Peace, Federalism and Human Rights

Papers Presented at the First Annual Graduate Conference on Peace, Federalism and Human Rights
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August 12-13, 2015

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Preface

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University took the initiative of organizing annual graduate conferences particularly catering for PhD candidates with the belief that the quality of a PhD dissertation will be improved with every opportunity the candidate gets to present it in front of a critical audience. After all, a PhD program should be accompanied by as many opportunities as possible for candidates to present, and thereby further sharpen, their draft findings. The IPSS is proud to present such an opportunity, titled ‘Graduate Conference on Peace, Federalism and Human Rights’, for PhD students based in Ethiopia and beyond.

The first edition of the Graduate Conference was held on 12 and 13 August 2015 at the premises of the Institute. There was a high response to the widely advertised call for abstracts, indicating the need for such graduate conferences. Of the 42 abstracts received, 15 were selected for presentation at the conference through a double-blind selection process by reviewers from the Center for Federal Studies, Center for Human Rights and the IPSS. The sessions where these papers were presented at were also chaired by experienced researchers from the abovementioned Centers/Institute. The authors benefited significantly from the critical reflections of the audience as well as the chair persons. It is the belief of the Institute that the authors will take the lessons from the conference and use the same in their PhD work as well as in their academic career.

Of the 15 papers presented during the conference, eleven are included in this publication. All fifteen authors were given the opportunity to further strengthen their papers using inputs gained at the conference, and then by an assigned reviewer. Only eleven responded to the second round of revision, and these papers were further subjected to proof readings and copy-editing works. The Institute believes that this publication process will be a positive contribution to the experience of graduate students.

Organization of the conference and the publication of this proceeding came to successful culmination thanks to the concern and hard work of various individuals. The coordinators of the Regular PhD program in Peace and Security, Yonas Tariku and Fana Gebresenbet, came up with the idea and consulted me. As Director of the Institute, I was pleased with the idea and further pushed it to the Director of the Africa Peace and Security Program, Ms. Michele Michelle Ndiaye, to finance it. She agreed to finance the full expenses of the first Graduate Conference. Therefore, I take this opportunity to thank her and the PhD coordinators.

Yonas and Fana further took the responsibility of organizing the event, with the active assistance of the finance, outreach and communications team of the Institute. I also thank colleagues from the Centers for Federal Studies and Human Rights, and those from the IPSS who took part in the selection of abstracts, in the revision of papers, and those who took their time to attend and comment on presented papers. Costs related to the publication of this proceeding are covered by the assistance the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) gives to the PhD program in Peace and Security Studies.

Kidane Kiros (PhD),
Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies
Addis Ababa University
Opening Speech

Dr. Melaku Wakuma
Director, Graduate Programs
Addis Ababa University

Dr. Kidane Kiros, Director of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies;
PhD students, presenters and other attendees

It is with great pleasure that I stand here before you to say a few words and officially open the First Graduate Conference on Peace, Federalism and Human Rights organized by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

As you well know, Addis Ababa University is striving to strengthen its graduate programs, particularly the quality of its PhD programs. The University is shouldering the responsibility of training the future professors of the 30+ Universities throughout the country. By corollary and inevitably, the quality of education in these Universities will depend on the quality of the PhD programs we offer here at Addis Ababa University. In recognition of this responsibility, the Graduate Programs Office is assisting Departments/Institutes in the design of new PhD programs as well as the strengthening of those already running.

The task at hand however is too much to be left to the Graduate Programs Office of the University. It is to be shared by individual Departments/Institutes of the University as well as students. The initiative the IPSS took to organize and host this graduate conference is to be applauded in this respect. Despite their obvious importance, such conferences specifically dedicated to PhD students are rare (not to say inexistent) in Ethiopian Universities.

As you well know, among the very important measures of quality of a PhD work is the extent to which the work has been presented at conferences and published. This conference gives PhD students the opportunity to share their work with the academic community and to publish part of their findings. It is through such processes that a PhD dissertation gets refined, and its quality improved. It is only through the exposition of one’s work to critical audiences (which I hope this room will be) that PhD students can improve their work. Thus, I thank the Institute for Peace and Security Studies for organizing this conference, and hope that other Departments/School’s will take lessons from this event and follow suit in coming years.

I wish you all fruitful deliberations, and officially open the conference.
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PART I
Insights into Methodological Processes and Analytical Cautions in Interpretive Approach to Inter-Group Conflict Research: Experience from Empirical Research Process in Eastern Ethiopia

Jeylan Wolyie Hussein

Abstract

The objective of the paper is twofold. The first part discusses how the theoretical and methodological perspectives of interpretive approach to inter-group conflict research interacted and influenced one another in my study. Based on my experience I argue that those who adapt interpretive paradigm to study the history, meanings, processes and impacts of intergroup conflicts should integrate a range of interconnected and mutually reinforcing methods that can enhance the multidimensional understanding of the problem. The paper reveals why and how my study involved complex back and forth movement between research problems, paradigms and methods. The second part of the paper discusses the centrality of framing in identity-based conflict research and provides some ethical cares which researchers should make when they organize and interpret their respondents’ framing of conflicts.

Introduction

Research methods and approaches are guided by paradigms and related philosophical assumptions. Paradigms are a set of beliefs, world views, and assumptions about the world. According to Denzin & Lincoln (2003: 33), paradigm is an interpretive framework. It is ‘a net that contains the researcher’s epistemological, ontological and methodological premises.’ The four well known paradigms are the positivist, post-positivist, constructivist and critical paradigms. Out of these four known paradigms, my study adhered largely to the interpretive (constructivist) paradigm. This paradigm stands in dialectical opposition to the positivist and post-positivist paradigms. This paradigm has its roots in the idealist philosophy of Kant and in the post-modernism and post-structuralism. A principal assumption of the paradigm is that there is no single, external reality that can be accurately predicted, described, explained and controlled. It posits that there are multiple constructions of reality and the nature of the construction is based on people’s diverse historical, political, social, psychological and cultural experiences in their specific context of existence. For interpretivists/constructivists, reality is relative to the people who construct it and the experience on the basis of which they construct their understanding.

In this paper, the author shares his experience on methodological processes and analytical challenges. The paper is an analytical extension of the experience he gained while studying causes and dynamics of conflict between the Jarso and the Girhi clans in eastern Ethiopia. The Jarso and the Girhi are Oromo and Somali clans respectively. The two have long history of sociopolitical and economic interactions and forged local coalition to confront the political-economic pressures from the centre. In the post-Derg political context of the country, they can be described as groups caught up in identity-based and politicized rivalry over tangible and symbolic resources. The study dealt

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largely with the causes, dynamics and patterns of conflicts between them in the post-Derg context although it gave due consideration also to patterns of their cooperation and contestation in the past. The study is a systematic inquiry into the nature of localized and historically contingent intercommunal encounters.

The study was based on qualitative research design. Data collection, analysis and interpretation were informed by interpretivist paradigm in which respondents assume vital role in the construction and reconstruction of reality. The data required for the study was collected through ethnographic processes such as one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions and field observations. The researcher considered the role of broader sociopolitical processes on intercommunal dynamics such as attribution error and reproduction of intergroup enemy images. In this study, attempts were made to make a critical examination of the interactions between group identities and interests in conflict dynamics and the role of social and institutional processes in intensifying the interaction. The researcher used various conceptual frameworks and analytical models to explain the role of historical, social, political, psychological, perceptual and cognitive factors in shaping dynamics of intercommunal conflict.

If one chooses to use interpretivism to study dynamics of peace and conflict in similar contexts, one should know the paradigm’s key traits. Interpretivism promotes constructive ontology. Its empirical focus is fundamentally socially constructed cognition. A researcher may approach members of the conflicting groups and ask: How do you understand the nature and meaning of conflict and violence between Group A and Group B. Through such a question, one can generate multiple competing and sometimes contradictory answers. The reason is that the research participants express their opinions, perceptions and understandings from their own perspectives. Various factors including political, social, economic and symbolic interests affect what the respondents have to say about the conflict being studied. Their reflections, in general, are the outcome of socially constructed cognition. In other words, the type of knowledge an interpretivist tries to generate is an understanding of the phenomenon under study, for example, understanding about dynamics of identity-related contestations in a specific socio-political, economic and demographic context. The role of the knowledge created through interpretive process is its revealing power. One’s role as a researcher is to reveal the meaning of things, issues, experiences and encounters in the way they are understood and interpreted by research respondents. The fundamental tenet in constructivism or interpretivism is that a single reality such as inter-group conflict can be seen from multiple perspectives. For a researcher, the most important thing is not the reality, but how that reality is understood from multiple perspectives and the values, beliefs and expectations that shape the nature and patterns of understanding. Since there is no single understanding, for example, about inter-group conflicts, the researcher is expected to adopt a pluralist position and go for pluralist methodology. Interpretivism promotes naturalistic studies that involve direct contact with people who reflect on their world in actual contexts.

As an interpretivist research, one is expected to generate data through rigorous analytical and interpretive processes. Your role as researcher is, therefore, nuanced engagement in the process of understanding and re-understanding. In interpretivist perspective, understanding is considered as value of its own. Thus, in this paradigm, the researcher focuses not only on the objectively verifiable facts, but also on the subjective meanings which people derive from their experiences. The other important trait is pursuing emerging interpretations. The data are analyzed and interpreted within the emerging/emergent theoretic framework rather than within pre-established set of theories or hypotheses. The other important trait within the emergent theoretic framework is the centrality of flexibility, reflexivity, and openness to discovery. The analytical processes involve definition and redefinition of variables. They also involve and reconstruction of theories, schemas and categories of issues and their meanings. Theories, schemas and categories are not imposed on the qualitative data; rather they emerge from processing and re-processing the data (Given, 2008).
The methodological substance of interpretivist framework is identifying, sorting and interpreting the diverse meanings which people attach to their experiences. The other important aspect of the interpretivist paradigm is that the researcher tries to grasp phenomena in the light of the broader social, cultural, political, socio-economic and physical environments. Interpretive research involves processes that are emergent and reiterative. The process is emergent because the design of qualitative research is never fixed since the inquiry involves constant interplay between design and discovery and since findings emerge continuously. It is reiterative mainly because the researcher is always in contact with the data he or she has generated. My experiences show that access to the qualitative data generates fresh insights that can be used to re-evaluate and re-interpret the data (see also Cooper and White, 2012).

The purpose of this paper is to share my experiences with other students of social, political, institutional and governance studies about the methodological and ethical issues addressed in my study on Jars-Girhi conflict in eastern Ethiopia. My study attempted to explain the Jarso-Girhi conflict from multiple perspectives and through multi-method approach. While addressing the historical roots and trajectories of the conflicts, my study attempted to illustrate how inter-group conflicts relate to identity, resource competition and ethno-political ecology that create intersections for resource, territory and power politics. The study selected interpretive approach of inquiry into broader and specific pictures of the causes, dynamics and processes of conflicts in the study area. The approach was selected for its effectiveness in generating rich and diverse data through analysis of cases, narratives, and phenomenological and ethnographic renderings.

The paper is organized in the following ways. Section Two below discusses the interaction between the domains of research including ontology, epistemology and methodology. The third section explains the interrelations and interactions between the parts in the entire research process. Section Four discusses the centrality of framing in identity-based conflicts and the ethical and analytical dilemmas which researchers who generate data that contain conflict frames encounter when analyzing frames and their meanings. This section accentuates that frames are lenses via which people who have experienced conflicts capture and interpret the meaning of the conflict to them. The section warns that while addressing the political and psycho-social meanings of frames, conflict researchers should guard their analysis from subscribing to reification of the meaning, status and causes of the conflicts from the respondents’ perspectives they study and the differences that exist between the competing identity groups. The argument draws on scholarly works that elucidate risks that accompany subscription to essentialist foundationalism that are inherent in the processes of political mobilization, but are strictly discouraged in academic analyses of social realities including conflict analysis (Brubaker, 2004; Milosevic’, 2006). The final part of the paper draws conclusions and sets brief epistemological and methodological implications of the discussion.

The interaction between the domains of research

The strength of a research endeavor lies in the strong interaction and interrelation between the three domains of research: ontology, epistemology and methodology. How these research domains are integrated to create synergy differ from paradigm to paradigm and are affected by the value-base of the particular paradigm of inquiry chosen and its impact on how realities are defined. The interpretive/constructivist paradigm purports that reality is relative to the construction of individuals. For constructivists, reality is value-bound and researchers can understand them from and through analytical (epistemological as well as methodological) processes that can generate understanding of the meanings which individuals draw from the reality being investigated. The epistemological concern in constructivist research is the fear that the data generated from the
respondents can lead, depending on situation, to the reification or undermining of the reality being investigated. The methodological concern arises from uncertainty over the capacity of the methods used to engage participants to construct their knowledge and understanding about the reality and the trustworthiness of the data collected from them in capturing their multiple constructions of the reality. I try to show what I tried to do to overcome the challenges.

The principal methods of my research were case study, narrative analysis and frame analysis. The case study method was chosen to explore the social, cultural and institutional construction of the dynamics of contemporary conflicts in the area by focusing on selected events and scenarios. Contextualized narrative analysis was chosen to gather information on specific events in the past to reconstruct the broader and micro-dynamics of selected conflict events and how their processes unfolded. Among the several methods of analyzing respondents’ qualitative reflections, I used frame analysis to gain access to the way the community members frame conflicts. Frame analysis served important methodological role in capturing both the instrumental and interpretive dimensions of social reactions to the processes and dynamics of contestation. As in all inter-group conflicts in which the identity and socio-historical matters play central role (Başer and Çelik, 2014 and Desrosiers, 2012), in the Jarso-Girhi context myth-making, stereotyping, scapegoating, vilification, adversarial frames and counter-frames assume central role in shaping dynamics of conflict and consolidating the social-psychological bedrock of the conflict system. Frame analysis was instrumental in elucidating how the community members load various experiences and perceptions with certain socio-cognitive meanings (Brubaker, 2004). In other words, the method played supportive role in helping access how the community members’ past and present conflictual experiences come into existence via ‘processes of interpretation, discursive practices, and active meaning making’ (Lindekilde, 2014: 203). Figures 1 and 2 below try to depict how I tried to attain integration and reinforcement between three pillars of my research endeavor. Figure 1 is a matrix for integrating research paradigm, research methods and research tools. Figure 2 is the cycle of thinking followed to integrate the dynamic interaction between ontology, epistemology and methodology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Status of reality</th>
<th>Researcher’s role</th>
<th>Methods and techniques of inquiry involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontological level</td>
<td>Reality is a social construction.</td>
<td>Understanding reality inter-subjectively</td>
<td>In-depth questions focusing on why and how problems and description of the context of the problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemological level</td>
<td>Social constructions are not based facts but values.</td>
<td>Identifying the diverse ways in which the respondents view the world</td>
<td>Generating multiple perceptions, views and experiences of participants via multiple interviews and interacting with the participants and their situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological level</td>
<td>Triangulating and interpretation of research issues</td>
<td>Generating as detailed and diverse data possible and intra-data comparison</td>
<td>Data, methodological and theoretical triangulation. Data triangulation refers to the dimension of time, space and analytical level of the information obtained. Extensive experience in the research environment to obtain broader understanding about the nature and dynamics of the problem. Methodological triangulation involved within-method triangulation. Theoretical triangulation refers to multiple concepts and theories used to see conflict issues and processes from diverse perspectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Matrix for integrating research paradigm and research methods and research tools
Adapted from Willis (2007)
Literally, research is a process of posing intellectual questions and developing appropriate standards and procedures of inquiry to answer the questions. Before one embarks on research, one has to pose domain-related questions from which subject matter related questions later emerge. In constructively oriented research processes, a researcher is expected to pose appropriate ontological, epistemological and methodological questions that reinforce one another in complex ways. In other words, a researcher who wants to explore into the causes, patterns, profile, dynamics and trends of identity-based inter-group conflicts should know what questions to ask and how to maintain conceptual and causal linkages between the issues addressed in and through the questions. In this research, questions served as devices through which research paradigms and processed were grounded.

It is clear in Figure 2 that the ontological questions address the form and nature of reality and what can be known about it. In addition to the sample items in the figure, I posed the following questions to guide my research: What can be known about inter-group conflict? Is inter-group conflict a reality outside there? Or are there multiple realities about inter-group conflict that are constructed and interpreted in the minds of the people? What meanings do people draw from this dynamics? I drew on the core assumption of the constructivist perspective that there is no single entity of conflict as an external reality, but rather that there are multiple mental constructions of it that comes out of the concerned people’s experience in context. In other words, the ontological questions reveal that inter-group conflict is a reality that is relative to the people who participate in the study and share their perspectives.

The epistemological questions were set to address the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the research participants. In addition to what were presented in the figure, I asked the following epistemological questions: What should my epistemological position be in relation to the community members’ perspectives? What else do I need to know about inter-group conflict other than what I obtain from the research participants and my own
observations of the reality? I drew on the constructivist assumption that since inter-group conflict as a reality consists of multiple social constructions, the questions asked during data collection must target at engaging the research participants in a process of constructing and creating meaning through deep interaction or meaning-making process.

One can deduce from Figure 2 that in the constructivist paradigm, as in other paradigms, the methodological issues should be addressed in reference to the research’s ontological and epistemological bearings. Thus, methodological questions focus fundamentally on how a researcher can find out what he or she believes can be known. In addition to those sampled in the figure, I asked the following methodological questions: From what perspectives should I see the way inter-group conflict is understood and interpreted in the community? These methodological questions were anchored on the constructivist assumption that people’s social constructions of inter-group conflict (a reality) are generated through reflection, opinion-making, dialogue, discussion and interpretation that call for close relationships between the researcher and the research participants.

**Interrelations and interactions between the parts in the entire research process**

As a constructivist/interpretive research, my research adopted a cyclical pattern of investigation. The research involved recursive and interrelating networks of thoughts, processes and actions of dynamic interrelationships and interdependence. The components and processes of the research were thickly and variously interconnected. The research started with (1) initial thoughts and constructs about inter-group conflicts in Ethiopia by focusing on aspects of such conflicts within the ethnofederal context. The fuzzy initial thoughts and constructs were further clarified by (2) assessing the existing research works and finding research gaps. This involved careful and critical inquiry into the issues covered, methodologies used and analyses made. The process involved back and forth movement between initial constructs and emerging constructs and insights. This animated the desire to (3) consolidate the theoretical insights and empirical grounds of the research. The theoretical grounding involved analysis of various theories and concepts of inter-group conflicts and their empirical dimensions. The research questions and initial constructs benefited from analyses of related theories and empirical studies. Reviewing related theoretical and empirical works offered better ways of conceptualizing the research problem, constructing paradigmatic questions and formulating research questions.

The research problems and questions on their part guided the research design, methodologies and methods of the inquiry. The effort at theoretical grounding helped refine the initial constructs and perspectives. It also provided conceptual and analytical lenses for re-evaluating the existing empirical works and outlining new focuses of analysis for the current research. The interaction with the theoretical and empirical literature contributed well toward (4) defining focus/scope in terms of research problems, justifications, questions and objectives. The effort at defining the problem, focus, scope and objectives of the study was also interacting with the process of evaluating the initial constructs and the previous studies, their focuses and scopes. Problematization of the research issues, the questions posed and the objectives set helped (5) decide on the research paradigm. Deciding on the research paradigm was done in reference to and by interacting with the theoretical, empirical and conceptual background of the study.

Decision on the research paradigm called forth the importance of grounding (6) the research paradigm through addressing the ontological, epistemological and methodological questions. It was influenced by and by consulting the paradigmatic questions that (7) the methods of data collection were fixed. Deciding on the relevance of methods of data collection such as case studies, narrative analysis and frame analysis influenced the nature and structure of (8) the tools of data collection.
Before actual data collection was done, I made (9) assessment of the research setting and the appropriateness of the contents covered in the research tools. This step provided insights regarding the social, historical, political and geographical environment in which the Jarso-Girhi conflict is embedded. This allowed the opportunity to mystify previous expectations, assumptions, hypothesis and questions about their conflicts and their patterns of interaction. The assessment involved discussion with the key community members and institutional actors and helped overcome some misunderstandings about the meaning of identity, the nature of settlement and socio-cultural relationships between the two competing groups. The insights gained from this process helped re-consider the content of the research problems and questions and the tools of data collection. The insights helped also (10) settle diverse methodological issues about the research participants and processes.

The research tried to make purposeful sampling of cases that are capable of yielding the most relevant scenarios and information that can generate data that would help address the objectives of the study and the research questions. As much as possible informants who were believed to offer comprehensive and relevant information were selected using known processes and mechanisms of sampling in qualitative researches. The process promoted interactive, cooperative and participative relationship between the researcher and the research participants. This was followed by the research stage that involved simultaneous and interlocking (11) processes of producing data and managing analyses. The data production and (12) writing up from the data and analyses and interpretation of the realities on the ground in light of theoretical and empirical concepts and findings occurred interactively and informed one another in recursive ways throughout the study. In particular, the data collection process encouraged flexibility and adaptiveness to accommodate the richness inherent in the research participants while staying focused on the phenomena under study, the research questions and particular cases and topics of discussion or analysis.

The epistemological challenges that had emerged from analysis and interpretation of data animated the desire to assess theoretical as well as empirical literature. The concurrence of literature review and data analysis and writing from data and analysis facilitated access to theories and concepts that helped make sense of the data and explain their meanings. Of course, the data analysis on its part assisted in generating and consolidating the conceptual and theoretical propositions from the empirical field. The process is indicative of the centrality of the holistic-inductive approach to data analysis and interpretation. The researcher attempted to provide a variety of explanations about the cases and issues observed, reported theoretically viable variables and their relationships and, where possible, provided factual qualitative data and the interpretations that emerged from them. This is an attempt to provide empirical grounding for the interpretations and conclusions made about the phenomena under study. Again, data analysis and interpretation provided the opportunity and context to qualify the next step of the inquiry and ignited more empirical concerns that called forth my involvement in formulating and refining more research questions. Consistent with constant comparison methods of the grounded theory, the issues and insights that had emerged from analysis of data were incorporated into the later interviews and explored in more depth. The processes interacted with the ontological, epistemological, methodological and theoretical perspectives which in turn went into the research methods and processes.

The research involved various phases of inquiry and the interaction between them. The back and forward interactions between and across the processes reveal that in constructivist/interpretive research design data analysis is a process of making sense of data through uncovering themes, concepts, insights, patterns, categories, and understanding. Figure 2 tries to present that the analyses involved iterative, inductive and reductive process of formulating conceptual ordering for data is called coding and it is coding that facilitates conditions for the constructing themes, essences,
descriptions and theories. They involved—among other things—identifying the form and nature of conflicts, examining or diagnosing why conflicts are perceived in particular ways, evaluating or appraising the social, political and psychological meanings of conflicts and their processes, and identifying frameworks through which the community members interpret conflicts. The analytical processes generally involved generating analytical categories and providing theoretical explanations. This is an approach that required me to do multiple readings and interpretations of the raw data to create thematic categories. By moving back and forth between each category of data, I identified the most salient meanings in the data and organized them into more concrete and meaningful set of codes (Thomas, 2006).

The processes of data analysis took into consideration the nature of the research questions and the type of data generated. Attempts were made to see different phenomena and provide a variety of explanations for each phenomenon and its sub-features. The main feature of data analysis in this work is contextual understanding and adapting an emergent and iterative approach to data analysis and interpretation. This is an approach to data analysis in which the researcher interacts with a particular data in relation to other data, their interpretations and in the light of conceptual and theoretical tools to elucidate the meanings and salience of data thereby by opening rooms for new angles and perspectives from which the data are given more powerful and connected meanings. There was also time in the data analysis process when the researcher felt the need to do additional interviews to increase clarifications on issues. The diverse, interrelating or competing meanings which the research participants gave to situations were placed within core thematic or conceptual and theoretical framework. Depending on the nature of the data and the research questions, some of the respondents’ reflections and field notes and memos were sorted out around themes and focused coding were conducted.

By and large, the schematic representation reveals that in interpretive research, research idea, plan, sampling, data collection and analysis and interpretation of findings intertwine and reinforce one another in complex ways.

The centrality of framing in identity-based conflicts
The second part of the paper is to emphasize the centrality of framing in identity-based conflicts and to provide notes on some analytical cautions we, as researchers, need to take.

How is framing central to identity-based conflicts?
Framing analysis has its roots in cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology and recently social movement studies. Frame analysis generally belongs to the analytical framework called interpretive perspective. As a construct, framing is generally associated with sociologist Erving Goffman who introduced the concepts of frame and frame analysis in his analysis of the sociological processes involved in the dynamics of political protests and social movements. He revealed the vital role of frames in helping people organize their observations in everyday life and defined frames as ‘schemata of interpretation’ (see in Borah, 2011: 248).

Frame analysis is widely used across the social and behavioral sciences including conflict, social-psychological, organizational and media and communication studies (Borah, 2011). Framing analysis rests on the assumption that human beings are meaning-making or signifying agents. Frames are not static, compete among themselves and change overtime depending on situations. In frame analysis, the analytical focus is on how issues, experiences, ideologies, actions and decisions are viewed and interpreted (Başer & Çelik, 2014). Framing is generally understood as a process of meaning-making in and through which a certain group of people and their representatives construct, define, interpret, reproduce and give meaning to their social, political and economic
reality. However, frames cannot be understood in isolation and without examining them against and within the frame environment—that is the broader socio-economic and socio-political milieu within which they occur (Baser & Celik, 2014; Fumagalli, 2007).

Framing takes a central role in the way people construct meanings from their conflictual experiences. Framing can provide also insights on micro-processes, frames and expressions that derive identity-based mobilizations and conflict (Desrosiers, 2011). My own study reconstructed the centrality of framing in contexts where identity groups compete over substantive and symbolic resources and its role in engendering consensus and action mobilization (Hussein & Beyene, 2015). The concept assumes different meanings across the sub-fields of the social and behavioural sciences. Even within conflict studies, the meaning of frame and framing can differ depending on how they are used (Murer, 2012; Desrosiers, 2014; Başer & Çelik, 2014).

In this regard, social-psychological perspectives such as social constructivism and symbolic politics theory that attempt to theorize from dynamics and processes of inter-group conflicts differ from instrumentalist perspectives in their interpretation and problematization of framing (Desrosiers, 2012). It provides huge data on how members of the conflicting groups understand and interpret their group’s conflictual encounter with the out-group. Frame analysis provides insights about why identity-based divisions become politicized and turn conflictual, and reveals the nature of the framing strategies and discursive frames deployed during identity-based mobilizations (Schatz, 2000; Fumagalli, 2007). In this situation, the main purpose of frame analysis is detecting how phenomena are loaded with particular meaning and the angles from which that particular meaning is loaded (Desrosiers, 2012; Başer & Çelik, 2014).

In countries where there are identity-based divisions, people have multiple frames in their mind. In the time of positive inter-ethnic relations characterized by absence of violence, ethnic cooperation and peace frame prevail. On the other hand, in the time of politicized competitions and violence, crisis frames dominate (Oberschall, 2000; Pickering, 2006). The agency of identity groups involved in conflicts is visible not only in the violent confrontations they have undergone or participated in, but also in the way they frame conflicts in which they have become trapped (Baser & Celik, 2014).

The following are among the common conflict frames in my study area.

- We are as important as they are in this territory and we have the same level of profound historical attachment to the area as they have (Identity Frames).
- Our problem with them is deep-rooted. We came to it only to see it happening. When they see our cows, they raid and we do the same when contexts allow us. This has been in practice since long time ago. (Enemy frame)
- They have the keen support of their government. This is what we don’t have. When something happens in one of the Girhi localities, their region mobilizes its force to that spot. This is not the case in our context. (Power frame)
- This issue of boundary between us and them is in essence tit-for-tat over insignificant an issue, but is taking time without solution. Meetings after meetings, but no finalization. Appointments are followed by appointments, but less progress. We are just watching out what they would finally come up with (Frames for blaming action processes)
- They are the ones who violate peace agreements. Their elders and their administrators are equally inconsistent in their positions. It is difficult to trust those who are not up to their words (Characterization Frames)
- Unless appropriate actions are taken against the perpetrators and unless firm rulings are made about this boundary issue, we expect that our community will be exposed to similar assaults (Risk frames)
• After the government took serious action against the key conflict instigators and dismantled their networks, the two groups are at peace now and we hope this would remain the norm (Frames of hope/optimism).

One should also look into the structures framing takes in the context of dynamics of identity-related conflicts. In my study area, I noted the following structures.

• **Historically rooted and narratively-based framing** (re-activating the importance of the past) (Reconstruction of old memories in light of contemporary challenges/dilemmas—there is high tendency to arrange the past experiences in an order of interconnected, linear and mutually reinforcing sequence. This socio-cognitive mechanism which is pervasive in the politics of memory is now captured by the concept narrativization (Rydgren, 2007). Narrativization is characterized not only by its hyper linearity, but also by its selective memory-uptightening some issues and ignoring or downplaying others, thereby denying full representation of the past. Such memories are also called ‘memories selected for antagonism.’ Dereje Feyissa (2010) generated a good example in his research on the Anuak-Nuer identity-based contestations. The following is what the Anuak elites say of the Nuer: ‘They are the ones who eat with two knives’ (Dereje Feyissa, 2010). A related narrative in my research site includes the Jarso’s view of the Girhi and other Somali clans. They capture their conundrum as: ‘We are unfortunate like the cactus tree destined to be in the neighborhood of the agamsa tree’ (thorny and harm-causing shrubs). These are good examples that show that the politics of identity and identity-based contestations over substantive and symbolic resources invokes such a remapping of memory as well as re-framing of issues.

• **Situationally-based framing** (reaction to situational dilemma and uncertainty): situationally-based framing simply reinforces the truth of interactionist prim: that agents act in situations in accordance with the way they perceive that situation and the effect it is perceived to have on them.

In my research, frame analysis provided conceptual tools via which the respondents’ interpretation of their past and present situations was analyzed. The method was used to create understanding about the social-psychological and interpretive as well as the instrumentalist dynamics of inter-group conflicts (Hussein, Beyene and Wentzell, 2015). Both community members and their social and political-administrative leaders are consciously or unconsciously engaged in intensive socially constructed cognition in which framing stands out as a strategy. In this regard, the researcher conquers with Desrosiers (2012) who accentuates the dual nature of framing (strategic and interpretive) in identity-based politics and conflict. Desrosiers (2012: 3) appreciates the role of frame analysis in the context of inter-group conflicts for ‘explaining key dynamics behind ethnic mobilization and conflict’ in general and for shedding light on ‘some of the micro-processes, frames and vocabularies behind ethnic mobilization and conflict.’

