soft-geopolitics is culture. One of the Agenda 2063 aspirations is on culture: “An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics”.¹¹ The goal of this aspiration is African cultural renaissance, and priority areas being: values and ideals of pan-Africanism, cultural values and African renaissance, cultural heritage, creative arts and business.

“United We Stand”: Rethinking Colonial Boundaries

Despite the colonial boundaries and numerous linguistic groups in the Horn of Africa, there is a constant urge for unity manifested by the increasing use of Swahili in a good number of the Horn of Africa countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, South Sudan and Somalia) as a uniting factor. There is also the growing call for a more robust political federation of the Eastern African states. The move towards regional integration is expressed in such initiatives as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) that includes Tanzania and DRC, East African Community (EAC) that includes Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan, Nile Basin Treaty, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the AU. However, there is no regional block officially recognized as “The Horn of Africa.”

What do RECs hope to achieve through regionalism? It is to end the three interrelated crises in the Horn of Africa:¹² 1) conflicts (interstate wars, civil wars and inter-communal conflicts); 2) economic crisis (poverty, chronic

food shortage and recurring cycles of famine); 3) environmental degradation (soil erosion, loss of biodiversity and desertification). Important to observe that these crises reinforce each other: conflicts cause poverty by disrupting economic activities; poverty leads to environmental degradation as the poor use forests for fuel; and poverty and competition for natural resources lead to conflict. Regional integration as a post-cold war form of geopolitics has four main goals: 1) Maintaining peace; 2) Attaining greater multi-purpose capabilities; 3) Addressing specific challenges of member countries; 4) Attaining a new identity unlike that imposed by colonial borders.

Horn of Africa RECs and their main Vision

COMESA:

To have a fully integrated internationally competitive regional economic community within which there is economic prosperity and peace as evidenced by political and social stability and high standards of living for its people.

EAC:

To attain a prosperous, competitive, secure and politically united East Africa.

IGAD:

The promotion of joint development strategies; the gradual harmonization of macroeconomic policies in the social, technological, and scientific fields; and the harmonization of policies on trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources.

The most important geopolitical resource for the Horn of Africa is the African continent itself. Currently intra-African trade stands at around 11%, although in some regions it is about 25%. Only recently has there been a move to form a Tripartite Free Trade Area of COMESA/SADC/EAC made of 26 countries with a potential population of 625 million and

with a combined GDP of US \$ 1.2 trillion— which is 58% of the continent’s GDP.¹³

United by the Waters of the Nile: Hydropolitics is Geopolitics

The other geopolitical phenomenon is the Nile Basin consisting of all the countries that River Nile traverses or those that serve as its hinterland (Burundi, DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda).¹⁴ The Rift Valley, River Nile, Lake Tana (source of Blue Nile in Ethiopia), Lake Victoria (source of White Nile in Uganda), the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, are the major geographical landmarks of the Horn of Africa, that give it its unique geographical and strategic location in Africa, and the entire world.

The connection between the Nile and the ‘scramble for Africa’ is well articulated by Prof. Kinfe Abraham: “The Nile was also an important element in the context of the scramble for Africa and the colonial power rivalry between Britain and France with Italy being used by Britain to keep France out of the Nile Basin Area.”¹⁵

Part of the root causes of unending crises in the Horn of Africa are the colonially-defined borders that divided ethnic communities and nationalities that have deep historical roots. With cross-border kinship ties, conflicts also cross boundaries as have been the cases between Somalia and Kenya, DRC and Rwanda, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as Burundi and Rwanda. People are caught between two identities—citizens and subjects—a few who enjoy the benefits and rights of the modern post-colonial state, and the majority who are still under the authority of traditional chiefs, in Africa’s bifurcated states.¹⁶ The tragic consequences of colonialism and nativism as twin evils in post-colonial Africa’s political developments have

been well documented with specific reference to Rwanda’s genocide and its aftermath.¹⁷

But before any geopolitical architecture can be helpful in addressing regional challenges of the Horn of Africa, the respective member countries under their political leaders, have to demonstrate a willingness to address the following major issues: (1) ethnicized politics; (2) ethnicized militarism; (3) tyrannical and repressive political culture of hybrid regimes; (4) failure to have a clear transition plan and a desire to cling to power against constitutional frameworks; (5) constitutions without constitutionalism; (6) development without corresponding democratic participation and inclusion; (7) Religious fundamentalism and extremism. It is these factors, inter alia, that have brought about ethno-political and religious intolerance, state failure and secessionist tendencies in the Horn of Africa.

