

APSA Impact Report

The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015



Impact Analysis of Interventions

by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities
in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa

Reporting Period

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Abbreviations

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| ACIRC | African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises |
| AFRIPOL | African Police Cooperation Organisation |
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| AGA | African Governance Architecture |
| AMANI | Field Exercise of the African Standby Force |
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| AMU | Arab Maghreb Union |
| APF | African Peace Facility |
| APSA | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| APSTA | African Peace Support Trainers Association |
| ASC | African Standby Capacity |
| ASF | African Standby Force |
| ASI | African Solidarity Initiative |
| AU | African Union |
| AUC | African Union Commission |
| AULOs | African Union Liaison Offices |
| BMZ | <i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) |
| CAR | Central African Republic |
| CEN-SAD | Community of Sahel-Saharan States |
| CEWARN | Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism |
| CEWS | Continental Early Warning System |
| CoE | COMESA Council of Elders |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| COMWARN | Early warning system of COMESA' |
| CoW | ECOWAS Council of the Wise |
| CPX | Command Post Exercise |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EAC | East African Community |
| EACWARN | Early Warning System of EAC |
| EASF | Eastern African Standby Force |
| EASFSEC ¹ | EASF Secretariat |

¹ Formerly EASFCOM (Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism)

| | |
|----------|---|
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECDPM | European Centre for Development Policy Management |
| ECOMIB | ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau |
| ECOWARN | Early Warning System of ECOWAS |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EJVM | Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism |
| EU | European Union |
| EUNAVFOR | European Union Naval Force (Op Atalanta) Somalia - Operation Atlanta |
| EWS | Early Warning System |
| FDLR | Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda |
| FOC | Full Operational Capability |
| FTX | Field Training Exercise |
| GISAT-BF | International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso |
| GIZ | <i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Development Cooperation) |
| HCB | Heidelberg Conflict Barometer |
| HIK | Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research |
| ICGLR | International Conference on the Great Lakes Region |
| IDPs | Internally Displaced Persons |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IPSS | Institute for Peace and Security Studies, University of Addis Ababa |
| IPSTC | International Peace Support Training Centre |
| IT | Information Technology |
| KAIPTC | Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre |
| LRA | Lord's Resistance Army |
| LRA-RCI | Lord Resistance Army-Regional Cooperation Initiative |
| LRA-RTF | Lord's Resistance Army – Regional Task Force |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFD | Mediation Facilitation Division |
| MINUSMA | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali |
| MISAC | <i>Mission de l'Union Africaine pour la Centrafrique et l'Afrique Centrale</i> (AU Mission in CAR) |
| MISAHHEL | African Union Mission to Mali and the Sahel |
| MISCA | <i>Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine</i> (International Support Mission in CAR) |

| | |
|---------|--|
| MNJTF | Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram |
| MONUSCO | UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| MRG | Mediation Reference Group |
| MSU | Mediation Support Unit |
| MVM | Monitoring and Verification Mechanism |
| NARC | North African Regional Capability |
| PAPS | ECOWAS Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security |
| PCRD | Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development |
| PEP | Panel of Eminent Persons |
| PoE | Panel of Elders |
| PoW | Panel of the Wise |
| PRC | Permanent Representatives Committee |
| PSC | African Union Peace and Security Council |
| PSD | African Union Peace and Security Department |
| PSO | Peace Support Operation |
| PSOD | Peace Support Operations Division |
| RDC | Rapid Deployment Capability |
| RECs | Regional Economic Communities |
| RIMC | Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee |
| RMS | Regional Mechanisms For Conflict Prevention, Management And Resolution |
| RPTC | Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre at SADC |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| SVA | Structural Vulnerability Assessment |
| UCDP | Uppsala Conflict Data Programme |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMID | UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNMISS | United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan |
| USD | US-Dollar |

Executive Summary

The number and intensity of armed conflicts in Africa remained at a high level in 2015. This is particularly evident in the large number of civilian casualties reported. Thus, the engagement of African states and regional organisations in strengthening peace and security in Africa remains of great relevance. This engagement is especially visible in the development and operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which includes the central instruments for conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction and development by the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs).

The APSA Impact Report 2015 presents data and analyses on the state of various APSA instruments and the results and impact of APSA interventions by the AU and the RECs. The report identifies the following progress in the development of selected APSA tools:

- The **African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC)** is firmly established and meets on a regular basis. Although information on crises and conflicts is readily available, decisions are often not taken in a timely and suitable manner due to different political interests of council members. The PSC itself has noted this shortcoming.
- The **early warning systems** of the AU and various RECs have been physically established, are widely connected and capable of quickly delivering information and policy recommendations for crisis mitigation to political decision makers.
- Capacities and instruments for the analysis, development and implementation of strategies for **structural crisis prevention** are currently being developed and tested. Synergies with the structures of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) are established and utilized.
- The **border program** of the AU makes significant contributions to the crisis prevention and peace consolidation efforts through the delimitation and demarcation of borders, the support of an integrated border management and through transboundary cooperation.
- Actors and instruments of **preventive diplomacy** at the AU and the RECs contribute to the prevention, de-escalation and transformation of violent conflicts in AU Member States.
- The AU and the RECs conduct **mediation** missions in coordination with other international organisations. However, mediation framework structures are not yet fully established or operational at either the AU or the RECs level. These structures will be necessary to guarantee professional preparations, and conduct of mediation processes which the AU and the RECs are increasingly engaging in.
- According to political decision makers, the multi-dimensional **African Standby Force (ASF)** has reached its full operational capability in four (out of five) regions following relevant field exercises. The AU and the RECs have gained extensive experience in AU- or REC-led **Peace Support Operations (PSOs)**. Training institutes in the regions allow for professional preparations for PSOs through relevant training programs. In the last year AU Member States have sent more than 60,000 personnel on AU and UN peace missions. However, the police and civilian components of the ASF remain behind the development of the military dimension. The AU is currently addressing deficits of the ASF that could jeopardize its operational capability through the development of a Mission Support Strategy.

- The African Heads of State and Government have decided to increase Member States' contributions to the **AU Peace Fund**. This is a precondition for more effective crisis prevention, strengthening human and institutional capacities and guaranteeing reliable funding for AU PSOs.

Regarding the success and impact of **APSA interventions**, this report shows that the AU and RECs have remained active and have conducted diverse and often comprehensive interventions in 2015. During this year, 57 violent conflicts have been identified in which interventions through the AU or the RECs are generally appropriate. Conflict-transformative APSA-interventions were conducted in 29 of these violent conflicts, i.e. in 51% of cases. In eleven cases, these interventions led to the de-escalation of conflict. Another twelve interventions were assessed as partly successful. Five interventions were deemed unsuccessful. **This shows that the AU and the RECs are taking extensive responsibility for ensuring Peace and Security in Africa, despite lacking human, financial and organisational capabilities.**

The following interventions took place in 2015:

- Diverse diplomatic activities aimed at the de-escalation of conflict and conflict transformation in 29 violent conflicts;
- AU- or REC-led mediation in 17 violent conflicts;
- PSOs in seven violent conflicts;
- Crisis-preventive interventions by the AU and/or RECs in at least seven cases. (In addition to cases of "silent diplomacy" and crisis-preventive interventions that are not known publicly.)

Furthermore, the AU and the RECs played a vital role in the mediation of **peace agreements**. From July 2014 until June 2015, they contributed to the establishment of 16 peace agreements. This increases the number of peace agreements supported by APSA-actors that lasted for over one year to 58 (since 2007). Out of these, 23 agreements lasted for over three years.

Like the previous three reports (2007-2012, 2013 and 2014), the APSA Impact Report 2015 demonstrates that despite existing deficits, the AU and the RECs have become irreplaceable actors for assuring peace and security in Africa.

Introduction

With the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Union (AU) shows its commitment to finding ‘African solutions for peace and security’ in order to be better prepared for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent. Since its inception, the APSA has taken an increasingly active role in addressing conflicts in Africa. The APSA Impact Report therefore attempts to measure this engagement to inform actors and partners about the impact of the APSA in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. This report gives an overview of:

1. The development of the conflict landscape in Africa
2. The progress made in the development of the APSA instruments
3. The type, quality and success of interventions conducted by the AU and the RECs

The APSA Impact Report 2015 is the fourth of its kind. A first baseline-study covered the years 2007 to 2012. Two follow-up reports covered 2013 and 2014 respectively. The reports are meant to be updated on an annual basis, as progress made and impact achieved will only become tangible over an extended period of time.

A first English-language version summarising the main results of the 2007-2013 reports was produced in 2014 and presented at the African Union in April 2015 to members of the AU PSC, AU PSD, representatives of African embassies and several RECs. Similarly, this report is intended for the distribution among AU, RECs, PSC and partners.

The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020, which was published in early 2016, constitutes the first thorough, results-orientated work-plan for the AU’s peace and security architecture. Currently, the AU is developing a corresponding monitoring tool which is designed to measure and assess the impact of the implementation of APSA activities. The indicators of the monitoring system are largely aligned with the indicators used in this report. The information generated through the APSA Roadmap monitoring and the high-aggregated data presented here will therefore be able to inform each other and create a more comprehensive picture of the state of the APSA and its instruments.

In the future, the collection of data and analysis for the APSA Impact Report will be gradually handed-over to the *Institute for Peace and Security Studies* (IPSS) at the University of Addis Ababa in order to create African ownership and guarantee the continuation of its long-term monitoring efforts.

A. The Julius Nyerere Peace and Security Building at the African Union



The new Julius Nyerere Peace and Security Building of the African Union Commission holds the plenary hall for the AU Peace and Security Council as well as the AU’s situation room and operations room; the building offers working space for more than 300 employees.

Methodology

The APSA Impact Report measures the use and success of APSA tools based on impact hypotheses, which are outlined in the results matrix in Annex 1. The background research regarding the interventions of the AU and RECs, as well as their assessment, has been conducted by the *European Centre for Development Policy Management* (ECDPM) in Maastricht, Netherlands. The research is based on the conflicts identified by the *Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research* (HIIC) in their annual *Heidelberg Conflict Barometer* (HCB). The barometer classifies conflicts according to the following categories:

- Non-violent conflicts: „Dispute“ (HCB intensity level 1) and „Non-violent crisis“ (HCB intensity level 2)
- Violent conflicts: „Violent Crisis“ (HCB intensity level 3), „Limited War“ (HCB intensity level 4) and „War“ (HCB intensity level 5)

Many of the conflicts identified by the HCB are interlinked with regards to their actors, conflict dynamics, conflict factors, as well as in the way the conflicts were addressed by the AU and the RECs. Based on these four factors, ECDPM decided to group various conflicts identified by the HCB into clusters, when treating them individually did not appear useful. The conflicts referred to in this report are therefore based on the list of conflict clusters identified by ECDPM.²

The research was conducted differently for each of the chapters:

Chapter 1 is a collection of various data and trends regarding the conflict situation in Africa. This information is based on the research conducted by ECDPM. Substantial findings on conflict trends and developments will only be evident following long-term comparison.

Chapter 2 offers information on the status and development of various key APSA instruments. Information has been provided through GIZ-projects on the continental and regional level.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of AU and REC interventions in African conflicts. Special emphasis is placed on violent conflicts as identified by the HCB (conflict intensity 3-5). Publicly available data is therefore gathered by ECDPM and subsequently assessed according to the following criteria:

- 1) *Success* („Was the conflict de-escalated?“)
- 2) *Quality* (Appropriateness of means used, relative importance of AU/REC intervention in comparison to interventions by other actors and the quality of cooperation between these actors).

These assessments were adopted by this report in an aggregated manner. In addition to the data by the HCB, data issued by the *Uppsala Conflict Data Programme* (UCDP) was used for reference. The chapter includes a short qualitative assessment of whether a specific peace mission has fulfilled a core mandate. Furthermore, it provides information regarding the number and success of peace treaties negotiated by AU/ RECs as well as details on AU and REC activities in post-conflict countries.

² See Annex II, III, IV.

1. Conflicts in Africa


Aggregated objective regarding the indirect impact of the APSA:³

The trend shows that the number, duration and intensity of armed conflicts are decreasing.

1.1. Development of armed conflicts in Africa⁴

The number and intensity of armed conflict in Africa remained at a high level in 2015. This continues to impede the economic, social and democratic development of many countries on the continent.

B. Violent conflicts in 2015 (subnational level)⁵



In 2015, **nearly one third of all conflicts** worldwide took place in Africa.⁶ Based on the data published annually by the *Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research* (HIIK), conflicts in Africa have been divided into various conflict clusters.⁷ This report counts a total of 88 conflicts in Africa for the year 2015. More than two-thirds of these conflicts (62) are classified as *violent conflicts* (HCB intensity level 3-5). 20% of conflicts in Africa (18) are categorized as *highly violent conflicts* (HCB intensity level 4-5). According to the HCB, half of the *violent conflicts* worldwide are therefore in Africa.⁸

³ All aggregated objectives are summarised in Annex I.

⁴ As the APSA constitutes a continental security architecture, this report does not differentiate between „North Africa“ and „Sub-Saharan Africa“ as categorized in the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer.

⁵ The graph was adopted from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) and subsequently adapted, *Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research* (2016): *Conflict Barometer 2015*, Heidelberg, pg. 11, ["http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2015.pdf"](http://www.hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2015.pdf).

⁶ In total, the HCB counts 113 conflict in Africa, out of a total of 409 conflicts worldwide.


⁷ The 113 conflicts outlined in the HCB are occasionally combined and result in a total of 88 conflict clusters (see methodology).

⁸ Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, page 14, 163


In comparison to the year 2014 (17), the number of highly violent conflicts decreased slightly (16). Violent crises on the other hand (HCB intensity level 3) increased from 45 (2014) to 46 (2015).

Due to the inadequate availability of data, a long-term comparison of these numbers is difficult. Research by the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) and the *German Institute of Global and Area Studies* (GIGA) however suggests that

state-based violent conflicts⁹ with a high-number of military casualties have decreased since the 1990s. On the other hand, the intensity of conflict and number of civilian casualties has increased, as seen in the cases of Nigeria, DRC, South Sudan and Somalia.¹⁰



D. State-based conflicts and battle deaths in Africa 1993-2015¹¹




⁹ The *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) defines *state-based conflict* as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year”, see “<http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>”

¹⁰ The number of battle deaths accounted for by the HCB are estimates and can thus include inaccuracies. Furthermore, it does not include indirect victims of violence (e.g. conflict-related malnutrition or illness). Yet the numbers allow for the comparison of data over a longer time-period. See Matthias Basedau, Nina Mappes „Kriegskontinent Afrika? Ein Klischee auf dem Prüfstand“, GIGA Focus | Afrika | Nummer 05 | July 2015.

¹¹ Own graph based on data by UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015 / UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015.

1.1.1. Causes of conflict and conflict actors

Domestic conflicts continue to dominate the conflict situation in Africa. According to the HCB, the main causes of conflict in 2015 were (more than one issue per conflict possible): National Power, i.e. national claims to power (31); Subnational Predominance, i.e. territorial claims to power (29); System/Ideology, i.e. regime change or the demand for a shift in the ideological, religious, socio-economic or legal nature of a system (20); Resources, i.e. control over natural resources (20); Autonomy, i.e. achieving or extending of political autonomy of a non-state actor or an independent region (6); Secession, i.e. secession of a territory from the state (4); and Territory, i.e. demand for changing an international border (1).¹² More than half (14 out of 23)



of the highly violent conflicts (HCB intensity level 4-5) revolved around subnational claims to power, often in combination with disputed control over natural resources. The main actors in these conflicts were militias and ethnic-based groups.

8 out of 20 conflicts revolving around system/ideology also involved extremist groups. Examples include Al-Shabab (Somalia), Boko Haram (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad) and groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda (Mali, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger) and the Islamic State (Libya). More specifically, this conflict item accounts for 70% of conflicts in North Africa. Similar to 2014, the most common combinations of conflict items in 2015 were “national power” and “system/ ideology” (14), and “subnational predominance” and “resources” (13).

This high number of conflicts explains why over half (9 out of 16) UN Peacekeeping Operations worldwide were deployed in Africa during 2015.¹³

Despite the increasing level of responsibility taken by African actors (see chapter 3), the developments in previous years suggest that UN-Peacekeeping Operations, as well as military interventions by non-African countries, will continue to play a vital role in managing conflicts. Examples include the French Operations *Barkhane* in the Sahel region and *Sangaris* in CAR, as well as contributions by US-forces in fighting extremist movements in the Sahel region, Al-Shabab and the LRA.¹⁴

¹² HCB 2015.

¹³ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/archive/2015/bnote1215.pdf>

¹⁴ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/17/this-is-where-american-special-operations-forces-are-helping-advise-u-s-allies/>

1.1.2. Conflict trends and risks for peace and security in Africa


Three conflict trends worth highlighting for the year 2015 are (a) violence in the context of elections and *third-termism*, i.e. attempts to pursue an unconstitutional third-term in office, (b) refugees, displaced persons and migration, and (c) violent extremism and terrorism.

(a) Violence in the context of elections and *third-termism*

2015 was (and 2016 is) an important year for elections in Africa. Elections were held in Egypt, Ethiopia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Comoros, Lesotho, Nigeria, Zambia, Sudan, Tanzania and Togo. In many cases, elections constituted a point of escalation. Riots, as a result of an election, occurred in Burkina Faso and Burundi. In the CAR, elections were postponed to December 2015 due to the unstable security situation. The elections were finally held in a rather peaceful manner. In South Sudan on the other hand, elections were postponed until 2017 due to continuing violence and the failure of peace talks.

Furthermore, attempts by heads of state to extend their constitutionally limited term in office caused violence in various cases.¹⁵ Four cases in central Africa were given particular attention: Burundi, DRC, Republic of Congo and Rwanda. These countries share the need to tackle the repercussions of decades of civil war and the resulting instability present at the regional level.

(b) Refugees, displaced persons and migration



An increasing number of people decided to flee their homes in order to escape violent conflict in 2015. According to UNHCR and IOM, 2015 marks the highest number of displaced persons globally since the Second World War. Together, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in

¹⁵ http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2015_S04_sms_tll.pdf

¹⁶ Own graph based on data from *UNHCR Global Trends 2010-2015*, „UN major regions“

Africa is about 17.5 million people in 2015.¹⁷ This is a 30% increase as compared to 2014 (13.5 mil.).¹⁸ By the beginning of 2015, 6 of the 10 major source countries of refugees are on the African continent.¹⁹ At the same time, Africa is home to 5 of the 10 countries with the highest number of IDPs.²⁰

The African refugee movement was coined by three trends in 2015: new mass movements of refugees arose in Central Africa due to the eruption of various new conflicts (e.g. Burundi, South Sudan and CAR). Secondly, on-going conflicts continued to cause protracted displacement. One example is the civil war in Somalia leading to 1.1 million refugees. Thirdly, mixed-migration routes²¹ are playing an increasingly significant role in North Africa. The failed state Libya, is considered a hub for irregular migration towards Europe, while at the same time hosting over 400,000 IDPs.²²

Regional implications and risks are particularly evident in Central Africa and the region around northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon and Chad. Regional destabilisation is a continuously increasing threat, not least because groups like Boko Haram operate across borders and target civilians. Refugee host countries and countries with a high number of IDPs in Africa often face additional challenges, as they themselves are developing countries and often subject to violent and/ or political conflicts. This implies overburdened resources and capacities, thus exacerbating the support-system for both refugees and their own population and potentially constituting a reason for future conflict. Consequently, the existing asylum regime in Africa is in danger of suffering lasting damage.