The method was found to be instrumental in examining the relationship between what people say about their micro-sociological environment shaping dynamics of peace and conflict and the broader macro-political and institutional ecology (Hussein and Beyene, 2015). One can think of historically-based and context driven framing in the Jarso-Girhi conflict context. Memories are re-activated and interpreted in light of contemporary challenges and uncertainties. Framing is a carrier of cognition. In addition, it offers them the mechanism to provide their cognition symbolic and semantic structure.

In my study, frame analysis involved re-reading of transcripts of the respondents’ reflections to come up with key lexicons and catchphrases in their reflections. The coding process involved clustering of key words and phrases that appeared to highlight the respondents’ cognitive frame.
or framing. The frames were compared and contrasted to come up with core frames and sub-frames. To analyze the research participants’ conflict frames, I adapted analytical concepts from symbolic interactionist perspective of framing. This approach to framing posits that frames (schemes of interpretation, meaning, definition or interpretation) are a gestalt via which humans make sense of their experiences and thus they are fundamental in the way humans think and act in everyday life (Thompson, 2014). The perspective emphasizes the socio-contextual and cognitive structural logic of frames. It suggests that frames are constructed through social interactions that involve interaction with the world. The symbolic interactionist approach underlies also that frames emerge from human cognition and the social interactions that define and shape definition and interpretation of the world (Aggestam, 2015). I drew also on the hermeneutic philosophy that accentuates the power and role of human language to constitute and structure objects of perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, emotions, affects, actions and multiple other experiences. In my context, the core objective in adopting hermeneutic-qualitative approach is to identify and describe the frames which the research participants used to signify and portray the conflicts in their area. Analyses took into consideration the depictions the respondents make of the issues of concern and their causal interpretations (Aggestam, 2015).

On the whole, in carrying out frame analysis, the researcher’s role is elucidating the cognitive and discursive battles over the meaning and interpretation of the world. In my context, the method served the purpose of assessing how the community members frame conflict events and the way they construct issues and concerns from their perceptions and practical experiences. It was also used to see the role of framing in informing micro-processes behind inter-group mobilization in the context of rivalry over resources and in the events of inter-group violence that involved the formation of collective motives and goals. For example, the way the community members construct and express sense of victimization and promote collective grievance can be organized into core and sub-frames.

**Notes on ethical considerations when analyzing conflict framing**

At this place, it is important pointing out some ethical cares one should make when dealing with one’s respondents’ conflict framing. Studies that engage respondents from identity groups competing over substantive and symbolic resources encounter methodological and ethical dilemma that emerge from the frames they generate through interviews and focus group discussions. As in other qualitative researchers, researchers who generate frames have no full control on the nature of the data they generate and the cognitive processes through which those data burst out of the mind of the respondents. Respondents are active human beings and as human beings they are not free from values, ideology, perspectives and orientations. Again, there is strong human agency in the way they frame issues and interpret realities.

The reflections and narrations of community members caught in the history of identity-based inter-communal encounters may contain stereotypes that exaggerate differences and problems. For example, in the context of Jarso-Girhi conflicts over ownership of and control over administrative localities, the representatives that represented each group drew on framing strategies that involved re-interpretation of past relations and formulation of new symbols and myths of self-realization used fundamentally to galvanize support and ignite popular participation in inter-group participation.

In this study, frame analysis served adequate methodological role in capturing both the instrumental and interpretive dimensions of social reactions to the processes and dynamics of contestation. In the Jarso-Girhi context myth-making, stereotyping, scapegoating, vilification, adversarial frames and counter-frames assume central role in shaping dynamics of conflict and consolidating the social-psychological bedrock of the conflict system. Frame analysis was instrumental in elucidating how
the community members load various experiences and perceptions with certain socio-cognitive meanings (Brubaker, 2004). The method was useful also in examining how framing, identity, socio-material conditions of existence and emotions interact say in triggering perceptions, goals and actions (Hussein & Beyene, 2015).

In their framing, some respondents treat ethnicity and ethnic-based conflicts as naturally given and immutable (Brubaker & Loveman, 2002). One of the things one may come across while inquiring into identity and identity-based conflicts is what Anthony Smith (1998) calls ‘participants’ primordialism’ or what Fearson & Laitin (2000) conceptualize as ‘everyday primordialism.’ One can encounter respondents who maintain ‘that ethnic groups are objectively primordial and therefore eternally permanent and impervious to modification by circumstances, as well as having impermeable boundaries’ (Gil-White, 1999: 803).

As a researcher, one should not criticize such participants for rectifying their problems as criticizing them for what they have said is itself is a type category mistake (Brubaker, 2004). One should take rectifications simply as something that is ‘central to the practice of politicized ethnicity’ and attempt’…account for the ways in which and conditions under which this practice of rectification, this crystallization of group feelings, can work. According to Brubaker, stereotypical thoughts and positions should be viewed as ‘cognitive structures that contain knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about social groups’ rather than defining them in terms of cognitive deficiencies or instead of seeing them as ‘…the distinctive and pathological propensity of particular kinds of personalities.’ Stereotypical thinking should, like other aspects of thinking, be seen as a form of thinking ‘rooted in normal and ubiquitous cognitive processes’ (Brubaker, 2004: 72). As an analyst, one should make a maximum care to avoid being carried away by the data to avoid essentialization of identity groups and the boundaries between them (Nowicka & Cieslik, 2014). Similarly, the respondent’s view in Text B that ‘…at present once conflict arises with its neighbors, the attitude of animosity continues for a longer time and attempts to cool-down and to return to normal relation are becoming arduous and time consuming’ should not tempt one to mark the Afar-Issa conflict as an intractable and insurmountable conflict. In connection to this, Brubaker (2004: 1-10) warns against subscribing to the practices of commonsense analytic naturalizers:

Instead, we need to break with vernacular categories and commonsense understandings. We need to break, for example, with the seemingly obvious and uncontroversial point that ethnic conflict involves conflict between ethnic groups. I want to suggest that ethnic conflict or what might better be called ethnicized or ethnically framed conflict need not, and should not, be understood as conflict between ethnic groups, just as racial or racially framed conflict need not be understood as conflict between races, or nationally framed conflict as conflict between nations.

It is clear that Brubaker warns against intentional as well as unintentional doubling or reinforcing the reification of ethnic groups in ethnopolitical practice with a reification of such groups in social analysis’ (Brubaker, 2003: 10, emphasis original). One has to avoid replicating it in one’s scholarly or intellectual analyses. One has to know how to strike balance between legitimizing your respondents’ views and positions and avoiding the mistake of using your respondents’ ways of framing issues as analytical frames. If one takes as truth, for example, what ethnic actors or entrepreneurs claim such as their tendency to reify the differences between their group and out-group, one has unwittingly contributed to the reification of identity groups and their differences. When respondents from the ethnic groups being studied say ‘we’ and ‘they’, ‘our difference and contestation with them’, ‘the difference between our thinking and their thinking’ and ‘this is how we define our situation today’, a researcher must sense that they speak of collective identities and identity-based differences as things existing out there (Benford, 1997). A researcher is expected to be ‘analysts of naturalizers’ not ‘analytic naturalizers’ (Gil-White, 1999: 803).
My study suggested that one common element in identity-based conflict is reification, objectification and politicization of historical entities such as culture, people, identities and differences as well as conflicts that occur between and within groups. Reification is embedded in the reflections and perspectives of our research participants. Reification may occur, for example, as part and parcel of the process of self-identification and otherness and through significations that accentuate the existence of strict symbolic, political and socio-cultural orientations and aspirations between the competing groups (Hussein et al. 2015 & Jones, 1997). Elites from the competing groups may explicitly try to have one believe that their group is a coherent and objective entity who stand around in opposition to specific others (Fearson & Laitin, 2000). This is what we call reification or objectification of differences (Jones, 1997; Brubaker, 2004). Reification, inherently embedded in the identity politics, is problematic as an analytical category. In connection to this, Benford (1997) and Brubaker (2004) warn against duplication of ethnic actors’ ‘reification’ of reality. Intentional and unintentional subscription to the common people’s ‘socio-biological theories’ as well as adapting categories inherent in politicized identity or ethnicity as our categories of social and political analysis may place the analyst in the camp of those who uphold essentialist foundationalism common in populist writings and political mobilization thereby causing severe blow on their scholarly robustness (Maleševic’, 2006).

As an analyst, a researcher’s primary role is providing empirical accounts to why and how identities are reproduced and uncovering the symbolic structures, the processes through which the relations between the identity groups are produced and reproduced and the social, political and relational implications of the processes that have the potential to sustain reification/objectification of identities and conflicts between identity groups (Jones, 1997). In other words, an academic observer should provide rigorous accounts of the ‘processes and discourses that construct and subsequently naturalize/reify group differences’ (Karner, 2007: 17, emphasis original) and the motives behind those processes and the potential impacts of the processes on inter-group relations in the conflict environment. In other words, one should not discard the sense which people make from the social, cultural and political processes that underlie identity constructions and identity-related inter-group problems. There are ample meanings and implications in what Brubaker refers to as the ‘vernacular categories’ and ‘participants’ understandings’ (Brubaker, 2004: 10).

The implication is that as constructivist researchers, we cannot totally neglect the primordial aspects of identity (Schraml, 2014) and rather need to search for ways of integrating them with our constructivist prism. There are some primordial realities that impose themselves on people and affect the relationships they forge both in times of peace and conflict. We cannot ignore these self-imposing primordial realities. One of the primordial facts is ‘the fact that social bonds, solidarity and identifications inevitably involve some people and exclude others, that social identities rely on boundaries delineating ‘us’ from ‘them’ (Karner, 2007: 20). The instrumental and organizing roles of the primordial categories in the periods of crisis and intense inter-group competitions over scarce substantive and symbolic resources are significantly implicated in some scholarly works that took up various Ethiopian cases (e.g., Feyissa, 2010; Adugna, 2011; and Debelo, 2012). They suggested that politicized competition over such resources engenders change in identity discourses and evokes primordial emotions that in turn set in motion the social construction of the ‘we’ and the ‘they’ groups (Hussein and Beyene, 2015). Worth inquiring into in this connection is the role of institutionalization of ethnic differences at policy, political, cultural and territorial levels in reifying the concept of identity and identity-based conflicts (Maleševic, 2004).
Conclusions
Attempts were made in this paper to show the principles and processes involved in constructivist/interpretive research paradigm that guided the current research. The paper tried to reveal also the interaction and reinforcement between research paradigm, research methods, tools of data collection and processes of data analysis and interpretation. The paper indicated that an interpretive research process is non-linear and requires a researcher to move back and forth between and across parts.

The final part of the paper revealed that researchers who inquire into identity-related problems should know how to strike balance between ethical dilemmas that beset them. The terrible dilemmas are legitimizing their respondents’ views and positions and avoiding the mistake of using their respondents’ ways of framing issues as analytical frames. The paper emphasized that if a researcher takes as truth, for example, what ethnic actors or entrepreneurs claim such as their tendency to reify the differences between their group and out-group, he/she has unwittingly contributed to the reification of identity groups and their differences. Reifying, according to Brubaker (2004), is a social process and what in the context of politicized contestation ethnic elites are in the business of doing. Researchers must know how to keep their works from getting contaminated from what Brubaker (2004) coins as category mistake. The danger of reification can be minimized by locating analyses and discussions of identity/ethnic issues in specific empirical and historical contexts. Careful approach to popular framing of conflicts can provide relevant insights regarding the impact of the political and institutional definitions of identities, the relation between the identity groups (Malešević’, 2004) and the major influences which the institutional and political practices exert on local relations mainly in the context of competition over scarce resources (Hussein & Beyene, 2015; Tache & Oba, 2009).

Of important analytical significance, for example, is how changes in policies and other political-administrative initiatives that create local contexts for inter-group competitions ignite dynamics of structural, discursive and psychological reactions that involve transformation of the latent primordial entities into manifest conditions that would serve catalytic and mobilizational role in the collectivities’ reaction to tensions or crisis. As an analyst one is thus expected to illuminate how the competitive and reactive processes result in mergers between the subjective and objective aspects of ethnicity or clanship (Brown, 1994).

In connection to this, one of the emphases in the instrumentalist/circumstantialist prism of identities including ethnicity is that events of tensions and crises ignites a kind of collective arousal toward uncertainty reduction, drive pervasive group formation and intensify categorical thinking (Hale, 2004). In such a context, primordial categories like ‘group membership, cultural meaning, social networks of solidarity, mutual support and reciprocal obligations can provide important coping mechanisms, channels of mobilization and strategies of adaptation’ (Karner, 2007: 146). As an analyst one has to focus on broader socio-political, economic and environmental changes engender social processes of collective sense making in which the instrumental use of the primordial categories introduces the dynamics of competition within and between groups without losing sight of variations in the way the power of these categories manifest itself. Our vulnerability to essentialist foundationalism is minimized if we develop interest in the comparative politics of identity and be able to make sense of the existence of contextual variations affecting the power identity related factors assume to impinge on the form and content of inter-group relations.

Last but not least academic analysts of identity related social problems including inter-group conflicts should anchor themselves on critical conceptualization of the concept of identity itself. This includes analytical reliance on conscious awareness of the multiple uses to which identity is
put, the conceptual inconsistency and over-burdenedness (Brubaker, 2004) for which it is known, and the socio-political and economic processes and changes that offer ontological conditions for identity’s existential dynamism. These are formidable and compelling circumstances that shape the formation, manifestation and transformation of identity. These are insuperable realities whose power and influence over the form which identity takes defy the essentialist thesis of ethnic or cultural authenticity and other associated social, political and philosophical positionalities that uphold the logic of group identity building as a linear and immutable process.
References


The main purpose of this paper is to examine the multifarious status of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and ethnic conflict handling ability of university students in Ethiopia and how it contributes to reducing people’s ethnocentrism and interethnic conflicts. A total of 771 participants (484 males and 287 females) were sampled from four government universities. Questionnaire and interview were data collection tools. The questionnaire was partly adapted from the existing tools but the interview guiding notes were locally developed based on reviewed literature. The adapted measuring scales were the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney, 1992), the Intercultural Sensitivity Scale (Chen & Starosta, 2000), Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale (Neuliep, 2002; Neuliep & McCroskey, 1997), and Intercultural Conflict Style Inventory (Hammer, 2009). A combination of multistage cluster sampling, stratified simple random sampling, simple random sampling and purposive sampling procedures were employed to select participants. The data was analyzed using Descriptive Statistical Measures (mean, standard deviation, quartile & percentile scores), frequency percentage, chi-square, pearson correlation coefficient and multiple regression analysis. Data collected through qualitative interview were transcribed verbatim. The findings of the study revealed that university students were labelled at ethnic identity search or exploration status; whereas they labelled at higher level of intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability but at lower level of ethnocentric status. Serious ethnocentric attitudes and interethnic conflictual behaviours were not manifested among the students. Ethnic identity score was positively correlated with ethnocentrism score but not with intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability scores. Whilst, regression analysis provided that intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability made unique contributions to the reduction of ethnocentrism while ethnic identity has been a reason for the rise of ethnocentrism.

Background
Ethiopia is one of the populous and ethnically diverse countries in Africa with 73.9 million people by 2007 (Central Statistical Agency (CSA), 2008) and 91.7 million people by 2013 (World Bank, 2013) and inhabited more than by 80 ethnic groups with over 200 dialects (CSA, 2008). Ethiopia’s population is composed of several ethno-linguistic communities with different histories, languages, and cultures.

Regardless of their diverse demographic and historical origins and with several points of contacts over the centuries, by and large, the ethnic groups have experienced inter-marriage, interdependency, attend similar religions and co-exist peacefully (Habtamu, Hallahmi & Abbink, 2001) and have co-existed and continue to exist as nations among nations (Lubo, 2012).

However, in the recent past and contemporary times Ethiopia has faced relevant actors to untangle the myriad ethnic, political and religious interactions and conflicts have blown up among its citizens at different periods (Asebe, 2007; Lubo, 2012; Tilahun, 2007; Vaughan, 2003). The occasional interethnic conflicts which have occurred in some parts of the country, range from...
simple exchanges of words and insults to serious incidents that have escalated to certain severe conditions, such as burning of houses and farms, blood-shedding fights, and killing of members of other ethnic groups (Habtamu, Hallahmi & Abbink, 2001).

To address the rights of ethnic groups and resolve deep rooted inter ethnic conflicts in the country beginning with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-led national conference in 1991, which set up a framework of the transitional government, Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has restructured a political system in the country through a policy of “Ethnic Federalism” (Assefa, 1998). In ethnically divided countries, the hope is that political recognition of cultural and ethnic pluralism through federalism reduces ethnic tensions and conflicts (Fleiner, 2000). The constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, ratified in December 1994, provides for the unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession for every nation, nationality, and people (FDRE, 1995: Art.39).

After these rights all nations and nationalities are given the rights to use their own language in administration, exercise as media of instruction in learning-teaching and use it to conduct formal meetings. Ethnic groups began writing history of their ethnic groups in their own languages and freely celebrate their cultural legacies. It is also after these rights that all ethnic groups’ got the freedom to identify themselves as a member of their ethnic groups (Abera Teferi, 2010; Birhanu, 2007).

Ethnic based associations and political affiliations have mushroomed. It is no wonder that these developments would create an atmosphere of ethnic tension, violence and conflicts among different ethnic groups in different parts of the country. For instance, in the past two decades, after the endorsement of ethnic federalism as of 1995, several ethnic based conflicts have been observed between different ethnic groups. To mention few of them: the Silte-Guragie conflict, the Wagagoda language conflict, the Sheko-Majang conflict, the Anuak-Nuer conflict, the Berta-Gumuz conflict, the Gedeo-Guji conflict, the Oromo-Amhara conflict, the Borana-Gerri conflict, the Afar-Issa conflict, the Oromo-Somali conflict, the Oromo-Gumuz Conflict, etc. (Lubo, 2012).

The major causes for the conflicts are attributed to socio-political, socio-economic, or socio-cultural issues and incompatibility of opportunities (Abera Hailemariam, 2010; Alemayehu, 2009; Asebe, 2007). Similarly, Lubo (2012) asserts that the violent way through which assimilation and adoption processes took place in Ethiopia casts its own weight on current inter-ethnic relations. Some ethnic groups claim that they have been misunderstood, others unjustifiably disliked, undermined or marginalized (Habtamu, Hallahmi & Abbink, 2001). However, based on scholarly arguments regarding the sources of ethnic conflicts, one may presume that this is a misconception (Asnake, 2002). For instance, according to Cordell and Stefan (2009), though ethnicity may provide the mobilizational basis for collective action, it is not the ultimate, irreducible source of violent conflicts.

It has also become common to hear in universities in Ethiopia (which host almost all ethnic groups of the country and is considered as “little Ethiopia”), students of one ethnic group being in conflict with others at different occasions (Abera Hailemariam, 2010; Abera Teferi, 2010; Assefa, 2009; Tilahun, 2007).

The psychological factors contributing to such conflicts and interethnic tensions in Ethiopia have not been exhaustively studied. The attitudes, beliefs and behaviours responsible for perpetuating such conflicts, tensions and misperceptions need to be addressed. Thus, this study would address the situation of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, multiculturalism, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability of university students in Ethiopia.
Ethnicity is defined historically in demographic terms (e.g., common language, national origin, culture, etc.), but it also has some socially constructed meanings as well, even if these socially constructed meanings are not always acknowledged in psychology (Quintana, 2007). Developmental psychologists (e.g., Quintana, 2007; Phinney, 1996) do not restrict ethnicity to its demographic denotations but acknowledge the socially constructed connotations of the term. Moreover, Habtamu (1998) considers various features to define ethnic group/ethnicity as a human collectivity within a larger society, having real or putative common ancestry, mostly speaking the same language, with similar culture as reflected by common social values and child rearing practices, and with the association to specific territorial boundaries.

**Ethnic identity** is conceptualized as that part of a person’s self-knowledge defined by membership in, and emotional connection to, an ethnic group, together with beliefs and emotions related to membership (Buckingham, 2008; Healey, 2010; Worrell et al., 2006). Ethnic identification is an understanding of the self within a particular ethnic group (French, Seidmean, Allen, & Aber, 2006). Hence, self-identification as a member of an ethnic group is a necessary precondition for ethnic identity (Phinney, 1992). Many developmental and social psychologists regard ethnic identity as one of many facets of an individual’s social identity (Quintana, 2007).

**Ethnic identity definition and formation** is a complex phenomenon, particularly for minority groups (Phinney, 1998). It is not an easy task for youths, minorities and mixed ethnicities to choose the way they define themselves. In fact, ethnic identities are dynamic in a sense that they are shifting and changing according to historical and social processes (Santrock, 2011). In understanding ethnicity in the context of multi-ethnic and pluralistic societies, it is crucial to take into account the complex and dynamic historical processes and factors.

Empirical findings by different authorities (e.g. Dong, Day & Collaço, 2008; Phinney, 1990; Qingwen, Kenneth & Christine, 2009) reveal that higher or achieved ethnic identity promotes intercultural sensitivity and multiculturalism, and it is possible to enact rules thereby measures to overcome ethnocentrism and reduce interethnic conflict during inter-group interactions.

**Intercultural sensitivity** is the affective dimension of intercultural communication competence that refers to the emotional desire of a person to acknowledge, appreciate, and accept cultural differences. Similarly, Chen and Starosta (2003) suggest that intercultural sensitivity helps to promote individual’s ability to respect cultural differences to foster multiple cultural identities, and to maintain multicultural coexistence.

**Multiculturalism** emphasizes the importance of recognizing cultural diversity within the same political framework as well as equal chances and opportunities for all (Arends-Toth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Berry, 2001). Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belongingness. Acceptance of other’s cultural identity gives a feeling of security and self-confidence making them open to and accept diverse cultures (Berry, 2001).

Similarly, Donald & Cindy (2010) conceptualize ethnocentrism as contrary to multiculturalism for it does not accept cultural diversity, and is a general intolerance to out-groups and a relative preference for one’s in-group over most out-groups. The literature suggests that ethnocentrism has the potential to lead to stereotypical prejudices and negative behaviours against out-groups or other ethnic group members.

**Inter-ethnic conflict**: within psychology, conflict is often defined as some sort of incompatibility among different ethnic groups of goals, beliefs, attitudes, and/or behaviours (Alemayehu, 2009;
Jeong, 2000). Inter-ethnic conflicts and cultural difficulties, anxiety and uncertainties occur due to lack of awareness or insensitivity to the cultural cues of different cultural frame of references (Awang-Rozaimie, Affidah, Aiza, & Musdia, 2011).

The research problem
Nowadays ethnicity is a phenomenon of growing importance and is an “inescapable fact of our world” (Spickard, 1989). In earlier times, ethnicity has often been associated with traditional societies, and liberal thinkers in the 1950s and 1960s often thought that it would fade away with modernization (Spickard, 1989). But, today the issues of ethnicity, ethnic identity, interethnic conflict and multiculturalism have clutched the attention of many scholars from various fields due to the fact that ethnic based conflicts and searching for one’s own ethnic identity are increasing from time to time in many parts of the world, including in Ethiopia.

In contemporary Ethiopia, the issues of ethnicity, ethnic autonomy and multiculturalism are highly popularized than earlier times. Particularly higher education institutions (colleges and universities) are places where young people of many ethnic backgrounds, social classes, religious and political affiliations come together in campuses. These students are expected to live in the same dormitories and learn together in the same classrooms and collaborate in university organizations, social activities, sports, and cultural festivals and events.

Higher education is especially influential when its social milieu is different from students’ home and community background and when it is diverse and complex enough to encourage intellectual experimentation and recognition of varied future possibilities. In fact modern institutions of higher education are expected to be beacons for harmony, bridging ethnic differences and promoting an atmosphere of reason, inquiry and collegiality (Blum, 2010). Moreover these higher institutions are deemed to address the teaching and learning of diversity by creating an environment that allows positive interaction among students from different ethnicities and backgrounds. Likewise, as declared on Higher Education Proclamation of Ethiopia (proclamation No. 650/2009), one of the objectives of higher education in Ethiopia is to promote democratic culture and uphold multicultural community life (FDRE, 2009). Phinney (1996) also asserts that exposure to university programs may offer opportunities of intellectual framework for understanding the historical, psychological, and sociological foundations of multiculturalism, prejudice, cultural and interethnic conflicts.

Nevertheless, sometimes unwise exposure to ethnic diversity in higher learning educations brings experience of ethnic prejudices, cultural ethnocentrism, feeling of distrust and intergroup conflicts. This is true that these days and in the recent past, in universities in Ethiopia, it has become common news to hear that students of one ethnic group are being in clashed with students from another ethnic group (or other ethnic groups). Studies conducted in some universities like Addis Ababa, Hawassa, Adama and others have attributed this to unhealthy relationship among some sections of students especially between those from the dominant ethnic groups such as Oromo, Amhara and Tigray is common (Abera Hailemariam, 2010; Abera Teferi, 2010; Assefa, 2009; Tilahun, 2007). More often than not, minor disputes between individuals escalate into a bigger fighting which involves students aligned along ethnic lines (Abera Hailemariam, 2010; Tilahun, 2007).

Similarly, Demewoz (1997) reported that there is a tendency of ethnocentric attitude among Addis Ababa University students of Amhara, Oromo, Tigray and Gurage ethnic groups. By and large this ethnocentric attitude leads to interethnic prejudice, feeling of distrust, intolerance and intergroup conflict among university students (Abera Hailemariam, 2010; Abera Teferi, 2010; Demewoz, 1997).
The topic of ethnic identity and related concepts are researchable in Ethiopia particularly in higher learning institutions; as, to the best knowledge of the investigator, there is no study that exhaustively deals about the status of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, multiculturalism, ethnocentrism, and interethnic conflict handling ability among university students in Ethiopia.

The reasons might be as noted by Asefa (cited in Habtamu, 1998) that studies and discussions about ethnicity and ethnic related issues are considered as destructive in this country. He further asserts that some intellectuals and politicians pretend as if the differences do not exist. Others keep silent because they do not want to suffer from the unbearable consequences of treating these delicate issues. For these and other reasons, ethnicity and related concepts are the least studied topics (Habtamu, 1998). However, lately some attempts are made to study the issues belonging to different ethnic groups, especially about the minorities and college students (Abera Hailemariam, 2010; Abera Teferi, 2010; Asebe, 2007; Birhanu, 2007; Demewoz, 1997; Habtamu, Hallahmi & Abbink, 2001; Habtamu, 1998; Tilahun, 2007). However, these studies have some limitations. They have been executed on few segments of ethnic groups, particularly focused on the dominant ethnic groups in the country such as Amhara, Oromo, Tigrie and Guragie. In addition, many of them have been studied on few individuals through qualitative investigations. In general, researches on the topic in Ethiopia are fragmentary and inconclusive.

Furthermore, theoretically this study is expected to bridge the theoretical and research gap in the area of ethnic identity and related issues among university students in the context of Ethiopia and multiethnic African nations considering Phinney’s three-stage of ethnic identity and Tajfel’s social identity theories. To the best knowledge of the investigator, none of the researchers conducted studies on ethnic identity and related issues in Ethiopia had used the aforementioned theories as theoretical framework. Moreover, the theories are formulated in western contexts and lay emphasis on comparing the dominant (white) and subordinate (non-white) groups. Therefore, this study as a secondary purpose targets to verify the validity of the theories in Ethiopian culture. Moreover it may contribute to theory building on ethnic identity and associated factors which are appropriate for non-western multiethnic African nations particularly for Ethiopian young adult college students. Notably, this study would also be useful for proposing strategies to reduce ethnocentrism and interethnic conflicts through facilitating accommodation of diversity and tolerance among young adult university students in Ethiopia.

Accordingly the following research questions are addressed through the conceptual lens derived from Phinney’s three-stage of ethnic identity and Tajfel’s social identity theories.

1. What are the status of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability of Ethiopian university students?
2. Are university students in Ethiopia ethnocentric; do they reject multiculturalism and are they pre-disposed towards interethnic conflict?
3. Is there a statistically significant correlation between ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability scores?
4. Do improved ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability among university students in Ethiopia contribute to the reduction of ethnocentrism?
5. What are the Ethiopian universities and other concerned bodies actually doing in terms of overcoming ethnocentrism and interethnic conflicts and enhancing achieved ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and multiculturalism among university students in Ethiopia?
Objectives
The general objective of this paper is to examine the status of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability among university students in Ethiopia and how it contributes to reduce ethnocentrism and interethnic conflicts. The specific objectives of the study include the following:

1. To determine the ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability status of university students in Ethiopia.
2. To explore whether or not university students in Ethiopia are ethnocentric, accepting multiculturalism and engaged in interethnic conflicts.
3. To investigate the relationship between the scores on ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability.
4. To examine the contribution of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability to reduce ethnocentrism among university students in Ethiopia.
5. To look into the efforts made by the Ethiopian universities and other concerned bodies to overcoming ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict and enhancing achieved ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and multiculturalism among university students in Ethiopia.

Theoretical orientation
This paper is grounded in the argument that ethnic identity is crucial to one’s self-concept and has its own contribution to one’s intercultural sensitivity, acceptance or rejection of diversity, attitude towards other ethnic groups’ culture and interethnic conflict handling ability. In this regard, it has been hypothesized that higher status of ethnic identity is necessary to reduce ethnocentrism and interethnic conflicts during inter-group interactions and through achieved ethnic identity it is possible to promote intercultural sensitivity and multiculturalism.

The theoretical framework of this study relied on Phinney’s three-stage of ethnic identity theory and Tajfel’s social identity theory. These theories have helped to explain how status of ethnic identity and self-identification with the group influences the quality of interaction among students in Ethiopian universities. Much of the researches in western world (U.S.A) on ethnic identity have been conducted within the framework of these theories as conceptualized by developmental and social psychologists (Phinney, 1993).

Conceptual framework of the study
In this section, the conceptual framework of the study is presented and elaborated. It is assembled by the investigator from Phinney’s three-stage model of ethnic identity, Tajfel’s social identity theory and related concepts to draw the dimensions of the framework. It also served as a steppingstone for the subsequent empirical analysis of the study. The framework comprises five dimensions. These are ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, multiculturalism, interethnic conflict handling ability and ethnocentrism. In the schematic diagram of the conceptual framework of the study portrayed in Figure 1 below, the single arrow lines indicate the direction of the influence among the variables while the double arrow line is used to show the link between constructs.
Methods
To achieve the objectives of the study mixed research method was used.