Positive and Negative Peace Approaches in the Horn of Africa—AU/UN and RECs Models

Several interventions by the AU and RECs have taken place under the rubric of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), involving the UN, AU and RECs. So far five peace operations have been established in the Horn of Africa:¹⁸ AMISOM in Somalia—the largest and most costly operation with 22,100 forces; United Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with 12,523 forces; United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) with 17,554 forces; UN mission in DRC (MONUSCO) with 19,784 forces; Regional Task Force-LRA AU and African Sub-regional Organizations with 5,000 forces. The case for a more robust regional integration model is supported by the case of Uganda and its fight against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that has engulfed DRC, Central African Republic (CAR) South Sudan and Uganda. If the interventions above were done by the support of regional blocks that have more political and

military clout such as ECOWAS and SADC, the interventions would be more effective.

There are also cases of conflicts in 2016 that erupted in violent crisis and yet the AU and RECs did not intervene to prevent them. AU's continental security architecture (APSA) consists of a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) that is charged with authorizing peacekeeping missions; an AU Commission that coordinates operations; a panel of the wise that advises on mediation efforts; a Continental Early Warning System that gathers information on potential conflicts; An African Standby Force (ASF) and a Peace Fund that finances peacekeeping operations.¹⁹ APSA actors have mediated the following agreements in the Horn of Africa between July 2015 and June 2016:²⁰

- 16 March 2016—Somali (federalization process/inter-militia rivalry—the result was inter-clan reconciliation peace agreement reached in Kismayo, Somalia);
- 21 March 2016—Sudan (inter-communal violence/Darfur); Sudan (opposition); Sudan (SPLM/A-North/South Kordofan, Blue Nile/Sudan-South Sudan, South Sudan (Abyei)—Roadmap agreement signed between the government and opposition groups;
- 17 August 2015—South Sudan (civil war)—Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- 14 October 2015—Sudan (SPLM/A-North/South Kodfofan, Blue Nile/Sudan-South Sudan)—Joint Political and Security Mechanism agree on the demarcation of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa, their intensity and form of intervention

Somalia: (government and al-Shabaab): War-Highly violent Level 5 - *AMISOM (2007)*

South Sudan: (civil war) : highly violent level 5 - *UNMISS (2011)*

Sudan (communities): war in Darfur - *UNAMID (2007)*

DRC: (Rebel groups) : Violent crisis level 3 - *MONUSCO (2010)*

Uganda: (LRA) : violent crisis level 3 - *Regional Task Force-LRA*

Some major reasons why APSA and RECs have failed to intervene in some of the conflict situations in the Horn of Africa are the principles of respecting the territorial integrity of member countries and the principle of non-interference. However, the AU has since made some provision for intervention under certain circumstances. There are situations where member countries are also involved in the very conflict they are supposed to mediate or prevent²¹—this is one of the major obstacles to peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

Conclusions

The Horn of Africa is a complex web of interlocking geopolitical systems whose future trajectory is yet to be understood. It is a region of great political and economic potential if its diverse geographies, cultures and identities can be well-harnessed through carefully designed and well-coordinated regional integration frameworks. Protracted conflicts in the Horn of Africa rotate around arbitrary state borders, identity, and failed political processes. Even though some mediation measures and diplomacy have been tried under APSA, these interventions need to be improved through adequate funding and political will on the part of member countries. Self-interest and narrow geopolitical interests have also undermined the AU and RECs interventions.

IGAD, COMESA and EAC as the main regional integration blocks where the Horn of Africa countries are situated, need to harmonize their frameworks with the broader vision of AU's APSA and Agenda 2063. The Horn of Africa needs to learn from best practices from successful RECs model such as ECOWAS as far as intervention is concerned. Given the fragility of states in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia stands a better chance as the pivot of the region, in the anticipated geopolitical architecture that integrates and domesticates principles of APSA within the IGAD, COMESA and EAC RECs framework. A larger regional integration model that includes all the countries of the Horn of Africa is the best guarantor for peace, security and sustainable development in the Horn of Africa.

Recommendations

- Set up a Horn of Africa Early Warning System to track and anticipate violent conflicts.
 - Utilize maximally the knowledge services available at UNECA and AU and broaden research programs at IPSS, in collaboration with African academic institutions.
 - Work towards making IGAD a more robust REC following the model of SADC, ECOWAS and EAC so as to be able to handle complex geopolitical emergencies.
 - Expedite the ratification and operationalization of AfCFTA as part of Africa's geopolitical strategy.
 - Invest more in soft-geopolitics (cultural and religious practices, role of youth, women and civil society) as part of regional integration from below.
- Work towards a Greater Horn of Africa regional block that incorporates IGAD, COMESA, EAC, with Ethiopia as its pivot, given its strategic location as headquarters of the AU.
 - Include political integration, governance, citizenship, sovereignty issues as crucial elements in RECs framework, and as of equal importance as trade, investment, security, and infrastructure issues.