(c) Violent extremism and terrorism

Violent extremism and terrorism further increased in North Africa, as well as in other African regions. Close connections can be seen between structural, political and social causes of violent extremism. Local and regional radicalisation can develop depending on the socio-economic and political situation.²³

There remains to be a continuous debate on the push-factors of radicalisation. Research has shown that individual causes, such as poverty, are unlikely to cause radicalisation.²⁴ Push factors or enabling circumstances include political grievances, lack of civil liberties, human right violations, difficult economic conditions, sociological circumstances such as religious and ethnic discrimination, anti-terror operations and their impact, actual or perceived inequality and an insufficient feeling of inclusion.²⁵ Research conducted at the Horn of Africa confirms that limited development and fragility in the region have caused a number of grievances paving the way for terrorist recruitment.²⁶

There are strong indicators that Africa will remain a hotspot for wars and violent conflicts in the future. In this context, it is of great importance that AU, regional organisations and African governments take

¹⁷ <http://www.unhcr.org/publications/fundraising/564da0e3b/unhcr-global-appeal-2016-2017-populations-concern-unhcr.html>

¹⁸ <http://www.unhcr.org/publications/fundraising/5461e5ec3c/unhcr-global-appeal-2015-update-populations-concern-unhcr.html>

¹⁹ Somalia with 1,1 mil., Sudan with 666.000, South Sudan with 616.000, as well as the DRC, CAR and Eritrea.

²⁰ Sudan, DRC, South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria.

²¹ According to UNHCR, mixed migration refers to the phenomenon when migrants and refugees increasingly make use of the same routes and means of transport to get to a destination.

²² UNHCR „ Numbers of internally displaced in Libya double since September“

<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/6/5592a8286/numbers-internally-displaced-libya-double-since-september-unhcr.html>

²³ In in-going conflicts, violent extremism can be used opportunistically.

²⁴ Botha, A.; Abdile, M., , September 2014


²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ *Global Centre for Cooperative Security, Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Action Agenda*, May 2015


increasing ownership in tackling peace and security issues. The strong political will of these organisations to engage in peace and security measures in Africa is increasingly evident. One example of this is the AU's objective of *Silencing the guns until 2020*²⁷ and its focus on crisis prevention.

H. Jihadist violence in Africa 2013-15²⁸

Number of deaths in conflict involving Jihadist violence



Number of deaths by actor



The following chapters show to what extent the operationalisation of the APSA Instruments addressing peace and security issues have developed (Chapter 2) and to what extent and success the AU and/or RECs have intervened in crises in 2015 (Chapter 3).

²⁷ See African Union „50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration” <http://agenda2063.au.int/en/documents/50th-anniversary-solemn-declaration>

²⁸ The graph was created by the *Munich Security Report* and the format slightly amended. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz (MSC) “*Munich Security Report 2016*”, Januar 2016 “<https://www.securityconference.de/aktivitaeten/munich-security-report/>”; basierend auf den Daten von *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)*, “*Africa Data (Version 5 Data and Real Time Data 2016)*,” <http://www.acleddata.com/data/>. *Islamic State-affiliated groups include “State of Sinai” (formerly “Ansar Beit al-Maqdis”), “Islamic State of Tripoli”, “Islamic State (Cyrenaica Province)”, “Islamic State (Fezzan Province)”, and “Soldiers of the Caliphate”.*

2. Development of APSA Instruments²⁹

The African Union, together with eight *Regional Economic Communities* (RECs) and two *Regional Mechanisms For Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* (RMs), has been given an extensive mandate to build the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The five core instruments of the APSA are the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Union Peace Fund. Thereby, the APSA has instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management and following the adoption of the relevant *Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework*, a tool for peace consolidation. In theory, the APSA is thus equipped with instruments for all stages of conflict. The African Standby Force (ASF) is even mandated to intervene against the will of a member state in case of severe crimes against humanity (genocide) given the agreement of the AU General Assembly.

The following chapter will provide an overview of the most important instruments of the APSA and their current state of development.

Aggregated objective regarding the development of the APSA-instruments:³⁰

The decision-makers of the AU and the RECs/ RMs have functional instruments for civil conflict prevention and transformation and post-conflict peacebuilding (peace consolidation) at their disposal.

The measurement of this objective is based on indicators outlined in Annex 1. These indicators were developed by GIZ for internal monitoring purposes. With the aim to create more African ownership of this report, the indicators are planned to be further aligned to APSA's own indicators as outlined in the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020. The monitoring system of the APSA Roadmap is then envisioned to provide the necessary information to assess the state of development of the various APSA tools.

This chapter discerns that the *Full Operational Capability* (FOC) of the APSA Instruments for conflict early warning, mediation and the ASF has been achieved largely, but not completely. The degree of its functional capability varies between the different APSA elements and organizations. In particular, the crisis-dependent absence of the region North Africa hinders the operational ability of the APSA in the region. Similarly, other regions and instruments continue to face significant challenges.

Nonetheless, early warning systems, diplomacy, mediation, as well as the ASF, have already been actively contributing to prevention, de-escalation and termination of conflict for many years (see Chapter 3). Thus, extensive practical experience can be utilized in the optimisation of the APSA tools. Despite remaining limitations, AU and RECs are also increasingly engaging in post-conflict reconstruction.

The funding issues of APSA interventions, in particular PSOs, remained unresolved in 2015.³¹

²⁹ This chapter is based on information provided by various GIZ projects working within the framework of the APSA. Therefore, this chapter does not offer a holistic overview of all APSA elements and regions involved, as the focus is placed on the elements of the APSA that GIZ is supporting.


³⁰ All aggregated Objectives can be found in Annex I.

³¹ The decision to operationalize the AU Peace Fund was taken at the AU Summit in Kigali in July 2016. Its aim is to finance Peace and Security measures, such as PSOs (up to 25%) as well as crisis prevention and capacity development. An import tax of 0,2% on appropriate goods is meant to generate USD 65 mil. (in 2020: USD 80 mil.). The remaining 75% of costs for PSOs

2.1. Conflict Early Warning Systems

The development of an early warning system on AU and RECs level aims to provide political decision-makers with timely information on emerging conflicts and corresponding policy options. Conflict developments in the individual Member States are measured based on an indicator system. The information gathered through a multitude of sources are analysed through various means. Subsequently, accessible information is processed and available to both leadership and experts. Mutual exchange of data between the AU and the RECs is aimed for and partially practiced.

2.1.1. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)



The CEWS is technically functional. The situation room has software programmes granting access to a range of sources of information at its disposal. At the moment, the system provides the following products:

shall be financed predominantly with the help of UN funds. <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-adopts-the-au-peace-fund>

CEWS Products

Regular distribution of information:

- *Daily News Highlights: 2x daily news clipping service*
- *Daily Reports: (5x a week)*
- *Weekly Wrap-Up: (1x a week)*
- *SMS Alert Service*

Analysis of and recommendations on countries and their current conflict situations:

- *Flash Reports: Short information on concrete conflict situations*
- *SMS Alerts on current conflicts: need-dependent, only for AUC, PSC and PoW*
- *Situation Update Reports: Conflict Analysis including policy recommendations (classified due to their political sensitivity)*
- *Early Warning Reports: timely information on potential crises/ violent conflicts (part of the situation updates)*
- *Structural Vulnerability Assessment³² (currently in trial stage)*


Analysis of and recommendations on countries and current conflicts:

- *Contribution to the annual PSC Report on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa*

2.1.2. The Conflict Early Warning Systems (EWS) of the RECs

The regional Early Warning Systems (EWS) of the *Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS) and the *Intergovernmental Authority for Development* (IGAD) are the most advanced. ECOWAS' ECOWARN observes a wide spectrum of conflicts. Data collection is conducted by one civil and one government staff per country. In 2014, the regional focus was on Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo and Nigeria. Most alerts and reports were related to the Ebola pandemic, Boko Haram and election-related violence.

³² "Structural Vulnerability Assessments" are conducted by AU-CEWS using the Africa Prospects tool which assesses and forecasts the vulnerability of countries to conflict escalation based on its set of structural indicators. SVAs are planned to be conducted annually for all MS and shall indicate which MS are the most vulnerable to conflict.



ECOWARN Products

Regular distribution of information:

- *Daily Highlight***
- *Monthly Country Policy Brief*
- *Situation reports:*
 - *Weekly Situation Report**
 - *Quarterly Security Situation Reports**
 - *Annual Peace and Security Situation Report**
 - *Situation Update Report**

Analysis of and recommendations on countries and their current conflict situations:

- *Early Warning Report**
- *Incident Report*
- *Thematic Report*

* only accessible for the ECOWAS-President and the Department for Politics, Peace and Security

** publicly available

In 2014, ECOWAS developed a concept to decentralize its EWS to the national level. The implementation is still in the planning stage. Designated pilot countries are predominantly conflict and post-conflict countries (i.a. Nigeria, Mali, Guinea-Bissau).

Until 2012, IGAD's CEWARN focused predominantly on pastoral conflicts. Data gathering was conducted through field research in particularly conflict-prone, transboundary areas. In 2012, CEWARN's mandate was extended geographically (beyond transboundary conflict zones) and thematically (political conflicts, terrorism etc.). The necessary changes in the structure of the system have not yet been fully developed, and will be at the earliest in 2016. Planned changes include the number of involved research institutes as well as further cooperation with local organizations in the replacement of or addition to the field researchers. Additionally, CEWARN is working on a system to receive EWS information via text messaging service.

CEWARN Products

Regular distribution of information:

- *Situation Reports*: daily and weekly
- *News Highlights*: 2x daily
- *Flash Reports* as well as *SMS* (need-dependent)

Analysis and recommendations on countries and their current conflict situations:

- *Early Warning Reports* (country and conflict zone reports)
- *Structural Vulnerability Assessments*³³

EACWARN produces reports on the situation in its member states and various neighbouring countries to be used by decision-makers at the EAC and member states' governments.

Unlike the early warning system of the AU and other RECs, **SADC's** EWS is classified and based predominantly on secret service information.

EACWARN Products

Regular distribution of information:

- *Daily Highlight***
- *Daily Situation Reports* (classified)

³³ Similar to the Structural Vulnerability Assessments conducted by AU-CEWS (see previous footnote), SVAs are conducted to assess and forecast the vulnerability of countries to conflict escalation based on a set of structural indicators.

Analysis of and recommendations on countries and their current conflict situations:

- *Early Warning Report**
- *Incident Report*
- *Thematic Analytic Reports*
- *Situation Update on Emerging Peace & Security Issues*
- *Joint Analysis with COMESA & AU (so far two reports on Burundi)*
- Information for the *Panel of Eminent Persons for Burundi*

The EWS of COMESA and ECCAS are currently still under development. According to the latest information, the use of existing data from already established early warning systems and open-sources has been chosen over the development of their own data-gathering structures. COMESA focuses predominantly on the conflict aspects relevant for economy and trade. With the use of the COMESA Peace and Prosperity Index (CPPI) however, COMESA is additionally looking at structural drivers of conflict in its Member States.³⁴ The *Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)* and the *Community of Sahel-Saharan States CEN-SAD* have not yet started the development of their EWSs.

2.1.4. Achievement of objectives and indicators

Aggregated objective regarding the development of the early warning system:

Political decision-makers at the continental (PSC) and the regional level have at their disposal timely and needs-oriented information, analyses and response options for decision-making on measures aimed at early conflict transformation when conflicts arise within and/or between Member States.

Indicator:

- a) Decision-makers confirm the use and usefulness of the EWS and its outputs.

Most CEWS products are used, dependent on their classification, at the working level of the AUC's Peace and Security Department (PSD). Currently, the analysis and policy options are forwarded indirectly to the PSC by the AU Chairperson, supported by the Director of the PSC and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. The CEWS regularly provides information for the PoW. For the first time, the CEWS directly briefed the PSC on conflict prevention in 2015.³⁵ So far, the CEWS has not received systematic feedback regarding the use of CEWS' reports and policy recommendations.³⁶ CEWS is aiming to accommodate the wish of the PSC to strengthen the direct cooperation between

³⁴ See statement by Mr Sindis Ngwenya, COMESA Secretary General, at the Annual Briefing by African Regional Economic Communities to Member States and United Nations Entities on *Silencing the Guns in Africa: The Nexus between Peace, Security, Governance, and Development*, pg.4

³⁵ *Joint Narrative Report 1/2015*, pg. 9.

³⁶ APSA Assessment 2014/2015, pg.67ff.

CEWS and the PSC, and to place further emphasis on policy recommendations in its reporting. As a result of this, CEWS has been holding bi-annual policy briefings at the PSC since May 2016.³⁷

ECOWARN products are similarly used by decision-makers. This was particularly evident in the case of Burkina-Faso, where timely reports on the potential dangers and policy recommendations were available before the outbreak of the crisis. This allowed for the fast reaction of ECOWAS following the outbreak of the crisis. Furthermore, ECOWARN composed reports about Boko Haram, which were used during the discussions at the PSC on the *Multi National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram* (MNJTF).

Nonetheless, a study conducted in early 2015 highlights a number of problems with ECOWARN products; for example, not all staff members at the *Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, PAPS* have access to the products. Furthermore, the Early Warning Reports are not sufficiently used by the Political Affairs Unit's briefings to the leadership. In the future, the unit will be included in the drafting of the report.

As in previous years, CEWARN was able to address a number of pastoral conflicts in cooperation with local peace committees and the use of the *Rapid Response Fund*. Moreover, CEWARN structures play a relevant role in the support of the mediation team in South Sudan.

EACWARN was able to further increase the number and quality of its reports. The reports significantly supported the work of the EAC *Panel of Eminent Persons* during their work in the crisis in Burundi in December 2014.

Indicator:

b) Level of harmonization of CEWS with regional EWS of RECs (technical compatibility, data exchange)

Significant progress has been made in the cooperation between RECs and the AU with regards to early warning. An internet portal has been established which connects the CEWS with the EWS of the RECs. ECOWAS and EACWARN are fully connected to CEWS via the online portal. The connection with SADC is currently being established. Initial plans to transmit information via satellite have not materialized.

In addition, regular technical meetings facilitate exchange between representatives of the RECs' EWS and of the CEWS. Topics include the further refinement and alignment of the systems. Trainings in data management and analysis are held at the meetings. On top of the technical meetings, CEWS organized a simulation exercise in Addis Ababa in 2015 to further improve the collective data gathering and analysis and train CEWS staff in drafting of policy recommendations in early warning reports.³⁸ Moreover, CEWS conducted *Site Assessment Missions* at ECCAS, EAC, SADC and COMESA in 2015 to assess their connectivity with the situation room.³⁹ Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) exercises were conducted together with COMESA and ECOWAS.⁴⁰ Exchange of staff for training purposes was facilitated between CEWS and COMESA, and CEWS and SADC.

³⁷ <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-601st-psc-meeting-on-early-warning-30-may-2016.pdf>


³⁸ *Joint Narrative Report 1/2015*, pg. 18.

³⁹ *Joint Narrative Report 1/2015*, pg. 19.

⁴⁰ *Joint Narrative Report 1/2015*, pg. 20.

2.2. Mediation

2.2.1. Mediation structures



The diagram shows the various differences between the mediation structures at the AU and at the respective RECs. Important mediation efforts are conducted by the *Special Envoys*, the *High-level Representatives of the AUC-chairperson* and the so-called *International Contact Groups*. Former African heads of state or government, or former ministers, often take the lead in AU mediation teams. The Panel of the Wise (PoW) at the AU is not formally part of the AU mediation structure, but rather an advising body for the PSC and for preventive diplomacy measures. Its members prepare relevant new topics for political decision-makers (usually the PSC) and often actively engage in preventive diplomacy (e.g. pre-election missions). Support, and sometimes representation, is offered by the *Friends of the Panel of the Wise*, which consists of former politicians or former members of the PoW. The *Pan-African Network of the Wise* (Pan-Wise), created in 2013, is a body allowing for the exchange between the PoW and the corresponding structures at the RECs and in civil society.

At the RECs level, some members of the institutional mediation structures have the mandate to be actively involved in mediation processes and to lead negotiations. A different name is given to each organisation's respective group of renowned personae (e.g. *Panel of Elders*, SADC; *Council of the Wise*, ECOWAS; *Panel of Eminent Persons*, EAC; *Committee of Elders*, COMESA; etc.⁴¹). The mediation structures at SADC and EAC are supported by a group of experts in the form of a *Mediation Reference Group* (MRG). Their members (ideally) possess extensive academic or practical experience in the field of mediation. IGAD is currently developing its mediation structures, which are

⁴¹ Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) are also core members of the PanWise.

expected to include both mediators and thematic experts. The AUC is planning the creation of a Mediation Support Unit (based on the example of the UN). Only partial progress was made in 2015. This includes the creation of a small support unit at IGAD and the creation and subsequent staffing of a small unit at SADC. These units are expected to contribute to logistical and technical backstopping of on-going processes and to conduct background research to support institutional learning. However, the RECs equally have the tendency to use external chief mediators. These are usually (male) former heads of state and government or former ministers.

2.2.3. Achievement of objectives and indicators

Aggregated objective regarding mediation structures:

The mediators mandated by selected RECs (SADC and ECOWAS) have at their disposal professional, technical, methodological and organisational support for planning, executing and evaluating mediation missions.

Indicator:

(a) Existence and use of AU/REC mediation structures (panels, expert groups and/or mediation support units)

The creation of a *Mediation Support and Conflict Prevention Unit* (MSU) was initially rejected by the *Permanent Representatives Committee* (PRC) at the AU Summit in January 2015 due to budgetary constraints and the fear of duplication. Subsequently however, the APSA Assessment 2015, as well as the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 explicitly called for the creation of an MSU. A head of the subdivision charged with the management of the MSU has been appointed in June 2016. Further positions are believed to be created in January 2017. Until the operationalisation of the MSU, solid mediation structures are necessary to provide technical support to the ad-hoc created mediation teams in cooperation with the PoW-Secretariat. The APSA Assessment criticises a lack of professional support mechanisms as well as the low number of women in AU and REC mediation teams.⁴² Until the creation of the MSU, the PoW-Secretariat needs to ensure that mediation remains present on the AU agenda.⁴³ An example of the role of the PoW is the *International Symposium on Peace and Development through Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue*, which was organized by the PoW and the government of Benin in May 2015.

SADC has established a *Mediation, Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy Structure* in 2012, which was further institutionalized by the adoption of the corresponding *Inception Guidelines*. The candidates for the *Panel of Elders* (PoE) and the *Mediation Reference Group* (MRG) were accepted by the *Ministerial Committee of the Organ* (MCO) in August 2014. The targeted female quota of 50% was not achieved.⁴⁴ The MRG, which is elected for four years, adopted a Strategic/Work Plan for 2015-2017 at its first meeting. Furthermore, SADC established a Mediation Support Unit. Due to the

⁴² APSA Assessment 2014, pg.81f.

⁴³ Gomes Porto, Joao and Kapinga Yvette Ngandu, „The African Union, Preventive Diplomacy, Mediation, and the Panel of the Wise: Review and Reflection on the Panel's First Six Years“, *African Security*, 2014, pg. 198.