Research design and sites
To achieve the purpose of the study and to answer research questions, this study is principally organized around a cross sectional survey research design. The reason behind selecting this design is, primarily it is the most commonly used design in the social science. Furthermore, a cross sectional survey research design is best suited to studies intended at finding out the prevalence of a phenomenon, circumstance to problem of attitude or issue by taking cross section of the population.

Data was collected from four Universities: Adama Science and Technology, Addis Ababa Science and Technology, Addis Ababa, and Madawalabu. The universities were purposefully selected from various generations and sizes of universities: Addis Ababa Science and Technology University is from the new and small universities, Madawalabu University is from the medium size and young universities, Adama Science and Technology is from old and large and finally Addis Ababa University from the very large and very old universities. Four universities from different categories instead of one is primarily preferred in this study for the reason that including more than one case gives more power to the analysis and findings in terms of getting comprehensive and rich data. Furthermore, in most government universities in Ethiopia at different episodes, interethnic conflicts among university students have been reported in these Universities.

Population, sampling procedures and sample
The target population of this study has been university students of regular program of 2013/2014 academic year of both sexes from different ethnic backgrounds of Addis Ababa Science and Technology, Madawalabu, Adama Science and Technology and Addis Ababa universities. In addition, to generating additional and supportive information few administrative and focal people were considered for qualitative data.

For this study, the combinations of multistage cluster sampling, stratified simple random
sampling, simple random sampling and purposive sampling procedures were employed to select respondents. The survey has used the single population proportion formula to determine the sample size.

In order to address non-responses, the sample size had increased by a non-response insurance factor. Thus, allowances of 10% non-response rate make a total sample of 421. Furthermore, the single population proportion formula is valid only for simple random or systematic random sampling method; but the sampling technique that is used for this study is multistage cluster sampling technique. Therefore, the calculated sample size has to be multiplied by D which is the design effect resulting with \( N = Dn \) where \( N \) is the sample size for cluster sample, \( n \) is the sample size obtained from the calculation and \( D \) is the design effect. The design effect (\( D \)) provides a correction for the loss of sampling efficiency resulting from the use of multi stage cluster sampling instead of simple random sampling. Hence, by considering the design effect of 2 the number had been multiplied by 2 and the total number of students taken for the study was 842.

For qualitative data gathering, purposive sampling technique was employed to select sixteen (four from each) interviewees from universities management bodies, staffs working in student affairs directorate office and university campus police staffs.

**Instruments for the study**

To achieve the objectives of this study, the required and relevant information was gathered through questionnaire and interviews. The Amharic and English versions of the questionnaire were extensively used and preferred to other tools for its simplicity for such large sample size and for the nature of the study.

**Questionnaire preparation, validation process, and data gathering procedures**

A structured self-completion survey questionnaire consisting of six sections was constructed. The adapted measuring scales were The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measuring (MEIM) Scale, Intercultural Sensitivity Scale, Generalized Ethnocentrism Scale and Intercultural Conflict Style Inventory. A scenario (a case) and 10 questions portraying the notions of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, multiculturalism, ethnocentric attitude and behaviour and interethnic conflict issues of the university students have been prepared and presented by the investigator. During the adaptation process of the measuring scales, to secure the psychometric properties (the validity & reliability) of the scales a standard procedure known as “Steps (Stages) of Instrument Preparation” (Leplege & Verdier, 1998 cited in Beaton, Guillemin, & Ferraz, 2000) and which is internationally recognized for its numerous applications was employed. Finally, for the pilot study, 84 refined five-point Likert scale items were administered. The pilot study was conducted in Madda Walabu University on 50 Male and Female regular undergraduate students and 5 interviewees.

In data collection, eight data collectors (two from each university) who have previous experience in data collection were recruited. Training was given on the questionnaire and data collection techniques. Data collection took place from 20th April, 2014 to 20th May, 2014. Data collectors had distributed the questionnaire to the students, remained in the class room during administration and transported the completed questionnaire from the universities.

Procedurally, both the Amharic and English versions of the same questionnaire were given to the respondents and invited to fill out the one they prefer. The average response rate for this study was 92%, with highest response rate (100%) from MWU and lowest response rate (86%) from Adama Science and Technology University.
Methods of data analyses
After the responses on the questionnaires have been collected, SPSS version 21.0 was used to enter, clean, and analyze the collected data. Answer sheets were excluded from entry if respondents failed to complete at least half of the questionnaire. After the data was entered into SPSS, the first step to complete (before running any inferential statistics) is EDA (Exploratory Data Analysis), which involves computing various descriptive statistics and graphs. Exploratory Data Analysis is used to examine and get to know about the data.

To answer the first research question, descriptive statistics (the mean, SD, variance, quartile and percentile scores), frequency percentages, Chi-square ($\chi^2$), pairwise chi-square comparisons, Bivariate Pearson Correlations and Multiple Regressions were computed. Confidence intervals of 95% were used to see the precision of the study.

Finally, data collected through qualitative interview were transcribed verbatim. The transcripts were narrated and presented theme by theme accordingly.

Findings
Socio-demographic context of participants of the study
Before turning to the main analyses of the study, the main socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are summarized in Table 1 below. As indicated in Table 1 below, a total of 771 regular undergraduate university students have been included from four government universities. The sex distribution of participants was: 484 (62.8%) male and 287 (37.2%) female. The age of the participants ranges from 17 to 36 (a mean age of 19.23 years). The majority of students, 430 (55.8%) were in between 18 to 21 years old and the remaining 243 (31.5%) and 92 (11.9 %) of them were found between 22-25 and 26 & above years old respectively. Two hundred two (26%) of the respondents identified themselves as Oromo ethnic group whereas 239 (31.0%) of them self-identified as belonging to Amhara ethnic group. Furthermore, 108 (14%) self-identified as belonging to ethnic groups in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples regional state, and 76 (9.9%) were belongs to Tigray ethnic group. Considerable number of respondents, 124 (16.1%) were not or didn’t like to identify their particular ethnic group. As it is indicated in Table 1, 456 (59.1%) of the respondents said they are from single (mono) ethnic background whereas 305 (39.6%) of them said they are from mixed ethnic group i.e. their parents were from different ethnic background. Five hundred fourteen (66.7 %) of the respondents identified themselves as they are affiliated to urban background whereas 255 (33.1%) of them were from rural. One hundred eighty two (23.6%) of them were freshmen, 142 (18.4%) of them were second year and 212 (27.5%) were third year while the remaining 235 (30.5%) were fourth year and above.

Status of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability
One of the major intents of this study was to determine the status of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability of university students. Hence, the next sub-section and Table 2, display a descriptive summary of the rating scores of respondents using mean, variances, SD and percentile scores and its description to suggest on the ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability status of university students.

Hence, in order to determine the ethnic identity status of university students in Ethiopia, in reference to Phinney’s ethnic identity formation stages i.e. unexamined ethnic identity, ethnic identity search/exploration or achieved ethnic identity, it is pragmatic to exercise simple descriptive statistics such as the mean, SD, variance and percentile scores on the Multigroup Ethnic
Table 1: Socio-demographic Characteristics of Participants of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex (n=771)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (n=765)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-21</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-25</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (n=771)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromo</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amhara</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigré</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNNP</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Identified</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic background (n=761)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Single(mono)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>39.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion (n=765)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orthodox Christian</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-religious</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place grown up (n=769)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First year</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second year</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Year</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>27.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth and above</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>30.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mothers’ Education (n=769)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t read &amp; write</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read &amp; Write</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree &amp; Above</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Not alive</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fathers’ Education (n=765)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t read &amp; write</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read &amp; Write</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree &amp; Above</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Not alive</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identity Measures (MEIM). A high score on the MEIM (5x12=60) represents a highest ethnic identity achievement, the average (3x12=36) would stand for ethnic identity search or exploration and while the lower score (1x12=12) stands for lower ethnic identity attainment or unexamined ethnic identity.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistical Values on Ethnic Identity, Intercultural Sensitivity, Ethnocentrism and Interethnic Conflict Handling Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No of items</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Expected Average</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Percentile Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39.49</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>148.45</td>
<td>12.18</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>31.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>57.52</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>67.53</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>53.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40.27</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>156.82</td>
<td>12.52</td>
<td>90.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>31.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>84.43</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>184.80</td>
<td>13.59</td>
<td>110.00</td>
<td>44.00</td>
<td>73.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The descriptive summary of the observed mean ethnic identity score (M=39.49) portrayed in Table 2, is not far from the expected average (36) and 50th percentile score (41). As it can be observed from the Table the lowest 25th percentile score (31.00) is lower than the expected average (36), while 75th (49) percentile scores are higher than the expected average and the mean. Thus, the ethnic identity status of the participants’ of this study has tended to be to ethnic identity search or exploration.

Thus, the above exercises attest that the participants’ ethnic identity status tends to be to ethnic identity search or exploration. In other words, those individuals who are in this middle stage are usually motivated to explore their ethnicity due to a growing awareness for not all values of the dominant group are beneficial to other ethnic group members (Phinney, 1993). It is evident that these days people especially the youth in Ethiopia actively engage to learn more about their culture and origin by participating in cultural activities (rituals). For instance, the Oromo’s celebrate “Erecha” (to thank God (Waaqaa) for the blessings and mercies they have received throughout the year), Sidama’s ethnic group celebrate “Chambalala” (marks of a new year incoming) and other religious holidays such as by Orthodox followers “Timket” (epiphany), “Meskel” (the finding of the True Cross) and others are colorfully celebrated than past times.

Note that the rating scores of respondents, the descriptive summary of the observed mean score (M=57.52) on intercultural sensitivity rating scale shown in Table 2, is far well above the expected average (42). It is conspicuous that even the lowest 25th percentile score (53.00) is bigger than the expected average (42). Surprisingly 90 percent of the cases, the observed scores are well above the expected average score. These figures may hint that the university students involved in this study has labelled at higher status of intercultural sensitivity. In general, this suggests that respondents are likely to be sensitive to others’ culture.

In a manner that is unlike to intercultural sensitivity construct, the descriptive statistics in Table 2, on rating score of ethnocentrism scale provides that the observed mean score (M=40.27) is quite lower than the expected average (60). Note that even the highest 75th percentile score (49.00) is lower than the expected average (60). These figures suggest that the university students involved in this study has labelled at lower status of ethnocentrism. In another words, they do not exhibit a tendency of ethnocentric attitude and behaviour.

Likewise, the observed mean score (M=84.43) on interethnic conflict handling ability scale is far above the expected average (66). It is evident that even the lowest 25th percentile score (73.00) is higher than the expected average (66), not to mention of the 50th and 75th percentile scores. From these analyses it is possible to label university students involved in this study at higher status of interethnic conflict handling ability. This may bear out that university students who took part...
in this study are capable of handling interethnic conflicts during their interethnic interactions in campus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>( \chi^2 ) (Pairwise Comparisons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( \chi^2 )</td>
<td>(I) Level (J) Level df ( \chi^2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>Lower (12-24)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>253.70*</td>
<td>Lower Middle 1 218.83*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle (25-47)</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher (48-60)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>771</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural Sensitivity</td>
<td>Lower (14-28)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>451.10*</td>
<td>Lower Middle 1 241.43*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle (29-55)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher (56-70)</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>771</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism</td>
<td>Lower (20-40)</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>401.14*</td>
<td>Lower Middle 1 18.46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle (41-79)</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>41.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher (80-100)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>771</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interethnic Conflict</td>
<td>Lower (22-44)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>401.06*</td>
<td>Lower Middle 1 286.81*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle (45-87)</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>40.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher (88-110)</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>58.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>771</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore to verify the above information, in other words based on the total rating scores exhibited on multigroup ethnic identity measure, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict scales, it is possible to label the ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability status of participants of the study into higher, middle and lower level.

Taking into account the above descriptions, as shown in Table 3 above, on ethnic identity
construct, significant number of the respondents \( (\chi^2 = 253.704, p < 0.05) \), more than half (59.3 \%) were categorized under the middle level of ethnic identity (ethnic identity search or exploration). On other hand, we can still observe that significant number of participants of the study 63.7\% \( (\chi^2 = 451.105, p < 0.05) \) and 58.7 \% \( (\chi^2 = 401.658, p < 0.05) \) were labelled at higher level of intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability respectively. However, as shown in Table 3, a significantly higher number of participants of the study 57.5\% \( (\chi^2 = 401.144, p < 0.05) \) were categorized under lower level of ethnocentrism.

Thus, all the above descriptions may give clues that the ethnic identity status of the participants’ of this study has tended to be to ethnic identity search or exploration. Similarly, from the findings it is said that university students who participated in the study are sensitive to others culture or sensitive to each other’s, less ethnocentric and capable of handling interethnic conflict. This attests that the respondents are not in a position to show a tendency of ethnocentric attitude and behaviour. This finding is inconsistent with the findings of Demewoz that conducted in Addis Ababa University and Dilla College of Teachers Education and Health Sciences of Debub University among four major ethnic groups of students (Amhara, Oromo, Tigre, and Guragie) reported that all the ethnic group students were ethnocentric (Demewoz, 1997; 2001).

In order to triangulate the data acquired through different measuring scales, a scenario which has demonstrated a story of five public university students formulated and forwarded to the respondents to see their reaction to the narration. Subsequently, 10 questions have been presented based on the scenario. The scenario and questions are designated to assess the ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, multiculturalism, ethnocentric attitude and behaviour and interethnic conflict situation of the participants see Table 4. The respondents have been instructed to carefully read the story and then to reflect their first impression to the story as follows:

Students named Gemachu, Azimeraw, Ledebo, Hagos and Abdinasir were selected from Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, Tigray and Somali Regional States respectively. They were assigned and attended their undergraduate study in Addis Ababa University, Department of Psychology. All of them were second year students and shared the same dormitory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Statements/questions</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Do you believe that all the five students should be assigned to the same university regardless of their ethnic differences?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>771</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do you think that all the five students to be assigned in the same dormitory regardless of their ethnic differences?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>771</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Do you believe that the above mentioned students have common interest to do their group work if they are assigned in the same group owing to their ethnic differences?</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>218.83*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>771</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Participants Response to Questions Prepared Based on the Scenario
Overall, based on the reaction of the students on the story concerning the five university students nominated from different regions and ethnic groups, it is possible to say that the respondents in the present study have accepted and believed in the mixture of students from different regional states and ethnic backgrounds to be assigned in the same university and dormitory. A significant number of respondents have reported that university students would have interest to work together in their group work regardless of their ethnic differences. The result has also provided that the respondents have mixed feelings on whether conflicts might emerge due to sharing the same dormitory and watching different TV programs among the students owing to their ethnic differences. Similarly, the majority of the respondents have affirmed that students could freely discuss issues concerning their ethnicity, culture and local affairs and even would engage in romantic relations breaking their ethnic and regional ‘divide’. Furthermore, the results
have revealed that the majority of the students have accepted diversity and living together compromising their ethnic and cultural differences.

Thus, from the above findings it can be said that university students who participated in the study are sensitive to other students from diverse background, accepting diversity, less ethnocentric and conscious about interethnic conflicts.

Adding to the above, to verify data obtained from student questionnaire, interviews were conducted with few management and administrative staff members who have been closely working with student affairs in Adama Science and Technology, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa Science and Technology and Madawalabu universities. The majority of the informants who participated in the interview have stated that they have not observed a pronounced ethnocentric attitude, interethnic conflicts and division among students along ethnic line in the universities. Similarly, they have asserted that conflicts are natural and inevitable. However, an interviewee of Adama Science and Technology University stated that occasional conflicts do occur in some parts (ethnic groups) of university students especially between the main ethnic groups i.e. the Oromo, Amhara and Tigré, ranging from exchanging of words and insults to serious incidents that can escalate to certain conditions, like physical attack lead to serious injury and attempt to killing of other groups (Campus Police).

Despite the fact that the majority of the interviewees took the conflicts that had happened in their respective universities as trifling, personal and more on political grounds. As stated by interviewees the majority of these trivial conflicts stem from poor handling and management of the universities.

Furthermore an informant from Adama Science and Technology University accentuated that some sections of the elites, educated part of the society and political activists are the root cause for aggravating and propagating the issues and accelerate it to big conflicts and fights. Informants from Madawalabu University also revealed that “some political groups irresponsibly use the incidents (conflicts) to gain their political profit (consumption) with the scarification of university students”.

The Ethiopian government also on a document prepared to train university students and staff clearly recognized that ethnocentrism (negative), narrow-mindedness (ጠባብነት) and chauvinism (ትምክህት) are prevalent problems. However, the problems are only for few segment of the population, the majority of the population is deemed as innocent, interculturally sensitive to each others, tolerant and accepting multiculturalism with respects to diversity of ethnic groups, religions and social classes (FDRE, 2014). In different way an interviewee from Addis Ababa University underscored that:

The immediate causes of such conflicts vary from a simple personal disagreement between students who just happen to belong to different ethnic group that would then be translated into a full-blown inter-ethnic conflict to the ones instigated by organized attacks of certain ethnic group. The organized attacks are mostly orchestrated by particular members of ethnic group or political agents, who disguise themselves as representative of the suppressed ethnic group. In some instances they have gone as far as killing a student of certain ethnic group for the sake of instigating violence against the others (Campus Police).
Overall, the lesson learned from data obtained from student questionnaire and interviews, suggests that fairly healthy relationship and tolerance, acceptance of ethnic diversity, intercultural sensitivity and improved interethnic conflict management ability have been observed among the university students. Consistent to this study, an earlier local study on students in the former Beede Mariam School and Hailesellasi I University (Ziegler, 1972), has found that those subjects had not been ethnocentric in the strictest sense of the term. This is attributable to the then aspiration of unity among students had been strong, Habtamu, Hallahmi & Abbink (2001) also investigated that good and positive relationship has been exhibited among various ethnic groups’ young adult college and high school students in Ethiopia. These findings are incongruent with the reports (Abera Hailemariam, 2010; Abera Teferi, 2010; Asefa, 2009, Demewoz, 2001; 1997) that university students in Ethiopia exhibited more negative intergroup attitude, misunderstanding among ethnic groups, greater desire to avoid interethnic interactions, suspicious to each others and more ethnocentric.

**Relationship between ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability scores**

The other central question raised in the study was whether university students’ ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, ethnocentrism and interethnic conflict handling ability scores are correlated or not. To measure the strengths of these relationships between the variables, Bivariate Pearson Correlations have been computed. The following table summarizes the correlation matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Y1</th>
<th>Y2</th>
<th>Y3</th>
<th>Y4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity (Y1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural Sensitivity (Y2)</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnocentrism (Y3)</td>
<td>.280**</td>
<td>-.580**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic Conflict (Y4)</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.198**</td>
<td>-.283**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*

As clearly portrayed in Table 5 above, Bivariate Pearson Correlations reveals that ethnic identity score is positively correlated with ethnocentrism score ($r=.280$, $n=771$, $P <0.01$) but not with intercultural sensitivity ($r=-.058$, $n=771$, $P >0.05$) and interethnic conflict handling ability scores ($r=.049$, $n=771$, $P >0.05$).

Thus, ethnic identity measure is differently associated with different measures for university students. Ethnic identity is positively correlated with ethnocentrism whereas not with intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability scores. Under normal circumstance, it is assumed that higher ethnic identity is positively correlated with intercultural sensitivity and interethnic handling ability, but negatively correlated with ethnocentrism (Phinney, 1992). However, in this study ethnic identity is positively correlated with ethnocentrism whereas not correlated with intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability scores. These results are inconsistent with the conceptualization of Phinney (1992) in which a positive sense of ethnic group membership is often expected among individuals who have an achieved ethnic identity and is highly correlated with improved intercultural sensitivity and means of coping to interethnic conflict during inter-group interactions and negatively correlated with ethnocentrism. Despite the fact that in this study, as indicated in above section, the participants were not labelled at the status of achieved ethnic identity rather they categorized in stage of searching or exploring.
their ethnic identity, which involves the active search for their ethnic identity. During this stage, some individuals may develop identity. Nevertheless, they may purposely reject customs, traditions and cultures of the dominant groups and even engaged in intergroup conflicts (Franzoi, 2000). However, the findings of this study are different from the above assertions in that, even if the ethnic identity status of the participants is at searching or exploring ethnic identity, they were not labelled as ethnocentric, conflictual and less interculturally sensitive. Similarly the finding is incongruent with the conceptualization of the social identity theory which articulates that the more individuals strongly identify with their groups, the more bias they demonstrate in favor of their groups at the expense of out-groups or heighten ethnocentrism, intergroup competition and conflict (Hogg & Ridgeway, 2003; Negy et al., 2003). Thus from the findings of the current study it is possible to articulate that the Phinney’s three-stage ethnic identity and social identity theories were not fully supported by the study population. Furthermore, the improved intercultural sensitivity, ability of handling interethnic conflicts and lower ethnocentrism might be due to medium level (searching/exploration) of ethnic identity.

**Prediction of ethnocentrism score from the scores of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability**

Furthermore, to forward one step correlation coefficients and to attest whether scores of ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability predicts ethnocentrism score among university students, simultaneous multiple linear regression has been performed. For this particular section variable, ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity, and interethnic conflict handling ability have been used as independent variables, whilst ethnocentrism has served as dependent variable. Before conducting simultaneous multiple linear regressions, preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homosedasticity. In simultaneous multiple linear regressions approach the predictor variables enters into the model in a simultaneous manner, because the lack of previous empirical research does not elucidate a potential order in which the variables should be entered (Field, 2005). The significant results obtained were presented in Table 6 and described as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnocentrism (Dependent Variable)</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std.Error</th>
<th>Beta (Standardized)</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>90.834</td>
<td>3.150</td>
<td>28.839</td>
<td>9486</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>9.486</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercultural Sensitivity</td>
<td>-.803</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>-.527</td>
<td>-18.933</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic Conflict</td>
<td>-.176</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>-6.886</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: R² = .432; F (3,767) = 194.62, *p<.05; **p<.01, n=771

The combination of the independent variables significantly predict ethnocentrism, F (3,767) = 194.62, p < .01, with all three variables significantly contributing to the prediction. The beta
weights presented in Table 6 suggest that intercultural sensitivity ($\beta = -.527, P<.01$) contributes the most to predicting ethnocentrism, followed by ethnic identity ($\beta = .259, P<.01$), and interethnic conflict handling ability ($\beta = -.192, P<.01$). The R squared value was .43. This indicates that 43% of the variance in ethnocentrism is explained by the model. According to Cohen (1977), this is a large effect. If these results are taken as evidence of causal effects, then, intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability make unique contributions to the reduction of ethnocentrism while ethnic identity reason to the rise of ethnocentrism. As a number of studies have shown, ethnocentrism has the potential to lead to negative stereotypes, negative prejudice, and negative behaviours against other ethnic group members (Justen, 2009). Therefore, it is possible for the researcher to look significant contributing factors to the reduction of ethnocentrism. Currently, there are very few empirical studies in this area examining which specific factors help to reduce ethnocentrism.

The findings of this study partly coincide with the argument of authors (like Chen, 2010; Dong, Day & Collaco, 2008) that higher levels of intercultural sensitivity and multiculturalism may lead to reduced ethnocentrism. Similarly, the finding is deemed analogous to the conceptualization of the social identity theory which states that individuals with higher ethnic identity, the more bias they demonstrate in favors of their groups at the expense of out-groups or heightens ethnocentrism (Hogg & Ridgeway, 2003). Likewise, in this study, the improved intercultural sensitivity, ability of handling interethnic conflicts and lower ethnocentrism among the participants of the study might be associated to the medium level (searching/exploration) of ethnic identity.

**Mechanisms of reducing ethnocentrism and interethnic conflicts**

From the above findings, even though there are no serious ethnocentric attitudes and interethnic conflicts observed among university students in the study settings, in order to prevent an incident before it happens, a variety of schemes have been employed by the universities and other concerned bodies. The participants of the interviews have mentioned the following devices applied by their respective universities to minimize the episodes. Among the interventions they have said:

1. Diversifying or mixing students’ composition in dormitories across ethnic groups and regional background. It is natural that when students residing together in one dormitory, exchanging many things such as their language, culture, customs, possessions etc... may occur.
2. The other intervention made by the universities as demonstrated by almost all the respondents are recurrent trainings on religious, ethnic and cultural diversity and tolerance by experts from the universities, Zonal or City administrations, Ministry of Federal Affairs and Ministry of Education.
3. Furthermore in order to secure peace and security in Madawalabu University “Peace Committee” comprised of different organs mainly from students has been established and brought a significant change on tolerance and acceptance of diversity.
4. In addition to promoting multiculturalism certain cultural events such as Cultural Days, Inter-Universities Sport Festivals, celebration of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Days have been arranged by different concerned bodies and particular ethnic groups. This inturn brought considerable changes on the relation among university students.
5. Similarly “Day of Tolerance, Diversity and Multiculturalism” have been celebrated in some universities to minimize interethnic conflicts and ethnocentrism and enhance intercultural sensitivity among students.
6. Six of the participants from three universities declared that sometimes they apply the
traditional reconciliation procedures “Shimgilina” (traditional court system) to settle intergroup conflicts.

7. In Addis Ababa Science and Technology University “Student Policing” have been used to avoid immediate conflicts emerged between students.

8. An interviewee from Madawalabu University added that the current one-to-five grouping also often contribute to reduce interethnic conflicts and enhancing intercultural sensitivity and cooperation among different ethnic and cultural background students.

**Recommendations forwarded by interviewees to reduce ethnocentrism and sustaining peace in university**

A lot of suggestions and recommendations have been forwarded by the interviewees to reduce ethnocentrism, wipe out interethnic conflicts and sustain peace in universities. The suggestions can be summarized as follows:

1. The university community should be mindful of the diversity, understand the existence of others (ethnic groups, religions, cultures etc...), develop open mindedness, acceptance and respect, sensitivity to others and appreciate diversity. Shortly, the students (university community) should believe in “Unity within Diversity”.

2. Accordingly, they propose that the Ministry of Education and universities should take initiative to design and teach courses like Multiculturalism (Diversity) and Cross-cultural Psychology that familiarizes students with how to maintain unity within diversity from lower grades to higher.

3. Absence of violent conflict does not necessarily warrant the presence of peace. Hence, the university leaderships and other staff members in order to effectively avoid interethnic conflicts they should provide immediate response for any students’ request before blowing up to huge conflict which may lead to death of individuals and damage of resources.

4. Universities should arrange to strengthen cultural events such as Days of Tolerance, Diversity and Multiculturalism, Cultural Days, Inter-University Sport Festivals, and celebrations of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Days.

5. By mobilizing instructors who come from different ethnic backgrounds and who have the relevant knowledge, experience, ethics, and reputation among students, the universities management should create a forum and experience sharing where students cultivate the culture of dialogue, tolerance, mutual respect and non-violent way of solving differences.

6. The Ministry of Education and universities management should plan and facilitate persistent training for university students, staffs (both the academic and administrative staffs), parents and the larger community on diversity (multiculturalism), tolerance, impact of negative ethnocentrism and interethnic and religious based conflicts.

**Conclusions**

The findings of the study show that the ethnic identity status of the participants’ of this study has tended to be to ethnic identity search or exploration. Individuals who are in this midst stage of ethnic identity are usually motivated to explore their ethnicity due to a growing awareness that not all values of the dominant group are beneficial to their and other ethnic group members. Similarly from the findings it is said that university students who participated in the study are sensitive to others culture or sensitive to each others, less ethnocentric and capable of handling interethnic conflicts during their interaction. Ethnic identity score is positively correlated with ethnocentrism scores but not with intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability scores. Furthermore, the study underscores that ethnic identity, intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability made contributions to the rise and reduction of ethnocentrism.
Implications
The implications of each of the findings in this study have relevance to the field of psychology and university administration. These implications are germane in theory, research, and practical work.

Practical Implications

Based on the major findings and the conclusions drawn, the following practical implications, suggestions and recommendations are implied to be taken into account by line stakeholders:

- The evidence provided herein this study healthier feelings, attitudes and behaviours such as higher intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability and lesser ethnocentric attitude and behaviour. Thus university administrators, counseling psychologists and others should exert in their efforts to promote and sustain intercultural sensitivity and interethnic conflict handling ability among university students.

- Similarly, in this study the emerging young adult university students’ ethnic identity development is searching or exploring ethnic identity. Consequently it has to be improved from searching ethnic identity to achieved ethnic identity. Hence peers, parents, counseling psychologists, elders, university staffs and management and other concerned bodies should encourage and help to construct their ethnic identity to the achieved status.

- As the findings presented based on scenario, provides that several respondents have mixed feelings on the concern of whether the students can watch different TV programs without conflict regardless of their ethnic and language differences. Many respondents presuppose that TV programs transmitted in different local languages in TV rooms may cause for conflict. Thus, university management should consider language diversities and students interest and arrange TVs in different angles of the campus halls or dormitories to satisfy the need of students.

- This study is hoped to provide baseline information about the existing problems, and a paramount importance to curriculum development of Multiculturalism or Cross-Cultural Psychology courses and diversity training programs.

- The findings of this study would help policy makers, university administrators and others in their efforts to bring about mutual understanding and more positive relationships among various ethnic group university students in Ethiopia and makes the country model of diversity, equality
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Federalism and Peace in Ethiopia: Current Achievements and Challenges

Temesgen Thomas Halabo

Abstract

Based on literature review, this paper explores whether the Ethiopian federal system is achieving the promised goal of accommodating ethnic diversity and building sustainable peace, and the challenges the system is facing. After the fall of the Derg, Ethiopia adopted a federal system as a panacea for accommodating diversity and conflict management, and for creating an environment for building sustainable peace. Looking back on two decades of Ethiopia’s federal experiment, the remarkable achievements is that it helped to provide peace and security for the great majority of its population and laid down the legal foundation for building democracy in the country. The study further reveals that the federal system is not a panacea for all conflicts as conflict and federalism have an interlocked relation. New conflicts have emerged after adopting a federal system. The federal system has basically only decentralized conflicts away from challenging the center. The federation’s biggest challenge for building sustainable peace is therefore its heavy reliance on ethno–national groups’ political rights that has led, in practice, to lessened attention to minority rights protection in the regional states and an inclusive and sustainable pan–national identity; border conflicts; ethnic based autonomy and identity conflicts and soon. This study therefore suggests that federalism in itself is not enough to build sustainable peace and reduce ethnic–based conflict, but it needs to be reinforced by other factors.