End Notes

¹ See Mesfin Wolde-Mariam (1999), *The Horn of Africa : Conflict and Poverty* (Addis Ababa: Commercial Printing Press), pp. 68-88, 153-156; Christopher Clapham (2017), *The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay* (London: Hurst & Company), pp. 31-63, 111-140. For the crises in the Great Lakes Region that have led to genocides, massive displacement and cross-border armed conflicts, and the role of external forces, see African Union (2000), *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide – The Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events* (Addis Ababa), pp. 39-132; Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (Eds) (1999), *The Path of Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Jersey: New Brunswick), pp. 3-91; John F. Clark (Ed) (2002), *African Stakes of the Congo War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 33-50, 129-164.

² Richard Pankhurst (1998), *The Ethiopians* (Malden, Massachusetts,), p. 1. See also, Cheikh Anta Diop, (1974) *The African Origins of Civilization: Myth or Reality* (Chicago Illinois: Lawrence Hill Books), pp. 260-275.

³ Conventional conception of the Horn of Africa generally restricts the countries of the region to: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. To capture the entire reality a new concept of The Greater Horn has been devised to include Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. For detailed discussion countries of the Horn of Africa see, Mesfin Wolde-Marian, *Ibid. op. cit.*, pp. 68-75; Petros J. Gebeto (2010), *No More Thirst: The Citizens of the Nile* (Addis Ababa: Rohobot Printers), pp. 7-12.

⁴ See Gero Erdman (2013), "Neopatrimonialism and Political regimes", Goran Hyden (2013) "Economy of Affection" Nic Cheeseman et al. (Eds) (2013), *Routledge Handbook of African Politics* (New York: Routledge), pp. 59-69, 334-345.

⁵ See Gerard Prunier and Eloi Fiquet (Eds) (2015), *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Melese Zenawi* (London: Hurst & Company, London), pp. 63-91, 93-146. Ethiopia's 2007 population census figures show that 43.5 per cent of the population are Orthodox, 33.9 per cent are Muslims, and 18.6 per cent are Protestants, while Catholics are 0.8 per cent.

⁶ See Christopher Clapham, *op. cit.* pp. 131-132.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

⁸ See Tobias Hagmann and Filip Reyntjens (Eds) (2016), *Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa: Development Without Democracy* (London: Zed Books), pp., 44-66, 67-118.

⁹ See Lauren Tracey and Edward Kahuthia "Beyond Rhetoric: Engaging Africa's Youth in Democratic governance", Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief 99/February 2017, p. 1.

¹⁰ African Union (2015), *Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want – Framework Document*, (Addis Ababa: African Union Commission), p. 29.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹² See Kidane Mengisteab (2012) "Relevance of Regional Integration in the Greater Horn Region" in Kidane Mengisteaba & Redie Bereketeb (Eds) (2012), *Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa* (Suffolk: James Currey), p. 3.

¹³ Table replaced

¹⁴ Petros J. Gebeto, *No More Thirst: The Citizens of the Nile* (Addis Ababa, 2010), pp. 7-12; Prof. Kifle Abraham, *Nile Dilemmas: Hydropolitics and Potential Conflict Flashpoints* (EIIPD & HADAD, 2004), pp. 13-39.

¹⁵ Kifle Abraham, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁶ See Mahmood Mamdani (1996), *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and Legacy of Late Colonialism* (New Jersey: Princeton).

¹⁷ See, Mahmood Mamdani (2001), *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda* (Oxford: James Currey).

¹⁸ See APSA Impact Report (2015), *Impact Analysis of Interventions by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa*, p. 44.

¹⁹ See Center for Conflict Resolution (2014), *Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Post-Cold War Africa* (Capetown: Center for Conflict Resolution), p. 2

²⁰ See APSA Impact Report 2016, *Assessment of Impacts of Intervention by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in 2016 in the Frame of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)* (Addis Ababa: Institute of Peace and Security Studies), p. 41.

²¹ For a detailed discussion on this issue see, Mwesiga Baregu (Ed) (2011), *Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, Interests, and Strategies in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers), pp. 1-28, 61-144

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