⁴⁴ The current members of the SADC *Panel of Elders* are: Joaquim Alberto Chissano (former President of Mozambique), Sam Nujoma (former President of Namibia), Lopo do Nascimento (former Prime Minister of Angola) und Brigalia Ntombemhlope Bam (Chancellor of the *Walter Sisulu University*, South Africa). The percentage of females in the PoE is thus at 25%.

delays in the development of mediation structures in the SADC secretariat, no substantial support has been given to individual mediation missions in 2015.

The ECOWAS *Council of the Wise* is composed of eight male and three female individuals nominated by ECOWAS Member States. The ECOWAS *Mediation and Security Council* (comparable to the AU PSC) can mandate the *Council of the Wise* to intervene in conflicts. Unlike the PoW, the *Council of the Wise* is not a permanent body but rather a list of renowned personae with experience in mediation. Following a two year delay, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the *Mediation Facilitation Division* (MFD) in March 2014. The division is meant to serve as a mediation platform for regional mediation processes and to provide technical expertise to designated ECOWAS mediators. Reasons for the delay were the on-going crises in the region (Mali, Guinea-Bissau) and the resulting shift of priorities. In addition, a hiring freeze has been active at ECOWAS for the last 5 years. The recruiting process of four MFD experts was still on-going by the end of 2015; an acting director has already been named.

ECOWAS mediation support teams were so far created on an ad-hoc basis following consultations with stakeholders. In 2014, ECOWAS mediators, including heads of state, intervened in crises in Burkina-Faso and Guinea-Bissau. In the case of Burkina Faso, the Senegalese President, Macky Sall, was named the chair of a *Regional Contact Group* by ECOWAS' *Authority of Heads of State and Government*. In 2015, the PoW supported the development of mediation structures at ECOWAS, including the new *Panel of Elders* and a mediation roster.

In 2012, the EAC decided to establish a *Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP)*, the members of which will be nominated by its member states. Members do not have to be EAC citizens. The PEP has been active in Burundi since the beginning of 2015. Furthermore, the EAC Secretariat is planning to develop a roster of potential mediation experts and resource persons in 2016.

IGAD established a *Mediation Support Unit* in 2014, which is composed of one mediation expert who has already been involved in mediation efforts in South Sudan. Moreover, CEWARN supports conflict mediation at the local level, such as in the peace process in South Sudan. In May 2015, CEWARN organized a training in *conflict sensitive reporting* for South Sudanese journalists, in cooperation with the IGAD-MSU.⁴⁵

Indicator:

b) Coordination and collaboration efforts undertaken by (potential and active) mediators from the AU and RECs (e.g. during PanWise retreats)

Established in mid-2013, the *Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise)* brings together relevant mediation actors at the AU, REC, and civil society level to strengthen exchange and collaboration between these structures. Joint AU and RECs workshops, excursions, country missions and research are meant to harmonise the approaches of the different institutions and reinforce their ownership. In 2014, several consultations on establishing *National Peace Infrastructures* took place, and joint declarations and initiatives were drafted. In October 2014, the fifth *Retreat of Special Envoys, Representatives and Mediators* and the *Meeting of the Chairperson with AU Special Envoys and Special Representatives* occurred. In 2014, the cooperation with the RECs led to a number of joint statements and initiatives such as the development of an online platform to facilitate the exchange of


⁴⁵ http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1137:south-sudanese-journalists-trained-on-conflict-sensitive-reporting&catid=45:peace-and-security&Itemid=128

the RECs' and the AU's *Mediation Focal Points*. The AU, sometimes in cooperation with UNDP, conducted missions in ECCS, EAC, COMESA and SADC.

The third *Retreat of the PanWise* took place in November 2015 in order to address the topic of “*Silencing The Guns By 2020: The Pan-African Network of the Wise and the Promotion of Cultures of Peace In Africa*”. Possible synergies between the area of peacebuilding and mediation on the local, regional and national levels were identified and their feasibility was discussed, in order to better include municipalities, local governments and civil society organizations.

2.3. African Standby Force, ASF

2.3.1. Structure of the African Standby Force



As seen in the above diagram, the *African Standby Force* (ASF) has a complex structure. It requires the interaction of the AU and five regional organizations – three RECs and two RMs. A multidimensional instrument in nature, it comprises military, police and civilian components. There are six different types of operations that can be performed by the ASF, ranging from observation missions to comprehensive, multi-dimensional interventions. One significant intervention scenario is the option to intervene against the will of the member state in question. This can only occur in the case of genocide or other severe crimes against humanity, following a decision in the AU General Assembly.

The development of regional *Rapid Deployment Capabilities* by the ASF is particularly relevant for such a scenario.

In addition to the ASF, the *African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises* (ACIRC) was created in 2014 due to lacking capabilities of the former to act during the violent crisis in Mali 2013. ACIRC was meant to bridge this gap until the operationalisation of the ASF RDC. ACIRC is a rapid intervention force by the AU, consisting of member states' troops. A lead nation is named for every mission. As of June 2015, 13 African countries agreed to support this endeavour. Following a Command Post Exercise in Tanzania in October 2014, ACIRC declared its *Full Operational Capability* (FOC).

The creation of ACIRC initially caused concern, especially among the RECs commissioned with the development of the ASF, as well as among international partners. Therefore, the harmonization of both processes was decided at the AU-Summit in Addis Ababa in January 2016. As a result, ACIRC will be integrated into the ASF. ACIRC's lead-nation concept will be partly adopted in ASF missions. Generally, the objective is to create a more flexible framework for individual PSOs to better address the conflict-specific scenarios. Although the implementation is expected to take some time, this decision is important for the endeavour to create an operational, flexible and rapidly deployable ASF.

The continental field exercise, AMANI Africa II, which took place in South Africa in November 2015, was meant to assess the FOC of the ASF in general and the RDC in particular. The exercise included an RDC operation according to scenario 6⁴⁶ as well as its transition to a multidimensional, AU-led PSO according to scenario 5⁴⁷. Based on the results of the exercise, the FOC of the ASF, including the RDC, was declared. The *North African Regional Capability* (NARC) is excluded from this declaration as the fragile situation in Libya and the lacking functionality of the regional structures have hindered it from developing beyond the initial stage. Nonetheless, Algeria and Egypt are contributing to ACIRC directly and through contributions to exercises, trainings and missions.

The definition of FOC is changing and is no longer considered to be the attainment of an ideal state, but rather the pragmatic declaration of an operational state, which should be optimised on a continuous basis. In this regard, the contributions of member states will be assessed with regards to troop size and their equipment.

The operational capability of the ASF and its RDC is severely challenged by insufficient equipment and lack of logistical organisation. This aspect of the FOC is in need of considerable improvement.

Moreover, issues with the funding of African PSOs remain. The AU aims to finance 25% of the cost of PSOs itself. The decision to operationalise the *African Peace Fund*, as taken at the AU-Summit in Kigali in July 2016, was an important step towards addressing this issue. The fund is meant to finance measures taken by the AU in the field of peace and security, particularly PSOs. An import tax of 0.2% on appropriate goods shall allow the five African regions to contribute USD 65 mil. to the fund annually (as of 2020: USD 80 mil.).⁴⁸ The remaining 75% could be covered by the UN (*assessed contributions*) and/or other partner contributions. The distribution of funding sources will be decided on a case-to-

⁴⁶ Scenario 6: (military) intervention under chapter VII of the UN-Charter, e.g. in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.

⁴⁷ Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers

⁴⁸ <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-adopts-the-au-peace-fund>

case basis. Therefore, it is possible that individual missions will be financed 100% through the Peace Fund.

A significant advantage in the operationalisation of the ASF is given by the fact that nearly all African countries have already deployed troops in African-led peace operations and have consequently collected hands-on experience, including experience with robust mandates.⁴⁹ In total, more than 60,000 African peacekeepers have gained experience in African or UN-led peace missions in 2015.

Civil and police component of the ASF:

The multidimensional structure of the ASF includes a police and civilian component in addition to the military. The civil standby component is expected to consist of 1,800 experts from up to 20 different professional fields. In order for their mission to be successful, close cooperation is needed between various professionals such as political observers, advisers on human rights, rule of law, gender and civil affairs. Furthermore, the cooperation of the civil personnel with the military and police staff is crucial to the success of a mission. Tasks such as protection of civilians and human rights, rehabilitation of government structures, DDR, SSR, and gender-mainstreaming call for cross-field cooperation. A higher number of female staff is aimed for in all three components.

The development of a continental, IT-based recruitment and HR-management system (*African Standby Capacity, ASC, or Roster*) is expected to facilitate the timely recruitment of sufficient subject experts and other well-skilled staff. The structure and recruiting criteria for the roster were set by the AU, based on the needs of a continental mission. The training and recruitment of staff for the roster is usually conducted at the regional level.

2.3.3. Achievement of objectives and indicators

Aggregated objective regarding the ASF:

The political decision-makers of the AU (PSC) and RECs have at their disposal a strong contingent of well-prepared civilian experts (of whom at least 25% are women) who can be deployed in a multidimensional ASF. The ASF considers protection of civilians and human rights as an integral part of its mission.

Indicator:

a) Number of deployable civilian experts on the roster and growing percentage of female civilian experts

In June 2015, the ASC Roster was officially launched which allowed the individual regions to start selecting their candidates. The selection is a multi-step process. Next to professional qualifications, all candidates are assessed based on their willingness and availability to be deployed in an African PSO. This process includes a personal interview. In addition, candidates have to pass selected qualification assessments including a civil foundation course. At the moment, several hundred applications or

⁴⁹ Under Chapter VII of the UN Charta, see above.

candidate recommendations have been received. In mid-2016, approximately 60 candidates have been accepted to the roster by SADC, ECCAS and the AU. ECOWAS is currently clarifying the extension of the roster to several further categories of subject experts. Many candidates have already shown interest in joining the roster through ECOWAS and some have completed the necessary courses. NARC has not yet started the development of the roster.

The EASF constitutes an exception, as it has already been using a roster developed in cooperation with UNDP for the past five years. The 400 registered subject experts have to pass an additional assessment to also be included in the ASF Roster. Of the 86 candidates (38% of whom are women) who are on the initial roster and have now been screened for the ASC, 71% have been proven qualified. The final step to be included in the ASC requires candidates to pass the foundation training course. Moreover, 17 new experts (24% of whom are female) have been directly accepted into the ASC through the newly established application process. The overall number of females accepted to the roster is over 30%.

It is expected that the ASF-Roster roster will have approximately 400 subject experts by the end of 2016. The anticipated number of experts needed to fill several PSOs with qualified personnel at the same time is approximately 1,800. This number is expected to be reached by 2020.

The following challenges have been identified:

- The system is very complex as it requires the close cooperation of the AU PSD and the HR divisions of the RECs and the AU, as well as the close cooperation of AU and RECs in general.
- The Roster Officer position has been vacant at several duty stations due to staff rotations. This led to the temporary breakdown of the system. Ideally, the task should be covered by a staff member directly contracted by the respective REC.
- So far, many member states have exclusively recruited public service staff for the roster. However, it has been decided that the recruitment of staff from the private sector and civil society is crucial for quality-maximization of the roster. The decision has not been implemented in all member states.

The roster is a crucial instrument for the timely recruitment of civil experts in PSOs. In the future, a similar roster system is anticipated to be developed for the police and military component.

Indicator:

b) Degree to which civilian, police and military experts as well as the consideration of gender, human rights and protection of civilians are integrated into continental and regional PSO exercises

With regards to the EASF, last year's impact report laid out the continuous improvement of the civil and police components in field exercises and the increasing integration of the three components since 2009. This also included the number and quality of exercises dealing with gender, human rights, rule of law, protection of civilians and prevention of humanitarian crises. The percentage of females in the Command Post Exercise (CPX) 2014 was 14%. This is a decline compared to the 18% at the CPX 2011. A reason for this may however be that the CPX 2014 included a Scenario 6 exercise, consisting predominantly of RDC male soldiers. The number of females in the headquarters, on the other hand, increased since the 2011 exercise. In general, there have been considerable qualitative improvements at the EASF.

The AMANI Africa II exercise dominated all developments in the ASF in 2015. The exercise took place in Lohatla/ South Africa and in Addis Ababa (strategic headquarter). The largest number of participants came from the hosting SADC (SF) region. Additionally, participants came from the AU and the other regions (e.g. 96 participants from EASF).

The AMANI Africa I exercise in 2010 noted the lack of functioning civil and police components. Significant improvement was observed at the 2015 exercise. The integration of the three components was explicitly praised and can generally be assessed as functioning.

Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. The number of civil and police participants was not yet sufficient. Problems were particularly identified in communication and transport. Not all civil participants had the necessary knowledge for their specific tasks. Only a fraction of them had completed the mandatory trainings.

The design of the exercise placed a considerably stronger emphasis on the protection of human rights and civil society in comparison to the 2011 exercise.

2.4. Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, PCRD

2.4.1. Structure

The *Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy Framework* adopted in 2006 constitutes the conceptual basis for the AU's contributions to PCRD in post-conflict countries. The PCRD unit in the PSD however wasn't created until 2011. A new head for the sub-division crisis management and PCRD was appointed in 2016. An inter-departmental task force was recently created to improve the collaboration of various departments tasked with PCRD within the AU Commission.

The PCRD framework was only marginally operationalised by the end of 2015. The African Solidarity Initiative (ASI), adopted in 2012, constitutes the only mechanism for the support of post-conflict countries through members states in the form of financial, material and technical contributions. The ASI has succeeded to recruit international and African actors (incl. the AfDB and individual member states) for contributions to and collaboration within the ASI. The ASI Roadmap 2013-2016 includes no concrete details on activities and distribution of responsibilities.

As one of the top priorities, development has been seen in the area of DDR in the form of the DDR Capacity Programme. The policy aims to foster DDR processes that are supported by the World Bank and the UN. The program, *Building AU Capacities for Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, creates space for further initiatives on the member state level. This includes an assessment conducted as part of the AMISOM mission in Somalia in 2015.

Furthermore, the AUC has started to develop a roster system for the recruitment of PCRD experts. In addition, the AU is planning the establishment of a *Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development*, with the aim to support the AU-PCRD structures in the field of research, documentation, training, lessons learnt, project planning, resource mobilisation, public relations, trauma counselling, rehabilitation and M&E.

IGAD has its own PCRD framework. ECOWAS has included details on DDR in its *Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)*. ECCAS has cooperated with the AU in developing a regional PCRD Framework and a corresponding strategy.

2.4.2. Achievement of objectives and indicators

Aggregated objective regarding PCRD:

The division of roles between the actors involved in implementing the PCRD Framework has been clarified and funds for implementation are available.

Indicator:

a) Guiding documents on the division of roles among AU, RECs and Member States in relation to PCRD are available, as well as functional mechanisms for their implementation.

The AU's PCRD Framework foresees the adoption of regional PCRD policies in every REC. In 2013, IGAD was the first region to follow this policy. Its PCRD policy includes recommendations for every member state. The policy is based on the division of responsibilities as laid out in the AU's PCRD framework, giving RECs the responsibility to harmonise PCRD policies in member states and support the development of national PCRD strategies.

The AUC and COMESA have agreed on an *Implementation Agreement* and an *Implementation Manual*, which defines the division of responsibilities regarding the PCRD's financing mechanism. It is expected that the AU and the RECs will reach further agreements of this kind in the future.

A concrete mechanism for the division of responsibilities includes the *Trading for Peace* Programme's financing mechanism by COMESA. This allows for funds to be transferred from the AU to COMESA to support implementation processes. Yet again, capacity shortages as well as difficult bureaucratic processes have hindered the speed of implementation at the AUC and COMESA in 2015.

Indicator:

b) AU Member States are making contributions to the African Solidarity Initiative.

The AU continues to face significant challenges in the area of PCRD. The existing framework has only been marginally implemented. The development of ECCAS' PCRD policy and implementation strategy has been achieved during the reporting period. In addition, the ASI has developed a communication strategy and a website.

3. Use of APSA Instruments in conflict countries

While chapter 2 deals with the state of development of various APSA instruments, chapter 3 takes a closer look at the interventions conducted by the AU and the RECs in 2015. The observations in this chapter present a general idea on the effectiveness of APSA instruments and their use. However, given the multitude of actors (e.g. UN) and factors influencing the peace and security situation in a given context, no intervention can be assessed independently.

The following chapter will look at the number and extent of APSA interventions in comparison to the number of violent conflicts in general. This will be followed by a summary of the quality and success of interventions.

AU and REC interventions within the framework of the APSA are separated into the following categories:

| Objective | Type of Intervention |
|---------------------|--|
| Crisis Prevention | Preventive diplomacy (political declarations, observation missions, talks with conflict parties) |
| | Preventive conflict mediation |
| Conflict Management | Diplomacy, Sanctions |
| | Conflict mediations, Peace negotiations |
| | PSOs, use of (AU or REC) standby forces |
| Peace Consolidation | Participation in and contribution to post-conflict processes and peace consolidating measures |


3.1. Overview of the number and type of AU and REC interventions in conflict countries

During the reporting period, 62 out of a total of 88 conflicts have been categorised as violent (intensity level 3-5 according to the HCB).

| Number of conflicts (Numbers for 2014 in brackets) | Intensity Level |
|---|--------------------------|
| 46 (45) | Level 3 (violent crisis) |
| 8 (8) | Level 4 (limited war) |
| 8 (9) | Level 5 (war) |

The following analyses focus solely on violent conflicts (i.e. conflicts with an intensity level 3-5). Crisis preventive measures are the exception as they can also be applied in non-violent conflicts.

In 2015, the AU and/or RECs have intervened in 29 (2014: 25) of these 62 (2014:62) conflicts above intensity level 3. Therefore, they have intervened in 47% (2014: 40%) of all violent conflicts. Looking at conflicts at level 4-5 only (i.e. highly violent conflicts), AU and RECs have intervened in 12 (2014: 12) out of 16 (2014: 17)⁵⁰, i.e. in 75% (2014: 71%) of these highly violent conflicts. This shows that priority in intervening is given to more severe crises.



It is important to note that not all conflicts are suitable for interventions by regional or continental actors. This is particularly true for conflicts between actors on the sub-national level. This includes ethnic divisions as much as conflicts between crop farmers and livestock holders in which the government is not an active conflict party. In this case, it is the responsibility of the national government to mediate between conflict parties. On the other hand, transboundary conflicts, as well as conflicts in which a government is part of a conflict party, may be mediated by a “neutral” third-party actor. Considering these circumstances, the number of conflicts qualifying for AU/REC intervention is reduced by 5 to 57 (2014: 47). The AU and/or RECs intervened in 29 (2014: 27) and therefore in 51% (2014: 47%) of these conflicts.

Furthermore, AU and RECs can usually not intervene in a region without the consent of the respective government(s). This is particularly true for more extensive interventions. The principle of subsidiarity is

⁵⁰ The conflict not addressed by AU/ RECs is between crop farmers and livestock owners in Nigeria. The conflict led to a high number of casualties and was thus classified as highly violent by the HCB. Yet, as the conflict revolves around a number of small issues, which should be addressed on a national or subnational level, the intervention of a regional organization would not be appropriate.

generally applicable for APSA interventions.⁵¹ Exceptions are only made in cases of severe crimes against humanity such as genocide. Only these cases allow for troop deployment without the consent of the respective country's government. The case of Burundi for example sparked discussions within the AUC whether to pursue military intervention. Following the declaration of the President of Burundi to declare such an intervention an act of war, the venture was vetoed at the AU summit in Addis Ababa in January 2016. The use of diplomatic measures is considerably less limited. Nonetheless, diplomatic measures are usually only taken if the resolution of conflict without such external influence has become increasingly unlikely. Considering these limitations, a rate of intervention at 51% can be regarded as very high.