1. Introduction

In stark contrast to strong unitary state in the past, the 1995 constitution established a federal state structure. In the endeavor to reconstruct the Ethiopian state as a multi–national political entity, federal system and ethnicity were taken seriously by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime (Asnake, 2013; Berhanu, 2007). The birth of federal system is a response to the historical trajectory of building a nation–state through ethnic assimilation that gave rise to the ‘Nationality Question’ or ethno–linguistic inequality as the politico–ideological agenda and the emergence of Marxism–Leninism as the dominant ideology of the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) against the imperial regime since the end of 1960s (Aalen, 2006; Hagmann & Abbink, 2011). The federal system along with the granting of the right to self–determination up to and including secession to all ethno-linguistic groups was therefore adopted as effective and appropriate response to a longstanding ‘Nationality Question’, which was for long articulated by the ESM and ethno–national armed conflicts in the country (Tsegaye, 2010; Vaughan, 2003;).

The federal system has given maximum importance to the ethnic groups [termed as Nations Nationalities and Peoples (NNPs)] in the constitution. In the constitution, ethnic groups are conceptualized as holders of sovereign power of the state and are entitled to full self–determination.

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2 The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) was first organized by the students of the then Haile Selassie I University (now Addis Ababa University) in early 1960s and later spread to the colleges and secondary schools in the country as protest against the exploitative feudal system of the imperial regime. After the mid-1960s, the movement was transformed into a radical phase with emerging Nationality Question. Inspired by Marxist–Leninist philosophy of National Oppression thesis and the solution provided for this – the right to self–determination of nations and nationalities including secession – the ESM politicized ethnicity and brought it to the public forum for the first time. The ESM played a central role in Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 (Asebe, 2007; Vaughan, 2003).
3 The meaning and the distinction between ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ and ‘people’ is not explicated in the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) constitution. For the purpose of this study I took the three categories as ethnic group.
up to and including secession (Art. 39/1). The component units that constitute the Ethiopian federation are nine. They are the regional state of: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Hareri, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNPRS).

Ethnicity is the key factor in establishing the regions, and sub-regional units in the multi-ethnic regions. Regional states are given a broader symmetrical political autonomy. However, the interesting point about the federal constituent units is asymmetry in practice in terms of ethnic composition, territorial and population size. The level of ethnic heterogeneity differs from one state to the other. With 56 officially recognized ethno-linguistic groups, the SNNPRS stands as the most ethnically diverse regional state in Ethiopia. The regional states also exhibit wide variations in terms of territorial size ranging from the largest Oromia state, both in territorial and population terms, to a tiny city-state of Harer region. Such an asymmetry could have the potential to destabilize the federation.

Although some scholars challenge the use of ethnic-based federal system in managing ethnic diversity and ethnic based conflicts, both the federal studies and the empirical track record of federations point to federalism’s ability to manage ethnic diversity and preserve peace. As this study focuses on the achievements and challenges of ethnic-based federal system, it is important to highlight the existing competing perspectives on the achievements of the federal system in Ethiopia. While one perspective defends the federal system as a way towards democratization and development by managing ethnic diversity and ethnic conflicts (Alemseged, 2004; Fasil, 1997; Mengisteab, 1997; Salih & Markakis, 1998), the other perspective contends that ethnic-based federalism is exacerbating localized inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in the country (Aalen, 2006; Asnake, 2004; Abbink, 1997; 2009; Berhanu, 2007).

For the purpose of this paper, I will emphasize the first perspective with passing remarks on the second. The second perspective further emphasized that the federal system is divisive due to granting the rights to self-determination up to and including secession. This perspective emphasizes the fear of fragmentation by justifying its position using the experience of collapsed ethno-federal arrangements in the former USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. As counter reaction to this position, advocates of ethnic federalism emphasized that the collapse of communist federations were not an outcome of the system’s being a genuine federal system but was rather a result of too little or insufficient implementation of federal principles. The existence of all-powerful socialist party prevented the federal sub-units from being democratically represented at federal level and performing a real form of self-government in their respective units (Alemante, 2003: 88; Stepan, 2005: 257-8). To show the feasibility of ethnic federalism, the advocates’ present successful experience of ethnic federation in India, Canada and Switzerland that continue to work well. The critics further claim that ethnic federalism has neither realized its own raison d’état nor emerged as a credible instrument of pacifying ethnic conflicts. However, this second perspective is not convincing when applied to the analysis of the federal system’s achievements and challenges in maintaining peace in Ethiopia.

Although the institutional approaches to accommodate ethnic diversity are multiple, for the purpose of this study, I have emphasized on federalism, which is often cited as one of the major institutional approaches for managing ethnic diversity (Horowitz, 1985; Young, 1998).

Federalism provides shared rule and self-rule for constituent units, which might be ethnically based like the Ethiopian case, with constitutionally guaranteed rights to autonomy and sovereignty over their own territories and representation of these self-ruling units in the shared central governments (Elazar, 1987; King, 1982). The theoretical debate on the use of federalism in managing ethnic diversity is polarized between those who argue that federal sub-divisions would lead to further integration of the sub-national groups (Horowitz, 1991; Kymlicka, 2006) and those
who claim that it would reinforce both the desire and capacity for groups to separate from the state (Feardon and Laitin, 1996). When a federal system is ethnically designated like the Ethiopian system, constituent units are ethnically designed to make ethnic groups to control their own areas and feel sense of security and able to promote identity (Kymlicka, 2006). However, some, like Aalen (2008), argue that ethnic based federal system will further exacerbate the chance of conflicts and disintegration by promoting ethnic nationalism.

As one institutional approach to managing diversity, federal system faces problem when meeting with practical challenges of managing ethnic diversity. It is because of this that key proponents of federal system have underlined the importance of contextual factors in determining the success of the institutional arrangement in managing ethnic diversity and mitigating conflicts. In other words, a federal system as institutional approach is not a ready-made solution and quick fix to complex political circumstances as it is only one of many impetuses to ethnic relation and may or may not have straight forward relationship between institutional design and exacerbation/decline of ethnic conflicts. In line with this, this study is based on the following assumptions: 1) the introduction of a federal system in Ethiopia is by no means a quick fix to manage diversity and conflicts; 2) it does not fully explain the exacerbation of localized ethnic-based conflicts; and 3) it is not the sole factor increasing likelihood of state disintegration. Therefore, the Ethiopian case underlines the need for a contextually sensitive and empirical approach to the analysis of the achievements and challenges of the federal system in accommodating ethnic diversity and building sustainable peace.

Ethiopia has gone the furthest in promoting expression of ethnic diversity than any other African country. By instituting a unique political system in Africa, Ethiopia takes a special place in the context of contemporary African politics (Aalen, 2006; Hagmann & Abbink, 2011). When we look back on two decades of federal experiment in Ethiopia, the key question that arises is whether the federal system has created a conducive environment to build sustainable peace or it has been encountering challenges that exacerbate ethnic based conflicts in Ethiopia. Using federalism as an institutional approach, the study is based on the view that ethnic based federal system in Ethiopia has successfully responded to ethnic based conflicts that beleaguered the state before 1991, but it has created conflicts of its own types.

In light of this, this paper addresses the following two key research questions. What are the socio-economic and political achievements of federal system that would help to build sustainable peace in Ethiopia? What are the institutional and contextual challenges that the federal system has been encountering in transforming the state in terms of democracy and building sustainable peace in Ethiopia? To realize the stated research questions, the study has used secondary sources and document analysis.

The remaining of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section provides background to adopting ethnic-based federal system in Ethiopia as briefly as possible. The second section of the paper focuses on the major achievements and their implications for peace building. The third section is devoted to presenting the institutional and contextual challenges that the federal system has been encountering in an effort to maintain peace. The last section concludes by showing that federal system should be reinforced by political and other contextual factors to effectively manage diversity and to ensure sustainability of the existing relative peace in the country.

**Brief backgrounds of the federal system in Ethiopia**

Any attempt to understand the rationale for adopting the federal system and politicized ethnicity would be incomplete if it is seen separately from the historical trajectories that shaped the modern Ethiopian state since the late 19th century. Accordingly, I briefly explore the historical process
that led to the creation of modern Ethiopian state and the outcome of these processes in terms of ethnicity, thereby highlighting the historical factors for adopting ethnic federal system and formalizing identity politics in the current Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is an ancient state with a three millennia history of statehood (Bahru, 2002). However, it took its modern shape in the first decade of 20th century. During the Europeans’ scramble for Africa in the 1880s, the Abyssinian empire was also busy in an empire-building project launched by its architect, King Menelik of Shawa—later Emperor Menelik II, who assumed power after the death of Emperor Yohannes IV (1872–1889) (Bahru, 2002: 61; Mengisteab, 1997: 220). Through the conquest, the greater portion of the country’s current landmass was incorporated into the empire and gave its present geographical shape and cultural, linguistic and ethnic compositions by the beginning of the 20th century (Hameso, 2001: 74–75). The autonomous smaller states of south, south–west, and south–eastern Ethiopia were subdued by Emperor Menelik II as a result of unbalanced military power despite fierce resistance by some of these states (Vaughan, 2003: 106; Yishak, 2008: 5). The net effect of the process of state formation put various ethno–linguistic groups under the newly created state of Ethiopia which is now a multi–ethnic state where more than 80 ethnic groups live.

As Teshale Tibabu pointed out, the end of the territorial conquest was followed by the institutionalization of the northern feudal system of exploitation, conquest of lands and the imposition of the Amhara language, religion, and other forms of culture at the expense of the indigenous practices of subjugated peoples (1995: 44–45). The consequence of territorial conquest was far more brutal and devastating for the conquered peoples. The conquest had mostly brought into the emerging empire–state new lands and new people from the south on unequal terms. For the south, the outcome was a dual oppression, both national and class. The territorial conquest had created the north–south dichotomy: one polity but two markedly different systems (Merera, 2003: 62).

Like his predecessors, Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930–1974) continued a project of building “one nation out of many” via cultural homogenization through policies of assimilation, centralization and one language policy by adopting the first modern constitution in 1931 (Yishak, 2008: 5). John Markakis also emphasized that “it was easier for a non–Christian, who also did not speak Amharigna, to pass through the eye of a needle than to enter the charmed circle of power and privilege” (1994: 227). He further noted that understandably Amhara ruling elites’ perception of national identity was the “mirror image of their ethnic and cultural ego” (: 225).

Inequality based on ethnic affinity has been a part of the Ethiopian governance since the establishment of the modern state. The Ethiopian national identity was therefore intrinsically linked to the Amhara (Aalen, 2006: 246). Ethnic diversity had been totally denied recognition.

It was ethnically based historical injustices and inequality that had brought ‘Nationality Question’ as politico-ideological agenda, which finally led to the 1974 popular revolution⁴ spearheaded by the ESM and to the overthrowing of emperor Haile Selassie I from power (Temesgen, 2016: 4–7). Nonetheless, in the absence of organized political parties to assume power, the military took advantage of the political vacuum and controlled power (Merera, 2003). Notwithstanding the military regime’s attempts to constitutionally recognize ethnic diversity and reorganize the country’s internal administration after its establishment of People’s Democratic Republic of

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⁴ Since the early 1960s, the legitimacy of the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie I began to be questioned among the military and the educated elite. Earlier to this, a peasant protest in Tigray (the First Woyane movement) and Gojjam and the protest by the Bale Oromo/Somali Nationalists raised their head as a form of bottom up resistance but were suppressed. It is important to note that Haile Selassie I enjoyed the most peaceful season of Ethiopia’s history except for the short-lived Italian occupation from 1936–1941. This peace begun to be ‘disrupted’ by the sign of dissonance expressed first among the army, then among the students, and later among the general public (Tsegaye, 2010).
Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1987, it failed to create a new social and political basis for the country (Clapham, 1994: 34). The 1974 popular revolution was basically the result of the ESM which begun in 1960’s. Influenced by Marxist–Leninist ideology, students brought forward the issue of ‘Nationality Question’. In addition, the idea of the right of ‘Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (NNPs)’ to self-determination up to and including secession had also dominated the political agendas of the ESM (Vaughan, 2003). This political ideological agenda became a driving revolutionary force in the Student circles and the political movements which descended from the ESM.

The ESM itself was divided on the issue of ‘Nationality Question’. Some groups of students started to contend that the issue that needs to be addressed in the Ethiopian politics is the idea of class struggle, not the Nationality Question (Temesgen, 2016). This debate led to the birth of two contending political groups. The first was the Pan–Ethiopianist groups or class based movements, such as Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and All Ethiopian Socialist Movement, known popularly by its Amharic acronym as MEISON (Merera, 2003: 97-98). The second was mainly the ethno–national groups or ethnic based movements, such as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). These ethno–national based groups were organized on the ideological foundation of Marxist–Leninist principle of the ‘right to self-determination up to and including secession’ as a driving revolutionary force. Their politico-ideological agenda was based on the claim that the Ethiopian state is an exclusionist one and the oppressed and marginalized groups need to have the right to self-determination to the extent of secession. Moreover, the EPLF and OLF emphasized that the Ethiopian state had ‘colonized’ various ethnic groups and hence, Ethiopia, just like any western colonial empire, needs to undergo decolonization (Alem, 2003: 9).

Ethnicity became the organizing principle of the political movements. Accordingly, the EPLF and OLF opted for complete independence, consecutively of Eritrea and Oromia from Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the TPLF oscillated in their agenda between complete independence from Ethiopia and its self-determination within the greater Ethiopian context (Asebe, 2007: 31; Markakis, 1987: 254). The most protracted and Africa’s longest intra-state civil wars (a 30 years’ war by the EPLF) ended in 1991 by the secession of Eritrea and the control of state power by ethno-nationalist forces led by TPLF/EPRDF forces after hard-won victory over the military regime.

Accordingly, at the end of the Cold War, one of the continent’s brutal dictators, Colonel Mengistu was removed from power in 1991 (Merera, 2004). In 1995, the EPRDF adopted a new constitution that brought a fundamental transformation in Ethiopia’s politics. The EPRDF adopted ethnic federal model, along with the right to self-determination, as a panacea to ethnic inequality and the challenges of ethno-national armed conflicts that beleaguered the old Ethiopian state (Assefa, 2012; Tsegaye, 2010). Although the ethnic-based federal system helped to remove and minimize devastating ethno-nationalist armed struggle from the national scene after 1990s, it has created its own types of localized ethnic-based conflicts in Ethiopia. With this in mind, let us proceed to the discussion on the achievements and challenges of federalism in building peace in Ethiopia.

The achievements of federal system in maintaining peace in Ethiopia
As it has been discussed earlier on, the introduction of federal system in Ethiopia followed the failure of ‘nation building’ projects of the previous regimes. Federal system was expected to provide a democratic and legitimate basis for the Ethiopian state (Keller, 2004: 38). In this regard, the goals of federal restructuring in Ethiopia could be summarized into two: first, to provide self-determination rights to the ethnic groups of the country as a response to ‘Nationality Question’

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5 There are three major theses on Ethiopia’s historiography, namely the colonial thesis, the national oppression thesis, the nation-building or the national (re)unification thesis the unleashing of which partly contributed to the affairs of competing nationalism in contemporary Ethiopia (Merera, 2003).
and ethnic inequalities and; second, to end prolonged ethnic conflicts and building sustainable peace in the country. To this end, when we look back on two decades long federal experimentation, the key question that arises is to what extent these key twin goals came to fruition? What are the key political transformations and key achievements that have taken place and what have they meant for both state and citizens? Analysis of achievements of federalism in realizing peace in Ethiopia has to be evaluated with these two twin goals and associated questions in mind.

Some of the achievements of federal system in Ethiopia could be examined from selected angles. Firstly, the federal system attempts to balance the interest of maintaining national unity, on the one hand, and the ethno–linguistic groups’ demand for cultural preservation and distinctiveness, on the other. Despite some contextual and practical challenges, the ethnic federal system has responded to ethnic inequality and marginalization by constitutionally granting the rights to self-determination. In the area of language, culture, development of history and local self- government, the Ethiopian federal system has played a positive role. The ethnic groups have largely welcomed the right to speak and write their own languages and use them in local administration, as well as appoint local government officials from their own ethnic groups (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011: 583). Theoretically, the preservation and development of ethnic groups’ history, use of cultures and languages could also contribute to the pacification of inter- ethnic relationships (Smith, 1995: 19). The recognition of cultural and linguistic autonomy has been positively contributing in paving the way for building a new democratic basis and sustainable peace for the country as a multi-ethnic country.

Secondly, with a view to addressing the age-old cause of the state crisis, the federal system has decentralized power and resources by accommodating the country’s various ethno-linguistic groups in public institutions (Assefa, 2012: 446). As an institutional approach to calming down or taming ethno-nationalist forces through recognition and empowerment at federal and sub- state levels, Ethiopian federal system has played a positive role as it has opened up a political space for the ethno-nationalist forces. The federal system has enhanced the political participation of the Ethiopian population and many hitherto marginalized minority groups were given representation at federal and regional levels.

Thirdly, the Ethiopian federation preserved unity, brought about relative peace, established temporary truce, attempted to guarantee ethno-national equality, and partially dispensed ethno-cultural justice (Tsegaye, 2010: 57). It is a truism to say that Ethiopia is riddled with conflicts. Class conflicts and status conflicts had dominated the political terrain of the 20th century. Economic conflict and ethno-national conflicts were singled out as the politically most important conflicts in Ethiopia’s political history (ibid). The restructuring of Ethiopia as an ethnic federation has contributed to provide peace and security for the great majority of its population and laid down, for the first time in the history of Ethiopia, the legal foundation for a fully- fledged democracy (Turton, 2006).

As a key institutional approach to managing ethnic diversity, federalism helps to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts by proliferation of the points of power so as to take the heat off of a single focal point (Horowitz, 1985: 598-9). Seen from this perspective, the federal system has responded to ethno-national conflicts that pre-dominated the political terrain of the 20th century and the associated ethnic quest for ethno-cultural justice. It reduced national ailments of ethnic conflicts and transformed and generated localized ethnic conflicts. The federal system has diffused conflicts out into local arenas, making them less a threat to the centre. In recent years, ethnic armed conflict has declined in the country. Thus, one can say that it helped pacify ‘the big house’ (Tsegaye, 2010). Fourthly, due to prevailing peace and security in the country, the federation’s ability to deliver services, such as access to education, health and infrastructure, such as roads, telephone, electricity dams, is promising as well. It is this factor that contributes to maintain the peripheral regional states’ high stake in the system. The networks of economic infrastructure and age-old
cross-cutting bonds are hoped to cement unity among the several groups (Assefa, 2012: 463). Overall, since the introduction of the federal system, there has been an improvement in access to education, health and infrastructure. These developments are important preconditions to building one economic community (ibid.: 450). The federal system helped achieve remarkable economic growth in the last one decade. This economic development by its own significantly contributes to mitigating conflicts and helping build sustainable peace in the country.

The challenges of the federal system
The Ethiopian federal system is facing some critical challenges. So far, the federal system has been preoccupied in addressing the ‘Nationality Question’. As a result, it has not responded well to the newly emerging issues. Failure to respond to these issues adequately and timely may lead to severe problems that may be difficult to address at a later stage. There are emerging tensions and conflicts related to border demarcation, inter-group rivalry, minorities within the regional states and claims for creating new regional states or other forms of local governments. Another critical challenge that the federal system has been facing is the transition to democracy and political pluralism. Beyond this general proposition, let us discuss each of these challenges and their implications for maintaining peace in Ethiopia.

Challenges of democracy and peace
Although Will Kymlicka cannot see any other formula for the successful accommodation of ethno-national diversity, he is pessimistic about the future of the multi-national federalism in Africa and in Ethiopia due to the general absence of two pre-conditions: the de-securitization of ethnic relation and lack of liberal democratic values (2006: 52). The absence of these conditions in Africa means that democratic multi-national federalism is more likely to emerge there from the barrel of a gun than it from democratic politics (Turton, 2006: 6). In the West, the state has responded to sub-national claims after the challenges of state building and democratization have been solved, while in Africa, the state is facing claims from sub-national groups concurrently with state building and democratization (Aalen, 2008). As a result, the same institutional arrangements of federalism will have diametrically opposite effects in these two contexts.

Almost all of those federations that have been reasonably successful are due to functional democratic system and rule of law. In contrast, almost all of the collapsed communist federations operated under authoritarian systems. As noted by Seroka (1994), the lack of rule of law was one of the key factors that contributed to the collapse of federations in the former Eastern Bloc (cited in Asnake, 2009: 50). This is evident for the fact that it is the contextual factors but not necessarily the nature of federalism that led to success or failure of federations. Seen from this perspective, the Ethiopian ethnic federation does not have a good record regarding contextual factors, such as democracy, rule of law and political pluralism, which are essential for the success of federation (Aalen, 2008: 25; Asnake, 2009: 268; Assefa, 2012: 452; Kymlicka, 2006: 52). After two decades of experimenting the federal system, the overall challenge facing Ethiopia is how to promote and strengthen democratic institutions, political pluralism, rule of law, avoid hegemonic control of power and centralized federal system and build a genuine multi-national federation with functional democratic system that are essential for its sustainability and success in building peace in a very fragile Horn of Africa.

It is difficult to sustain a federation for long unless it exhibits some elements of democracy. This has become a point that is no longer contested. When democracy is combined with federalism, it takes a peculiar form (Assefa, 2012). At its core, however, is that federalism and democracy combined create multiple center of decision-making and bring power closer to the people (Watts, 2008:155). The key question to ask here is how does the Ethiopian federation fare in this regard? In Ethiopia, a clearer picture of the federal system can be drawn if one looks at the operation of the party system, its links with democracy and its impact on the federal system. Many critics point to
the operation of the party system as the most obvious limitation to Ethiopia’s federalism (Abbink, 2009: 6; Asnake, 2009: 702-4; Clapham, 2009: 187). Though the federal system has granted broader political autonomy to the constituent units, power is centralized in practice due to centralized policy-making by a dominant ruling party (Aalen, 2006; Assefa, 2012). The implication is that the autonomy of the states is limited in practice, and the party structure overshadows the federal and regional government institutions.

In a democracy, power ultimately emanates from the people through free, fair and periodic elections. In Ethiopia, the party dictates institutions of democracy. By practicing ‘democratic centralism’, the practice of the ruling party contradicts with the constitutionally proclaimed principles of self-rule and state autonomy (Medhane & Young, 2003). In this regard, Hagmann & Abbink also emphasize, first and foremost, the permanence of top-down ideology-driven policy making, from the federal level to the regions, Zones, Woredas and Kebelles (2011: 584). This continuity is by and large the result of the Leninist political heritage of ‘democratic centralism’. Federal scholars further emphasized that once the ruling EPRDF party loses control of power; the fate of the federal system will be uncertain or will wither away with it (Clapham, 2009: 191). Indeed, in many federations that relied more on a centralized party system than on the ‘federal compact and federal institutions’, the withering away of the party has led to the withering away of the federation (Assefa, 2012: 459).

In Ethiopia, ‘democracy’ and ‘democratization’ have become promises of an almost spiritual nature that are constantly renewed, but never really fulfilled (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011: 591). The incomplete process of transition resulting from the disengagement of the opposition, shrinkage of the political space and the divergent perspectives with little political accommodation has made the transition to democracy more challenging and protracted (Assefa, 2012: 460). The party and state organs overlap through a vanguard party in Ethiopia (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011: 585). Given Ethiopia’s diversity, and complexity and its turbulent history within the Horn of Africa’s ever unpredictable political dynamics, it is thus neither useful nor possible to foretell the future of federalism and resultant peace in Ethiopia.

**Challenges of ethnic based border conflicts**

Ethnic based boundary making excludes many other essential concerns. There is long history of ethnic mobility, integration and inter-group relations in the country. The ethnic groups in Ethiopia had become interspersed for long years through diverse and long-standing patterns of settlement (Clapham, 2002; Vaughan, 2003). Accordingly, redrawing ethnic based boundaries between groups has been generating ethnic based boundary conflicts (Asnake, 2010; Tsegaye, 2010). The ethnic restructuring divides ethnic groups which formerly used to live together and share resources. In this regard, Asnake has noted that “the process of reconstitution of the country into an ethnic federation with the aim of matching ethno-linguistic identity with self-administrative structures brought to the politico-legal arena, the question of which group belongs to which wider ethnicity” (2010: 616).

The ethnic based federal re-structuring has created new stranded groups that are caught in between two or more regions or sub-regional units. The inclusion and exclusion of these stranded identity groups in the administrative units dominated and designated by dominant groups has serious implications to resource access, power and opportunity due to their subsumed status (Temesgen, 2011). This has been remarked as another cause for conflicts between regional states. When the disputed areas coincide with the boundaries between regional states, conflicts between

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6 These stranded ethnic groups include: Yem in SNNPRS and Oromia; the Majang in SNNPRS and Gambella; the Argoba in Afar and Amhara; the Guji Oromo in SNNPRS and Oromia; the Agaw in Benishangul Gumuz and Amhara; the Oromos in Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia; the Opo in Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz; the Oromos in Harari State and Oromia; the Afar, the Amhara, and the Oromo in Tigray (Tsegaye, 2010; Asnake, 2010).
ethnic groups have transformed to conflicts between regional states. This is apparent by prolonged boundary conflicts over the ownership of Babile, a town between Oromia and Somali regional states (Asnake, 2010). Other instances include violent inter-regional ethnic boundary conflicts, among others, between the Borana vs. Gerri in Oromia and Somali regional states; the Afar vs. Issa in the Afar and Somali regional states; the Guji vs. Gedeo in Oromia and SNNPRS; and Guji vs. Burji in Oromia and SNNPRS. All these ethnic conflicts resulted in human casualty, ethnic animosity, inter-regional dispute and destruction of property.

Some of these inter-regional ethnic border conflicts had however a long history that predated the federation. For instance, the traditional competitive nature of relationships between the pastoralist Gerri Somali and the Borana Oromo are getting new dimensions after the establishment of Somali and Oromia Regional states. Their traditional competition over land resources are being transformed into modern nation state type boundary conflicts between Oromia and Somali regional states (Asnake, 2004: 63). In the same vein, traditional pastoralist Afar and Somali clans’ competitions for resources are being transformed into inter-regional boundary conflicts after ethnic regionalization as Afar and Somali regional states. Moreover, the process of boundary making of the Benishangul–Gumuz region with its Amhara and Oromo neighbors impelled inter-ethnic and inter-regional conflicts (Berhanu, 2007). The Gedeo and the Guji did not have a history of protracted conflicts before 1990s. But the regional boundary making between SNNPRS and Oromoia has changed their inter-ethnic relations and engendered in violent conflicts (Asebe, 2007).

The ethnicization of state and territory is not the only underlying cause for boundary conflicts. Whether the underlying cause of boundary conflicts is one or the other depends a great deal on other factors. Ethnic based conflicts are often subjected to manipulation by domestic elites for their own political expediency (Assefa, 2007: 258). For instance, a longstanding peaceful co-existence between the Guji and Gedeo ethnic groups has changed into a protracted inter-ethnic conflict mainly due to local political elites vying for power (Asebe, 2012). Ethnic elites gain an advantage in using conflict for their own ends. As a result, they have strong interests in perpetuating some of the conflicts. This is particularly evident in the most prolonged inter-regional ethnic boundary conflicts between the Oromia and Somali Regional states (Asnake, 2010; Assefa, 2012). The boundary conflicts are often mainly based on the identity politics, and are also instigated by ethnic elites’ or group interests and greed.

Challenges of ethnic quest for distinct identity and political autonomy

As much as a federal system solves conflicts, it might generate ‘new’ conflicts that are peculiar to its type. The heavy reliance of the Ethiopian federation on ethnicity for state re-structuring, entitlement and representation could often increase the ethnic desire for more autonomy and resources. This is evident in that the federal system has born ‘new’ decentralized conflicts7, mainly related with ethnic quest for political autonomy and group demands for distinct ethnic identity. As it is evidential, the most important achievement of the current federal system is the absence of destabilizing ethnic conflicts on the state level except low intensity secessionist struggle, for instance, by the OLF and the ONLF in contrast to devastating ethnic liberation struggles during the old regimes. However, the autonomy conflicts – conflicts for distinct ethnic identity status, self-governance at sub-regional levels and regional status – remain serious challenge of the federation. These autonomy conflicts are not taking place on the larger national scene and threatening the political center, but are mostly scaled down to the local level (Aalen; 2006; Assefa, 2012).

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7 Such as ethnic based conflicts for new power structure, new resources, new opportunities, new demands for a distinct ethnic identity, new demand for self-governance and autonomy, new quest for local economic justice, new quest for political empowerment and participation, new quest for state-hood and soon (Asnake, 2013; Tsegaye, 2010).
For major ethnic groups, fitting into the new ethno-federal structure has been relatively straightforward than smaller ones. Five major ethnic groups: Oromo, Tigray, Amhara, Somali, Afar and the anomaly Hareri, were granted their own ‘mother states’ as core ‘nations’. The smaller ethnic groups are merged together under multi-ethnic regional states of SNNPRS, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. However, the case of minority Harari regional state as a core ‘nation’ is somehow paradoxical while ethnic groups with large population sizes, such as Sidama, Wolayita, Gurage, Hadiya and Gamo, which indeed number more than a million in population, are not considered (Berhanu, 2007: 93). For smaller ethnic groups, the constitutionally entrenched ethnic rights to self-governance have necessitated a continuous (re)construction of ethnic identity to assert their right to self-governance, distinct ethnic identity and get share of state resources (Aklilu, 2003). This is particularly evident in the multi-ethnic regional states. In SNNPRS, for instance, there was a violent and an intensified quest for distinct ethnic identity by Silte from Gurage. Under the auspices of House of Federation (HoF), Silte declared an independent ethnic group status from the Gurage by referendum after prolonged struggle.

Apart from the Silte, the eruptions of autonomy conflicts have been particularly recurrent in the SNNPRS over the issues of ethnic identity and self-governance (Temesgen, 2011). For instance, the Sidama have been frequently demanding the re-establishment of a separate regional state (from the SNNPRS) (Aalen, 2008: 165-8). It has been refuted that allowing the Sidama people to secede from the SNNPRS could endanger the entire structure by triggering other ethnic demands for self-administration in the region as well as in other multi-ethnic regions (Asnake, 2013; Berhanu, 2007).