However, there is an evident trend that the AU and the RECs do not intervene in a number of countries despite the existence of a conflict at HCB-intensity level 3 or higher. In 2015, this was true for Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. All of these countries play an exceptional role in the APSA. They are either major financiers or troop contributors, host one of the institutional headquarters or chaired the AU during that period. This creates the impression that the AU and RECs are less likely to intervene in these countries than in others. One interesting example of this is Nigeria. While no intervention was conducted during 2014, the growing presence of Boko Haram made an intervention inevitable in 2015. Yet, none of the other three conflicts of intensity level 3-5 in Nigeria were addressed by APSA.

Indicator: The number of violent conflicts (conflicts \geq HCB intensity level 3) in which the AU and/or RECs have become involved through conflict prevention and conflict management measures, in relation to the totality of conflicts

Conflicts in which an intervention occurred: **29**

= **51%** of the total number (**57**) of conflicts (HCB intensity level 3-5) that qualify for regional intervention

+7 conflicts (HCB intensity level 1-2) in which conflict preventive measures were taken

Type of intervention

- **Diplomatic** measures in all 29 conflicts, threat of sanctions in 2 cases⁵²
- **Mediation** in 17 conflicts
- **Peace Support Operations** in 7 conflicts⁵³ 6 African-led missions + 1 UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur

Diplomatic means were used in all 29 conflicts, sanctions were used in 2 of the diplomatic interventions. Mediation was used in 17 cases, while PSOs were deployed in 7. A combination of diplomacy and mediation was used in 17 cases.⁵⁴ In 3 cases, a PSO was deployed in combination

⁵¹ According to the Principle of Subsidiarity (state) duties which can be efficiently carried out by one smaller body, should not be carried out by a larger body. Thus, the regional organisations should not cover tasks that can be carried out by the Member States. Next to the Principle of Subsidiarity, the MoU on *Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between AU, RECs, RMs* further notes complementarity and comparative advantage as guiding principles for the division of tasks between AU and RECs.

⁵² Burkina Faso and South Sudan.

⁵³ These are AMISOM, which addresses two separate conflict clusters in Somalia, as well as missions in Lesotho, CAR, South Sudan, and against the LRA and Boko Haram.

⁵⁴ These are Burkina Faso, CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan (two conflict clusters), Tanzania (diplomacy and mediation) and Boko Haram, LRA, Somalia (diplomacy and PSO).

with diplomatic efforts (LRA, Somalia, Nigeria/ Boko Haram). In four cases, all three means were applied (Lesotho, Somalia (2x)⁵⁵, and Sudan). Only 9 interventions were purely diplomatic.⁵⁶

| Use of Instruments | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| Only one instrument*: 9 conflicts | Two instruments*: 20 conflicts | Combination of all three instruments*: 4 conflicts |
| *only diplomacy | *either diplomacy and mediation (17) or diplomacy and PSO (3) | *diplomacy, mediation and PSO |

The intensity of interventions varies considerably. Diplomatic measures can be an official declaration or demand by the AU PSC or a similar REC institution. A more severe intervention may include the conduction of an observation mission or the imposition of sanctions. Conflict mediation constitutes a more impactful and often time-intensive form of intervention. Especially peace negotiations can often take several years. The most extensive and costly type of intervention is the deployment of PSOs.

There are also significant differences in the types of conflicts. They can range from new conflicts with a high potential of escalation to protracted conflicts. An example of the latter are the conflicts in Somalia and Sudan, in which the AU and RECs have been active for over a decade.

Interventions can be conducted independently by the AU or a REC, however the AU and the relevant REC usually collaborate. Other actors outside the ASPA structure may include the UN, EU and individual non-African countries. An example of this is the UN-AU Hybrid mission in Darfur. There is a tendency in PSOs to let the AU and RECs intervene first with a robust mandate before handing over responsibilities to the UN, as was the case in Mali and the CAR.

3.2. Impact of the APSA

The impact assessment of APSA interventions is based on an analysis of conflict developments and AU/REC interventions in 29 conflicts and a number of crisis preventive measures, as conducted by the research institute ECDPM. In addition to their own data collection and research, ECDPM made use of the data and research of other think tanks and research institutions.⁵⁷ The numbers and assessments presented in the following section should be considered indicative, rather than absolute, as the assessment of success and quality can rarely be done based on purely objective criteria.

The limits of a given mandate and the institutional preconditions are considered in the impact assessment. If an intervention has contributed to the prevention or de-escalation of conflict, it is deemed successful. This does not, however, imply that this limited activity was sufficient to tackle the conflict as a whole, as this would require a large number of political, economic and social measures on various levels over an extended period of time. Nevertheless, an election observation mission, which contributes to the conduct of peaceful elections and thus to a non-violent regime change, should be viewed as successful due to its potential importance for the long-term de-escalation of conflict.

⁵⁵ The AU-Mission AMISOM addresses two conflict clusters and is thus counted twice.

⁵⁶ These are Algeria, Burundi, Egypt, Mozambique und Tunisia (2 conflict clusters).

⁵⁷ ECDPM mainly uses the following studies: *Peace and Security Reports des Institute of Security Studies* in Pretoria, South Africa; scientific and political analysis of renown *Think Tanks*; reports by civil-society organisations, especially the *International Crisis Group*.

3.2.1. Crisis prevention

Aggregated Objective:

Conflicts arising within individual member states as well as transborder conflicts are being successfully defused through use of crisis prevention measures of the AU and/or RECs.

In general, crisis prevention is given the highest priority within the APSA. Every intervention that prevents a further outbreak of conflict at an early stage saves lives and high social and economic costs. The use of conflict early warning and preventive diplomacy serves this purpose. In 2015, ECDPM counted seven crisis preventive measures taken by the AU and/or RECs, in a total of 18 conflicts with the potential to further escalate. Two of these cases (Burundi-Rwanda, Republic of Congo) were new conflicts. The other 16 cases were on-going conflicts with new escalation potential. Further crisis-preventive measures were considered but not taken in Lesotho (SADC) and Burundi-Rwanda (ICGLR).

This depiction of crisis preventive measures should not necessarily be regarded as complete. Crisis preventive measures often include silent diplomacy, implying that talks are not publicly known. It can be assumed that the actual number of cases of preventive diplomacy in 2015 is higher than the known number.

Two criteria were used to assess the extent to which an AU or REC intervention has contributed to the de-escalation of conflict: (1) the extent to which the intervention has achieved the anticipated effect (e.g. to encourage the conflict parties to engage in dialogue) and (2) whether this effect actually led to de-escalation or hindered further escalation.

| Indicator | Results in 2015 |
|---|--|
| Number of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises in which the AU and RECs intervened with explicit prevention measures | Crisis preventive interventions were taken in 7 out of 18 new or newly escalating conflicts. This includes Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Tanzania and Togo. |
| Number of these newly arising (and potentially violent) crises in which the AU/RECs intervened and which did not erupt into conflict and violence | In 4 out of 8 cases, preventive measures taken by AU/ RECs contributed to the prevention of further escalations. This includes Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Nigeria. Partial success was achieved in Tanzania and Togo. The elections were largely peaceful. In the case of Comoros, it's too early for an assessment. In Burundi, all preventive measures failed. |

Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Burkina Faso are all examples of successful interventions. In Guinea-Bissau, the conflict following the removal of the prime minister from office through the president was mediated by ECOWAS. By the end of the year, the HIIK re-categorized the conflict to intensity-level 1. Further success was evident in several interventions revolving around election observation missions.

Long-term missions proved to be comparably more successful. In the example of Guinea, both ECOWAS and the AU were actively engaged. ECOWAS sent both a high-level solidarity and information mission, while the AU sent a pre-election assessment mission. These interventions led to agreements among all parties and subsequently to generally transparent and peaceful elections. Similar interventions took place in Togo, Tanzania and Nigeria. While these interventions were also partly successful (i.e. the elections took place relatively peacefully), singular incidents and questions about the validity of results by individual actors could not be avoided. In Comoros, it is too early to assess the success of the intervention as the elections only took place in February 2016. The establishment of the international monitoring group in Burkina Faso (*Groupe international de Suivi et d'Accompagnement de la Transition au Burkina Faso*/ GISAT-BF) can be counted as a successful preventive measure.

No significant positive effect on the course of conflict was achieved by the multitude of regional preventive measures in Burundi (AU, EAC, COMESA).

The activities of the AU, ICGLR and COMESA in several conflicts in the eastern DRC mainly involved the demand for armed rebel groups to cease violence. This does not suffice to count as a crisis preventive measure.

The reluctance to intervene in strong countries – as mentioned above – is also evident in crisis prevention. Of the ten cases of newly erupting conflicts that the AU and/or RECs did not intervene in, eight were in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Republic of Congo, South Africa and Sudan.

3.2.2. Conflict Management

Aggregated Objective:


Violent domestic and transboundary conflicts reach resolution and peace agreements are being established.

The interventions are assessed both according to their quality and their success. This separation is based on the experience that the two categories do not always overlap. Some interventions are conducted exactly according to plan and yet do not achieve the anticipated objective. This might be due to the fact that the conflict parties are not willing to compromise, or other previously unknown factors further fuel the conflict. On the other hand, there are examples of successful interventions despite only marginal contributions by the AU/RECs.

a) Quality of Interventions

The quality of interventions is measured by a three-tiered approach, combining (1) the appropriateness of the means employed (extent, intensity and means used), (2) the relative importance of the interventions by APSA actors (AU/RECs) in comparison to other actors, and (3) the extent and quality of cooperation between the AU and RECs, as well as between AU/RECs and other African and international actors. The interventions are categorised as low, medium or high quality.

Indicator: Quality of the AU/REC interventions, appropriateness of the means employed, relative significance of the role played by AU RECs, quality of cooperation in AU/REC interventions in the identified conflicts (numbers of 2014 in brackets)



In 16 out of 29 (=55%) interventions, the use of diplomatic means was deemed successful. However, the number of interventions classified as low quality has increased from 4 to 6 (=21%). 7 interventions have been categorized as medium quality (=24%). Examples of high quality interventions vary in type: from complex and protracted conflicts like in Darfur, Somalia, DRC and the Boko Haram conflict, to limited conflicts such as the one on Burkina Faso and Guinea. The analysis also depicts an increasing cooperation between AU, RECs and other actors. One example of this is the intervention against Boko Haram, which was conducted by affected countries under the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the AU, ECCAS, ECOWAS and external actors.


All mediation efforts by AU and RECs have been either classified as high (7) or medium quality (1). When the situation in Burkina Faso deteriorated, ECOWAS intervened very rapidly. Even though the positions of AU and ECOWAS were at times not attuned, the intervention was successful. In Guinea, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, ECOWAS with the support of the AU conducted successful mediation interventions in particular in the context of elections.

Shortcomings have been identified in most PSOs. Often the success is lower than asserted, as for example in Somalia or the LRA-Mission. Nonetheless, there is broad consent that the situation for civilians would be even worse without the interventions. All on-going PSOs have achieved partial successes. Furthermore, it is important to consider that some of the African-led PSOs face extraordinarily difficult situations, in which the UN would not intervene.

b) Impact of the interventions

Of the 29 interventions conducted, 11 led to the de-escalation of conflict. In 5 cases, the intervention had no positive effect, while in 12 cases, partial success was achieved. One case was too early to assess.

Indicator: Outcome of AU/REC interventions in terms of contributing to the mitigation/resolution of conflict (numbers of 2014 in brackets)



Success is measured according to three criteria: (1) the timeliness, determination and appropriateness of an intervention, (2) whether the anticipated objectives were met, and (3) whether the intervention contributed to the de-escalation of conflict or at least prevented the conflict from further escalating. The interventions are categorised as “successful”, “partly successful” and “not successful”.

The diplomatic successes observed are largely due to election-related engagement.⁵⁸ Numerous interventions were conducted by the AU and even more so by RECs such as ECOWAS and SADC. Long-term observers have been deployed in a number of election-related missions. These have proven to have a more significant effect on conflicts as they can prevent crises at an early stage. High-level missions deployed in the context of elections, and often combined with mediation efforts, have proven to be especially effective. Examples of successful engagements include Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the success of the intervention does not imply that a positive development is solely the result of that said intervention. Nonetheless, the peaceful conduct of an election which had the potential to escalate is a success, particularly in a country that has previously experienced massive outbreaks of violence and even civil war in the context of elections. In general, the results of the analysis indicate that diplomatic means by themselves rarely contribute to the de-escalation of already on-going violent conflicts. None of the eight cases in which diplomacy was used as a single measure were deemed successful. Four out of the eight cases were even deemed

⁵⁸ Missions in the context of elections, including election observation missions are categorised as diplomatic measures.

unsuccessful. Of the interventions, which included more than one instrument, only one was deemed unsuccessful.

The analysis depicts a very positive trend for mediation processes. A strong correlation can be seen between the quality and the success of an intervention. All seven mediation processes categorised as high quality also proved to be successful. Furthermore, mediation interventions conducted prior to elections were largely successful. These mediations included all relevant parties and sometimes even civil society actors. In the case of Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire for example, the intervention contributed to the peaceful conduct of elections. Some of the interventions deemed successful were led by neither the AU nor RECs. Regardless, these actors made an active contribution to the success of the intervention. International mediation efforts by the UN or Algeria were, for example, supported by the AU in Libya and by the AU and ECOWAS in Mali.

A rather strong correlation is also evident between the assessment criteria "medium quality "and "partly successful" of an intervention.

In 2015, none of the PSOs was categorised as successful. Most PSOs were however able to achieve partial successes. The Boko Haram Mission (MNJTF) and AMISOM were able to push back Boko Haram and Al Shabab. In Somalia, the success against Boko Haram allowed the federal and state government to continue their work. Despite these successes, extremist groups maintained strongholds in large parts of both regions. Fatal extremist attacks remain present in these regions. Still, civil society is often trapped between the fronts. Therefore, the perceived situation has not increased considerably even though improving the situation for civilians is one of the main mandates of the respective missions. The same is true for the LRA-RTF, which was able to reduce the number of LRA members, without disabling the organisation as a whole.

3.2.2.1. Peace agreements mediated by AU/RECs

To further assess the success of conflict mediation, the following section examines peace agreements mediated by the AU/RECs between 2014 and 2015 which have lasted for more than one year. Peace agreements negotiated during the second half of 2015 were not included as insufficient time has passed to judge their longevity. The indicator therefore focuses on agreements which were signed between July 2014 and June 2015.

Indicator: Number of peace agreements concluded through mediation by the AU and/or RECs between 01. July 2014 and 30. June 2016 that are adhered to for more than one year

| Date | Name of Agreement | Country/ Conflict |
|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Second Half of 2014 | | |
| 23/07/2014 | <i>Accord de cessation des hostilités en République centrafricaine</i> | CAR (Anti-Balaka / ex-Séléka) |
| 24/07/2014 | <i>Draft Roadmap of Negotiations with the framework of the Algiers process ("Algiers Agreement")</i> | Mali (Northern Mali) |

| | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|
| 30/07/2014 | <i>Central Regions State Formation Agreement (Mudug and Galgadug)</i> | Somalia (federalization process/ inter-militia rivalry) |
| 31/07/2014 | <i>Windhoek Declaration</i> | Lesotho (military factions) |
| 25/08/2014 | <i>Re-Dedication of and Implementation Modalities for the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement</i> | South Sudan (civil war) |
| 05/09/2014 | <i>Landmark Agreement on a National Dialogue for Sudan</i> | Sudan (Darfur/ inter-communal violence) |
| 16/09/2014 | <i>Peace deal between former opposition leader Col. Barre Hirale and Interim Jubba Administration</i> | Somalia (federalization process/ inter-militia rivalry) |
| 02/10/2014 | <i>Maseru Facilitation Declaration</i> | Lesotho (military factions) |
| 18/10/2014 | <i>Elements for a peace and reconciliation agreement in Mali” (UN Report, December 2014) [not signed yet by the warring parties]</i> | Mali (north Mali/ Islamic groups) |
| 23/10/2014 | <i>Maseru Security Accord</i> | Lesotho (military factions) |
| 16/11/2014 | <i>Transitional Charter</i> | Burkina Faso (opposition) |
| First Half of 2015 | | |
| 10/05/2015 | <i>Agreement between the Transitional Government and the Armed Groups on DDRR Principles and of Integration into the CAR Uniformed State Forces</i> | ZAR (Anti-Balaka / ex-Séléka) |
| 11/05/2015 | <i>Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction</i> | ZAR (Anti-Balaka / ex-Séléka) |
| 15/05/2015 | <i>Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d’Alger</i> | Mali (Azawad/Northern Mali) |
| 20/06/2015 | <i>Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali</i> | Mali (Azawad/Northern Mali) |

The above list identifies 15 (2013-14: 9) agreements⁵⁹ mediated by the AU/ RECs between June 2014 and July 2015 which lasted for over one year. In comparison, only a single peace agreement negotiated during that period failed before reaching the one-year milestone.

⁵⁹ Intermediate agreements which are drafted during peace negotiations are also counted.

The number of agreements concluded during the second half of 2014 is considerably higher than the number during the first half of 2015. Yet, this number increases again during the second half of 2015. In 2015, the AU and RECs have again made a significant contribution to peace processes in Africa. Nonetheless, the number of processes in which the AU and RECs were the lead-negotiators has decreased slightly in 2015. In 50% of agreements, other actors took the lead. Several peace processes have seen a growing number of actors involved. This includes Mali, Libya and South Sudan. After a year and a half of mediation attempts by IGAD in South Sudan, external actors such as the US and the UK were included; this formed IGAD+, which continued the negotiations. This strategy is meant to increase the pressure on the conflict parties, as they have to justify their positions in front of a greater audience.

Since the beginning of the measurement through the APSA Impact Report in 2007, the total number of peace agreements that lasted up to one year has thereby increased to 58. 24 of these lasted for over three years.⁶⁰ It is important to note that a large number of agreements considered are still on-going but have not yet reached the three-year threshold.

3.2.2.2. Peace Support Operations, PSOs

To assess the quality and impact of African-led PSOs, the report analyses (1) the staffing level of civilian and police personnel, in comparison to the number of military troops, and (2) the degree of fulfilment of the respective PSOs' mandate.

Five African-led PSOs with troop deployment were conducted in 2015. These were either mandated or executed by the AU and/or the RECs. Additionally, the AU and the UN collaboratively conducted the Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).


AMISOM is the largest and consequently the most expensive PSO. It has been on-going for over nine years. The operation against the *Lord's Resistance Army* (LRA-RCI) and the *Regional Task Force* (RTF) has lasted since 2011. This mission is an exclusively military operation. The latest deployment of troops concerns the fight against Boko Haram. The *Multinational Joint Task Force* (MNJTF) deployed by the *Lake Chad Basin Commission* has started in mid-2015. By late 2015, the task force was operating solely under an AU-mandate; the mandate by the UN was not yet given. The considerably smaller operation in Guinea-Bissau by ECOWAS has been on-going for four years. Unlike the previous three operations, this peacekeeping mission is comprised of a relatively high number of police and civilian personnel. The mission by SADC in Lesotho is a relatively short-term endeavour with a specific assignment, which is exclusively staffed with police personnel.

The AU remains greatly involved in the *African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur* (UNAMID). The mission replaced the AU-led *African Union Mission* in Sudan (AMIS) in 2008.

In addition, the AU and RECs are involved in a number of smaller, civil PSOs such as the *African Union Mission to Mali and the Sahel* (MISAHEL), the *Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism* (MVM) in South Sudan and the *Mission de l'Union Africaine pour la Centrafrique et l'Afrique Centrale* (MISAC), which support and accompany peace processes. None of these constitute an ASF operation.

⁶⁰ In 2014 the number was 25. The agreements that were breached in the meantime were subtracted.

M. Peace Operations in Africa⁶¹



⁶¹ Diagram taken from the EU Institute for Security Studies “Understanding African armies”, Report N. 27, April 2016, pg. 8, “<http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/understanding-african-armies/>”, based on data of EEAS; AU; UNDPKO; Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP).

Indicator:

Staffing level of the civilian and police dimension in African-led missions in comparison to military staff and to the number required by the mandate

The following table provides an overview of on-going African PSOs and their staff composition. As it was not possible to collect data on all AU/RECs-led PSOs in 2015, the overview also includes some of last year's numbers on staffing levels:

| Name | Organisation | Land | Duration | Staff military (M), police (P), civil (C) | |
|---|--|--|------------------|--|---|
| | | | | According to mandate | In duty |
| African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) | AU | Somalia | Since 19.01.2007 | 22.126 uniformed personnel + one appropriate civil component (70 logistical staff supported by UN) | 21 645 M 415 P 70 C (Sept.2015) |
| Lord's Resistance Army – Regional Cooperation Initiative (LRA-RCI) | AU-authorized coalition between DRC, CAR, Uganda and South Sudan | Central African Region (DRC, CAR, South Sudan, Uganda) | Since 22.11.2011 | 5030 M 1 C (Dec. 2014) | 2284 M 1 C (Dec. 2014) |
| ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB) | ECOWAS | Guinea Bissau | Since 16.04.2012 | 850 uniformed personnel 120 C (Dec. 2014) | 576 M 282 P (2 FPU) 7 C (May 2015) |
| Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram | AU, Chad Lake Basin Commission supported by ECOWAS and ECCAS | Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad | Since 29.01.2015 | Mandated in 2015 8 700 M 2000 P und C | 8000 M (October 2015) |

| | | | | | |
|--|--------|--------------------|-------------------------|---|--|
| African Union–United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) | AU, UN | Sudan | Since 01.01.2008 | 15.854 M 3.403 P Appropriate civilian component (Dec. 2014) | 13.460 M 3.165 P 1.242 C (Dec. 2014) |
| Small Peace Operations with civil personell | | | | | |
| SADC Politics, Defence and Security Observation Mission | SADC | Lesotho | 22.09.2014 - 31.03.2015 | | 179 P (Dec. 2014) |
| Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) | IGAD | South Sudan | Since 04/2014 | | 80 C |
| African Union Mission to Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) | AU | Mali, Sahel-Region | Since 08/2013 | | 30 C |
| Mission de l'Union Africaine pour la Centrafrique et l'Afrique Centrale (MISAC) | AU | CAR und Region | Since 09/2014 | | 30 C |

Indicator:

Degree of compliance with core aspects of the respective mandates of African-led Peace Support Operations

The following table attempts to compare the actual set up of PSOs with their respective core mandates to help assess their current level of success.

African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The mandate of AMISOM includes three main tasks: (1) to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabab, (2) to increase the ability of the Somali government to operate through capacity building (especially of its security structures), and (3) to improve security and allow for the provision of sufficient humanitarian aid. The government took back control in many regions. Yet, this is mainly true for cities; Al Shabab remains very present in the countryside. Al Shabab makes use of asymmetric warfare and terrorism in both Somalia as well as in troop-contributing countries such as Kenya. The attack on the University in Garissa, where 150 students were killed, was one of the most severe. Despite an improvement in the provision of humanitarian aid, the security situation for civilians has not improved to the anticipated extent. Nonetheless, AMISOM is contributing significantly to the government's growing ability to exercise their mandate. Moreover, it supports the creation of a federalist system. AMISOM supported the re-establishment of the Somali security forces, who are however not yet capable of fulfilling their duties on their own. Therefore, AMISOM was only able to partly fulfil its mandate.

Lord's Resistance Army – Regional Task Force (LRA-RTF)

The core mandate of the LRA-RTF is (1) capacity building in the countries affected by the LRA's actions, (2) the stabilisation of the affected region, and (3) the provision of access to humanitarian aid. At the beginning of the year, the LRA-RTF celebrated its first success when one of the lead commanders surrendered and even encouraged other rebels to do the same. Another rebel leader was summoned to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. By mid-2015, financial commitments to the LRA-RTF were made through the African Peace Fund. While Uganda has considered withdrawing its troops, Sudan has shown interest to contribute to and participate in the LRA-RTF. The living conditions for the people affected by the LRA have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the conflicts in South Sudan and the CAR have significantly hindered the work of the LRA-RTF. Thus, the LRA has managed to increase the number of attacks committed in 2015. No meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JMC) took place in 2015.

ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB)

The mandate of ECOMIB includes (1) support to the government in their effort to stabilise the country, (2) the implementation of reforms regarding the security sector and the right to vote, and (3) the provision of access to humanitarian aid. ECOMIB continued to contribute to the improvement of the security situation in Guinea-Bissau. After progress made during the first half of 2015, the security situation was again deteriorating following the president's dismissal of his cabinet. It can be assumed that the presence of ECOMIB contributed considerably to the success of the mediation mission led by ECOWAS; both were instrumental in avoiding a violent conflict despite the tense political situation. In 2015, the intensity of the conflict did not even reach level 3 on the HCB. The most important challenge for ECOMIB to overcome in the future will be the further consolidation of the peace process and the reform of the security forces. Despite the overall positive developments, the objective of the mission is not yet fully met. Thanks to commitments through the APF, the funding of ECOMIB is secured for the immediate future.

Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

The *Multi National Joint Task Force* (MNJTF) against Boko Haram is a cooperation of the *Chad Lake Basin Commission* Member States. The commission, which has been inactive since the '90s, was reactivated for this task force; its compilation proved more suitable for the operation, as only two member states of both ECOWAS and ECCAS are affected by Boko Haram. Nonetheless,

ECOWAS and in particular ECCAS, were actively involved in the operation. The core mandate of the MNJTF is (1) the cessation of violence against civilians in areas affected by Boko Haram (particularly in the form of sexual violence against women and children), (2) the stabilisation of the region (including the re-establishment of governmental institutions supporting the return of refugees), and (3) the provision of access to humanitarian aid. The task force has achieved a number of military successes against Boko Haram which have increased safety in the affected areas, at least temporarily. Yet, the mandate is far from being fulfilled. Part of the reason is the lack of funds caused by the still outstanding UN-mandate. Internal problems are also evident. Reports about assaults by the MNJTF against civil society make the likelihood of “winning hearts and minds” less likely.

African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

The core mandate of UNAMID includes (1) creating a safe environment for civilians, (2) the protection of human rights and the provision of access to humanitarian aid, (3) monitoring the compliance with various ceasefire agreements and the Darfur Peace Agreement, and (4) supporting the country's political development and post-conflict measures such as the reintegration of refugees. Due to reductions in staff, the benchmarks for all components were lowered in 2014 to the following: (1) an inclusive peace process through mediation between the government and the armed groups in the context of the Doha process (this includes the protection of civilians and access to humanitarian aid), (2) prevention or de-escalation of local conflicts through mediation, (3) measures to tackle the roots of the conflict. In 2015, UNAMID continued to face problems in showing progress in the fulfilment of its mandate. The security situation in Darfur deteriorated slightly during the reporting period. The Sudanese government asked for the withdrawal of the mission. Thus, there is currently the risk that the operation will end before its objectives have been met.

Small PSOs with civil personnel

SADC Politics, Defence and Security Observation Mission

The operation was intended to calm the situation in Lesotho and to support SSR measures. The operation, which was initially limited to three months, was extended by another three months until the elections in February 2015. The elections took place in a peaceful manner, however SSR measures were not conducted. Consequently, the security situation again escalated during the course of the year. The mandate was only partially fulfilled.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM)

The MVM was deployed to assess the compliance with the *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement* in South Sudan. In 2015, the MVM played a crucial role in monitoring various breaches of the agreement. The MVM is protected by UNMISS. Following the *Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan* (ARCSS) in August 2015, the MVM was integrated in the *Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism* (CTSAMM).

Mission de l'Union Africaine pour la Centrafrique et l'Afrique Centrale (MISAC)

MISAC was created following the handover of the AU PSO MISCA to the UN. Its objective is to support the preparation of elections and measures for peace consolidation. The duration of the mission in 2015 is too short to assess its impact. So far, MISAC is involved in all political processes in CAR.

This overview reflects the extensive engagement of AU and RECs in PSOs. This includes sensitive missions which are not solely about compliance with peace agreements, but in three cases incorporate combat missions against highly violent and uncompromising conflict parties (AMISOM, LRA-RCI and MNJTF). The situation in Darfur is equally difficult due to the fractionalisation of the rebel groups and the unwillingness of the government to cooperate with the mission. ECOMIB is the only peace operation revolving around the customary PSO task of securing rather than creating peace. Considering the outlined challenges, the relative successes of the PSOs should be judged in a positive light.

Nonetheless, some problems are increasingly evident:

- Although AU PSOs do not match the costs of a UN PSO, combat missions remain very costly. This makes the AU and RECs very dependent on external financiers, as internal funding is not sufficiently available nor reliable.
- Especially missions with combat operations against terrorist groups lack a clearly defined exit strategy. Neither the tasks of AMISOM, nor of the LRA-RCI can easily be passed on to the UN. At the same time, new conflicts with the potential for PSOs are already emerging (e.g. Burundi and South Sudan).

3.2.3. Peacebuilding

Aggregated objective regarding peacebuilding

Processes of post-conflict peacebuilding (peace consolidation) that improve living conditions for the population are being successfully initiated, supported and monitored by the AU and RECs.

The frequently occurring re-emergence of violence following failed reconciliation and reconstruction underlines the importance of peace consolidation efforts after the cessation of violent conflicts. Both the AU and the RECs acknowledge the importance of peace consolidation. The PCRDR Framework outlined in chapter 2 offers the foundation for AU support in post-conflict member states.

Close cooperation between the AU/ RECs and the UN in the area of peace consolidation is inevitable. In 2015, the dialogue between these organisations increasingly focused on peace building and consolidation.

Indicator:

a) Number of post-conflict processes in which the AU/RECs actively participate

The AU's central actors in the area of PCRDR are the *AU Liaison Offices* (AULOs) in the respective member states as well as the regional offices in Mali and CAR. They contribute to national PCRDR processes and conduct small missions called *Peace Strengthening Projects*. MISAHEL, the AU-Mission in Mali and the Sahel region, further provides direct humanitarian support.

No additional *Post-Conflict Needs Assessments* were conducted in 2015. Yet, a number of PCRDR-missions were conducted and various projects within the frame of the *African Solidarity Initiative* were implemented. One example is the collaborative UN, AU and ECCAS mission in CAR. The mission dealt with the situation of women and IDPs by leading discussions with various representatives from the government, civil society, and international partners with the aim to increase the participation of women in peace missions.

DDR and SSR are integral components of the AU PCRDR strategy. The *DDR capacity* programme and the *Building AU Capacities for SSR* programme support the operationalisation of these components. Several missions were conducted by the AU and its regional and international partners following requests by the respective member states (South Sudan, Sudan, CAR, Somalia, Comoros, Libya). These missions were tasked predominantly with consultations (e.g. Libya) and training measures (e.g. the training at the KAIPTC for high-level representatives of Somali ministries and the Somali security sector). A further training was conducted in Tunis for representatives of northern African states, NARC, CEN-SAD, MISCA and the AU-mission in Mali. The participants of trainings are expected to act as multipliers. A collaborative assessment of the AU and ECCAS on the state of the security sector was conducted in CAR. The control and limitation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is an important component of DDR and SSR.

The *African Solidarity Initiative* outlined in Chapter 2 is a further instrument for reciprocal African support in post-conflict situations. Measures can also be taken on a bilateral basis.

IGAD has developed priorities for its post-conflict member states. Emphasis is placed on strengthening the capacities of youth, women and national media in order to foster the peacebuilding process from within. IGAD is closely involved in the post-conflict efforts in Somalia.

ECOWAS has previously taken PCRD measures within the context of the *Peace and Development Project*. Mechanisms such as the *Emergency Response Team* and the *Emergency Response Mechanism* serve to support post-conflict countries. ECOWAS supported multiparty agreements with regards to the local integration of refugees between Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Guinea-Bissau constitutes a pilot country for PCRD measures by ECOWAS. Emphasis has been placed on supporting the stabilization of the political system and the security sector.

ECCAS' endeavours in PCRD are focused on CAR.

COMESA has gained experience in supporting transnational cooperation through its *Trade for Peace Project*. ICGLR is adopting a similar approach in its own programmes.

Indicator:



b) Degree of improvement in the population's access to social and economic infrastructure

The AU and COMESA have drafted plans to foster transnational markets and customs offices. AULOs in post-conflict countries are given a very limited budget for their *Peace Strengthening Projects*. These are usually small measures with the aim to strengthen mutual trust. Nonetheless, these measures are capable of improving people's living conditions on a small scale.

4. Overall assessment of the state of the APSA

In 2015, the AU and the RECs have continued to demonstrate their increasing commitment to crisis prevention and transformation as well as to the protection of civilians. The number of interventions conducted by the AU and the RECs remained high in 2015: overall, the AU and RECs intervened in 29 out of 57 violent conflicts, i.e. in 51%. Additionally, they pre-emptively intervened in a number of newly emerging conflicts. The rate of intervention was even higher (12 interventions, 75%) in highly violent conflicts. This depicts clear and comprehensible prioritisation. Thus, the AU and the RECs have again proven to be indispensable actors in addressing conflicts in Africa.

A positive trend is further evident when looking at the quality and success of interventions (see Chapter 3). The quality and success of interventions is predominantly assessed medium to high. These results indicate an increasing capacity of the AU and RECs and their respective APSA tools.



Ten years after the initial development of the APSA, its elements have reached different levels of functional capability:

- The **African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC)** is firmly established and meets on a regular basis. Although information on crises and conflicts is readily available, decisions are often not taken in a timely and suitable manner due to different political interests of the council members. The PSC itself has noted this shortcoming.
- The **early warning systems** of the AU and various RECs have been physically established, are widely connected and capable of quickly delivering information and policy recommendations for crisis mitigation to political decision makers.
- Capacities and instruments for the analysis, development and implementation of strategies for **structural crisis prevention** are currently being developed and tested. Synergies with the structures of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) are established and utilised.

- The **border program** of the AU makes significant contributions to crisis prevention and peace consolidation efforts through the delimitation and demarcation of borders, the support of an integrated border management and through transboundary cooperation.
- Actors and instruments of **preventive diplomacy** at the AU and the RECs contribute to the prevention, de-escalation and transformation of violent conflicts in AU Member States.
- The AU and the RECs conduct **mediation** missions in coordination with other international organisations. However, mediation framework structures are not yet fully established or operational at either the AU or the RECs level. These structures will be necessary to guarantee professional preparations, and conduct of mediation processes which the AU and the RECs are increasingly engaging in.
- According to political decision makers, the multi-dimensional **African Standby Force (ASF)** has reached its full operational capability in four (out of five) regions following relevant field exercises. The AU and the RECs have gained extensive experience in AU- or REC-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Training institutes in the regions allow for professional preparations for PSOs through relevant training programs. In 2015 AU Member States have sent more than 60.000 personnel on AU and UN peace missions. However, the police and civilian components of the ASF remain behind the developments of the military dimension. The AU is currently addressing deficits of the ASF that could jeopardise its operational capability through the development of a *Mission Support Strategy*.
- The African Union Heads of State and Government have decided to increase Member States' contributions to the **AU Peace Fund**. This is a precondition for more effective crisis prevention, strengthening human and institutional capacities and guaranteeing reliable funding for AU PSOs.

The following **challenges** for the AU and RECs have been identified:

- The intensification of crises and violent, asymmetric and hybrid conflicts in Africa with a high number of civilian victims, refugees and displaced persons;
- The high number of re-emerging conflicts in post-conflict countries due to the insufficient impact of PCRD measures;
- Profound challenges in the field of governance, especially – but not exclusively – with regards to elections;
- The perceived or actual exclusion of social groups in the decision-making process;
- Insufficient human resources at the AU and the RECs;
- Insufficient internal funding coming from member states and the resulting dependency on external support.

As mentioned in the 2014 APSA assessment, the **role of women** in the prevention and resolution of conflicts should be further strengthened. This is particularly true in mediation and conflict transformation efforts. A larger proportion of females is sought out in multi-dimensional ASF missions. Yet, further effort will be necessary to increase the number of females in the APSA structures.

The PCRD framework provides appropriate guidance for interventions in post-conflict countries. Sustainable peace consolidation is meant to be achieved through DDR measures, reconciliation and transitional justice in combination with the reconstruction of political, economic and social

infrastructures. At the moment however, the AU and RECs are still at the very early stages of implementing corresponding measures.

APSA interventions contributing to the prevention and resolution of conflict or to peace consolidation are also helping to tackle **root causes of migration**.

Overall, the APSA has made quantifiable progress in 2015 both with regards to the state of the APSA and the use of its instruments. However, with the remaining challenges outlined above, further development of the APSA and its instruments is crucial. This is particularly the case for Central and North Africa, where the instruments are not yet adequately developed or not currently existent.

Annex I: Summary of aggregated results, including indicators for measuring the results of APSA used by the AU and RECs in crisis zones

Introduction

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is a complex, comprehensive system which the African Union (AU) along with multiple regional organisations and regional peacekeeping training centres are working to establish and maintain. German support for the APSA is similarly distributed across approximately 10 different projects mandated by various regional divisions. Each of these projects is required to identify and verify the specific results it achieves.

For German development policy, it is also important to identify and record the overall results of German support for the APSA system, as well as the impacts the APSA has had on concrete conflict situations and on the long-term development of peace and security in Africa. The aggregate results matrix and associated indicators presented below serve to facilitate these efforts. They form the basis for future aggregated results monitoring.

The results matrix compiling efforts to establish CEWS, mediation structures and the African Standby Force (ASF) illustrate the support provided by German development cooperation to create these key tools of the APSA. To broaden the perspective, this results matrix can be supplemented to include a further, relatively new topic at the AU level, that of post-conflict reconstruction. The partner organisations involved are the AU Commission and the commissions and secretariats of the regional organisations, i.e. the bureaucratic apparatus. The targeted direct result at this level is the establishment of functional APSA tools. The objectives and indicators subsequently indicated under Results Level I are based on this targeted result.

The second results matrix, Use of the African Peace and Security Architecture, is a continuation of the first results matrix. It is based on the assumption that the APSA instruments currently still being established, i.e. CEWS, mediation structures and the African Standby Force, constitute a toolbox for political decision-makers that they can use to provide an appropriate response to threatening or outbreaking crisis situations.