Inter-ethnic competition over the control of regional power, resources and opportunities is another challenge of federal system. Previously, the administrative structures in the entire country were highly autocratic and centralized. Regional governors and administrators were directly appointed from the center. This is however changed with ethnic federal restructuring. Due to intense inter-ethnic elite competition to control regional power and resources, ethnic based conflict between regionally dominant groups, for instance, the Nuer and the Anuak in Gambella; Berta and Gumuz in Benishangul-Gumuz and Sidama and Wolaita in SNNPRS (Aalen, 2008; Asnake, 2004; Berhanu, 2007).

**Challenges of minority rights protection in regional state and pan-Ethiopian identity**

One serious the Ethiopian federal system is facing is over the pan-Ethiopian identity and treatment of minorities within the constituent units. The issue here is about “deciding whether Ethiopia is a federation that has space both for groups, minorities and ordinary citizens or whether it is a federation only for ethno-nationalist groups where individual citizens and minorities are enslaved by ethno-nationalist forces” (Assefa, 2012: 454).

After adopting federal system, Ethiopian politics swings between the forces of state integration or pan-Ethiopianism on one hand and ethnic groups’ right of self-government, on the other (Asebe, 2007: 19). The ethnic federal system has brought apparent political paradigm shift from overarching common identity to distinct ethnic identity. The key to access resources dispersed by the federal government is to acquire a separate ethnic identity and an ethnically defined administrative structure (Aalen, 2006: 256). Unlike other African states, ethnic identity is the normative identity in Ethiopia (Abbink, 1997: 160).

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8 There is bicameral legislature i.e. House of Federation and House of Peoples Representatives (Art. 53) in Ethiopia. The HoF is principally an institution, among others, entrusted with the tasks of interpreting the constitution (art. 62/1) and deciding on issues relating to quest for distinct ethnic identity, quest for the right to self-governance including deciding on the issue of secession (Art.62/3).
In Ethiopia, we have at least two groups\(^9\) of minorities that deserve serious attention. The first group relates to the minorities and individuals in the ethnically designated regional states, such as Oromia, Tigray, Afar, Somalia, Harer and Amhara, where the regional state is expressly designated as belonging to these ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups. The regional states are even named after the ethnic group on whose behalf they are established. These groups dominate the political process in their respective states (Assefa, 2012:454-5). Other ethnic groups in each of these regions are, therefore, minorities, which has implications when understood in the context of an ethnic-based federalism. The groups that control the state determine the set of values, command the local public institutions and resources and they are the ones represented in the institutions. Under the present arrangement the minorities and individual citizens are declared invisible from the political process (ibid: 455).

The second category is the minority and individuals in multi-ethnic regional states. Even though the SNNPRS is one of the most multi-ethnic regions, I will emphasis on Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regions due to severity of the challenge there. What is distinct about these regional states, however, is that not only are the indigenous ethnic groups diverse but there are also sizeable ‘non-indigenous’ groups that were resettled in both regional states voluntarily over the past century and as part of the resettlement scheme of the mid-1980s (Asnake, 2013; Berhanu, 2007). These ‘non-indigenous’ groups also have a genuine security concern as well as a strong interest to participate in the political process of the regional states. However, there is a tendency by the indigenous ethnic groups to limit the role of these groups from the political process. Despite slight improvement in terms of getting seats in the regional councils since 2005, the ‘non-indigenous’ groups have still no broader rights to assume power at local levels and their rights to live and work in any parts of the country is seriously curtailed.

The minorities groups and individuals seek a diverse array of rights such as recognition, identity, exercise and enjoyment of linguistic rights, right to representation in government offices, participation in decision-making, self-rule, reassignment in a way they consider to be their “home region” and so on (Tsegaye, 2010: 98-99). Accordingly, the patterns of relationship between regional majority and settler minorities experience acute change in Ethiopia (Aalen, 2006). The majority vs. minority tensions often run into open confrontations and violence in most regional states. This is particularly evident in Gambella, Oromia, SNNPRS and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states where there are large scale internally displaced minorities.

Overarching and inclusive pan-Ethiopian identity has been replaced by a distinct ethnic identity in Ethiopia. This is mainly due to federal system’s matching of territory and ethnic identity for establishing ethnic self-rule. Due to this unique way of ordering relations between ethnic groups, politics of territoriality is making conflict protracted in Ethiopia (Aalen, 2006; Asnake, 2010). This is constraining rather than enlarging the political space for an overall citizenship although ethnic groups have unprecedented constitutional rights to self-rule and cultural expression.

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\(^9\) One can roughly identify at least two categories of new minorities in Ethiopia: a) scattered groups or internally displaced groups due to search for jobs, (re)settlement programs and others; b) stranded groups. Yet, one can add the new category of religious minorities, or of the minorities of mixed ethnic origin.
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, let me try to reiterate some brief answers to the questions the paper set out to answer. Consistent to the assumption of the institutional approach, the federal system was adopted as an instrument of managing the complex ethno-linguistic diversity of the country and to reduce conflicts in Ethiopia. Based on the preceding discussions, it is however possible to conclude that the federal system has brought mixed results in maintaining peace in Ethiopia. Federal system has significantly contributed towards empowering and equalizing the diverse ethnic communities and helped reduce ethno-national conflicts that beleaguered the Ethiopian state before 1990s. The federal system has responded well to ethnic equality by recognizing ethnic self-governance, cultural and linguistic right in the country. It has opened up a political space for the ethno-nationalist forces and hitherto marginalized groups. It reduced national ailments of conflicts to sub-national and local levels. It helped pacify ‘the big house’.

However, the federal system has been encountering institutional and contextual constraints that would endanger the sustainability of the federal system in Ethiopia. Federalism and democracy have an interlocked relationship. The success of a federal system depends on democratization and the extent to which the rule of law is respected. Democratization of the state is decisive to ensure the fate of the federation in Ethiopia. As it has been noted earlier on, indeed, in the area of democratization and political pluralism, Ethiopia lags behind. Federal and state institutions are currently instruments of a hegemonic party system. Constitutional and parliamentary supremacy has given way to party hegemony (Assefa, 2012: 465). Furthermore, Ethiopia today lacks two basic pre-conditions for mitigating ethnic conflicts in federal states: an inclusive and sustainable pan-national identity and protection of minority rights in the regional states. The overemphasis on ethno-national groups’ rights and politicizing ethnicity is constraining rather than enlarging the political space for an overall citizenship in Ethiopia. Ethnic based boundary conflicts have remained to be very critical challenge in Ethiopia. Without a lot of flexibility and dynamism to address these critical challenges, the current relative peace and stability in Ethiopia is fragile.
References


Peace, Federalism and Human Rights


PART II
Ethnic federalism and the effective political participation of minorities in Ethiopia

Beza Dessalegn

Abstract

A system of democracy built on ethnicity, if it intends for the effective political participation of all ethnic groups, should accommodate minority groups on the basis that they have meaningful influence, at least, on matters affecting their interests. Particularly when ethnicity is the only means of ascribing to political power; the need for securing equitable representation of all ethnic groups becomes indispensable. Ethiopia’s long history of competing ethnic nationalisms and lack of consensus reveals that, the contending ethno-cultural groups at best require the safeguarding of effective representation in areas of public life that are of particular interest to them. Despite this, the current federal arrangement—even though with its recognizable breakthroughs from the past—has failed to accommodate different ethnic groups on the basis, which is adequate and effective. Such is visible in various aspect of public life, but is most pronouncedly observable in the demand for meaningful representation and decision-making powers by ethnic minority groups both at federal and regional legislative bodies. This paper therefore argues for a beyond majoritarian rule of power-sharing so as to ensure the effective political participation of ethnic minorities.

Introduction

The Ethiopian model of federalism is constructed on the exclusive and strong link between ethnic identity and territory, markedly identifying itself as an “ethnic federation”. In what is considered as a reversal of the old ideology, since 1991, Ethiopia started with the bold adoption of ethnicity in the realm of politics. This federal idea became attractive to many not only for the purpose of accommodating and managing diversity, but also as a means of containing inter-ethnic tensions. Irrespective of its groundbreaking achievements, the federal arrangement has, however, brought about increased ethnic antagonism and competing ethnic nationalisms, particularly, within the sub-national units. Albeit the recognizable advantages of territorial federalism, especially in cases like Ethiopia—where elements of diversity within a federation do not fall neatly and precisely into geographical units—such an approach has already run the risk of undermining, among others, the right to political participation of regional minorities. For instance, in the regions of Amhara, Oromia, Afar, Tigray and Somali, a single ethnic group constitutes more than 50% of the regional population and controls most, if not all, of the political space, leaving other ethnic groups as disenfranchised regional minorities.

The creation of new centers of power (particularly the sub-national units) without sufficiently defining how they are to be shared among the various constituent ethnic groups has entrenched...
the threat of “local tyranny” (Assefa, 2006). In the regional state of Harar for example, a numerical minority (Hararis) is made to occupy key political offices thereby ensuring its dominance over ethnic groups constituting more than half of the total population. This has resulted in the creation of majorities (“dominant minorities”) and marginalized minorities (“oppressed majorities”).

Regrettably, despite the existence of ethnic heterogeneity and population movement, EPRDF has continued with the practice of solitarily empowering groups, which are considered “indigenous” to a particular subnational unit (ibid, 2007). What is worse, the federal Constitution does not explicitly envisage the effective sharing of political power for regional minorities and how this can be reconciled with the power of regional majorities. One of the structural limitations of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, in this regard, is therefore, its utter failure to provide mechanisms for reconciling competitive demands of ethnic groups for political power.

Disappointingly, some regional sates have endorsed the dichotomization of their residents and confer sovereign power of a regional state exclusively on the dominant ethnic group/s by totally casting out other resident ethnic group/s. Once again, this has not been dealt with either by the federal Constitution or the subnational constitutions, the exercise of government power in the regional states has been an exclusionary one and such has been further exacerbated by the electoral law’s adoption of the “winner takes all” electoral system. This paper henceforth argues that ensuring the effective representation of ethnic groups through their right to political participation is at the heart of guaranteeing the continuity of the Ethiopian ethnic federal arrangement.

The following caveats are however in order while examining the issue of effective political participation of minorities. First, the concept of political participation is examined under the auspices of ‘effective participation in public affairs’. This in effect is further examined narrowly under the right to political participation of minorities in the federal and regional legislative bodies only. Hence, participation in appointed bodies like the judiciary, or bodies such as the executive and other forms of sub regional and local councils is not a subject of deliberation. Secondly, the analysis largely depends on the normative investigation of representation of ethnic groups in the legislature as it relates to formal political power. Analysis into the informal aspect of political power in the Ethiopian context is beyond the scope of this work. Finally, these concepts are examined in the context of minorities, which are understood to include both national and regional minorities in the Ethiopian context. In this sense and for the sake of this work only, both national and regional minorities should, in the very simplest way, be understood as those that lack adequate decision-making powers to influence the State on needs that affect their interests, either at the national or regional levels respectively.

The concept of effective political participation of minorities

Democracy is basically flawed if it is, simply and always, the rule of the majority without the inclusion of the minority. To this end, achieving broad representation of different ethnic groups has important implications for the stability and quality of democracy. In this regard, legislative representation carries powerful symbolic power for ethnic minorities and often becomes an end in itself even when minorities have little or no chance of participating in the governing coalition (Moster, 2008).

The organization of the right to political participation and representation of groups on ethno-linguistic lines, as for instance evident in the Ethiopian federal arrangement, is not a new

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3 This is the case, for instance, in Benishangul Gumuz and Gambella, whereby both have dichotomized residents of their respective regions as “indigenous” and “other Peoples”. Shockingly, the Amharic version of the two regions Constitutions refer to the indigenous nationalities as the “owners” of the region.
phenomenon. Various countries, based on their distinctive federal arrangement features, including but not limited to, Nigeria, India, Belgium and Canada, in one form or the other, have been and are still experimenting on it. What is novel in this regard, however mainly in Europe, is the recognition that such participation along ethno-linguistic criteria should take due account of minority group’s right to effective political participation. For this purpose, since the 1990s an international right for persons belonging to minorities to effective participation in public affairs has slowly emerged in the minority rights regime (Verstichel, 2010).

Political participation has a broad meaning. However, in the context of human rights, the right to political participation is a right that entitles citizens to take part in government decision-making directly or through freely chosen representatives. Political participation is a condition for realizing the needs and aspirations of especially minority community members in various realms of public life. In this respect, political participation includes, but is not limited to, such activities as electoral participation and voting; contacting elected bodies and government officials; taking part in establishing and running political organizations; campaigning; standing for office; performing duties of a representative in elected and consultative bodies (Bieber, 2001).

Political participation is therefore essential for realizing the basic values and objectives that minorities have. “It provides minorities with multiple means for strengthening their self-organization, securing adequate representation, and achieving political and policy goals.”

Minorities’ right to political participation, however, cannot be fully realized without minorities’ ability to have control over their own affairs. The degree of this control and its forms depend on the specific circumstances of minority groups (ibid).

Seen in light of such criteria, mere legal recognition of political participation and presence of representatives of minority groups, in the legislature for instance, is not by itself enough. Rather, “the presence of minority representatives in decision-making processes should be translated into influence on the outcome of the decision-making” process (Verstichel, 2010). For example, in the 2015 general elections, Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party (BGPDP) won all the 99 seats of the state council. However, out of the 99 representatives, the indigenous nationalities assumed 81 seats. The remaining 9 seats are distributed to the non-indigenous groups. Accordingly, Amharas occupy 5 seats, Oromos 2 seats, Kembata 1 seat, and Agew 1 seat. It is evident from this that the non-indigenous community representatives will be outvoted in whatever decision-making process. Admittedly, their presence is simply window-dressing.

In a two-dimensional way, effective participation of minorities is commonly defined as consisting of both autonomy regarding their own affairs and participation in decision-making concerning matters of the polity as a whole (Henrard, 2005). Effective participation, however, requires guarantees, which are permissions more than mere presence that representatives of minority groups, particularly in areas affecting their needs, should not be out-voted or be given some sort of veto rights to counterbalance majoritarian dominance (Verstichel, 2010).

In this regard, effective participation of minorities is necessary for two important reasons. First, the central goal of minority representation is securing substantive equality. This is aimed at overcoming structural inequality and systematic discrimination faced by minority groups and their members (ibid: 78). As aptly stated by Verstichel, “inclusion in the decision-making processes should help to break the circle of socio-economic inequality. Minorities should be able to take part in public life as an implementation of the general principle of participatory democracy” (ibid).
Second, minorities, like majorities, have a right to the preservation and promotion of their identity. For this, they should be effectively involved in decision-making processes that have an impact on their identity (ibid). However, the justifications for minorities’ right to political participation extend well beyond these two imperatives, in which an analysis of such justifications falls beyond the reach of this paper.

**Choice of electoral systems and the effective political participation of minorities**

Admittedly, the concept of political participation is very much intertwined with electoral systems (See Reynolds, 1999). The right to political participation, which is a fundamental human right, especially, as applied to citizens of a country, is largely implemented through the electoral system (ibid, 2006). This section of the paper, therefore, following the theoretical framework for effective political participation of minorities, tries to analyze this theoretical framework in light of electoral systems.

This is done with the aim of elucidating two points. First, elections, in general, not only enable citizens to elect political leadership, but also provide the mechanism through which people can exercise control over their government officials, and hence providing for accountability (Kymlicka, 1995), equally for both the dominant and marginalized sections of the society. Second, electoral systems are vital, if not the only mechanisms, in assuring the equitable and effective participation of minority groups (Reilly, 2006), which makes analyzing the merits and demerits of each electoral system in light of realizing the right of minorities’ to political participation imperative.

Electoral systems are tools developed for organizing representative democracies. They are the mechanisms used to elect decision makers who represent citizens when societies become too large for every citizen to be involved in each decision that affects the community (Reynolds, 1999). However, the adopted electoral system can lead to uneven distribution of powers and most importantly to the marginalization and relegation of minority groups if it is not managed appropriately taking into consideration the specific needs of the electorate.

While there are some basic elements of participatory/representative democracy present in all methods of electing leaders around the world, the details of electoral systems vary widely (ibid). For this, adopting an electoral system largely depends upon the nature and character of the specific society, as what works well in a homogenous society may not be so in multiethnic societies.

With regard to the protection of minorities’ right to political participation, the electoral system may be used with two aims. As Laponce states, “one is to ensure the adequate parliamentary representation of a minority, and the second is to increase the electoral influence of minority groups independently from representation” (Laponce, 1957). Adequate parliamentary representation may be ensured through the choice of an electoral system, while guaranteed representation of minority groups (mostly provided by legislative guarantees) could be undertaken by reserving some seats for minority groups to increase minority representation outside of electoral competition. Particularly, as Verstichel maintains, when voting patterns are run along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines, special representation mechanisms become necessary to ensure the representation of minorities (Verstichel, 2010).

Two main types of electoral systems generally dominate the world. These are majority systems and the proportional representation system. While the first one is characterized by the winner takes all in which a relative majority is sufficient to be declared the winner, the second electoral system gives primacy to a close relationship between the votes cast and seats won proportionally (Reynolds, 1999). These electoral systems are generally defined and categorized with reference to
representatives elected from each constituency district, the formula adopted (either plurality or proportionality of vote) and threshold of representation for parties or candidates (which can be determined by the law or by the number of seats) (ibid).

Ethiopia has adopted the “first-past-the-post” electoral system, which simply states that one who receives the majority of votes within the electoral district is the winner. In practice, this means the candidate who gets a simple comparable majority of votes in the district is the outright winner. In a country where the regions are organized on ethnic lines and where none of these regions are ethnically homogenous, the use of such an electoral system runs the risk that the seat in each electoral district will be won by the candidate who represents the interest of the largest ethnic group. This is particularly problematic for minorities that are to be found dispersed, which will eventually make them a minority in each and every electoral district, thereby defeating the idea of effective representation of ethnic groups.

In this regard, Horowitz maintains, “electoral systems have a huge role in fostering or retarding ethnic conflict”. He argues that the “delimitation of constituencies, the electoral principle, the number of members per constituency, and the structure of the ballot have a potential impact on ethnic alignments, ethnic electoral appeals, multi-ethnic coalitions, the growth of extremist parties, and policy outcomes” (Horowitz, 1985).

In providing for the grand norm, Article 56 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia provides that “a Political Party or a Coalition of Political Parties that has the greatest number of seats in the House of People’s Representatives [HoPR] shall form the executive and lead it”. The Constitution further stipulates that members of the HoPR shall be elected from candidates in each electoral district by a plurality of the votes cast (ibid: Article 54(2)).

In consolidating this stance of the Constitution, the amended Electoral Law states, “a Candidate who received more votes than other Candidates within a Constituency shall be declared the winner” (Proclamation No. 532/2007, Article 25). This applies to all elections (both at the federal and regional levels), which include: “General Election, Local Election, By-Election, Re-election and Referendum” (ibid: Article 27).

To understand whether this electoral system furnishes effective political participation to minorities in Ethiopia requires an analysis on how votes are translated into seat in elections for regional and federal legislative bodies (3.1), as well as how decision-making is undertaken in these legislative bodies (3.2).

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Representation at federal and regional levels: assessment on its effectiveness

Four ethnic groups of Ethiopia (Amhara, Oromo, Tigray and Somali) together form an overwhelming majority. Despite this, the country is also inhabited by numerous and diverse ethnic groups. Hence, an electoral system for Ethiopia must be one, which best suits this multiethnic character of the nation. Nevertheless, “since 1991, elections in Ethiopia are based on a plurality system of votes, with single-seat constituencies drawn on the basis of Woreda administrative units” (Tafesse and Aklilu, 2007).

The Constitution, as mentioned earlier, adopted the plurality system for elections to the HoPR, which is supposed to be composed of representatives of the country. Accordingly, elections to the House are conducted by means of general and direct elections under the first-past-the-post electoral system. At the federal level, this implies that only an ethnic group, which constitutes a majority in a region, will be entitled to send its representatives, despite the presence of numerous minorities. For example, in the Oromia regional state the only representation will come from the Oromo ethnic group, despite the existence of numerous ethnic groups within it (like the Amharas Argobas and Agews). This is because; Oromos are the numerical majority not only within the region, but also in each and every electoral constituency within the region. Unless consideration for minorities is made in setting up electoral constituencies, where the voting line is exclusively along ethnic lines, it will be very difficult for minorities to win a contested seat. From this, it can safely be concluded that, minorities in the regions have no chance but to be outvoted.

This will also be the case in the multiethnic regions of Benishangul and Gambella where the non-indigenous groups are relatively smaller in number than that of the indigenous ones. Hence, under the plurality (first-past-the-post) system where absolute majority is not necessary, single vote supremacy can determine the winner. Hence, not all ethnic groups will have their representation in the HoPR from their own place of residence. If that minority ethnic group has a state outside its place of residence, it might get a representation via that line, although this cannot be called representation proper. Otherwise, ethnic groups which do not have a mother state and that cannot constitute a majority in an electoral district will be outside the ambit of representation in the House.

In contrast, considering the problem of guaranteeing adequate and effective political participation rights at the regional level reveals that, apart from the modality of the electoral system adopted, the problem of minorities participation is further exacerbated due to the small bargaining power of the states in the formulation of the electoral laws of the country. The power to enact laws concerning political parties and elections so as to give practical effect to the political rights provided in the Constitution is the duty of the federal government. This is done through the HoPR. This means, regional states are not entitled to formulate their own electoral system taking into consideration their population size, ethnic diversity and the long established communal relationships of their inhabitants. They only function within the emblem of an electoral law formulated through the federal government. Since some regional states have a more diversified population than others, adopting a countrywide electoral system without a mechanism by which these states are to deal with their diversified population seriously affects the representation of minorities at the regional level.

9 Article 54(2) of the FDRE Constitution.
10 However, it is worth noting here that they might secure a seat in the House of Peoples Representatives through minority nationality representation guaranteed under Article 54(3) of the FDRE Constitution. Apart from that, unless some affirmative actions are implemented, these minorities are outside of representation in the national parliament.
11 Article 51(15) of the FDRE Constitution. But see Getachew Assefa, Electoral System and Political Pluralism in Ethiopia: A case for Reform in Gedion Timotheows and Helen Fikre (eds.) The FDRE Constitution: Some Perspectives on the Institutional Dimension, Ethiopian Constitutional Law Series, Vol VI, pp 7-8 in which he argues that regions have, constitutionally speaking, the power to determine and adopt their own electoral systems towards representation in their regional parliaments. However, they have not done so and simply mimicked the FDRE Constitution stipulations.
With this, an assessment of the implications of the electoral law in a diversified population is in order. Proclamation No. 532/2007 clearly states that “[a] candidate who received more votes than other candidates within a constituency shall be declared the winner” (Proclamation No 532/2007, Article 25). Most commentators agree that the plurality (first past the post) system is contrary to the principles of “pluralist multi-party democracy” (Tafesse and Aklilu, 2007).

The winner takes all principle presents a significant problem in pluralistic societies, particularly where ethnic and cultural divisions have led to the formation of ethnic political parties and the division of the population along ethnic lines (ibid). In a multiethnic society, opting for the plurality system favors the majority by way of determining election results on the basis of a relative majority and reduces/downplays the chance of smaller and minority groups to be elected. The system exaggerates the representation of the winning party but fails to reflect the various opinions of the voters in the elected assemblies. In other words, election results are decided on the basis of very few votes achieved relative to the total votes cast (ibid). This is particularly problematic for minority groups, which cannot constitute a majority in each and every electoral district.

In the first-past-the-post electoral system, even a minimal majority is enough to gain a contested seat. In effect, proportional representation where smaller parties can get a voice without necessarily getting the highest number of votes in any of the electoral constituencies is avoided (Merera, 2003). In this respect, most commentators argue that the first-past-the-post electoral system is not the ideal type for Ethiopia where national consensus is lacking among the competing parties and ethno-nationalist elites of the country (ibid).

This assertion is also true for elections conducted to the regional state councils. In this regard, despite the competing ethnic nationalism being present at the sub national levels also, all regional states, however, followed a copycat method of duplicating the provision of the FDRE Constitution with respect to the manner of electing representatives to their regional councils. Accordingly, elections for the nine state councils are conducted by means of general and direct elections under the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, the Harari constitution follows a different procedure of filling the seats of the regional parliament even though the electoral system is first-past-the-post. With a slight deviation to the other regions, the regions of SNNP, Gambella, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, and Tigray give recognition to reserved seats for indigenous minorities that cannot get seats under the first-past-the-post system for elections to the state councils. However, regional minorities, which are not considered indigenous to the region, are effectively disenfranchised as a result of the first-past-the-post as well as the non-recognition by all the regional constitutions regarding their political representation.

Additionally, the Electoral Law’s stipulation of language as a legitimate criterion for political candidature has also presented various ethnic groups who are in the minority with a huge barrier to compete for political representation. A political candidate who runs for political office has to either know the working language or the local vernacular (the indigenous language) of the region. More specifically put, the Proclamation pursued the idea that language should be used as a legitimate requirement for political candidature. The formulation under this Proclamation took the working language of the region or the local vernacular as alternative requirements (ibid: 64 Peace, Federalism and Human Rights

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12 See for instance Article 48(2) of the Somali Constitution, Article 50(2) of the SNNP Constitution, Article 50(2) of the Gambella Constitution, Article 48(2) of the Amhara Constitution, Article 48(2) of the Benishangul Gumuz Constitution, Article 46(2) of the Afar Constitution, Article 54(2) of the Tigray Constitution and Article 48(2) of the Oromia Constitution.
13 Article 48(2) of the SNNP Constitution
14 Article 50(2) of the Gambella Constitution
15 Article 48(2) of the Amhara Constitution
16 Article 48(2) of the Benishangul Gumuz Constitution
17 Article 54(2) of the Tigray Constitution
18 See, Proclamation 532/2007, Article 45(4)(b)
Article 45(1) (b)). It is known that the choice of the working language for the regions is mainly made in the interest of the regional majority. Evidently, the regions of Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, Somali, and Afar have adopted the regional majority’s language as the working language of the region. While Gambella, Benishangul Gumuz and the Southern Nations Nationalities and peoples regions, have adopted Amharic as the working language, probably due to the lack of a single politically dominant group pressing to impose its language. On the other hand, Harari region has adopted the language of the two dominant ethnic groups as the working language of the region, which is Harari and Oromiffa.

This will, in effect, mean two things. First, ethnic minorities within a certain regional states that are not conversant with the working language (for instance Amharas in Oromia region) are totally excluded from running for political office. Second, other regional minorities in a region where the working language is Amharic but is politically dominated by ethnic groups with their own vernacular, for instance Oromos in Benishangul Gumuz, who are neither conversant in Amharic nor the local vernacular of the region, cannot run for political candidature. Simply put, this stipulation of the electoral law presents a huge impasse for ethnic minorities within the regions to secure political representation.

Decision-making procedures

Decision-making procedures, both at the federal and regional levels, are made through a majoritarian way, with no room for consociational arrangements or veto rights for minorities. If we see the case of the HoPR, elections to the house are conducted by means of general and direct elections under the first past the post electoral system (see Article 54(2) of the FDRE Constitution). In accordance with the Constitution, unless otherwise provided, “all decisions of the house shall be by a majority vote of members present and voting” (Article 59(1) of the FDRE Constitution). The quorum requirement will be fulfilled upon the presence of more than half of the members of the house (Article 58(1) of the FDRE Constitution). However, the combined presence of the four big nationalities (the ones mentioned earlier) in the house will suffice to legislate even in matters that affect the interests of other ethnic groups.

Despite this, in a move that seems to ensure the presence of minorities in the HoPR, Article 54(3) of the Constitution provides a guaranteed representation for “minority nationalities and peoples” by reserving at least 20 seats out of the maximum number of 550. With no veto rights, however, the guaranteed seats for minorities play no role in ensuring that their presence can be translated into meaningful influence. This is because; decisions in the house are made through majoritarian procedures and minorities, mostly if not always, will be outvoted.

The same reasoning applies to the House of Federation [HoF], which is also based on majoritarian rule, because all decisions of the House require the approval of majority members present and voting. The quorum requirement is the presence at a meeting of two thirds of the members of the House (Article 64(1) of the FDRE Constitution). Unlike the HoPR, there are no guaranteed seats to minority nationalities in the HoF. Each nation and people will have at least one member and will additionally be represented by one additional representative for each additional one million people (Article 61(1) of the FDRE Constitution). The larger the population size of an ethnic group, the higher the representation it will secure in the house and the higher is the risk of minorities being engulfed by the populous ethnic groups in the decision-making process.

Decision-making procedures at the regions also follow the same trend of majoritarian approval. What is more, the exercise of government power in the regional states has been elusive for regional minorities. Typically, the dominant or majority ethnic group considers itself to be the “owner” of the regional state while other ethnic groups are relegated to the status of second class citizens. Some scholars have described this situation as being one that engenders “local
tyranny” (Assefa, 2006). The nature of the civil rights denied to these minority groups varies, from representation to economic relegation (Yonatan and Van der Beken, 2013). Hence, it would not be surprising if one doubted the true extent of the right to equitable representation that is enshrined under Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution and its genuine applicability to all ethnic groups, including minorities.

Which electoral system best addresses the needs of minorities to effective political participation in Ethiopia? Undoubtedly, electoral systems have a significant influence on the outcome of any election. Their influence on the outcome, however, depends on a number of factors like territorial distribution, political organization of minorities, and on the modality of establishing electoral constituencies. For instance, depending on the territorial distribution of a minority group, and the extent to which its members are politically organized, both first-past-the post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems of voting may facilitate greater minority representation (see Brockington et al., 1998). Where members of a minority community are concentrated in a particular geographical region, candidates from ethno-cultural minorities are likely to be elected even under the FPTP system of voting (see Brockington et al., 1998).

However, in circumstances where ethnic communities are found scattered and are not concentrated in one or more geographical areas, as Pippa Norris explains, pure systems of proportional representation, where the percentage of seats in the legislature is roughly equivalent to the percentage of votes received, is believed to facilitate equitable representation (see Noris, 2002). Whereas, in circumstances where members of minority groups are politically organized, the use of relatively pure systems of proportional representation will also provide for a ‘representative’ presence of persons from minorities in the national parliament (Wheatley, 2005: 144-145).