Successful use of these APSA tools by political decision-makers in crisis situations leads to prevention or cessation of armed conflicts and to peacebuilding (result at the level of the conflict countries/regions [Results Level II]), and over the long term to positive overall development of the peace and security situation in Africa, which in turn constitutes the prerequisite for sustainable economic, social and political development (Results Level III). This superordinate, overarching impact matrix lies beyond the direct sphere of influence of German development cooperation efforts, as the political decision-makers (e.g. the AU's Peace and Security Council) are not identical with the project partners at the commission and secretariat level. The only opportunity for possibly influencing this impact matrix would lie in political dialogue at the governmental level. Nevertheless, it is important for the BMZ to learn more about the actual impacts and benefits of APSA interventions. The results will provide – albeit only in the longer term – the answer to the question as to whether the hypothesis on which German promotional efforts are based, namely that the AU and RECs can make a positive contribution to peace and security in their Member States, is a realistic one. This is why these impact levels (II and III), which German development cooperation can influence only very indirectly, are also being monitored based on defined indicators (see the respective tables of indicators). The result of these monitoring efforts is to be presented in an aggregated APSA impact report.

| Selected Elements of the APSA | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| | Conflict Early Warning Systems | Mediation structures | African Standby Force | PCRD |
| Impact | Political decision-makers at continental (PSC) and regional level have at their disposal timely and needs-oriented information and analyses on conflicts arising within and/or between Member States and on response options for gender-sensitive measures aimed at early conflict transformation. | The political mediation units of the AU and RECs (e.g. the Panel of the Wise) have at their disposal professional, technical, methodological and organisational support for planning, executing and evaluating mediation missions. Given parallel mediation activities by the AU and RECs, participants can call upon established coordination and agreement structures. Gender aspects are appropriately observed. | The political decision-makers of the AU (PSC) and RECs have at their disposal a strong contingent of well-prepared civilian experts (of whom 25% at minimum are women) for deployment in an ASF that is configured and acts on a multidimensional scale. The ASF considers protection of the civilian population and respect for human rights to be priority tasks of its mission. | The division of roles between the actors implementing the AU Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development is clarified and financial resources for its implementation are available. |
| Outcome | The units involved with the early warning system at continental and regional level provide a timely warning of any escalating conflict situations in the Member States. They formulate high-quality (and gender-sensitive) analyses and response options for conflict transformation. The CEWS are being continuously further developed. Technically speaking, the early warning systems at continental and regional level are mutually compatible and use a common shared network and a broad and diverse range of information sources. | The staffers of mediation support units institutionalise efforts to further develop the approaches, instruments and skills they utilise for mediation. Qualified mediators receive training updates continuously to keep abreast of the newest developments. The mediation support units at continental and regional level mutually coordinate and agree their respective approaches. | The AU PSOD prepares an analysis of the needs for civilian experts of various vocational groups. They develop standards for selecting and training civilian experts and register the experts appropriately trained at the regional and continental expert pools (rosters). They also develop directives, guidelines, specifications and standards for participants in peace missions that are gender-sensitive and geared to promoting respect for human rights and protection of the civilian population, and take part in multi-dimensional planning processes for designing the ASF. | The AU PSOD clarifies AU and REC involvement in post-conflict processes by consulting with RECs, member states and international partners. Member states make increasing financial contributions to the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). Other donors contribute to ASI or to the financing window, which the German development cooperation has established. |

| Selected Elements of the APSA | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| | Conflict Early Warning Systems | Mediation structures | African Standby Force | PCRD |
| Output | CEWS are technically ready for deployment. The indicators and instruments are designed to be gender-sensitive. The experts involved with the early warning system have mastered the instruments and possess the methodological skills needed to prepare conflict analyses. Organisational structuring for fulfilling their mandate has been established (lines of communication, distribution of tasks, management structure). | From an institutional standpoint, the mediation support units are established as part of the secretariats or commissions; the personnel are regularly trained and are qualified to perform their duties. Mediation approaches and instruments are further developed and adapted based on lessons learned, and taking gender aspects into account. A database of qualified mediators (of whom 25% at minimum are women) is being established and maintained. | The steering units at the AU and RECs/RMs are improving their capacities with respect to sectoral and professional expertise (including gender competencies), process development and networking. Regional peacekeeping training centres are professionally and methodologically qualified to train civilian personnel for peace missions. Steering units and training centres are designing their planning processes and work procedures effectively and efficiently, in part by establishing mechanisms for communication, | PCRD strategies and implementing documents (such as action plans) exist at AUC level (and at individual RECs). Rules and procedures for implementing PCRD measures exist. |
| Input | Holding training courses and workshops, preparation of studies, sectoral/technical advising taking into account relevant gender aspects and an approach to human security; funding, equipment and materials; supporting donor coordination efforts and funding contributions; promotion of cooperation and networking between RECs, between the AU and RECs, and with the member states. | Advising on sectoral, technical, methodological and organisational-developmental issues related to establishing mediation support units, holding mediation training, preparing studies and documenting lessons learned from past mediation processes, giving due consideration to relevant gender aspects; supporting exchange and cooperation between the AU and RECs and between the RECs; supporting donor coordination efforts and funding contributions. | Advising on sectoral, technical, organisational and process issues related to establishing the roster for civilian experts; development, performance and/or financing of appropriate training courses for civilian experts and for integrated groups, giving due consideration to relevant gender aspects and an approach to human security; promotion of cooperation and networking between RECs, between the AU and RECs, and with the Member States; support for donor coordination, funding, civilian experts; equipment and materials, and preparation of studies. | Expert, organisational and process consulting for AU and RECs involvement in PCRD processes in member states; rules and procedures counselling for implementing PCRD measures and for managing corresponding funds. |




Results Level I: Establishment of the APSA instruments by the AU and REC commissions and secretariats; this corresponds to the direct-results level of the aggregate results matrix for establishment of CEWS, mediation structures and the ASF.

Overarching objective: The decision-makers of the AU and the African regional organisations have functional civilian instruments for conflict prevention and transformation and post conflict peacebuilding (peace consolidation) at their disposal.

| Targeted results and sub-objectives | Indicators for measuring impact |
|---|---|
| <p>Political decision-makers at continental (PSC) and regional level have at their disposal timely and needs-oriented information, analyses and response options for decision-making on measures aimed at early conflict transformation when conflicts arise within and/or between Member States.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision-makers confirm the use and usefulness of the EWS and its outputs. • Degree to which CEWS is harmonized with the regional EWS of the RECs (e.g. technical compatibility, exchange of data). <p>(Sources: Survey of the EWS units, survey of the PSC Secretariat and appropriate units/offices at the RECs)</p> |
| <p>The mediators mandated by selected RECs (planned for SADC and ECOWAS) have at their disposal professional, technical, methodological and organisational support for planning, executing and evaluating mediation missions.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination and collaboration efforts from (potential and active) mediators (male/female) from AU & RECs (e.g. during PanWise retreat). (Source: Protocols and reports of PanWise meetings) • Existence and use of AU/REC mediation structures (panels, expert groups and/or mediation support units). (Source: AU/RECs reports) |
| <p>The political decision-makers of the AU (PSC) and RECs have at their disposal a strong contingent of well-prepared civilian experts (of whom 25% at minimum are women) for deployment in a multidimensionally configured and acting ASF. The ASF views protection of the civilian population and respect for human rights to be priority tasks of its mission.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of deployable civilian experts on the roster. Growing percentage of female civilian experts. (Baseline: Quellen: Databases disaggregated by gender and qualifications) • Status of integration of civilian, police and military experts as well as consideration of gender, human rights and protection of civilians in continental and regional PSO exercises. (Baseline: AMANI I assessment (2010), FTX EASFCOM, ECOWAS; Sources: AMANI II assessment and future planning and field exercises) • Availability of funds for civilian reconstruction measures in the context of AU PSOs at the AU. |
| <p>The division of roles between the actors involved in implementing the PCRDR is clarified and funds for implementation are available.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guiding documents on the division of roles between AU, RECs and Member States on PCRDR exist, as well as functional mechanisms for their implementation. • Contributions by AU Member States to the African Solidarity Initiative. |

Impact of the APSA in conflict countries

Use of APSA Instruments in conflict regions

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|--------------------|
| <p>Long-term indirect results of development policy</p> | <p>The more peaceful setting enables people in post conflict regions to assume their rights to physical and psychological integrity and to participate in economic, social and political development processes, thereby also improving the opportunities and chances for sustainably reducing poverty in a stable and democratic political setting.</p> | | | |
| <p> Indirect impacts (results) of APSA on conflicts in Africa</p> | <p>The trend shows that number, duration, and intensity of armed conflicts are decreasing.</p> | | | |
| <p> Direct results of interventions in conflict countries</p> | <p>Conflicts arising within individual Member States as well as transborder conflicts are being successfully defused through use of conflict prevention measures by the AU and/or RECs. Violent national and transborder conflicts are being halted and peace agreements reached. Processes of post-conflict peacebuilding (peace consolidation) are being inclusively and successfully initiated, supported and monitored.</p> | | | |
| <p> Use of APSA instruments by political decision-makers</p> | <p>The political decision-makers (the AU's PSC and comparable bodies and institutions of the RECs) base their decisions on the information and recommended actions of EWS. They use mediation and quiet diplomacy in forms coordinated and agreed between the AU and RECs for preventing crises at an early stage and conducting peace negotiations. The mediators they mandate (e.g. the Panel of the Wise) base their efforts on the professional expertise of the support units. The ASF is deployed together with its civilian elements to end warring conflicts and secure ceasefire and peace agreements.</p> | | | |
| <p>APSA instruments available</p> | <p>Functional Conflict Early Warning Systems</p> | <p>Professional Mediation Structures</p> | <p>Multidimensional African Standby Force ready for deployment</p> | <p>PCRD</p> |

Results Level II: The impacts (results) of AU and REC interventions on conflict situations in the countries and/or regions of intervention; this corresponds to the level 'Direct results in the countries of intervention' (highlighted in light orange) of Results Matrix B, 'Aggregate results matrix of use of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)'.

Overarching objective: Conflicts arising within individual Member States as well as transborder conflicts are being successfully defused through the use of crisis prevention measures of the AU and/or RECs. Violent national and transborder conflicts are being stopped and peace agreements reached. Processes of post-conflict peacebuilding (peace consolidation) are being inclusively and successfully initiated, supported and monitored.

| Targeted results and sub-objectives | Indicators for measuring results |
|--|--|
| Conflicts arising within individual Member States as well as transborder conflicts are being successfully defused through use of crisis prevention measures of the AU and/or RECs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises in which the AU and RECs took preventive measures [in 2013]. • Number of newly arising (and potentially violent) conflicts where AU/RECs intervened and which did not erupt into conflict and violence <p>(Sources: AU reporting to the donor community, Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, AU and REC reports, lessons learned reports, media reports, and scientific analyses)</p> |
| Violent national and transborder conflicts are being halted and peace agreements reached. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of violent conflicts in which the AU and RECs got involved by means of conflict transformation (diplomacy, mediation, deployment of the ASF)⁶², compared to the total number of conflicts. • Quality of the degree of APSA engagement in a given conflict. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Relative contribution of APSA: analysis of the relative contribution made by the APSA (AU or REC) and assessment of the appropriateness of the role taken by the AU/RECs as compared to other institutional actors. b) Cooperation between actors involved in conflict prevention and transformation: the degree and quality of cooperation between the AU continental level and RECs, and the degree and quality of cooperation between the AU/RECs and other international actors. c) Analysis of the appropriateness (scope, means) of the degree of engagement of the AU/REC in proportion to the intensity of the conflict. • Impact of the APSA intervention on deescalating a conflict a) in the year under scrutiny [2013], b) in the previous year [2012]. • Number of peace agreements concluded through mediation by the AU and/or RECs that hold more than one year [three years if applicable]. • Degree of compliance with core aspects of the respective mandate of African-led Peace Support Operations. • Staffing level of civilian and police dimension in African-led missions compared to number required in the mandate. |

⁶² Only looking at countries/regions that have at least one conflict of intensity levels 3 to 5 as per the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HCB).

Processes of post-conflict peacebuilding (peace consolidation) that improve living conditions for the population are being successfully initiated, supported and monitored

- The number of post-conflict processes (such as joint needs assessments) in which the AU and/or RECs actively participate.
- Degree of improvement in the population's access to social and economic infrastructure (measured in selected conflict regions that have benefited from promotion contributions of German development cooperation).

Results Level III: The long-term impact of the peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace consolidation interventions made by the AU and RECs on the conflict situations in Africa (highlighted in orange) in the impact matrix 'African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Impact In Conflict Countries'.

Objective: The long-term trend shows that the number, duration and intensity of armed conflicts in Africa are diminishing.

| Targeted results and sub-objectives | Indicators for measuring results |
|--|---|
| <p>The long-term trend shows that the number, duration and intensity of armed conflicts in Africa are diminishing.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease in the number of deaths caused by war and civil war and in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in the time period from 2010 to 2020 in comparison to the time period from 2000 to 2010 (Baseline: 2000-2010; Sources: Reporting by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] and the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program [UCDP]) • Decrease in the number and intensity of armed conflicts in the time period from 2010 to 2020 in comparison to the time period 2000 to 2010 (Baseline: 2000-2010; Sources: Global Peace Index, Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Crisis Watch) |

Annex II: Overview of all conflict clusters

| # | Name of Conflict Cluster | Conflict according to HCB | Level of intensity of HCB Conflicts | Max level intensity conflict cluster |
|----|---|---|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | Algeria (AQIM et al.) | CU 1: Algeria (AQIM et al.) | 3 | 3 |
| 2 | Algeria (Berbers/Kabylia) | CU 2: Algeria (Berbers/Kabylia) | 2 | 2 |
| 3 | Algeria (Malekites - Mozabites/Ghardaia) | CU 3: Algeria (Malekites - Mozabites/Ghardaia) | 3 | 3 |
| 4 | Algeria (opposition) | CU 4: Algeria (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 5 | Burkina Faso (opposition groups) | CU 1: Burkina Faso (opposition groups) | 3 | 3 |
| 6 | Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (Boko Haram) | CU 1: Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (Boko Haram) | 5 | 5 |
| 7 | Burundi (opposition) | CU 1: Burundi (opposition) | 4 | 4 |
| 8 | Burundi - Rwanda | CU 2: Burundi - Rwanda | 3 | 3 |
| 9 | Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - ex-Séléka) | CU 1: Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - ex-Séléka) | 5 | 5 |
| 10 | Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda (LRA) | CU 1: Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda (LRA) | 4 | 4 |
| 11 | Chad (opposition) | CU 1: Chad (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 12 | Chad (rebel groups) | CU 2: Chad (rebel groups) | 2 | 2 |
| 13 | Côte d'Ivoire (opposition) | CU 1: Cote d'Ivoire (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 14 | Cote d'Ivoire (militant groups) | CU 2: Cote d'Ivoire (militant groups) | 3 | 3 |
| 15 | DR Congo (Katanga) | CU 1: DR Congo (Bantu-Batwa/Katanga) | 4 | 4 |
| | | CU 2: DR Congo (Kata Katanga / Katanga) | 4 | |
| 16 | DR Congo (Eastern Congo / militia violence) | CU 2: DR Congo (ex-M23) | 3 | 4 |
| | | CU 8: DR Congo, Rwanda (FDLR) | 4 | |
| | | CU 5: DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi et al.) | 4 | |
| | | CU 9: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda (ADF) | 4 | |

| | | | | |
|----|---|--|---|---|
| | | CU 10: DR Congo, Burundi (FNL) | | |
| 17 | DR Congo (Ituri militias) | CU 3: DR Congo (Ituri militias) | 4 | 4 |
| 18 | DR Congo (opposition) | CU 6: DR Congo (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 19 | DR Congo - Rwanda | CU 7: DR Congo - Rwanda | 2 | 2 |
| 20 | Djibouti (FRUD) | CU1: Djibouti (FRUD) | 3 | 3 |
| 21 | Djibouti (opposition) | CU 2: Djibouti (opposition) | 2 | 2 |
| 22 | Egypt (Bedouin activists) | CU 1: Egypt (Bedouin activists) | 1 | 1 |
| 23 | Egypt (Islamist Groups / Sinai Peninsula) | CU 2: Egypt (Islamist groups/ Sinai peninsula) | 4 | 4 |
| 24 | Egypt (Muslims-Christians) | CU 3: Egypt (Muslims-Christians) | 3 | 3 |
| 25 | Egypt (opposition) | CU 4: Egypt (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 26 | Egypt-Sudan | CU 5 : Egypt- Sudan | 1 | 1 |
| 27 | Ethiopia (ARDUF) | CU 1: Ethiopia (ARDUF) | 2 | 2 |
| 28 | Ethiopia (OLF/Oromiya) | CU 2: Ethiopia (OLF/Oromiya) | 3 | 3 |
| 29 | Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden) | CU 3: Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden) | 3 | 3 |
| 30 | Ethiopia (opposition) | CU 4: Ethiopia (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 31 | Ethiopia (TPDM) | CU 5: Ethiopia (TPDM) | 2 | 2 |
| 32 | Ethiopia - Egypt, Sudan (GERD) | CU 6: Ethiopia - Egypt, Sudan (GERD) | 1 | 1 |
| 33 | Ethiopia - Eritrea | CU 7: Ethiopia - Eritrea | 1 | 1 |
| 34 | Gabon (opposition) | CU 1: Gabon (opposition groups) | 3 | 3 |
| 35 | Guinea (Guerze-Konianke) | CU 1: Guinea (Guerze-Konianke) | 1 | 1 |
| 36 | Guinea (opposition) | CU 2: Guinea (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 37 | Kenya (inter-ethnic violence) | CU 1: Kenya (inter-ethnic violence) | 4 | 4 |
| 38 | Kenya (MRC-Coast) | CU 2: Kenya (MRC-Coast) | 2 | 2 |
| 39 | Kenya (Mungiki) | CU 3: Kenya (Mungiki) | 3 | 3 |
| 40 | Kenya (opposition) | CU 4: Kenya (Opposition) | 2 | 2 |
| 41 | Lesotho (military factions) | CU 1: Lesotho (military factions) | 3 | 3 |

| | | | | |
|----|---------------------------------------|---|--------|---|
| 42 | Libya (Federalists/Cyrenaica) | CU 1: Libya (Federalists/Cyrenaica) | 1 | 1 |
| 43 | Libya (inter-tribal / opposition) | CU 2: Libya (inter-tribal) CU 3: Libya (opposition) | 4 5 | 5 |
| 44 | Mali (Azawad / Northern Mali) | CU 1: Mali (HCUA, MNLA et al./ Azawad) CU 2: Mali (inter-militant rivalry / northern Mali) | 3 3 | 3 |
| 45 | Mali (Islamist groups) | CU 3: Mali (Islamist groups) | 4 | 4 |
| 46 | Mali (military factions/opposition) | CU 4: Mali (military factions) CU 5: Mali (opposition) | 2 | 2 |
| 47 | Mauritania (AQIM) | CU 1: Mauritania (AQIM) | 3 | 3 |
| 48 | Morocco (AQIM) | CU 1: Morocco (AQIM) | 2 | 2 |
| 49 | Morocco (opposition) | CU 2: Morocco (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 50 | Morocco (POLISARIO/Western Sahara) | CU 3: Morocco (POLISARIO/Western Sahara) | 3 | 3 |
| 51 | Mozambique (RENAMO) | CU 1: Mozambique (RENAMO) | 3 | 3 |
| 52 | Niger (Islamist groups) | CU 1: Niger (Islamist groups) | 3 | 3 |
| 53 | Niger (opposition) | CU 2: Niger (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 54 | Nigeria (Christians - Muslims) | CU 1: Nigeria (Christians - Muslims) | 1 | 1 |
| 55 | Nigeria (Eggon groups/Nasarawa State) | CU 2: Nigeria (Eggon groups/Nasarawa State) | 2 | 2 |
| 56 | Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists) | CU 3: Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists) | 5 | 5 |
| 57 | Nigeria (Ijaw groups/Niger Delta) | CU 4: Nigeria (Ijaw groups/Niger Delta) | 3 | 3 |
| 58 | Nigeria (Islamic Movement) | CU 5: Nigeria (Islamic Movement) | 3 | 3 |
| 59 | Nigeria (MASSOB/Biafra) | CU 6: Nigeria (MASSOB/Biafra) | 3 | 3 |
| 60 | Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni/Niger Delta) | CU 7: Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni/Niger Delta) | 1 | 1 |
| 61 | Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners) | CU 8: Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners) | 3 | 3 |
| 62 | Republic of Congo (opposition) | CU 1: Republic of Congo (opposition) | 3 | 3 |

| | | | | |
|----|--|---|---|---|
| 63 | Senegal (June 23 Movement) | CU 1: Senegal (June 23 Movement) | 3 | 3 |
| 64 | Senegal (MFDC/Casamance) | CU 2: Senegal (MFDC/Casamance) | 3 | 3 |
| 65 | Sierra Leone (APC - SLPP) | CU 1: Sierra Leone (APC - SLPP) | 3 | 3 |
| 66 | Somalia (federalization process/inter-militia rivalry) | CU 1: Somalia (ASWJ) | 3 | 3 |
| | | CU 2: Somalia (Habr Gedir - Biymal / Lower Shabelle) | 3 | |
| | | CU 3: Somalia (Hawadle - Surre/Hiiraan) | 3 | |
| | | CU 4: Somalia (inter-militia rivalry / Jubaland) | 3 | |
| 67 | Somalia (Khatumo State - Puntland - Somaliland) | CU 5: Somalia (Khatumo State - Puntland - Somaliland) | 3 | 3 |
| 68 | Somalia (Puntland - Somaliland - FGS) | CU 6: Somalia (Puntland) | 1 | 1 |
| | | CU 7: Somalia (Somaliland) | 1 | |
| 69 | Somalia - Kenya (Al-Shabaab) | CU 8: Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab) | 5 | 5 |
| 70 | South Africa (Kwa Zulu- Natal) | CU 1: South Africa (Kwa Zulu- Natal) | 1 | 1 |
| 71 | South Africa (Anti-immigrants - immigrants) | CU 2: South Africa (Anti-immigrants - immigrants) | 3 | 3 |
| 72 | South Sudan (civil war) | CU 1: South Sudan (inter-communal violence) | 5 | 5 |
| | | | 3 | |
| | | CU 2: South Sudan (Opposition) | 5 | |
| | | CU 3: South Sudan (SPLM/A-in-Opposition) | 3 | |
| | CU 4: South Sudan (various militias) | | | |
| 73 | South Sudan, Uganda (border communities) | CU 5: South Sudan, Uganda (border communities) | 3 | 3 |
| 74 | Sudan (inter-communal violence/Darfur) | CU 1: Sudan (inter-communal violence) | 5 | 5 |
| | | CU 3: Sudan (Darfur) | 5 | |
| 75 | Sudan (Eastern front) | CU 2: Sudan (Eastern Front) | 1 | 1 |
| 76 | Sudan (Opposition) | CU 4: Sudan (Opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 77 | Sudan (SPLM/A-North/South Kordofan, Blue Nile / Sudan - South Sudan) | CU 5: Sudan (SPLM/A-North/South Kordofan, Blue Nile) | 5 | 5 |
| | | CU 6: Sudan - South Sudan | 3 | |

| | | | | |
|----|--|--|---|---|
| 78 | Swaziland | CU 1: Swaziland (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 79 | Tanzania (Chadema, CUF - CCM) | CU 1: Tanzania (Chadema, CUF - CCM) | 3 | 3 |
| 80 | Tanzania (Christians-Muslims) | CU 2: Tanzania (Christians-Muslims) | 3 | 3 |
| 81 | Tanzania (Uamsho/Zanzibar) | CU 3: Tanzania (Uamsho/Zanzibar) | 2 | 2 |
| 82 | Tunisia (AQIM et al.) | CU 1 : Tunisia (AQIM et al.) | 3 | 3 |
| 83 | Tunisia (opposition movement) | CU 2 : Tunisia (opposition movement) | 3 | 3 |
| 84 | Uganda (Baganda/Buganda) | CU 1: Uganda (Baganda/Buganda) | 1 | 1 |
| 85 | Uganda (Bakonzo/Rwenzururu) | CU 2: Uganda (Bakonzo/Rwenzururu) | 2 | 2 |
| 86 | Uganda (inter-communal rivalry/Rwenzururu) | CU 3: Uganda (inter-communal rivalry/Rwenzururu) | 2 | 2 |
| 87 | Uganda (opposition) | CU 4: Uganda (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 88 | Zimbabwe (opposition) | CU 1: Zimbabwe (opposition) | 3 | 3 |

Annex III: Overview all conflict clusters > HCB level 3 addressed by APSA

| # | Name of Conflict Cluster | Conflicts according to HCB | Level of intensity of HCB Conflict | Max level intensity conflict cluster |
|----|---|---|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | Boko Haram | CU 1: Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (Boko Haram) | 5 | 5 |
| 2 | Burkina Faso (opposition groups) | CU 1: Burkina Faso (opposition groups) | 3 | 3 |
| 3 | Burundi (opposition) | CU 1: Burundi (opposition) | 4 | 4 |
| 4 | Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - ex-Séléka) | CU 1: Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - ex-Séléka) | 5 | 5 |
| 5 | Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda (LRA) | CU 1: Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda (LRA) | 4 | 4 |
| 6 | Côte d'Ivoire (opposition) | CU 1: Cote d'Ivoire (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 7 | DR Congo (Eastern Congo / militia violence) | CU 2: DR Congo (ex-M23) CU 8: DR Congo, Rwanda (FDLR) CU 5: DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi et al.) CU 9: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda (ADF) CU 10: Burundi, DR Congo (FNL) | 3 4 4 4 | 4 |
| 8 | DR Congo (opposition) | CU 6: DR Congo (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 9 | Egypt (Islamist Groups / Sinai Peninsula) | CU 2: Egypt (Islamist groups/ Sinai peninsula) | 4 | 4 |
| 10 | Egypt (opposition) | CU 4: Egypt (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 11 | Ethiopia (opposition) | CU 4: Ethiopia (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 12 | Guinea (opposition) | CU 2: Guinea (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 13 | Lesotho (military factions) | CU 1: Lesotho (military factions) | 3 | 3 |
| 14 | Libya (inter-tribal / opposition) | CU 2: Libya (inter-tribal) CU 3: Libya (opposition) | 4 5 | 5 |
| 15 | Mali (Azawad / Northern Mali) | CU 1: Mali (HCUA, MNLA et al./ Azawad) CU 2: Mali (inter-militant rivalry / northern Mali) | 3 3 | 3 |
| 16 | Mali (Islamist groups) | CU 3: Mali (Islamist groups) | 4 | 4 |
| 17 | Morocco (POLISARIO/Western Sahara) | CU 3: Morocco (POLISARIO/Western Sahara) | 3 | 3 |
| 18 | Niger (opposition) | CU 2: Niger (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 19 | Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners) | CU 8: Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners) | 3 | 3 |

| | | | | |
|----|--|---|------------------|---|
| 20 | Republic of Congo (opposition) | CU 1: Republic of Congo (opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 21 | Somalia (federalization process/inter-militia rivalry) | CU 1: Somalia (ASWJ) CU 2: Somalia (Habr Gedir - Biymal / Lower Shabelle) CU 3: Somalia (Hawadle - Surre/Hiiraan) CU 4: Somalia (inter-militia rivalry / Jubaland) | 3 3 3 3 | 3 |
| 22 | Somalia - Kenya (Al-Shabaab) | CU 8: Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab) | 5 | 5 |
| 23 | South Africa (Anti-immigrants -immigrants) | CU 2: South Africa (Anti-immigrants - immigrants) | 3 | 3 |
| 24 | South Sudan (civil war) | CU 1: South Sudan (inter-communal violence) CU 2: South Sudan (opposition) CU 3: South Sudan (SPLM/A-in-Opposition) CU 4: South Sudan (various militias) | 5 3 5 3 | 5 |
| 25 | Sudan (inter-communal violence/Darfur) | CU 1: Sudan (inter-communal violence) CU 3: Sudan (Darfur) | 5 5 | 5 |
| 26 | Sudan (Opposition) | CU 4: Sudan (Opposition) | 3 | 3 |
| 27 | Sudan (SPLM/A-North/South Kordofan, Blue Nile / Sudan - South Sudan) | CU 5: Sudan (SPLM/A-North/South Kordofan, Blue Nile) CU 6: Sudan - South Sudan | 5 3 | 5 |
| 28 | Tanzania (Chadema, CUF - CCM) | CU 1: Tanzania (Chadema, CUF - CCM) | 3 | 3 |
| 29 | Tunisia (AQIM et al.) | CU 1: Tunisia (AQIM et al.) | 3 | 3 |

Annex IV: Overview of APSA Interventions

| No | Country | Conflict Cluster | Highest level diplomacy | Highest level mediation | Highest level PSO | Highest level PCRD | Acts of explicitly prevention | Effectiveness of interventions | Quality of interventions | Mediation and peace agreement |
|----|----------------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---|---|---|
| | <i>Name of country/ conflict</i> | <i>Name of conflict cluster</i> | <i>(e.g. AU: 1, IGAD:2)</i> | <i>(e.g. AU: 1, IGAD:2)</i> | <i>(e.g. AU: 1, IGAD:2)</i> | <i>(e.g. AU: 1, IGAD:2)</i> | <i>(Describe, if any)</i> | <i>Overall/Partly/Rather unsuccessful or 'too early to tell' (use latter very sparingly)</i> | <i>Overall high/ Medium/ Mostly low quality or 'too early to tell' (use latter very sparingly)</i> | <i>Description + Held > 1 year (if applicable)</i> |
| 1 | Boko Haram | Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (Boko Haram) | AU: 2 ECOWAS: 2 LCBC: 2 ECCAS: 3 | N/a | ECCAS: 1 AU: 2 LCBC: 3 | | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful ECCAS: Partly successful ECOWAS: Partly successful LCBC: Partly successful</p> <p>PSO: AU: Partly successful ECCAS: Partly successful ECOWAS: Partly successful LCBC: Partly successful</p> <p>Overall judgment:</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality ECCAS: Overall high quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality LCBC: Overall high quality</p> <p>PSO: AU: Medium quality ECCAS: Medium quality ECOWAS: Medium quality LCBC: Medium quality</p> <p>Overall judgment:</p> | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|-----------------------------|--|------------------------------|------------------|-----|--|---|---|--|
| | | | | | | | | Partly successful | Overall high quality | |
| 2 | Burkina Faso | Burkina (opposition groups) | ECOWAS: 2 AU: 3 | ECOWAS: 3 AU: 1 | N/a | N/a | Presence of GISAT-BF was preventive, as a platform for coordination in the anticipation of potential escalation. | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful ECOWAS: Overall successful</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Partly successful ECOWAS: Overall successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Medium quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | ECOWAS mediation after September coup d'état led to re-installment of the transitional government; |
| 3 | Burundi | Burundi (opposition) | AU: 3 EAC: 2 ICGLR: 2 ECCAS: 2 EASF: 2 | AU: 2 EAC: 2 COMESA: 2 | AU: 2 EASF: 1 | N/a | Some joint effort by the EAC and COMESA and Panel of the Wise prior to the elections seen as preventive, but situation in Burundi quickly deteriorated | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful EAC: Partly successful ICGLR: Partly successful ECCAS: Rather unsuccessful COMESA: Partly successful</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Partly successful EAC: Partly successful</p> <p>PSO: AU: Rather</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality EAC: Medium quality ICGLR: Medium quality ECCAS: Mostly low quality COMESA: Medium quality</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Medium quality EAC: Medium quality</p> <p>PSO:</p> | EAC appointed President Museveni as International Facilitator in July; considerable criticism on his role. |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|---|--|-------------------|-------|-------|--|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | unsuccessful Overall judgment: Partly successful | AU: Mostly low quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | |
| 4 | Central African Republic | Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - ex-Séléka) | AU et al: 2 (ICG-CAR) AU: 2 ECCAS: 2 ICGLR: 2 | AU: 2 ECCAS: 2 | N/a | AU: 1 | | Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful ECCAS: Overall successful ICGLR: Partly successful Mediation: AU: Partly successful ECCAS: Overall successful Overall judgment: Overall successful | Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality ECCAS: Overall high quality ICGLR: Medium quality Mediation: AU: Overall high quality ECCAS: Overall high quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | Republican Pact and an agreement on the principles of DDRR signed in May 2015 under the auspices of ECCAS |
| 5 | LRA | Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan, Uganda (LRA) | AU: 2 COMESA: 2 | N/a | AU: 3 | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful PSO: AU: Partly successful Overall judgment: Overall successful | Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality PSO: AU: Medium quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------|---|---|--------------------|-----|-------------|--|--|--|--|
| 6 | Côte d'Ivoire | Côte d'Ivoire (opposition) | AU: 2 ECOWAS: 2 | AU: 1 ECOWAS: 1 | N/a | N/a | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful ECOWAS: Overall successful</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Partly successful ECOWAS: Overall successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Medium quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | |
| 7 | DR Congo | DR Congo (Eastern Congo/militia violence) | AU: 2 ICGLR: 2 AU et al.: 2 EAC: 1 SADC: 1 COMESA: 2 | AU et al.: 1 | N/a | COMESA A: 2 | Escalation of violence in a number of conflict units in 2015 due to military offensives by FARDC; APSA actors did not undertake preventive action to avert further escalation. | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful ICGLR: Partly successful SADC: Partly successful EAC: Rather unsuccessful COMESA: Rather unsuccessful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Partly successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality ICGLR: Overall high quality SADC: Overall high quality EAC: Mostly low quality COMESA: Mostly low quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | |
| 8 | DR Congo | DR Congo (opposition) | AU: 2 | AU: 1 | N/a | N/a | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Rather unsuccessful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Rather unsuccessful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Mostly low quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Mostly low quality</p> | |

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|----|----------|---|--------------------|--------------------|-----|-----|---|---|---|--|
| 9 | Egypt | Egypt (Islamist Groups / Sinai Peninsula) | AU: 2 | N/a | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Rather unsuccessful | Diplomacy: AU: Mostly low quality | |
| | | | | | | | | Overall judgment: Rather unsuccessful | Overall judgment: Mostly low quality | |
| 10 | Egypt | Egypt (opposition) | AU: 2 COMESA: 2 | N/a | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Rather unsuccessful COMESA: Rather unsuccessful | Diplomacy: AU: Mostly low quality COMESA: Mostly low quality | |
| | | | | | | | | Overall judgment: Rather unsuccessful | Overall judgment: Mostly low quality | |
| 11 | Ethiopia | Ethiopia (opposition) | AU: 2 | AU: 1 | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful | Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality | |
| | | | | | | | | Mediation: AU: Partly successful | Mediation: AU: Medium quality | |
| | | | | | | | | Overall judgment: Partly successful | Overall judgment: Medium quality | |
| 12 | Guinea | Guinea (opposition) | ECOWAS: 2 AU: 2 | ECOWAS: 3 AU: 2 | N/a | N/a | ECOWAS dispatched a high-level solidarity and information mission in July and AU sent a pre-electoral | Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful ECOWAS: Overall successful | Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality | Agreement on Inter-Guinean Political Dialogue signed in August following a high-level mission dispatched by ECOWAS |
| | | | | | | | | Mediation: AU: Partly successful | Mediation: AU: Medium quality | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|-----------------------------------|------------------|---------|--------------|-------|--|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | assessment mission in August. | ECOWAS: Partly successful Overall judgment: Overall successful | ECOWAS: Overall high quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | |
| 13 | Lesotho | Lesotho (military factions) | AU: 2 SADC: 2 | SADC: 1 | SADC: 1 | N/a | SADC established an Oversight Committee to monitor the political situation in Lesotho. | Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful SADC: Overall successful Mediation: SADC: Partly successful PSO: SADC: Partly successful Overall judgment: Overall successful | Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality SADC: Medium quality Mediation: SADC: Medium quality PSO: SADC: Medium quality Overall judgment: Medium quality | |
| 14 | Libya | Libya (inter-tribal / opposition) | AU: 2 | AU: 2 | AU et al.: 2 | AU: 1 | N/a | Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful Mediation: AU: Overall successful Overall judgment: Overall successful | Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality Mediation: AU: Overall high quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | Libyan Political Agreement - Shirkat mediated by the UN signed in December; UN leading mediation, supported by AU Special Envoy |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|--|------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|--|---|---|--|
| 15 | Mali | Mali (Azawad / Northern Mali) | AU: 3 ECOWAS: 2 | AU: 2 | AU: 1 ECOWAS : 2 | AU: 3 | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful ECOWAS: Partly successful</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Overall successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality ECOWAS: Medium quality</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Overall high quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali signed in June, partly Algeria led negotiations |
| 16 | Mali | Mali (Islamist groups) | AU: 3, ECOWAS: 2 | N/a | AU: 1; ECOWAS : 2 | AU: 3 | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful ECOWAS: Partly successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Partly successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality ECOWAS: Medium quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Medium quality</p> | |
| 17 | Morocco | Morocco (POLISARI O/ Western Sahara) | AU: 2 | AU: 2 | AU: 2 | N/a | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Rather unsuccessful</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Rather unsuccessful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Rather unsuccessful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Medium quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Medium quality</p> | |