Where an electoral system relies on constituency representation, through gerrymandering, ‘minority-majority’ constituencies maybe established with the purpose of making the majority of the electorate members of a minority group in a certain constituency, thus enhancing opportunities for representation (ibid.: 145). As Steven Wheatley clarifies, “this may be achieved by drawing the electoral boundaries around the minority community, but without deviating significantly from the average number of voters in a constituency” (ibid.). However, in circumstances where the minority community is not capable of fulfilling the minimum number required by law for establishing a constituency, special or guaranteed representation along with veto powers remains to be the best option for minorities.

Regarding the choice of the existing electoral system in Ethiopia, two blocks stand back to back to one another. In defense of the plurality system, it is argued that in a country which has adopted a multiparty democracy and where there exists deep rooted divisions along ethnic, linguistic and at times religious lines, the best option is the FPTP system, which ensures the election of a strong executive capable of performing its duties efficiently and effectively (Tafesse and Aklilu, 2007: 102). Supporters of this system, despite the claim that it excludes ethnic minorities, challenge this position by stating, FPTP is convenient for ethnic minorities in areas where they are found territorially concentrated. This in effect guarantees minorities in Ethiopia, which have been granted their own mother states to hold on to their autonomy, as they constitute numerical majorities in their respective regions. In a deeply divided society like Ethiopia, and particularly at the national level, the FPTP electoral system offers for the best solution in guaranteeing the unity and continuity of the state structure by securing strong national government and simplicity of administration (Tafesse and Aklilu, 2007: 102).

However, those who argue in favor of the proportional representation system reject the above arguments on the following grounds (see for instance Getachew, n.d.; Kassahun et al., 2007;
First, PR offers for the translation of votes cast into seats proportionally, which means there are no outright winners and losers, and there will be little or no wastage of votes. This in effect encourages parties to negotiate between one another and form coalitions to form a government. Second, PR encourages and incentivizes parties to rally for support beyond their comfort ethnic zones and advocate for ideological support rather than seek for simple and blind ethnic backing. This is because, in PR system, obtaining more seats in parliament depends on the number of votes secured, which motivates parties to search and acquire additional votes outside their ethnic boundaries. This boosts party agendas to be formulated along ideological lines and therefore aptly contributes to nation building strategies transcending ethnic and tribal nationalisms.

Third, the level of diversity in Ethiopia that is present at the national level is even more pronounced at sub state levels. Even though the plurality system has benefited those in the majority, it has, however, disenfranchised minorities at the regional level. Fourth, the tendency by many multicultural states, which have adopted multination federalism around the world, having shifted from the plurality system to the PR system are steps in the right direction that can serve as impeccable litmus tests for Ethiopia. Many European countries, including but not limited to southeastern Europe (see for instance Bieber, 2008: 17-18), have dropped the majoritarian system in favor of the PR system.

Fifth, the fear that application of the PR system as argued by some, especially in an ethnically divided society like Ethiopia, runs the risk of leading to the emergence of a plethora of small radical and extreme ethno-nationalist parties (see Gedion, 2015), which would barely be able to work with one another, can be counterbalanced by establishing a threshold requirement whereby securing a minimum number of percentage of votes will be mandatory before a party is allowed to secure a seat in parliament (see Getachew, n.d.: 28).

Sixth, the contention that PR encourages fragmentation in the political landscape and the likelihood that it ends up in perpetually hung parliaments where no single party can command a majority, leading to the establishment of a weak government whereby various small, extremist parties would easily secure seats in parliament, which make both the formation of government and the process of governance (see Getachew, n.d.), is also untenable in the Ethiopian context. As Getachew explains, Ethiopia throughout its history is known for governments which were highly centralized and strong, but, however, non-inclusive (ibid.). These strong governments have only led to the marginalization of ethnic groups rather than build a nation on the basis of consensus and inclusiveness. Therefore, despite the advantages of a strong government, the contextual reading of the situation in Ethiopia is one, which warrants the establishment of a government on the basis of negotiation encouraged by PR, rather than by an outright victor as in the case of FPTP.

Nonetheless, despite the outlined merits and demerits of the plurality and the PR system for Ethiopia, caution must be in place in stating that a priori a certain type of electoral system is preferable to another. Each individual case calls for its own solution and simple transplantation of an electoral system from other countries does not seem to guarantee outright success. Yet, under a scheme of single electorate like the case in Ethiopia, the choice of an electoral system should be made and hence be further revised, among others, based on whether the country has a communal or inter communal party system (Laponce, 1957: 338). Laponce (1957: 338-339) notes the following in this regard:

If there is a system in which majority and minority collaborate in the same political parties, majority systems should be favored by the minority in so far as it tends to the creation of a two-party system in which the minority group has a greatly increased bargaining position. However,
if there is a communal party system, that is to say, a system in which, because of the minority’s own choice or because of the majority’s hostility, the parties are built along communal lines, proportional representation is to be preferred.

The later assertion by Laponce seems to closely resemble the case of Ethiopia. At the moment, for instance, close to eighty political parties, except for few, established along ethnic cleavages, function in Ethiopian politics (Getachew, n.d: 30). As witnessed over the years, there is little or no appetite between EPRDF and opposition parties to collaborate on areas of similar interest. “All or none” has been the governing norm in Ethiopian politics and this has been further exacerbated by the FPTP electoral system. This makes the adoption of a context-specific PR system a viable option for effective political participation of minorities in Ethiopia.

Therefore, it is argued under in this paper that, the proportional representation system should be adopted either replacing the already existing system or in combination with it for both theoretical and pragmatic considerations (see Getachew, n.d: 29). At a theoretical level, and especially for deeply divided societies like Ethiopia, in a situation where ethnic diversity is embraced through an ethnic federation, the most natural choice of electoral system would be the one that encourages inclusiveness and accommodation of these diversity rather than domination by a single vanguard party. This, therefore, makes a carefully tailored proportional representation system the best option available.

On the other, assessing the choice of an electoral system at pragmatic level requires dealing with two issues. First, from the foregoing discussions, it is evident that the FPTP electoral system has not fared very good in equitably empowering ethnic groups in Ethiopia. This problem ignites one to ask, despite the inherent flaws of FPTP, is this because this electoral system is inadequate to bring about equitable representation of ethnic groups at least for selected scenarios, or it is because elections under EPRDF have largely been not free and fair to test whether the current electoral system can bring about equitable representation? For instance, Gedion alleges, “to blame FPTP for the virtual exclusion of the opposition from parliament is unjustified. The culprit for the dangerous and embarrassing absence of a meaningful parliamentary opposition in Ethiopia is not FPTP, it is rather the chronic and severe deficit of political freedom we are suffering from” (Gedion, 2015).

With the clear advantages of FPTP, especially for territorially concentrated ethnic minorities in Ethiopia, the question remains, has Ethiopia enjoyed genuine translation of the votes cast into representation so as to determine the feasibility of the existing electoral system? The contested election results of 2005, which witnessed a huge support from the electorate to members of opposition parties have revealed that, despite ethnic minorities territorial concentration to elect a representative from amongst themselves, not every voting was carried out exclusively along ethno-nationalist lines. Admittedly, this situation signaled strong evidence that ethnic voting is not as rampant as believed and somehow, in the Ethiopian context, the electorate has the desire to vote along ideological lines also, which shows that a context-specific PR system is more workable for Ethiopia than the plurality system.

Taking into consideration the number of ethnic political parties available for competition and the lack of a strong opposition party challenging the incumbent regime, one can still argue that the best channel of accommodating the interests of these parties remains to be the proportional representation system (Getachew, n.d: 29-31). Yet, even the adoption of the PR system, however without genuine democracy, in which the electorates are able to freely articulate their choices, is not by itself a guarantee for the effective political participation for minorities. It would be very difficult to expect sincere empowerment of ethnic minorities in such circumstances, because the
holders of political power will eventually be decided by the undemocratic process rather than by the ‘free will of the people’.

In an over all assessment, despite the favored inclination to the PR system, pursuits of embracing it, however, require deeper study on the particularities of every ethnic group and the need of the country in general, and in effect, such pursuits call for series of national dialogues.

The need for a beyond a majoritarian rule of political participation in Ethiopia

The foregoing discussions have demonstrated that the Ethiopian approach of political participation largely seems to legitimize existing politically dominant groups. It also, by making representation as well as decision-making procedures purely majoritarian, has deviated from the standard requirement of representative democracy, which is an adequate inclusion of the voice of the minority. This, therefore, requires implanting democratic approaches, which in one way or the other promote inclusiveness and equitable power sharing. This, at best requires, the resilience of a federal arrangement to accommodate the existing status quo.

Lijphart has repeatedly stressed that in plural societies simple majority rule, which sees the winner takes all practice, as both dangerous and undemocratic (Lijphart, 1984: 22-23). Despite the majoritarian democracy EPRDF has endorsed to run its way of federalism in the country, federalism, rather, best functions in circumstances of consensual democracy, where power is legitimately shared between different contending groups. Evidently, as a matter of political theory, federalism refers to the constitutional division of powers whereby component governing elements share in the administration of government and process of common policy-making as of right, while the activity of government is conducted in such a way as to maintain the components’ respective identities (Elazar, 1992: 6, 12; Tarlton, 1965: 861, 863). In Daniel Elazar’s apt expression, the essence of federalism is “values of unity in diversity” or “self-rule plus shared rule” (1992: 12).

Apparent from Elazar’s expression, shared rule implies the need for power sharing between constituting groups with the aim of sustaining the diversity. Democracy based on simple majoritarian terms is therefore an outdated concept. Especially, in deeply divided societies, power should be shared amongst the diverse constituent groups so as to institutionalize a culture of democracy based on consensus. However, if power sharing is to work, then some degree of genuine autonomy is needed towards the constituent groups. Otherwise, there is just no real power to share.

If power sharing is an indispensable factor for the continuity of federal systems, it will only be logical to question on how the Ethiopian federal dispensation has fared in this regard. There are two contending views on this. First, for scholars like Lovise Aalen, the Ethiopian federal arrangement is not sincerely federal. Rather, it is a system which operates under the hegemony and dominance of the EPRDF which itself is dictated by the TPLF. For this reason, the regions are without genuine autonomy (Aalen, 2002). This in effect implies that the regions do not exercise authentic self-rule, and the representation of ethnic groups both at the federal and regional levels is nothing more than window-dressing (ibid.).

For others, however, the Ethiopian federal experiment, though without a clear formula at the federal level and at least between regional majorities at the regional level, somehow tried to institutionalize some sort of power sharing. In a fascinating work on the status of consociationalism in Ethiopia, Yared Legesse suggests that, the fact that at the federal level the positions of president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, and speaker of the house are not held by a single ethnic group and that Article 39 of the Constitution refers to “equitable representation in the state and federal governments” strengthens the existence of some sort of power sharing (Yared, 2011; see
also Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution). Moreover, he argues that the three prototypes of
subnational, semi-consociational power sharing in the regions of Harari (between the Harari and
the Oromo); in Benishangul Gumuz (between the Berta and Gumuz); and in Gambella (between
the Anuya and Nuer) that have tried to mitigate competition between two historical rival ethnic
groups could be seen as steps in the right direction (Yared, 2011: 208-221).

However, such power-sharing schemes have largely ignored regional minorities, even in the
prototype subnational units. For instance, neither the region of Gambella nor that of Benishangul
Gumuz, both of which are home to significant numbers of the habesha or “highlander”
populations, have replicated the same extent of power-sharing with their regional minorities. This
is also true of the Harari region, where a significant number of Amharas reside, but with appalling
representation and with no decision-making power in the government.

The Ethiopian discourse of power-sharing schemes -even in circumstances where they exist-
reveals that such dialogues were only negotiated between the regional majorities themselves and
that, in reality, very little or no action has been taken by majorities to include regional minorities.
Positive actions are yet to have a consistent and widespread trickledown effect on regional
minorities. Apart from this political practice, as outlined in the foregoing discussions, the electoral
system at work exacerbates the already imbalance in power sharing.

**Conclusion**

There is no “one size fits all” solution for the aforementioned problems. Federalism must be seen
as a work in progress, and hence, should not be seen as a “once and for all” solution for ethnic
problems in Ethiopia. This, side by side with the democratization process, requires a resilient
approach of adequate institutional design and adjustment to actual conditions of different
problems of different times. Sadly, the more than two decades experiment on ethnic federalism
which has single handedly relied on the “winner takes all” electoral system has done little to cope
with winds of change. With the particular context in issue, the effective political participation of
minorities throughout Ethiopia can be mentioned as one of its glaring failures.

Ensuring effective participation of minorities through the proportional representation system,
special representation mechanisms, veto rights or measures of affirmative action for minorities
(Verstichel, 2010: 78) could be taken as steps in the right direction. These, however, by no means
will be meaningful without taming the overall context of the political atmosphere of the country
towards a consensus democracy rather than a purely competitive and majoritarian one.
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Religion and the Secular State Order: The Ethiopian Experience

Mohammed Dejen¹

Abstract

This study examines the challenges of religious fundamentalism to the secular constitutional state order in Ethiopia. It argues that, while the fear of the government of religious fundamentalism for disrupting the secular state order is sustained by some level of truth, the empirical evidences show that, most religious communities in Ethiopia are struggling for more freedom and right within the framework of the secular state order. In short, the political manifestation of religious fundamentalism in Ethiopia is rare - not to say absent. Nonetheless, the rights consciousness of religious communities for the demand of land for the construction of worshiping houses and more public roles, not matched with the practical implementations of laws in some localities, have created frustrations among religious groups with the potential to create antagonism and conflict that definitely calls an urgent ‘intervention’ from concerned authorities.

Introduction

In one or the other form, religion is as old as human history. It has played and is playing an important role in societal life in governing their relationship with one another. The precursor reading of history ascertains that, religion was once the only source of legitimacy for controlling political power and administering worldly affairs for a long period of time. Most kings, including Ethiopian emperors², claimed to derive their authority from the divine order. However, its importance, especially as the only source of legitimacy for political power and knowledge, declined after the Enlightenment in the 18th century in Europe (Smith, 2008). The public role of religion was negotiated again and again between the enlightened political elites and religious figures to limit its roles in private realms. This in turn led to the emergence of secularism, which intended to draw a demarcating line between church (religion) and state – at least in their functional spheres (ibid).

Secularism, as a normative framework that tries to limit the public role of religion, is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ principle applicable all over the world for all religions. It is rather a ‘contingent and contested social construction’ that depends, among other things, on the prevailing social, cultural and religious conditions of a given society and time variables (Hurd, 2008: 99 citing Yavuz, 2003: 267). Secularism, as a principle of functional separation between state and religion, was introduced to achieve either of the following purposes: protecting the state from excessive religious influence (freedom for the state), protecting religion from the coercive powers of the state (freedom for/of religion) or managing religious diversity. Secularism is not about eliminating religion from public spheres altogether but to define its ‘proper place’ by guaranteeing state neutrality in religious matters (Esposito, 2010; Smith, 2008). Secularism is also important to advance the equality of religions and freedom of believers. It, by eliminating the presence of a state/established religion, avoids the dominance of one religion over the other – usually on the ‘newcomers’. Stating differently, having an established state religion is a ‘threat’ for minority religions, which can be tackled with secularism. In spite of the plenty of advantages that secularism could provide for multi-religious societies across the world, it is opposed by religious fundamentalists who claim to offer high moral and ethical values to the public than the virtues of secularism.

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² The 1931 Constitution, the 1955 Revised Constitution, the 1960 Civil Code and other laws of Imperial Ethiopia claim Emperor Haile Sellassie I as “Elect of God” where his power was unlimited and unquestionable by the people.
The word fundamentalism has its origin in American usage of Protestantism that opposes Darwinian evolution theory and those who advocate for the literal interpretation of the Bible (D’souza, 2008). At present, there is growing religious resurgence across the world (Smith, 2008). Some of the reviveralist groups seek to revive traditional practices and preach for strict observance of the fundamentals of their religious core dogmas. Nowadays, there is a tendency from the political actors to label these groups as fundamentalists. However, all reviveralists are not fundamentalists, though fundamentalists might benefit from the activities of the reviveralists. Religious fundamentalism can be manifested either in political terms such as overthrowing the existing regime by violence or in non-political terms such as purging one’s religion from ‘un-religious practices’ and saving the community from moral sloppy’ (Anonym, n.d: 23 quoting Appleby, 2001: 86).

This study examines the political manifestation of religious fundamentalism and intolerance towards other religions in the Ethiopian context. Following the institutionalization of religious freedom and separation of state and religion in post-1991 Ethiopia, religious renaissance is on the rise – though not necessarily connected with religious fundamentalism. While some groups are trying to maintain the status quo, even to the extent of objecting the secular order, others advance for more freedoms and rights. Stating differently, the Ethiopian secular constitutional order is challenged by some groups who try to restore their privileged status (being a state religion) and those who claim for more public role, sometimes through a violent means. In an atmosphere of fear of religious fundamentalism for disrupting the secular state order, it is quite imperative to undertake an academic research in this area to understand the problems on the ground. In doing so, this research poses the following major questions and examines the plausibility of government’s fear on the basis of empirical evidences. (1) Is religious fundamentalism on the rise in Ethiopia? If so, what are its manifestations? (2) Where does the government’s own religious policy and its implementation fit into the process of religious fundamentalism? Procedurally, the paper is organized in four major parts. Part I of the paper highlights the religious landscape of the country with a brief historical account of church (religion)-state relations in Ethiopia. Part II will discuss the legal frameworks governing religious freedom and secularism in the post-1991 period. Part III investigates the threats of religious fundamentalism and its possible dangers for the peace and stability of the country. Part IV touches upon some manifestations of religious fundamentalism in the form of exclusive religious-territorial control/claim by taking few cases from the north, south and east parts of the country. In between, the research explores how government’s own policies and implementations fit into religious radicalization in the country.

Part I
Religious landscape in Ethiopia: an overview
Historically, Ethiopia is home for the three major monolithic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and other indigenous beliefs. According to the 2007 national population census report, Christianity (of all denominations) and Islam are the dominant religions and together comprise roughly 97 percent of the total population. Among these, Orthodox Christianity³ accounts 43.5%, Islam 33.9%, Protestantism⁴ 18.6%, Catholicism 0.7%, indigenous beliefs 2.6% and others⁵ 0.6% (CSA, 2007). In one way or another, both Christianity and Islam were imported from outside (the Middle East) either through official state acceptance by the emperors of the

³ Orthodox Christianity includes the ‘Tewahdo, Kibat and Tsega doctrines’. Tewahdo means ‘united’ or ‘unionite’ which is related with the nature of Christ where it maintains that Christ had only one nature in that the Human and Divine nature of Him are completely united which could not be divided or separated. The Kibat doctrine (Unionists), on the other hand, believes that Christ has received his Divinity from his unction or anointing by the Holy Spirit at his Baptism. Tsega (Grace) doctrine believes that Jesus Christ became Divine by adoption when God the Father proclaimed him “MY SON” through grace, at the baptism.

⁴ Protestantism includes the Seven Day Adventist, Pentecostal, Lutheran, Baptist, Anglican, Presbyterian, ‘Mesorete Kirstos’, ‘Mu1u Wongel’, Kale Hiwot etc. and

⁵ The ‘Other’ category comprises the Jehovah, Behais, Jews, Hindus, etc. (CSA, 2007: 71)
kingdom or missionary activities. Both of which, over centuries of interaction with local cultures and traditions, were indigenized into the local cultures incorporating many indigenous creeds and practices (Trimingham, 1952). As a result, they could be well taken as indigenous social and cultural phenomenon instead of purely imported religious dogmas from abroad.

**A brief historical account of state-religion relations in Ethiopia**

During the imperial era, three combined homogenizing elements (Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity and Semitic culture) were used as litmus tests to screen out the fit and unfit candidates for Ethiopian officioldom (Wudu, 2006: 241-242, citing Abebe Fisseha, 2000: 165). This policy of assimilation was practiced for centuries despite the diverse nature of Ethiopian society. Loyalties to one’s religious and ethnic identities, other than the above specified core religious and ethnic identities, were regarded as antithesis to the Ethiopian ‘nation-state’. Hence, homogenizing the diverse society through ethnic and religious ‘melting pot’ strategy was the ‘only option’ and the emperors did it openly. The 1955 Revised Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia legally instituted Amharic and Orthodox Christianity as official language and state religion (arts 125 and 126 respectively). It required the Emperor to be a member of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (hereafter, EOC). The 1960 Civil Code recognized the legal personality of the EOC by law while other religious groupings were subject to registration and renewal based on the laws of association or other special laws concerning them (arts 398 and 407 respectively).

Nonetheless, the efforts of the previous regimes to forge ‘a single national identity through linguistic and religious uniformity’ proved to be futile and engendered discontents and open protests from the oppressed religious and ethnic groups, the peasant masses, urban dwellers and the Ethiopian students in the 1960s and even earlier. Muslims, in particular, opposed the privileged status of the EOC as a state religion and claimed for religious parity (Wudu, 2006: 283). The opposition finally culminated in the February 1974 Revolution which resulted in the ultimate demise of the imperial regime and its replacement with the military rule, popularly called Derg. The Derg regime came up with the new Marxist-Leninist ideology and in a breakthrough from the past legacies; it officially declared the equality of all religions that heralded the complete divorce between the EOC and the Ethiopian state. It boldly proclaimed that, “state/government and religion are separate; the legal personalities of religious institutions are to be determined by law” (art 46 of 1987 PDRE Constitution). Notwithstanding the official rhetoric, taking into account of the socialist and atheist policies of Derg, it was barely possible to talk about religious equality and freedom. The regime not only distanced itself from religion but also persecuted the expression of religions applying the same or similar degree of state-led hatred against all religions in the country. By its successive decrees, proclamations and official orders, the military government made its objectives crystal clear in a form of warning: “all Ethiopians [should] avoid religious differences and work for the unity of the country” (Wudu, 2006: 293). It explicitly cautioned religious institutions and adherents that ‘there is no place for religious fanaticism or prejudice in socialist Ethiopia’ and declared religion to be a private matter with no roles in politics. Nonetheless, for easing the grievances of the previously oppressed religious communities, Derg made some concessions for religious equality in the country.

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6 According to the 2007 official report of the FDRE Central Statistics Authority (CSA), there are more than 85 ethnic groups in Ethiopia with roughly equal number of languages and cultures.
7 Marxist-Leninist ideology, with regard to religion, was with the conviction that progress in science and technology would lead to the elimination of religious consciousness. For it, ‘the ensuing secularization at the social and political levels was designed to assault and eradicate religion using the state apparatus, often in the most brutal ways, in order to bring about a thorough and consistently hard secular society’ (Kosmin, n.d: 9).
8 For example, it recognized the three Muslim holidays- Eid al-Adha, Eid al-Fatir and Mewlid (birthday of Prophet Mohammed) as national holidays and their celebrations took place in public places for the first time in the country’s history in 1974.
Part II
The legal framework for freedom of religion and secularism: post-1991 period

The guarantee to freedom of religion is to be found in almost all ‘liberal democratic constitutions’.
At the same time, almost all liberal democracies maintain the principle of secularism. However,
maintaining the delicate balance between the principles of secularism and religious freedom
remains to be a daunting task for all governments across the globe. Secularism, as I discussed
erlier, is about limiting the public role of religion in order to ensure the freedom of the state from
undue influence of religion. In practice, religious groups are not happy about their roles to be
limited only at the private realm while leaving the public spheres for the secularist politicians.
Hence, they are claiming for more roles. The government also tries to defend its vital roles in public
spheres free from religious influence and interference. It forces religious groups and activists
to retreat from such places, sometimes with the use of its coercive arms (such as secular laws,policies and actions). In this regard, demands of religious activists for more visibility and roles
in the public sphere, including politics, poses a serious threat for secularism in many countries.
Undoubtedly, the restrictive policies and actions of governments over religious practices for the
sake of maintaining the principle of secularism also limit the rights and freedoms of religious
groups. Tensions and frictions between the two actors remain a persistent phenomenon that calls
constant negotiation and renegotiation.

With its democratic deficits, the debate on the constitution-making process during the transitional
period of Ethiopia (1994) reflects two extreme strands with regard to state-religion relations;
one from the previously privileged religion and its supporters and the other from the previously
marginalized religions and their proponents. The previously established official Church claims
not only the restoration of its properties confiscated by the Derg but also its ‘stolen status quo
as a state religion’ (Wolde Selassie, 2012: 142). There were some reflections from the members of
the EOC that the national church status of the EOC, which was illegally taken, if not stolen, by
Derg should be reinstated under the EPRDF, though remained at a minority in the debate. There
were also demands from the previously marginalized religious communities, in particular, from
the Muslims for the incorporation of their Shari’a law in the Constitution – though their desire
failed to come true. They struggled for the inclusion of shari’a law and other religious-related
provisions in the Constitution as a means of guaranteeing religious equality (Abbink, 2013: 6; Ostebo,
2010: 40). They openly expressed their feelings in the November 1994 demonstration held
immediately before the ratification of the Constitution in 1994 (ibid). One participant during the
constitution-making process said that, “Muslims of Ethiopia demanded the inclusion of shari’a
law in the Constitution not to make the country a ‘theocratic state governed by shar’a’ but as a
remedy for the past injustice and as a guarantee to prevent the return of previous discriminations”
(Minutes of Constituent Assembly Meeting No. 1-26).

Within the Constitution Commission, the body which was tasked to prepare the draft version, there
were members who proposed a more passive secularism, where the public roles of religion have

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9 In a research conducted by the Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life (2009: 8) on 198 countries, “76% of countries and territories [...] call for freedom of religion in their constitutions or basic laws and an additional 20% protect some religious practices”.
10 For example, some strong political parties or liberation fronts such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were excluded from the process.
11 In fact, there are some provisions included in the Constitution with reference to religion but are only limited for marriage, property, inheritance and other personal affairs. Art 34 (sub art 4) recognizes to marriage concluded under a religious law while sub art 5 allows the adjudication of disputes related to personal and family laws in accordance with religious laws provided that the two parties consented to that effect. Art 78(5) of the constitution also provides for the possibilities of granting official recognitions to religious courts by the House of People’s Representatives and the State Councils.
12 As provided by Ahmet Kuru (2007: 571), there are generally two types of secularism; assertive and passive. Assertive secularism is a ‘comprehensive doctrine’ that aims to eliminate religion from the public sphere while passive secularism allows the public visibility of religious symbols and the government plays only ‘passive’ roles in restricting freedom of religious expressions. In assertive secularism states play active roles in suppressing the public display of religious symbols and try to introduce social ethics to govern their ideal republics at the total exclusion of religion.
to be entertained in the Constitution. They argue that, in a deeply religious society like Ethiopia, expulsion of religion from public affairs could adversely affect the stability of the state in general and the normal functioning of the political system in particular by forcing religion to comeback in a backdoor.\textsuperscript{13} Andreas Eshete, who was one of the group that proposed passive secularism, argued in favor of adopting a more pragmatic and inclusionary institutional arrangement that embrace religious roles at public spheres on the basis of positive and negative implications of doing that. On the positive note, he argues that, religions usually secure grass-root support from the community that could be exploited by the government making them partners in its development and democratization efforts. This is exactly what Tariq Modood (2010: 6) called: “An organized religion is ... a potential public good or national resource (not just a private benefit), which the state can in some circumstances assist to realize”. Curtailing religion at home or at the private level or totally expelling from public spheres, he argues, is not only undesirable but also tantamount to loosing the benefits that it could offer to the society and the country at large. He provides that, an organized religion with ‘limited and proper place’ at the public sphere could be helpful in different spheres of the state’s activities; it could be an input in the legislative forum, on moral and welfare issues, as a partner for the state in the provision of public services such as education, healthcare, and other social services and even share the burden of the state by taking responsibilities on wedding and funeral activities, to mention the least.

On the negative note, in the debate over state-religion relations in Ethiopia during the constitution-making process, Andreas provides that, excluding religion from the public sphere could instigate conflict and is tantamount to allowing politics to be played under religious cover. This is now exactly reflected in the government’s allegation of some religious groups and opposition political parties ‘playing politics in religious cards’.

In the final setup, the ideological conviction of the EPRDF, the major architect of the Constitution, coupled with the diverse but competing interests of various religions partly informed the (absolute) separation clause of the 1995 FDRE Constitution. The Constitution unequivocally establishes the equality of all religions and the separation of state and religion (Art. 11). It declares that; “state and religion are separate, there shall be no state religion, and the state shall not interfere in religious matters and religion shall not interfere in state affairs” (sub arts 1-3). The Constitution contains various provisions which in one or another way refer to religion. Art 3(2) illustrates the emblem of the national flag that reflects the hope of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (NNP) as well as religious communities of Ethiopia to live together in equality and unity. Art 27(1) guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion for everyone which includes the freedom to hold or adopt a religion of one’s choice, and the freedom either individually or in community with others, and in public or private to manifest one’s religion in worship, observance, practice and teaching. Believers are entitled to establish institutions of religious education and administration in order to propagate and organize their religion (art 27 (2)), without prejudice to the provisions of sub art 2 of art 90\textsuperscript{14}. It guarantees individuals from being coerced to adopt a certain religious thought which would restrict or prevent their freedom to hold a belief of their choice (art 27(3)). Unless there are compelling reasons to do so, these freedoms could not be restricted by the government. The external aspect of the freedom, that is, the manifestation of one’s religious belief may be subject to limitation only “to protect public safety, peace, health, education, public morality or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, and to ensure the independence of the state from religion” (art 27(5)).

In the presence of legal guarantee, however, as the government claims through state media and its various policy documents, religious fundamentalists are now trying to stretch their rights and

\textsuperscript{13} Information provided by Dereje Feyissa from the discussion he has with Andreas Eshete, May 13, 2012, Addis Ababa.

\textsuperscript{14} Sub art 2 of art 90 illustrates that 'education shall be provided in a manner that is free from religious influence, political partisanship or cultural prejudices'.
go beyond the constitutional limits for ousting the government in an unlawful manner to institute their religious dogmas by establishing a ‘theocratic state’ in Ethiopia\textsuperscript{15}.