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|----|-------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------|-----|--|--|--|--|
| 18 | Niger | Niger (opposition) | ECOWAS: 2 | N/a | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: ECOWAS: Too early to tell Overall judgment: Too early to tell | Diplomacy: ECOWAS: Mostly low quality Overall judgment: Mostly low quality | |
| 19 | Nigeria | Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners) | ECOWAS: 2 AU: 2 | AU: 1 ECOWAS: 1 | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful ECOWAS: Overall successful Mediation: AU: Overall successful ECOWAS: Overall successful Overall judgment: Overall successful | Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality Mediation: AU: Overall high quality ECOWAS: Overall high quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | |
| 20 | Republic of Congo | Republic of Congo (opposition) | AU: 2 | N/a | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful Overall judgment: Partly successful | Diplomacy: AU: Mostly low quality Overall judgment: Mostly low quality | |
| 21 | Somalia | Somalia - Kenya (Al-Shabaab) | AU: 2 IGAD: 2 | N/a | AU: 3 | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful IGAD: Partly successful | Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality IGAD: Overall high | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------|--|-----------------------------|---------|-----|-----|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | <p>PSO: AU: Partly successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Partly successful</p> | <p>quality</p> <p>PSO: AU: Medium quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | |
| 22 | Somalia | Somalia (federalization process/inter-militia rivalry) | AU: 2 IGAD: 2 | IGAD: 2 | N/a | N/a | IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somali Peace and National Reconciliation directed in January 2015 to strengthen its Mogadishu Liaison Office and establish in consultation with FGS its presence in rest of the country ahead of 2016. | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall successful IGAD: Overall successful</p> <p>Mediation: IGAD: Partly successful</p> <p>PSO: Partly successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality IGAD: Overall high quality</p> <p>Mediation: IGAD: Medium quality</p> <p>PSO: AU: Medium quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | On-going mediation IGAD; conclusion 2013 Addis Ababa Agreement; local ceasefire agreements primarily mediated by FGS (f.e. Gaalkacyo); 7-point bilateral cooperation agreement was also signed by Sharmarke and Puntland President. |
| 23 | South Africa | South Africa (Anti-immigrants - immigrants) | AU: 2 IGAD: 1 SADC: 1 | N/a | N/a | N/a | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful SADC: Rather unsuccessful IGAD: Partly successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Mostly low quality SADD: Mostly low quality IGAD: Medium quality</p> | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-------------|--|----------------------------|------------------|-------|-----|--|---|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | Overall judgment: Partly successful | Overall judgment: Medium quality | |
| 24 | South Sudan | South Sudan (civil war) | AU: IGAD: 2 ICGLR: 2 | AU: 2 IGAD: 3 | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful IGAD: Partly successful ICGLR: Rather unsuccessful Mediation: AU: Partly successful IGAD: Overall successful Overall judgment: Overall successful | Diplomacy: AU: Medium quality IGAD: Medium quality ICGLR: Medium quality Mediation: AU: Medium quality IGAD: Medium quality Overall judgment: Medium quality | Agreement on the Reunification of The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Arusha Agreement); Agreement reached in August 2015 between GRSS, SPLM-IO and FD (preceded by preliminary agreement in February - all mediated by IGAD |
| 25 | Sudan | Sudan (inter-communal violence/Darfur) | AU: 2 ICGLR: 2 | AU: 3 | AU: 3 | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful ICGLR: Rather unsuccessful Mediation: AU: Partly successful PSO: AU: Partly successful Overall judgment: Partly successful | Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality ICGLR: Mostly low quality Mediation: AU: Medium quality PSO: AU: Medium quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | A unilateral ceasefire was declared by the SRF in October 2015 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|--|---|-------------------|-----|-----|------------------------------|---|--|---|
| 26 | Sudan | Sudan (opposition) | AU: 2 IGAD: 2 COMESA: 2 ICGLR: 2 | AU: 2 | N/a | N/a | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful IGAD: Partly successful COMESA: Partly successful ICGLR: Partly successful</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Partly successful ICGLR: Partly successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Partly successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality IGAD: Medium quality ICGLR: Medium quality COMESA: Medium quality</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Medium quality ICGLR: Medium quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | |
| 27 | Sudan | Sudan (SPLM/A-North/South Kordofan, Blue Nile / Sudan - South Sudan) | AU: 2 ICGLR: 2 COMESA: 2 | AU: 3 | N/a | N/a | | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful ICGLR: Rather unsuccessful COMESA: Rather unsuccessful</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Partly successful</p> <p>Overall judgment: Partly successful</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality ICGLR: Mostly low quality COMESA: Mostly low quality</p> <p>Mediation: AU: Medium quality</p> <p>Overall judgment: Overall high quality</p> | Agreement achieved on the centre line for the SDBZ in October 2015 under AUHIP facilitation |
| 28 | Tanzania | Tanzania (Chadema, CUF - | AU: 2 EAC: 2 SADC: 2 | SADC: 1 EAC: 1 | N/a | N/a | SADC deployed a Goodwill and | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Partly successful EAC: Partly</p> | <p>Diplomacy: AU: Overall high quality</p> | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---------|-----------------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|---|---|---|--|
| | | CCM) | | | | | Pre-deployment Assessment Mission; AU pre-election mission. | successful SADC: Partly successful successful Mediation: AU: Partly successful EAC: Partly successful SADC: Partly successful successful Overall judgment: Partly successful | EAC: Medium quality quality SADC: Medium quality quality Mediation: AU: Medium quality EAC: Mostly low quality quality SADC: Medium quality quality Overall judgment: Overall high quality | |
| 29 | Tunisia | Tunisia (AQIM et al.) | AU: 2 | N/a | N/a | N/a | | Diplomacy: AU: Rather unsuccessful Overall judgment: Rather unsuccessful | Diplomacy: AU: Mostly low quality Overall judgment: Mostly low quality | |

Annex V: Analysis of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises where AU/RECs intervened with explicitly preventive measures

1. Indicators

a) Number of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises in which the AU and RECs took explicitly preventive measures [in the year 2015].

b) Number of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises where the AU/RECs intervened and did not erupt into conflict and violence [in the year 2015].

2. Methodology

For the identification of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises in the year 2015, a review of the following literature has been conducted: Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2015, ISS Peace and Security Council Reports 2015, and the Report of the PSC on its activities and other early warning sources. The search was extended to all African countries.

Findings of this research are listed in table 1 and 2 below. Table 1 lists newly emerging and potentially violent crises emerged in 2015. Table 2 lists newly emerging and potentially violent escalations in conflicts already pre-existing in 2015. The number of total conflicts is counted below.

Once identified, the total of emerging conflicts and interventions by the AU/RECs have been researched, with a view to map explicitly preventive measures undertaken by the AU/RECs to address the conflicts. The tables below include a brief description, when relevant, of explicitly preventive interventions (mediation and diplomacy) concerning newly arising crises. The number of measures undertaken is also counted.

From all the conflicts identified in 1 Tables 1 and 2, the number of cases that did not erupt into violence is counted below. If a conflict is reported in the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2015 with a level of intensity equal or above three, it is considered that the conflict erupted into crisis. If the conflict is not reported in the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2015, or if it is categorised with a level of intensity lower to 3, the conflict is considered a positive example where a crisis was prevented. A qualitative judgment is then made on the basis of the research conducted.

An analysis of the below table and answers to indicator a) and b) is provided in Table 3.

Table 1: Newly emerged (potential) conflicts

| | Country | Context | AU/RECs explicitly preventive measures | Erupted in crisis |
|---|--------------------------|--|--|-------------------|
| 1 | Burundi - Rwanda | The conflict between Rwanda and Burundi emerged at the level of a violent crisis in 2015, in the context of the increasingly violent conflict between the government and the opposition in Burundi, following controversies over a third term of President Pierre Nkurunziza. Rwandan President Paul Kagame repeatedly and openly criticized Nkurunziza for seeking this third term. Furthermore, both governments accused each other of supporting armed opponents in their respective countries. | On 20 October 2015, the ICGLR Committee of Ministers of Defence appealed to the ICGLR Troika (Angola, Kenya and Uganda) to work with both the Government of Rwanda and the Government of Burundi to implement the decision of the RIMC meeting on the deployment of EJVM to verify allegations of acts of aggression against the Republic of Burundi, and to find an amicable resolution to the tensions between the two sister countries. however, the ICGLR did not respond to this call. (ICGLR, low intensity of engagement) | No |
| 2 | Republic of Congo | In 2015, a new conflict over national power erupted between opposition groups and President Denis Sassou Nguesso's Congolese Party of Labour (PCT). President Denis Sassou Nguesso announced in September 2015 that a constitutional referendum would be held on 25 October, to change presidential term limits and eliminate the current 70-year age limit for presidential candidates. Following this decision, opposition and civil society groups mobilized to oppose the changes. Preceded by a campaign of intimidation and harassment of opposition leaders and activists, the referendum held and passed on 25 October was without major disturbances. The question now is whether, having passed the hurdle of the referendum, the Republic of Congo has merely delayed further violence until the start of the presidential elections in 2016. | No preventive measures by AU/RECs | No |

Table 2: Existing conflicts with newly emerged (potential) crises⁶³

| | Country | Context | APSA interventions | Erupted in crisis |
|---|--------------|---|--|-------------------|
| 3 | Lesotho | The political agreement in 2014 tried to resume peace and stability with the announcement that elections would be held in February 2015. After the elections, there did appear to be a respite to the political instability seen the year before. The close and interwoven relationship between the government and military caused particular problems and eventually a political crisis throughout the year. The newly formed government appointed a new Army Commander who was seen as a staunch enemy to the ex-Prime Minister, who subsequently fled the country. The murder of the ex-Army Commander, General Mahao further escalated tensions, and for the remainder of the year, political opposition boycotted parliament and peace and political stability did not resume. | <i>SADC established an Oversight Committee to monitor the political situation in Lesotho.</i> (SADC, low intensity of engagement,) <i>The Oversight Committee however was never deployed and is considered as unsuccessful.</i> | Yes |
| 4 | South Africa | The violence in South Africa between immigrants and anti-immigrants escalated in 2015, leading to wide displacement of individuals and communities, as well as injuries and deaths. The conflict occurred in three waves across the year targeting specifically shop owners. | <i>No preventive measures by AU/RECs</i> | Yes |
| 5 | Tanzania | Elections were held in October 2015, which gave way for a possible increase in tension and violence, particularly among the government and opposition | <i>SADC deployed a Goodwill and pre-deployment assessment mission.</i> (SADC, low intensity of | No |

⁶³ Election Observation Mission's have not been considered as explicitly preventive measures, unless they were complemented by Goodwill Missions or high level pre-election missions

| | | | | |
|----------|-----------------------------|---|---|------------|
| | | parties, Chadema and CUF. | engagement) | |
| 6 | Sudan | Conflicts within Sudan remained at a very high intensity level, however elections occurred in the year which may have led to potential escalation of violence, particularly for the opposition groups and the government of Sudan. | <i>No preventive measures</i> | No |
| 7 | Burundi (opposition) | The conflict in Burundi between opposition groups and the Nkurunziza government grew increasingly violent throughout 2015 despite continued engagement by regional stakeholders and the international community. Violence left at least 400 people dead, hundreds injured, and more than 230,000 have fled to neighboring countries. Furthermore, security forces arrested several hundred opposition members. The conflict revolved around the question whether or not President Pierre Nkurunziza was allowed to run for a third term and intensified in the run-up of parliamentary and presidential elections in June and July. Nkurunziza intensified its crackdown on protesters and was reelected in July, which led to an escalation of violence in the second half of the year, with December being the deadliest month of the year. | <p><i>While some joint effort by the EAC and COMESA as well as the AU Panel of the Wise prior to the elections might have been seen as preventive, the situation in Burundi quickly deteriorated so that preventive action to avoid an escalation to a violent conflict were clearly futile.</i></p> <p>(AU/COMESA/EAC, low intensity of engagement)</p> <p><i>The interventions were partly successful, as they did not prevent the political crisis to degenerate throughout the year, leading to a genocide in the making at the end of 2015.</i></p> | Yes |
| 8 | Ethiopia | Ethiopia experienced the continuance of many long-standing conflicts, with the government and opposition parties conflict escalating to a violent crisis in the run up to the 2015 elections in May. The general elections took place with the government enforcing restrictions upon civil society, the media and the political | <i>No preventive measures</i> | Yes |

| | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|-----------|
| | | opposition, especially by using excessive force against demonstrators and opposition campaigns. | | |
| 9 + 10 + 11 | DR Congo (3) | The Heidelberg Conflict Barometer noted an escalation of violence in three conflict units in 2015. The conflict over national power in Burundi and subnational predominance between various factions of the National Liberation Front (FNL), on the one hand, and the governments of Burundi and the DR Congo, on the other, escalated to a limited war. The conflict about subnational predominance in North Kivu province between the former armed group M23 and the government escalated to a violent crisis. The conflict over national power, subnational predominance, and resources between the FDLR, on the one hand, and the government of DR Congo, supported by MONUSCO, as well as the government of Rwanda, on the other, escalated to a limited war. | <i>Violence increased in 2015 following the launching of offensives by the FARDC against the FDLR. APSA actors (namely the AU, the ICGLR, COMESA) all asked MONUSCO and FARDC to neutralize armed groups and to cooperate to that end, without taking into account the fact that violence was increasing due to the offensives. In that sense, no preventive measures have been taken by APSA actors to prevent an escalation of violence in the country.</i> | No |
| 12 | Guinea (opposition) | In 2015, the conflict between the government and opposition groups increased to a violent crisis. As Human Rights Watch reports, violence in the months leading up to and following the October presidential elections resulted in approximately 10 deaths, deepened ethnic tensions, and exposed ongoing concerns about abuses by the security forces. The presidential election, won by the incumbent president, Alpha Conde, was plagued by serious logistical problems but deemed largely free and fair by international observers. | <p><i>Several preventive measures were taken ahead of the 11 October elections. ECOWAS dispatched a high-level solidarity and information mission in July and the AU sent a pre-electoral assessment mission in August.</i></p> <p>(AU/ECOWAS, high intensity of engagement)</p> <p><i>The interventions were successful. As a result of the High-Level Solidarity and Information Mission to the Republic of Guinea, the Agreement on Inter-Guinean Political Dialogue of 20 August 2015 involving all stakeholders in the electoral process was</i></p> | No |

| | | | | |
|----|---------------------|--|---|--------------------------|
| | | | <i>signed. It prevented further escalation of violence since the 11 October elections were held peacefully and transparently.</i> | |
| 13 | Nigeria | General elections were held in March 2015, which contributed greatly to the conflict between the north and south of Nigeria where national political power plays a key role in influencing the conflict. | <i>No preventive measures by AU/RECs</i> | No |
| 14 | Comoros | Comoros had presidential elections planned for February 2016, where the AU had vested interest in ensuring that the elections were peaceful, free and fair. Comoros has experienced a tumultuous political past with many coups having taken place and contested power struggles over the autonomy of the islands. | <i>In 2015, the AU closely monitored the lead up to the elections in 2016. A number of diplomatic statements were made in relation to the elections, however these are not directly preventive. However, an AU High-level emissary was dispatched to the Comoros as part of a mediation intervention to urge peaceful elections.</i> (AU, Medium intensity of engagement) | Too early to tell |
| 15 | Burkina Faso | After 2014 saw the end of Blaise Compaoré's 27-year reign, an interim government was assigned by the military to govern Burkina Faso in 2015 until elections were planned to be held in October 2015. Tension and conflict was mainly related to the Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP) who carried out a coup d'état three weeks before the planned elections. This was short lived and APSA interventions were effective in de-escalating the conflict. The elections were then postponed until November 2015 | <i>No preventive measures taken in relation to the escalating tension between the interim government and RSP - interventions were reactive, but did lead to de-escalation.</i> <i>The presence of GISAT-BF is arguably a preventive measure, operating as a strong platform for coordination in the anticipation of potential escalation.</i> (AU/ECOWAS, low intensity engagement) There were limited preventive measures yet the GISAT-BF had some success in ensuring no escalation of conflict after the elections. | No |
| 16 | Cote | The 2015 presidential elections | <i>No preventive measures by</i> | No |

| | | | | |
|-----------|-----------------|---|--|-----------|
| | d'Ivoire | <p>in Cote d'Ivoire renewed the contestation for political power among the governing political party and the opposition groups. A faction of the FPI attempted to propose the candidacy of Laurent Gbagbo, but this was invalidated by the courts. This attempt divided the opposition (FPI) into a party of hardliners, who still hope for the return of Laurent Gbagbo, and non-hardliners, who wanted a fresh start for the party. These grievances, FPI hardliners and the re-election bid of Alassane Ouattara provided a conditional threat of violence in Cote d'Ivoire. Electoral protests by opposition party activists were reported in the period leading to the 2015 elections and turned violent following clashes between ruling party supporters and opposition activists. Although opposition parties, particularly supporters of Laurent Gbagbo, still hold political grievances, there was no widespread violence in the aftermath of the presidential elections.</p> | <i>AU/RECs</i> | |
| 17 | Togo | <p>Presidential elections occurred in April 2015, which gave cause for concern for general political instability given that the country has been dominated by a one-party system for many years, with Faure Gnassingbe Eyadema ruling for two terms and his father for 38 years before that. The main opposition party Combat for Political Change (CAP), originally tried to persuade the ruling party to support a two-term limit, as Togo is one of the two ECOWAS countries which does not implement term limits. This however failed, and Eyadema went on to win the elections with</p> | <p><i>ECOWAS deployed a pre-electoral fact-finding mission in October 2014, a Long-term Observation Mission from 5 April - 6 May. An Election Situation Room was also established and served as an Early Warning and Rapid response Mechanism. Lastly, a 100-member Short-Term Observation Mission was deployed. The African Union also deployed a short-term election observation mission in order to provide a critical assessment of the elections.</i></p> <p>(ECOWAS, high intensity engagement. AU, low-intensity engagement)</p> | No |

| | | | | |
|----|---------------|--|---|----|
| | | <p>58.75% of votes. CAP rejected these results outright and instead claimed a win for their leader, Jean-Pierre Fabre⁶⁴. Generally, Togo experienced high political tension, exacerbated by the contested elections and Fabre's call to his supporters to protest the results.</p> | <p>The interventions were partly successful. The elections were reportedly conducted calmly and peacefully, however there was many accusations of fraud, particularly by CAP, and generally an atmosphere of suspicion and tension. Furthermore, the strong support for third-termism is a worrying sign for the country's democratic development.</p> | |
| 18 | Guinea-Bissau | <p>A political strife started in August 2015, when President Jose Mario Vaz decided to sack his prime minister. He then named a new prime minister, Baciro Dja, who was rejected by the Supreme Court because he was not, as the constitution requires, chosen by the majority party in Parliament, the PAIGC. Another prime minister, Carlos Correia, is now in place, but there is still a stalemate between Vaz, who, with the return of 15 MPs who support him, is weakened within the PAIGC, and the prime minister and other powerful members of the PAIGC.⁶⁵</p> | <p><i>ECOWAS sent former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to the country in August to mediate in the crisis. He proposed a revision of the constitution to deal with problems arising from the fact that the prime minister seems to have more power than the president.</i></p> <p>(ECOWAS, medium intensity of engagement)</p> <p><i>Obasanjo was lauded for his role as a mediator in the crisis and it seems that his efforts have helped to defuse the tensions. The Heidelberg Conflict barometer in 2015 rated the conflict intensity level 1 and considered it as stable.⁶⁶</i></p> | No |

⁶⁴ "Togo opposition party rejects presidential poll results", 29 April 2015 <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/togo-opposition-party-rejects-presidential-poll-results-150429170309243.html>; "Togo Country Profile", 7 January 2016 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14106781>; "Togo opposition fails in bid to stop president running in 2015 election", 9 January 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-togo-politics-idUSKBN0KI24920150109>.

⁶⁵ Institute for Security Studies, Peace and Security Council Report No 79, April 2016

⁶⁶ Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2015. However, it is interesting to note that the AU issued several statements in early 2016 expressing "deep concern over the situation". This indicates that it remains to be seen whether the political strife will erupt into a deeper crisis in 2016.

Table 3: Analysis of preventive measures undertaken by APSA

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>a) Number of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises in which the AU and RECs took explicitly preventive measures [in the year 2015].</p> | <p>7: The AU/RECs took explicitly preventive measures in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Tanzania, Guinea, Togo, Guinea-Bissau and Comoros. (Total of newly arising conflicts is 18, with 2 new conflict units). The AU did not intervene with preventive measures in: Nigeria, Republic of Congo, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire.</p> |
| <p>b) Number of newly arising (and potentially violent) crises where the AU/RECs intervened and did not erupt into conflict and violence [in the year 2015].</p> | <p>3 (2): The AU/RECs intervened in Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau and Togo, where conflicts did not escalate further. * (2) In Guinea and Tanzania, post-electoral incidents were noted and the election results were disputed. * In one conflict, namely Comoros, it was deemed too early to tell.</p> |

Annex VI: Bibliography

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