\textbf{Part III}

\textbf{Challenges to the secular state order: the government’s perspective}

In spite of the legal frameworks and the practical measures that guarantee religious freedom and equality\textsuperscript{16}, the government claims that, there are some fundamentalist religious groups from all religions who have the temptation to misuse – not to say abuse – their constitutional rights and are propagating a ‘theocratic state’ by ousting the secular government through unconstitutional means (Meles Zenawi, 17 April 2012 Parliamentary Session). The threat of religious fundamentalism as an imminent threat for Ethiopia’s secular political order and survival was reflected in the 2012 parliamentary discussion, where the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi\textsuperscript{17} responded to different questions raised by the Members of Parliament. Among others, the one raised by Honorable Mohammed Abdosh was directly relevant for the purpose of this research;

\begin{quote}
While religious freedom and equality is anchored in the Constitution and all religions are freely practicing their religious rites (worship), why is religious fundamentalism and extremism observed in some parts of the country? What are the sources of these problems? (17 April 2012 Parliamentary Session, Author’s own translation from Amharic).
\end{quote}

Without specifying what elements that ‘religious fundamentalism’ constitute and what kind of challenges it poses to the secular state order, he further elaborated his questions in a form of leading questions and warning. He said:

\begin{quote}
Unless these signs of religious fundamentalism and extremism are dealt and protected at their early stages, there is fear among the general public that they could be transformed into terrorism with severe consequences. There are different ‘internal and external anti-peace forces’ who are taking shelter in religion [for their own political goals] (ibid).
\end{quote}

In his response, the late Prime Minister acknowledged the presence of threats of religious fundamentalism in the country. Islamic fundamentalists of the Salafis/Wahhabis and the Mahbere Kidusan were the major targets of his speech. He accused of the Mahbere Kidusan (association of saints) from Christianity for harboring intentions to ‘restore the privileged status of the EOC’ that it enjoyed during the imperial era. He elaborated that;

\begin{quote}
One of the slogans in the recent (2012) Timket (Epiphany) in Addis Ababa was unconstitutional – which declared ‘one country, one religion.’ We don’t have a constitution that says ‘one country, one religion.’ The Constitution says; ‘one country but whatever number of religions’. Those who carried this slogan were few. Although their number is few, this event showed us that, there are individuals/groups who want to erode the constitutional principle [of secularism] and establish a Christian government in Ethiopia. These are mostly people who lack awareness and can be corrected through
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15}For detailed information in this regard, see, for example, a documentary entitled Jihadawi Harekat (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPddMM7sN-Qs) and the 17 April 2012 parliamentary speech of the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, both of which broadcasted through the Ethiopian Television (ETV) – now renamed as Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC).

\textsuperscript{16}The United States Department of State generally reports positive policies and practices of the Ethiopian government for the respect of religious freedom until 2010 though some changes are observed after 2011 where the government is alleged in intervening in religious affairs particularly on the government-backed Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council. See, for example, 2013 Report on International Religious Freedom Report – Ethiopia, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53d9077b4.html.

\textsuperscript{17}Meles Zenawi, one of the prominent political figures in the EPRDF’s reign has served as a President during the Transitional Period (1991-1994). He then became Prime Minister of the FDRE following the 1995 national election and served as a prime minister for four consecutive terms (a total of more than 20 years) until his sudden and unexpected natural death in August 2012.
education (Author’s translation, extracted from Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s speech to the FDRE Parliament, 17 April 2012).

Based on his speech, there are quite few individuals from the Orthodox Christian community who are misusing their constitutional rights of religious freedom to ‘restore’ the historically hegemonic Christian rule by establishing a Christian government in the country. However, as stated by the Prime Minister, these groups of people are acting in this way for lack of awareness about their constitutional rights and duties – not inherently bad, intolerant or fundamentalist in their thinking. Hence, they can be straightened through education and awareness creation both by government organs and religious leaders.

There are Muslim counterparts, as he said, “even bigger in number and more dangerous than those who carried the slogan of one country-one religion”, who want to establish an Islamic state in Ethiopia. In his explanation, unlike the Christians, he categorized Islam and the Muslims into ‘nebar’ (indigenous) and ‘metie’ (exotic). He stated that;

There is nebar (indigenous) Islam in Ethiopia which stayed for centuries. This is called Sufi Islam. In all Ethiopian regional states, hundred percent of the Muslims were Sufis. There is no Shi’a in Ethiopia. The so-called Salafi (Wahhabi) came to the country within the last 20 or 30 years. The rest is all Sufi. The Sufis coexisted peacefully with the Christians for thousands of years better than any other part of the world, notwithstanding the discriminatory policies of the previous regimes [against Muslims] (ibid).

To illustrate the peaceful coexistence of Sufi Muslims and Christians, he mentioned an example from one village in Wollo. In that particular village, Christians decided to relocate their church to another place due to the recurrence of drought in the area. Muslims opposed the transfer of an Orthodox Church to a different area considering the Church as part and parcel of the village’s heritage – not a property of Christians alone. This might be an extreme example of ‘Sufi’ Muslims and Christians peaceful coexistence and cooperation but it was true (Meles Zenawi, 17 April 2012 Parliamentary Session). What makes it unique, he explains, is not because it was such exemplary model of cooperation and coexistence but happened in an atmosphere of discrimination and marginalization of Muslims by the state official policies. In spite of these positive legacies, the Muslim-Christian peaceful coexistence and the secular principle of the state, is now under challenge by the Salafi/Wahhabi fundamentalist teachings (ibid). It is obvious from his speech that, his government inclined towards ‘favoring or endorsing Sufi Islam as tolerant and acceptable vis-à-vis the Salafis whom he calls as intolerant and hence unacceptable’. Not only their inherent intolerance towards other religions that was focused in the discussion but also their fundamentalist/violent inclinations and collaborations with international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida. He stressed that;

It is known that, most of the members of al-Qaida terrorist group [at the global level] are Salafis. This does not, however, mean that ‘all Salafis are al-Qaida’. Saying this is not only wrong but also crime. But all al-Qaida members are Salafis. For the first time in Ethiopia, an al-Qaida cell has been discovered - mainly in Bale and Arsi [Oromia National Regional State]. All members of this group were Salafis. This does not again mean that all Salafis in Ethiopia are al-Qaida; most of them are not. [...] The Salafis claim that], ‘majority of Ethiopians are Muslims; the religious figure presented by CSA is false’. Hence, they use it as a justification to their ultimate goal of ‘establishing an Islamic state of Ethiopia’. Some Salafis even condemn the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians in the country (ibid).

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18 The term Wahhabi is derived from its founder Muhammad Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792) with a mission of ‘religious obligation to spread the call (da’awa) [for people] for the restoration of pure monotheistic worship (profess in Allah’s Unity]’ (Commins, 2006: xi). Despite the labeling of this group with Wahhabism, they prefer to call themselves ‘salafi’- one who follows the ways of the first Muslim ancestors (salaf)” (ibid).
In his speech, the Prime Minister spotlighted that, “unless the government takes an appropriate and timely measures on these extremist groups, the danger is clear and imminent from what the Salafis are doing in Yemen, Libya, Syria and Tunisia.” Some of these extremist groups are creating trouble in such countries and ‘our Salafis’ are trying to bring ‘the Arab Spring’ home in collaboration with ‘bankrupt politicians’, who are unsuccessful in the political arena.” The late PM, representing the government, believed that, the Salafis in Ethiopia are recruiting young innocent Muslims, who are unaware of its ‘extremist’ ideology and their rights and duties enshrined in the Constitution. The majority of Muslims, who joined this group, were unaware of their constitutional rights and duties or because of false promise; if they are properly educated about separation of state and religion and their constitutional duties, they will be on the right path. But, if the government fails to do that, the PM warned, the disaster to the country’s peace and stability will be so immense.

**Religious fundamentalism**

The term fundamentalism is the most controversial and politically-loaded term, where its original meaning is used, misused and abused by various actors to advance their own respective goals. The Oxford English Dictionary defines fundamentalism as; “a form of Protestant Christianity which upholds belief in the strict and literal interpretation of the Bible [and/or] the strict maintenance of the ancient or fundamental doctrines of any religion or ideology.” In this context, an individual who strictly follows or upholds the fundamentals of the Bible or the Quran is regarded as fundamentalist. This does not mean that the person who follows the fundamentals of his/her religious dogmas is necessarily against the secular order of a state. However, some scholars emphasize the political motivations behind fundamentalism rather than a pure act of literal interpretation and application of the texts of religious scriptures (Thompson, 2006: 20). Apart from creating a closed community secluding from the evil effects of modernism, fundamentalists work for “... chang[ing] their environment to fit their ideology ... by taking over or otherwise altering their state’s regime through either peaceful political means or militant and violent strategies” (Anonym, n.d: 23 quoting Appleby, 2001: 86). From the above definitions, it is understandable that, religious fundamentalism can be manifested either in political terms in the form of overthrowing a political regime, whom they perceive is an obstacle for the public dominance of their religious virtues, by violence (terrorism) and/or through election or in non-political terms in the form of purging their religion from the traditional practices and moral lax. It also entails the feature of intolerance towards other religions and the co-religionists who are supposed to be not strictly observing their religious duties as prescribed in the respective religious scriptures.

In order to fulfill their objectives, fundamentalists usually recruit youths who are educated but unemployed and those aggrieved with the existing system and modernity. Disseminating propagandas through different communication technologies like the internet, mobile and other social media such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and other means available to the people are also at the disposal of these groups.

**Manifestations of religious fundamentalism in Ethiopia**

Many of government sources reveal that, although ethnic conflicts arising out of the problems of boundary demarcation and competition for scarce resources and power might contribute for the instability of Ethiopia, religious extremism and fundamentalism by far poses the greatest challenge. Among others, a document entitled – Yehaimanot Akrarinetnina Yegosa Gichitochin Yeminfetabet Agerawi Eqid Meneshawechina Aqitachawech – literally means, A National Plan for Managing Religious Extremism and Ethnic Conflicts: Background and Directions (2011), prepared and disseminated for the public in 2011 gives a wide coverage to religious extremism and the means to cope with the problem.

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10 Grahame Thompson (2006) argues that, it is to the interest of the fundamentalists to discourage believers from communicating with outsiders in order to create a closed community ‘to save theirs from evils’.
As we have seen earlier, the government believes that, contrary to the 1995 FDRE Constitution, fundamentalists from both Christianity and Islam are trying to constitute a theocratic government in Ethiopia. Both groups are recruiting membership from their respective co-religionists for realizing their goals using different methods, including arranging training opportunities domestically and abroad. As government sources indicate, there are considerable numbers of believers from both sides joining these extremist groups without having sufficient knowledge about their objectives. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government to split the extremists from the innocent masses through public awareness creation. In dealing with the problems, one has to ask how the government understands religious fundamentalism in Ethiopia as it has direct implications on government responses and strategies to handle the problem. This part mainly discusses the various forms of religious fundamentalism in the two major religions of the country (Islam and Christianity).

**Islamic fundamentalism**

According to government sources (Addis Raey, 2012: 24; Yehaimanot, 2011: 11), one of the ultimate goals of Islamic fundamentalists in Ethiopia is nothing but “establishing an Islamic government based on shari’a law”. For the realization of their grand mission, they devised both short and long term plans. In the short term, they engage with the government in a way that looks like military combat. They mobilize the community under the pretext that, “Islam was/is dominated and marginalized in Ethiopia” (Woldeselassie, 2012: 145). They depict the previous regimes’ policies of discrimination and marginalization of Muslims in a more exaggerated manner and agitate the Muslim community that, “these policies and practices are still continuing in the EPRDF regime” (ibid). They preach that, the EPRDF-led government is in favor of Christianity at the exclusion of Islam and try to justify their actions for removing the system in any possible means available to them (including violence). Refuting this assertion, however, one informant said that, “in fact, the memory of second-class citizenship and oppressed- mentality is still fresh in the minds of many Muslims, but no one blames the EPRDF for this, except requesting for properly rectifying the injustices committed in the past”. Woldeselassie further argues that, fundamentalist groups oppose the constitutional provision that declares the separation of state and religion as anti-Quran and against the principle of Islam (ibid).

The government document indicates that, contrary to the principle of freedom of education from the influence of religion as enshrined in the Constitution under Art. 90 sub art. 2, the fundamentalists request educational administrations to grant worshiping places for congregational pray and allow ‘unacceptable Islamic dressings’ such as niqab (Addis Raey, 2009: 6). They also instigate believers to quarrel against other religious believers with false allegation that: “the Holy Quran is torn apart or used as toilet paper; [Christians] insulted Prophet Mohammed etc.” without any tangible evidence to corroborate their allegation (Yehaimanot, 2011: 12). On top of this, Muslim extremists involve in “burning churches, killing Christians, agitating the people not to pay taxes to the [Christian] government, not to take credit from government banks etc” (ibid).

In the long run, they plan to train their members in secondary and higher educational institutions in cooperation with foreign aid agencies and Islamic NGOs. They arrange foreign scholarships for their members in “Sudan, Egypt and other Middle East countries” (Woldeselassie, 2012: 145). The government believes that, some Islamic fundamentalists are focusing on the youth, occupying government machineries or institutions and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme

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20 Interview, 25 November 2014
21 Niqab covers a Muslim woman’s whole face with the exception of her eyes. Hijab, on the other hand, is a head covering that usually conceals a woman’s hair and neck. Wearing of niqab is not a common practice in Ethiopia compared with the hijab. Even in higher institutions, niqab-wearing female students are quite few.
Council (Mejilis) leadership. They try to inculcate the idea of extremism in the minds of students starting from the kindergarten all the way to universities. They encourage the construction of illegal mosques everywhere even in places that are inconvenient, if not impossible, for religious preaching using megaphones. They obtain land under the disguise of private endowment. As stated in some government documents, fundamentalists encourage innocent believers to handover their private property for the illegal activity of dominating the public space in order to realize their ultimate objective of establishing an Islamic state in Ethiopia. Some of them even involve actively in government bureaucracies, including the ruling party’s political positions pretending to be supporters, for the sole purpose of controlling government institutions for their own fundamentalist goals (Yehaimanot, 2011: 13).

In addition to their intolerant behaviors towards followers of other religions and the secular state order, the ‘exotics’ usually called the Salafis/Wahhabis, are challenging the long-held practices of Sufi Muslims in the country. They actively oppose their co-religionists whom they believe are excessively lax in upholding their religious duties and are traditionalist or culture-oriented in their practice (ibid). The Salafis consider the practice of Sufism such as religious rituals, celebration of Mewlid (birthday of Prophet Mohammed), saint veneration, pilgrimage to tombs etc. as shirk (worshiping things other than Allah) or regards such acts as un-Islamic. The Salafis mainly depend on Islamic scriptures (Quran and Hadith) as authentic sources of Islam and shari’a law as the real source of justice and social equity (Ostebo, 2010: 47).

If one thoroughly examines the above discussions, it is clear that the government’s perspective towards Muslims seem to have failed to differentiate Muslim activists and peaceful protesters who oppose what they consider ‘government interference in their religious affairs’ from extremists who really harbor political ambitions. The government’s position appeared to have been influenced by the positions of western governments towards Islam and Muslims after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Some research works on Islam in Africa divides the Islamic scene in the continent into so-called African Islam and Reformist Islam, which – by accident or otherwise – exactly coincides with the dichotomization of Ethiopian Muslims by the government. The former is related with Sufi practice and interpreted to denote as “tolerant, quiescent, and impotent in politics”, whereas, the latter being influenced by the radical interpretation of Islam and radical Muslim scholars, is used interchangeably with Salafism/Wahhabism, fundamentalism and hence political Islam (Otayek and Soares, 2007). Salafism/Wahhabism or Reformist Islam opposes the practice of Sufism, which recognizes and accepts the intermediary role of saints between ordinary Muslims and God (Allah) and some cultural practices in the society as part of Islam. As Otayek and Soares (2007: 6) puts it, this dichotomy of Islam as ‘African Islam’ of Sufi orders and Reformist or fundamentalist of Salafi orders has a deficiency in having a clear understanding about Islam but practically influenced the US policy-makers, particularly after 9/11, to deal accordingly (with military might, while working in cooperation with the moderates). Some, like the Rand Corporation Report (2003), even suggested for ‘encouraging the Sufis’ at the expense of Salafis/Wahhabis to tackle the ‘dangers of political Islam and global terrorism’. It recommends for developing partnerships with Muslims who have ‘democratic mindset or good Muslims (i.e. Sufis)’ for the sake of undermining the activities of ‘radicals or bad Muslims (i.e. Salafis)’, based on the principle that dictates – “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” (ibid).

22 For the obvious reason of the impact of globalization, the Ethiopian case could not be seen separately from the global realities. The so-called war on terror has influenced and/or inspired the Ethiopian government to closely watch the activities of its Muslim communities. See, for example, some scholars such as Craig (2013: 45) who argue that, the escalation of Islamophobic stands in the West after 9/11 directly influenced and shaped the ‘negative’ attitudes of the Ethiopian government towards Muslims. He said; “like many political actors in the west, the government in Ethiopia has been actively engaged, since the end of 2011, in colossal fear-mongering about the threat of terrorists and extremists in the country: it has released horror-inducing films, and broadcast bombastic news reports, on “Islamic terrorism”. However, as Craig provides, the Ethiopian government’s anti-Islamic stance is much different from the western political actors in such a way that, “…no independent sources during this period has ever identified an organized Ethiopian Islamist group that aspired to either fight the ‘un-Islamic order’, or the ‘enemies of Islam’ by waging jihad and conducting terrorist acts”.

Peace, Federalism and Human Rights
In the Ethiopian context, Haggai Erlich (2010: 128, quoted in Karbo, 2013: 48) divides Islam into Ethiopian Islam or African Islam and Middle Eastern Arab Islam or Fundamentalist Islam. The former is characterized by its flexibility “… with popular set of beliefs, traditions and customs with the acceptance of Ethiopia and its legitimacy as a land led by Christian establishment”. The latter, as Erlich argues, “…rejects Christian-led Ethiopia and works to win Ethiopia for Islam”. The Ethiopian government supported the efforts of Mejilis leadership in bringing the so-called Sufi-oriented al-Ahbash Muslim scholars from Lebanon, probably as a way for countering the growing ‘challenges’ of reformist and/or ‘radical’ Salafi Islam (Yuunus, 2013: 35). Dichotomizing Islam into ‘moderate and radical’ is also now widely diffused in the policy circles of the Ethiopian government. In one of the policy papers presented for public discussion, the government made its strategy crystal clear that: “it will work in cooperation with Muslims of democratic thinking and moderate stand in their religious views” (Yehaimanot, 2011: 20). According to the document, most Salafis are considered as ‘dangerous’ for the peaceful Muslim-Christian coexistence in the country and are ‘enemies’ of the FDRE Constitution that celebrates the separation of state and religion (secularism). This act of the government fits into what Mahmood Mamdani (2002) termed as ‘bad and good Muslims’, mainly used for recruiting friendship with the former while ‘drawing a red- line’ against the latter. The use of more noisy and unpleasant terms for Muslims such as extremist vs. moderate, terrorist vs. pacifist, good vs. bad, peaceful vs. violent would certainly create divisions within the Muslim community itself and suspicion from the non-Muslims over the activities of Muslims, which in turn damages the peaceful coexistence of religious groups in the country. This categorization, in some cases, pushes the so-called moderates to the hardliners’ bloc. The effects of this policy – marginalization and discrimination of part of the Muslim community – could aggravate problems of extremism by further radicalizing the so-called radicals. Moreover, the simplistic approach of dichotomizing the Muslim community into contrasted camps by the government (either with us – or – with the terrorists) coupled with the ‘global war on terror’, made some Ethiopian Muslims feel more alienated from the nation’s body politics and may push them to resort to other means available, including violence.

Despite the assertion of some scholars about the presence of a growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism and the emergence of political Islam, working for “political victory for Islam” (Erlich, 2005: 176, quoted in Ostebo, 2010: 31), Ostebo’s (2010) contends that, extremism in its political form is less powerful in Ethiopia. According to him, Ethiopian Islamist reform movement is more directed at ‘purifying Islam’ and claiming for religious equality and freedom, instead of establishing an Islamic state. Moreover, the government’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism and political Islam working for ‘establishing an Islamic state’ is in sharp contrast with the narratives and deeds of Muslim activists. They persistently expressed their grievances of government intervention in religious affairs through letters and peaceful protests while calling for the full implementation of government policies of secularism.23 None of them demanded an Islamic state or have showed any indication to that effect24. Some activists publicly opposed any claim or demand for an Islamic state, if any, not only for pragmatic reasons of the impracticability of this ideology in a multi-religious country like Ethiopia but also as a matter of principle25.

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23 Letters by the Muslims’ Solution Finding Committee submitted to various government offices, including the Prime Minister’s Office
24 It is to be remembered that, large number of Muslim gatherings in Addis Ababa and other major cities of the country rose up in protest almost routinely after every Friday prayer (juma’a salat) against perceived government interference in their religious affairs in the form of imposing new but deviant sect of Islam called al-Abbash and demanding the replacement of the existing ‘unelected’ Mejilis leadership with the elected ones. Starting from late 2011 (throughout 2012), the protesters stood in firm, sustained and voiced loud opposition against, what they call “government’s flagrant intervention in their religious affairs”.
25 Interview with a Muslim activist, 25 November 2014
Christian fundamentalism in the EOC

Religious fundamentalism in Orthodox Christianity is represented through a religious association called Mahbere Kidusan, which advocates for the ‘restoration of the privileged status of the EOC as a national church’. As stated in the ruling party’s document, although religious equality and freedom are guaranteed by the Constitution, some members in the EOC propagate for establishing a ‘Christian government or return the status quo of the EOC’ (Addis Raey, 2013: 38; Yehaimanot, 2011). With its long tradition of dependence on the state, it is quite natural and expected for the EOC to resist the change. Some members of the Mahbere Kidusan claim that, the religious freedom guaranteed in the FDRE Constitution and the subsequent opening of the country’s door for western liberal democracy and secularism is not welcomed by the Church. It, as they believe, undermined the hegemonic power and control over its adherents. They claim; its ‘sheep’ are now being stolen from their house (EOC) by the ‘aggressive and unethical’ Protestant evangelism.

As we have discussed above, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister mentioned the Mahbere Kidusan as one branch of the Church “working for the restoration of ‘one country, one religion policy’ of the imperial regime”. The government says: this fundamentalist group “preaches racist politics in religious institutions, use the finance of the religious institutions to support opposition parties and collaborate in anti-government demonstrations” (Yehaimanot, 2011: 13-14). They disseminate propaganda in press and electronic media portraying the EPRDF-led government as the “enemy of Orthodox Christianity” (Woldeselassie, 2012: 142). Moreover, some of them accuse the government of being remained indifferent while Christians were persecuted in different parts of the country by Muslim extremists (ibid). The religious equality guaranteed and the inclusion of the state-religion separation clause in the 1995 Constitution is also misunderstood as if it were included to undermine the roles of the Church. For achieving their goals, members of this group mobilize the people in “religious institutions, different associations, primary and secondary schools, colleges and universities” to stand in opposition against the government (ibid). According to Woldeselassie (2012), they are doing their best to stir up antagonism between the people and the government, creating animosity among different religious followers through audio and video recordings. Their allegation is directed against the EPRDF government, which they perceive, has given less emphasis for the Orthodox Church. The government’s policies and actions with regard to religious freedom, equality and secularism are (mis)interpreted as deliberate measures to undermine the contributions of the Church for Ethiopia’s independence and development for centuries.

Population census result, which is always highly politicized in Ethiopian history, is also at the disposal of the fundamentalists manipulating it to their advantage. Some EOC members openly objected the 2007 population and housing census result, which, in their perspective, understated the Orthodox Christian population (Abbink, 2011: 269-270). For them, the Orthodox Christian believers constitute about 80 percent of the total population and the 43.5% official report of the government is a ‘false fabrication’ aimed at overstating the number of Muslims and Protestants in the country. According to them, this in turn is targeted for weakening the Church’s vital roles in social, economic and political spheres in the future (Woldeselassie, 2012: 142). In terms of exponential growth, it is the Protestants that scored a remarkable achievement in the country’s religious figure by a national record or of probably world record of the fastest religious growth from a margin of 10% in 1994 to 18.6% percent in 2007. What makes even interesting is, the increase in the Protestants (10 to 18.6) is roughly equal to the decrease in the number of Orthodox Christians (from 50.6 to 43.5%). The Muslims (33.9%) scored only a 1.1 percent increment from the 1994 census. Worth mentioning here is that, the 2007 census result is objected by many

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26 Interview, 26 November 2014
27 The 1994 census result was objected by most ethnic groups and various religious communities in which case the Prime Minister’s Office was obliged to withhold the official announcement for almost a year (Abbink, 2011: 269).
ethnic and religious groups in the country. In the era of politicization of identity in post-1991 Ethiopia, every ethnic and religious group in the country strives for getting its share increased, in some instances, with financial and power-sharing entitlements. It was one of the contentious issues in revealing and approving the 2007 census result by the FDRE Parliament (reported on 04 December 2008, eight months later than planned) (Abbink, 2011) because of opposition, particularly from the Amhara and Addis Ababa representatives and the Muslim and Orthodox Christian communities. The Orthodox Church and Muslims, particularly from the Diaspora, submitted their complaints to the Prime Minister’s Office stating that, “their respective numbers has been reduced unjustifiably”. Badr International Ethiopian Muslims Federation (www.biemf.org), for example, lodged a petition to the FDRE Parliament, the Prime Minister’s Office, the CSA and other government organs and the Mejilis against the results of the 2007 population census. The government withholds the official announcement of the result for more than eight months that it was normally expected to be revealed, partly related with the complaints for re-checking the error, if any28.

More than anything else, fundamentalists in the EOC oppose the state-religion separation clause, complaining that, “this constitutional provision does not take into account of the historical contributions of the Church – more than other religions – for the development and independence of Ethiopia” (Woldeselassie, 2012: 142). The EOC always praises its ‘special contributions’ for the country’s educational system by developing its own alphabets (Geez and Amharic scripts); perhaps, while Muslims used to borrow Arabic scripts from Arab countries, and the Church’s efforts to provide education for the Ethiopian people29. It also claims that, the Church participated in defending the country’s independence from colonial powers while the Muslims, the Protestants and the Catholics ‘sought and obtained foreign support.’ Stating simply, the Church is invoking religious nationalism since it believed that its power base is threatened by the expansion of other ‘newcomers’, which have less or no contribution for the country’s independence and development. Generally, the Church considers itself as ‘indigenous’ while all others as ‘newcomers’ and the EOC as the only “true bastion of the national interest of Ethiopia” (Dereje, 2011: 5). And hence, the Church should not be treated in the same way as other religious groups or institutions understating its historical contributions for the country and the people (Woldeselassie, 2012: 142). In public religious holidays, members of this group also appear with a flag which is officially outlawed by the FDRE Constitution and deliberately wear T-shirts inscribed with a slogan of ‘andi hager, andi haimanot - one country, one religion’ against the fundamental principles of the constitution (Meles Zenawi, April 2012).

Contrary to government’s views and accusations of the association, the Mahbere Kidusan made its purposes and objectives crystal clear that, “it is established with the full knowledge and endorsement of the EOC Synod to spread the teachings of the Church to the community and support the Church in its administrative endeavors”. The association was founded in 1989 by graduates from various universities of the country (Mahbere Kidusan, 2008). It was established with the purpose of promoting and protecting the faith and with the mission of spreading the word of God through evangelism and proselytization (ibid). The relationship between the Ethiopian government and the association was generally smooth up to 2005 but their relations started to deteriorate following the 2005 national election where some of its members were accused of supporting opposition political parties and implicated with harboring religious fundamentalism. One of the documents released by the Ministry of Federal Affairs revealed that, “though the association’s objectives are clear and legal, they are falling into [the] hands of some radicals and

28 Showing the sensitivity of population census results and the fierce opposition of religious and ethnic groups against the reports of CSA, Jon Abbink (2011: 270) wrote that, “the day the census results were to be published, the government sent extra police to the predominantly Muslim areas of Addis Ababa, notably Mercato”.

29 It is true that, Ethiopia is one of the few countries in Africa, which has developed its own letters owing mainly to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church and its scholars.
extremists who are trying to mix religion and politics for their own vested interests” (Ethiopian Observer, 2014). The 2012 parliamentary speech of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi also reiterated this fact. Some of its members were labeled as “supporters of opposition political parties and propagators of religious fundamentalism in the country” (Yehaimanot, 2011).

However, many of its members and outsiders are in defense of the association where it had no record of fundamentalism and will never be part of it. Ephrem Eshete (2012: 1), for example, said: “I disagree with what the Prime Minister said about Mahbere Kidusan”. This is because, as he argued, “the T-shirt worn by some of the members in the Timket celebration carrying a slogan ‘andi haimanot - one religion ... but not one country’ has religious roots rather than reflecting fundamentalist tendencies intended to transmit intolerant messages towards other religious followers. He said, it is an association established with the sole purpose of promoting Orthodox Christianity but with full respect for other religions in the country (ibid). Another writer, by the name Girma Derib (2014) provided that, “Mahbere Kidusan has got 99 problems, but ‘terrorism’ isn’t one”. For substantiating his argument, he defined terrorism as a systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear usually for achieving political objectives. In this regard, there is no any single evidence that could be presented against Mahbere Kidusan. Even to accuse the association of religious fundamentalism, it never fit into that project. It never forced others to follow its way of teaching and disrespect the teachings of other faiths.

Part IV
Exclusive religious-territorial claim and control

The once seemingly ‘taboo questions’ in Ethiopian history started to be raised by Ethiopian Muslims and Pentecostal-Evangelists in post-1991 Ethiopia, which, in some localities led into ‘religious-territorial disputes’ in an ethnic-based federal state system. In a constitutionally secular state model, where the state maintains a ‘reasonable distance’ from religion, this kind of religious disputes and contestations inevitably leads into a challenge to the secular state order. Muslims of Axum town, who constitute around 11% (4,863) of the total population (44,647) (CSA, 2007; Dereje, 2013: 3) and Lalibela requested the respective local government authorities for plots of land to construct mosques and religious institutions invoking their constitutional rights affirmed under arts 25 and 27 of the regional constitutions. The EOC vehemently opposed the request arguing that, these places are ‘sacred places’ for the Orthodox Christians and hence Muslims and followers of other religions should not be allowed to construct mosques or chapels, “... as Mecca [Muslim holy land] would not allow the construction of any Church there” (Dereje, 2013: 3). For any person with knowledge of contemporary Ethiopian legal system and the religious history of the country, it would not be difficult to comprehend that the analogy between Mecca and Axum is legally and practically wrong. For one thing, the legal and practical prohibition of Christians for constructing churches in Saudi Arabia is unjust and criticized by almost all democratic states, and of course, without understating the absence of indigenous Christian community there. For the other, the laws

31 Habtamu Alebachew (2012: 21), for example, provides that, “Protestant Christians had to depend on government security service for their safety in the 1990s”.
32 The post-1991 state structure of Ethiopia is generally labeled as ‘ethnic federalism’ taking into account of the criteria employed in the creation of the constituent units. Art 46(2) of the 1995 FDRE Constitution emphasizes language and other identity markers, including ethnicity, to organize member states of the Federation.
33 Article 25 of the FDRE Constitution guarantees the equal protection of the law for all persons without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, nationality or other social origin, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status. Article 27 sub art 2 recognizes the rights for believers to establish institutions of religious education and administration in order to propagate and organize their religion.
34 For example, the 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013 annual reports on religious freedom across the world puts Saudi Arabia under the list of a “country of particular concern” for severe violations of religious freedom. The report contends that, “despite improvements in religious freedom, Saudi Arabia remains unique in the extent to which it restricts the public expression of any religion other than Islam. Not a single church or other non-Muslim house of worship exists in the country...” (Annual Report, 2013: 134). It is so designated as a ‘country of particular concern’ by the State Department of the US since 2004. Moreover, Saudi government officials vehemently opposed the construction of non-Muslim worship places because, as they argue, “Saudi Arabia is home to Islam’s two holiest cities: Mecca and Medina” (ibid: 140).
of Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia are in sharp contrast, which the EOC makes a reference to the debate over plots of land in Axum and Lalibela irrelevant. In spite of the invalidity of the claims of the EOC over such towns in legal terms, it tells us that, the Church considers Axum as its ‘exclusive property/territory’ in which ‘others/outsiders’ (e.g. Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Jews etc.) have no right to claim land for worship places, irrespective of the number and ‘indignity’ of believers in these vicinities.

To be noted here is that, Axum was the first place in the world to receive Muslim refugees from Arabia around 615 AD. King As’hama of Axum (Ahmed Nejashi – as the Muslims used to call) was the first Christian king on earth to allow the first Muslim asylum-seekers to live peacefully in his kingdom (Hajji Beshir, 2011), exemplified as the first remark of peaceful coexistence between the two monolithic religions on the globe. The current ‘Axum paradox’, however, mainly emanates from the conviction and propagation of the EOC not to allow the construction of mosques in a historically Christian ‘holy place’, where the original Ark of the Covenant is placed (Craig, 2010). Ironically, Axum is claimed by many Ethiopian Muslims as their ‘historico-religious holy land’ since the first companions of the Prophet Mohammed practiced Islam freely in the Kingdom and some of the sahabas35 buried in and around the city of Axum (Hajji Beshir, 2010). The tomb of Ahmed Nejashi is found in the nearby area of the town, which many Muslims pay a visit every year as a local hajji (pilgrimage).

In an interview made with some Muslim residents of Axum town, they said that, “Muslims have submitted requests – oral and written – to various local government offices but were denied of access to land for constructing mosques and religious education centers in and around the city” (Ahmedin, 2011). As some researches indicate, the prohibition of mosque construction extends up to 18 km radius of the town (Dereje, 2013: 3). The statement made by the US State Department in 2007 provides the following information with regard to the denial of land by local officials for the Muslims of Axum and Lalibela for mosque construction;

> Local authorities in the northern town of Axum, a holy city for EOC, continued to deny Muslim leaders’ repeated requests to allocate land for the construction of a mosque [...]. Tigray and Amhara regional government officials choose not to interpret this provision [art 27 sub art 2] liberally in the towns of Axum and Lalibela respectively and the Federal Government did not overrule them (cited in Badr Magazine, 2011: 25).

It is to be noted that, the prohibition of plots of land for constructing worshiping houses is in clear violation of the constitutional provisions of Ethiopia and the respective regional states (Tigray and Amhara) that guarantee “believers to establish institutions of religious education and administration in order to propagate and organize their religion” (art 27 sub art 2 of the 1995 FDRE Constitution). Practically, discrepancies are not uncommon to see in these localities in implementation from the legal provisions that guarantee the rights of religious communities to get access for religious institutions and worshiping places. For the claims of Muslims, local officials were often ambivalent. They reacted in a way that did not prohibit at the same time did not allow to build mosques. Local officials seem aware of the rights of Muslims for establishing religious institutions on the bases of the federal and regional constitutions but at the same time they do not want to disappoint the Christian community and the powerful EOC in the two towns. Despite their ‘efforts’ not to openly deny access to land for Muslims of Axum and Lalibela (which is the constitutional rights of Muslims and other religious groups), their silence is tantamount to denial as the saying goes – ‘justice delayed is justice denied’.

35 The sahabas were those disciples of the Prophet Mohammed while he was alive.
The denial of plots of land for mosque construction in Axum and Lalibela is not without a backlash effect on Orthodox Christians in the southern and eastern part of Ethiopia, where Muslims are numerically dominant. Muslims raised another weak but similar logic with their Christian counterparts, claiming that, Harar and Jimma are ‘holy places’ for Muslims and hence Christians should not be allowed to construct churches (Dereje, 2013). Some even went to the extreme demanding that, ‘the already constructed churches should be demolished from these areas’36. In fact, their claim might have some level of truth, though – legally speaking – it does not help them to stop the ongoing construction or to demolish the already constructed churches in their vicinities. These areas were exclusively controlled by either Muslims or indigenous religious believers before their incorporation into the Ethiopian state at the close of the 19th c by Emperor Menelik II (r.1889-1913).

Harar was incorporated into the fast expanding Ethiopian Empire in 1887 after the defeat of its ruler Emir Abdullahi at the Battle of Chelenqo by King Menelik of Shewa (Bahru, 2002). Before its forceful incorporation, there was no any single Christian in Harar (Trimingham, 1952: 24) let alone to have churches. Though not widely supported by the general public, some Muslims regard Harar as the fourth holiest city of Islam after Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem (Desplat, 2008: 149). Because of their stiff resistance against Menelik’s conquest, his rule in Harar was one of the most brutal, where, in some instances, their mosques were demolished and replaced with churches. Churches were built inside the old city of Harar, which the Muslims regarded as their Islamic holy center (Trimingham, 1952).

The Jimma case was relatively different from Harar, where Sultan Abba Jifar II of Jimma submitted his kingdom peacefully to the conquest of Menelik. As a reward for his acknowledgement of the suzerainty of Menelik and his agreement to pay annual tribute collected from his territory, he was allowed to retain his power of administering the local affairs without much interference in the religious affairs of the local Muslim community. Both leaders agreed or at least Menelik promised Abba Jifar that, “[... ] no churches should be built in his kingdom” (Trimingham, 1952: 129). Put simply, “[he] was able to reach an agreement with Menelik under which he not only remained on his throne, but was able to prevent the imposition of such symbols of conquest as the erection of Christian churches” (Clapham, 2013: 20). However, Menelik’s promise was later broken due to the desperate need of constructing churches for the Christian soldiers and settlers that accompanied his conquest.

Despite the initial exclusive control of some areas with a particular religion and some ethnic communities professing a single religion, this phenomenon gradually transformed into multi-religiosity of various communities, partly as a result of the homogenizing efforts of the previous regimes. Today, the FDRE Constitution and the government acknowledge and legally protect the rights of all religious groups in the country. Hence, it is only the plausibility of the claims and counter-claims of religious organizations and believers supported with evidences and their legal rights enshrined in the Constitution that could help their cases to win or lose for the construction of mosques or churches in Axum, Lalibela, Jimma, Harar and elsewhere. Nonetheless, this kind of exclusive claim of religious groups for a certain territory, in contradiction with the FDRE Constitution, coupled with the leniency of some local government officials to enforce the legal rights of minority religious communities could create frustration and lack of confidence on the part of the people on the legal system. This in turn paves the way for religious fundamentalists to mobilize the aggrieved groups to take the law into their hands. In case where there is a clear violation of individual or group rights such as this, the federal government needs to intervene for the proper implementation of the Constitution (arts 55 and 62 sub arts 16 and 9 respectively of 1995 FDRE Constitution).

36 Interview with former local official in Jimma town, currently residing in Addis Ababa, 26 November 2014
Conclusion
Although federal Ethiopia is a secular state with the constitutional principle of separation between state and religion (art 11) and respect for freedom of religion (art 27), religion appears to be present in all public spheres, sometimes claiming to play political roles. This is partly related with the opening up of public spaces for religious communities after the institutionalization of democratic governance in the country in the post-1991 period and partly as a result of the global resurgence of religion. The long marginalized religious groups have now started to appear in public places with assertive roles in the country’s social, economic and political life. In the last two or more decades, the public presence of Islam is more visible as is evident from the government bureaucracy (civil service), ministerial positions, construction of large numbers of mosques, strict religious observance (such as prayer, Islamic dressing codes etc.) and Muslim outspoken activists. The rapid expansion of Protestantism is also evident not only from exponential growth of adherents but also with the active engagement of religious evangelism in all public places of the country. From a very marginalized and insignificant role at the beginning of the EPRDF’s era, they reached to the level of ‘dominating the public space’, which in some instances led to conflicts with the previously privileged religion(s).

In historic Ethiopia, where one religion was privileged in its social, economic and political roles, the constitutional provision of ‘separation of state and religion’ is an absolute guarantee for those long marginalized religions in the country. In the process of separation between state and religion, normally, members of the previously privileged religious group oppose it for a simple reason that it undermines their privileged status and limits their benefits. They may even perceive the government, which advocates separation as anti-religious not because the government promotes anti-religious stand but because it denies the privileges they are seeking from the new government as well. Put differently, though a secular constitutional state order does not mean anti-religion, those previously privileged religious groups could see the new formula as a ‘zero sum game’ where their loss is equal to the gain for others.

Ethiopia is one of the countries in the world where ethnic and religious diversities are deeper and wider that needs great care to maintain the delicate balance between religious freedom and secularism. For obvious reasons, mixing religion with politics creates social problems and conflicts since it divides people along ardent lines often making negotiation for common terms difficult. In the struggle between a secular government and religious groups for protecting one’s own sphere of influence from encroachment often creates tensions between them. Religious activists, though not necessarily for political reasons, try to enlarge their influence in public places that inevitably attracts government attention for intervention. This in turn creates an opportunity for some fundamentalist groups to manipulate government’s intervention to fulfill their own goals by sensationalizing the issue and depicting the act as violation of the law. In this regard, the fear of the Ethiopian government for religious fundamentalism is legitimate, particularly when one takes into account of the country – neighboring the war-weary Somalia and conflict-prone areas of Horn of Africa hosting some of the internationally known terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaida such as al-Shabab and al-Ithad al-Islamia. However, an exaggerated fear of religious fundamentalism to the extent of dichotomizing believers into fundamentalist and moderate camps as Mahbere Kidusan in the EOC and Salafi/Wahhabi in case of Muslims and deal accordingly could threaten the government’s response to be transformed into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Externalizing all the problems as caused by the fundamentalist religious groups themselves or the influence of ‘bankrupt politicians’ or any other external anti-peace force would understate the impacts of government’s own policies and implementations in fueling the problems.

A final word to say, local governments have to fully implement the laws of the country for solving practical problems on the ground. We have seen that how Muslims and Evangelical Churches faced a problem of obtaining land for the construction of worshiping houses in the northern
towns of Axum and Lalibela, which local governments remained reluctant to enforce the rights of the claimants. In this regard, the failure to implement the law might lead the people to lose trust on the law enforcers and take the law enforcement tool in their hands that in turn could lead into the disruption of the constitutional order.
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A Tortuous Path to ‘Democratic’ Transition in Ethiopia: A Political Economy Perspective

Henok Getachew

Abstract

There has been a burgeoning interest among academics and policy makers regarding the complex link between democratic transition and development following the Third Wave of Democratization in the post-Cold War era. This wind of change has positively impacted on the political system in Ethiopia to gear towards the liberalization of the public sphere hitherto dominated by the state. As a result, the Ethiopian state and society has undergone rapid changes in the post-Derg period that are illustrated by economic liberalization and political ‘pluralism’. A distorted form of political transition has been in place in Ethiopia in the wake of the demise of the military regime by the combined forces of insurgents, particularly the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The overall objective of the paper is to uncover the structural impediments that hinder successful ‘democratic’ transition in the post-1991 political dispensation. In achieving this purpose, the study employs political economy approaches that shed light to the manifold interface between the political dynamics and the economic domain. The finding of the paper argues that the transition to democracy has been stifled by structural factors. Notwithstanding endeavors made by the incumbent to put legal and institutional frameworks in place, the slim size of the middle class, the lower rate of schooling/school years, the increasing trend of monopolizing the economy by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Force’s (EPRDF’s) conglomerates, the continuation of strangulating the peasants by cadre system, and manipulating development assistance to regime security have continued to impact on the flourishing of the public sphere in which political actors could engage in expanding the horizon of the political terrain, thereby facilitating the public to exercise their sovereign power.

Introduction

In the beginning of the 1980s a new social movement manifested itself as a “second independence way” (Nzongola-Ntalia and Lee, 1997) so as to realize democracy across most parts of Africa, particularly in the streets of Algeria, Chad, Uganda and Zaire (the current Democratic Republic of Congo). The increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo ante resulted from the dysfunctional nature of most African states to provide their citizens with social and economic development. This marked the failure of the raison d’être of the state in effecting it’s duties. The demise of communist regimes across the Eastern European states and the fall of Apartheid system in South Africa provided impetus for the increasing tide of social movements across the continent aimed at installing and consolidating democracy in lieu of authoritarianism at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s.

A movement against one-party state and military dictatorship does not always bear fruit though. What is being observed in today’s Africa is “multipartyism without democracy”, “elections without democracy” (van de Walle, 2002), “choiceless democracy” (Ninsin, 2006), “electoral sultanism”, and “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2002) and semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003). The variety of names attached to most political systems in Africa many features. It is a new version of authoritarianism in the third wave of democratization unlike the previous forms of authoritarianism-one-party, military and personal dictatorships- it allows certain norms

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of democracy, such as the right to organize and demonstration as well as freedom of speech so long as it does not challenge the status quo. As Schedler (2002) noted, it is a medium ground between open authoritarianism and practical democracy. Although elections are held regularly, their functions are not to exercise “sovereign choice”. Rather, it is a way to gain internal and external legitimacy. Personalized and weakly institutionalized politics, unconstitutionalism, and entrenched clientelism are some factors hindering political transition to democracy in Africa. Furthermore, according to van de Walle (2002), successful transition to democracy in Africa heavily relies on the concerted endeavors of civil society, opposition parties and ordinary citizens.

A distorted form of political transition has been in place in Ethiopia since the demise of the military regime by the combined forces of insurgents, particularly spearheaded by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In the immediate aftermath of the demise of the military regime in May 1991, the incumbent regime under the leadership of the EPRDF coupled with ethnolinguistically organized political parties formed a Transitional Government by promulgating a Transitional Charter in July 1991. Notwithstanding its permission of fundamental liberties and freedoms for the flourishing of political pluralism, the actual situation was quite different in that the political field was not leveled for all political actors. The established government was not inclusive in the sense that it excluded prominent pan-Ethiopian groups, particularly the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM) as well as the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF) on the alleged reasons that they are not giving allegiance to the Transitional Charter, that they not ready to relinquish resort to violence as well as they had ties with the defunct regime (Kassahun, 2003). This tactic of excluding formidable political parties from the political scene was also unleashed against the then members of the Transitional Government, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Sidama National Liberation Movement (SNLM). Subsequently, the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) and the Ethiopian Democratic Union Party (EDUP) became the next victims of the exclusionary politics orchestrated by the incumbent. Since its assumption of power, the incumbent government has undertaken various activities to maintain its hegemony through marginalizing independent and autonomous political parties and by forging surrogate political organization to countervail parallel organizations, thereby monopolizing the political space (Melaku, 2006). As a result, subsequent elections have been characterized by the use of manipulation and naked force to subjugate independent political parties and exclude them from political processes. Its instrumentality to ensure sovereign choice has become nebulous. The elections thus are unable to secure wider acceptances from the participants as well as civic groups per se (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009; Abbink, 2006; 2009; Merera, 2003; Smith, 2007; Tronvoll, 2001; Vaughan, 2003). Rather, allegations and counter-allegations on the one hand and political crisis subsequent to election results on the other hand are usually accompanying elections.

The findings of the paper attest that the transition to democracy in Ethiopia has been stifled by structural factors. Notwithstanding endeavors made by the incumbent to put legal and institutional frameworks in place, the slim size of the middle class, the lower rate of school life expectancy (the total number of years of schooling a child can expect to receive), the increasing trend of monopolizing the economy by the EPRDF’s conglomerates, the continuation of strangulating the peasants by cadre system, and manipulating development assistance to regime security have continued to impact on the flourishing of the public sphere in which political actors could engage in expanding the horizon of the political terrain, thereby facilitating the public to exercise their sovereign power. The authoritarian political culture that is illustrated by the paucity of culture of consensus and trust has further crippled the transition course to democracy.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework concerning political transitions to democracy, forms of transition and the structural factors that drive political
trajectories to democratization. Section 3 presents a brief overview of circumstances that led to the inauguration of the “second republic” (Abbink, 2009). Subsequently, Section 4 explores structural factors rooted in the socio-economic and political fabrics of the society that serve as backdrops to a tortuous course to political transition in the contemporary political dispensation. In its last section the paper winds up with concluding remarks.

Theoretical framework
The concepts of democracy, democratization² and pertinent related issues have grabbed the minds of the public and scholars alike across the board. The values and institutional setup which are the lynchpin of democracy are not the exclusive property of the Western world. Rather, it is a universal concept. Democracy expresses itself as a moral value, social process and practice. As a moral value, it entails tolerance of diversity, empathy, better life, political and social order, and justice. The endeavors to expand the horizon of human rights ranging from civil rights to collective rights have proven the progressive nature of democracy as a social process. Democracy, as a social practice, manifests itself as an expression of exercising power as per norms and principles (Nzongola-Ntalia and Lee, 1997).

Human history has witnessed social movements sought to realize democratic norms and values. This trend to democracy is not unidirectional (Huntington, 1991) in that the direction geared towards democracy may be relapsed as it was the case in the first and second waves of democratization. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this section of the paper is discussing political transition, its dimensions and driving forces. Thereafter, drawing on the works of Lipset (1959; 1994), Barro (1999) and Huntington (1991), an assessment is made regarding to the context of development and its components as propelling motives geared towards democracy.

Political transition
A wide variety of literature has emerged and discussed the political transition that underwent in most parts of the Third World (Huntington, 1991). This literature discusses the meaning of political transition to democracy, origins, conditions, forms, actors and outcomes. Huntington (1991), for instance, defined political transition as a change from an authoritarian form of government to a democratic one. The modes of political transition take the forms of reform, compromise and overthrow. Reform implies measures taken by the incumbent to reform its defects aimed at retaining its grip on power. In this case, the regime is in full control of the situation. Compromise, on the other hand, entails a tradeoff between the opposition and the incumbent to settle their differences through compromise. The last modality, ‘the overthrow’, arises when the regime is unable and/or unwilling to address the demands of the opposition, thereby facilitating its demise. Hence, the overthrowing of a regime results in the coming of a new regime, which is in control of the direction of political transition.

To ensure a political transition to democracy, structural factors which promote the flourishing of a political system are necessary. For instance, according to Ottaway (2003) structural factors, such as weak political organizations and democratic institutions, a persistent authoritarian tradition, socio-economic problems and ethnic and religious conflicts, have ambivalent effects on the propensity towards democracy. Haggard and Kaufman (1997), drawing on the experience of democratic transition in Asia and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, used the conditions of economic crisis as a way to political transition. They argued that if the economic condition is characterized by inflation on the prices of staples, fuel, transportation and declining of real wages, the authoritarian government loses credibility on the parts of the middle class, the poor

² Democratization is a complex and prolonged process before and after election. Democratization terminates a non-democratic regime, in turn, installs a new democratic regime. It also takes the consolidation of a democratic system. On the other hand, political liberalization implies political opening, which is short of the end aim of an incumbent. Rather, it includes permitting electoral democracy, releasing of political prisoners, permitting the activities of civil society, and lifting up strict censorship. As Huntington (1991) contends, political liberalization may or may not lead to a full-fledged democratization.
and the business sector. As a result of this economic downturn, protest and strike pose formidable challenges to the regime. Although governments recourse to violence to continue grip on power, keeping the cost of force is difficult. Furthermore, the problem would be aggravated when there is division between the elites within the bureaucratic military and political circles due to the effect of economic crisis. Hence, the opposition will get the advantageous position in their negotiation vis-à-vis the incumbent over the changing of the system.

However, “authoritarian leaderships will enjoy wider support, less protest, and fewer internal divisions when economic performance is strong” (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997: 268-269). But it should also be noted that the “choice factor” (Lemarchand, 1994), illustrated by the nature of transition bargain, the quality of leadership skills and the characteristics of opposition movements, are necessary denominators for democratic transition. For Lemarchand (1994) transition bargain entails the compromise between groups over divergent interests, particularly the sharing of state power. Its success hinges on the ability and political will of the leadership from the incumbent and the opposition to reach an agreement on important national issues. Furthermore, the willingness of the opposition to resort to negotiation rather than force to solve differences amicably is another aspect of choice factor that determine whether the transition is on the right track or otherwise (ibid.).

The linear model adopted by Huntington (1991) in a transitional framework contends the transition is from an authoritarian regime to democratic kind. This approach, however, is being criticized by scholars (Ottaway, 2003) on the ground that it overlooks another type of a regime which is found mid-way between a naked authoritarianism and democracy. This foggy zone is named differently. For instance, it is called as “semi-authoritarianism”3 (Ottaway, 2003), “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2002) “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria, 1997). Despite differences in naming, these regimes have certain things in common: permit limited political rights, manage regular elections, have constrained civil society and political parties and abuse of power. This kind regime permits certain political space in which limited political and civil rights are practiced. Furthermore, civil society and political parties are legally permitted to function so long as they are not threats to the status quo. Elections are not the ultimate mechanism to exercise people’s sovereign choice; thereby electorate’s verdict cannot be a means to change government as Ninsin (2006) clearly argued. Besides, in a semi-authoritarian regime, the existence of institutions, such as civil society, private media and regulatory frameworks are curtailed so as not to pose danger to the survival of the regime. Rather, they are manipulated or co-opted to serve the interests of the ruling class. As a result, their contribution to the political transition is minimal. Various actors can play their part in a political transition that brings a new regime in place of the defunct. The actors include the government, the opposition (local and abroad) as well as the international community. In the cases of reform (transformation) and compromise (transplacement), the moderate groups both within the opposition and governing regime should outmaneuver the standpatters to undertake smooth political transition. As it is also observed across ex-communist European states, domino effects of political development in Western Europe had implications on domestic political context by inducing domestic civic actors to vie for political changes (Huntington, 1991).

Indeed, the fragile conditions of “relative economic prosperity and development” (Ndulo, 2003: 318) are not out of the equation in terms of jeopardizing the propensity to entrench democratic governance in Africa. Furthermore, most African states’ political systems fall within the category of electoral authoritarianism. The persistence of weak political organizations and democratic institutions, authoritarian political tradition, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts making the transition to democracy in Africa complicated.

**Development as a factor of political transition**

Since the time of Aristotle down to the contemporary era, economic development is deemed as a

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3 Ottaway (2003) has further classified semi-authoritarian regimes into three kinds: semi-authoritarian regime in equilibrium, semi-authoritarian regime in dynamic change and semi-authoritarian regime in decay.
sustaining variable for democracy. For instance, Barro (1999) and Lipset (1959; 1994) forwarded theoretical explanations with regard to the nexus between development and democracy in a given country. These works have shown a positive correlation between elements of development characterized by education, urbanization, industrialization, wealth and significant middle class and the degree of democracy prevailing within a society. For instance, Lipset (1959) identified factors that determine the durability of democracy: economic development and legitimacy. For him, economic development entails industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education. Legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to “the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves, and considered right and proper” (Lipset, 1959: 71). In some circumstances, although socio-economic requisites for democracy, such as income, education and industrialization prevail, the country may move towards authoritarian version of political system owing to historical factor(s). The established democratic political system could be maintained before relapsing to authoritarianism by creating social infrastructures, particularly universal literacy and encouraging private business sector. This is possible when large segments of the population are living in prosperity while few are in the condition of poverty. The argument is that if the mass are not in dire poverty, they are less likely to succumb to the influences of a demagogue because they are participating in politics rationally. Economic development changes the structure of the society, that was previously had broad base for poor section of society, towards a diamond shape in which growing a middle class in size. As a result, “a large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups” (Lipset, 1959: 83).

However, if only few elites are enjoying the wealth of the nation while the mass are striving to survive, the political system has a probability of relapsing to/remaining authoritarianism illustrated by oligarchic or tyrannical forms of government (ibid.). Furthermore, familiarizing the lower strata with the norm of democracy, if they are benefitting from economic development in the sense that there is growing income, economic security and educational opportunity. Otherwise, they would not be supporter to democratic system and they become more revolutionary, to use the phrase of Marx, because ‘they have nothing to lose but their chains and can win the whole world’.

Wealth, according to Lipset (1959; 1994), could be proxied by per capita income (income differences), number of person per doctor, and the availability of means of media and communication (radio, newspaper and telephone). Indices of industrialization could be measured by the number of people engaged in agricultural activities and per capita energy consumption. Literacy rate, the percentage of enrollment in primary, post-primary and secondary school are variables in the indices of education to assess the propensity to sustain democracy within a state. Furthermore, percentage of people living cities and per cent in Metropolitan areas are major indices of urbanization. According to Lipset (1959), higher per capita income, lower differences in income, higher access to sources of information and communication, the larger the number of people engaged in industry, the more urbanized a society as well as better educated population are conditions for the flourishing and sustaining democracy. Education has been given more importance in its contribution to democracy compared to income and occupation. Education can enhance awareness of citizens and it widens their outlook so that they can tolerate political pluralism, develop tolerant norms, avoid political extremism and dogmatism as well as they can make rational electoral choice. As a result, the more literate society would avert the propensity to closed political system. Drawing upon empirical evidences across European countries, particularly Germany and France, Lipset (ibid.) found out a negative correlation between the degree of literacy and the one-man/one-party rule. The author argued that the more literate the society can hinder antidemocratic forces that impede multiparty system. This argument is also corroborated by Huntington (1991) on the ground that education paves the way for the flourishing of characters of trust, satisfaction and competence that go with democracy.
With varying degrees of influence, the force of development has remained a structural determinant in shaping the trajectory of democracy in Africa. As authors (Ndulo, 2003) state high rates of illiteracy, poor communication facilities, abject poverty, the prevalence of hunger and disease, and ignorance have continued to hamper constitutional order and hence the rule of law in most African states.

Other essential structural factors for political transition are the existence of a number of independent associations and the size of rural population. Independent civic associations have countervailing power, transmit and socialize democratic norms, represent interest and enable citizens to participate in politics. Because of these functions, they are instrumental to strengthen democracy. It is also argued that dictatorial regime easily suppress rural population because they have limited capacity to organize and to protect their interest. Furthermore, their sparse settlements subject them to monitoring and control by authoritarian regimes (Barro, 1999).

To summarize, the onset of political transition geared towards democracy is not uniform across places in that there are trends of consolidation and reverses upon the degree of entrenched social requisites of democracy. Hence, the success to embark on democratization entails not just structural factors, such as education, wealth, middle class and urbanization. It is also requires ‘Agency/Choice’ factors on the parts of elites, political parties and civil society, to shoulder an historical mission of opening up the political space so as to entrench a democratic system.

**Political trajectories in Ethiopia: a retrospect**

The quest for ‘institutionalization, social justice and equality’ (Bahru, 2008a) has been a perennial question throughout the political history of Ethiopia. This trend has got momentum since the mid twentieth century in which the state has had abysmal record of meeting the demands of the populace geared towards the realization of democracy and social justice. The persistent nature of distorted socio-economic and political system maintained by the imperial regime had invited widespread opposition from different corners of the society. The oppositions run from ethnic to ideologically-oriented movements, movements aspiring to protect the interests of the working class, peasants, national and regions. Peasants uprising in Bale (1963-1970) and Gojjam (1968), for instance, represented movements aiming to safeguard peasants against undue tax system imposed upon them. Eritrean insurgents posed formidable challenges to the survival of the regime. Students, both in university and high schools, were also playing a pivotal role in voicing the demands of the mass vis-à-vis the state. The defiance was also harbored by teachers, workers, civil servants; taxi drivers, and clergies (Bahru, 1991). The mounting protests uncovered the socio-political and economic malaises illustrated by tenancy, poverty, religious and national questions. This move, in turn, questioned the legitimacy of the raison d’être of the state in the sense that the system had no longer received unequivocal acceptance from the wider public. The growing grievances and discontents among the mass culminated in the demise of the imperial system in February 1974. Subsequently, the military took over state power by exploiting the existing power vacuum, given the absence of organized civilian opposition group(s) (Merera, 2003).

On 20 December 1974 the Derg issued ‘Ethiopian Socialism’ anchored on five basic principles: sovereignty, the absoluteness of Ethiopia’s unity, self-reliance, the dignity of labor and the precedence of public good. Although the military junta was being criticized for its failure

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4 Bahru (2008a) argued that since the time of earlier Emperors, particularly Tewodros, had endeavored to put institutionalized governance (Ser’at) in place to modernize the state. Thereafter, Gebre-Heywot and Takla-Hawaryat were striving to institutionalize governance. Accordingly, it has manifested itself in the promulgations successive constitutional framework since 1931. The quest for social justice replete with the endeavor to extricate the dispossessed sections of the Ethiopian society, particularly peasants, from the brunt of oppression. The quest for equality, since the earlier time to the contemporary period, has went through various stages to ensure equality between different faiths and ethnic groups.
to adopt ‘scientific socialism’ by the left-leaning political parties, particularly the EPRP and AESM, it took radical measures, including the nationalization of land, financial, industrial and commercial enterprises. The measure went to the extent of nationalization of urban lands and extra-houses. Administrative wings of urban dwelling and peasants associations were initially established to support the land reform programs. Thereafter, they served to indoctrinate the ideology of Marxism, as a channel to central government command as well as an intelligence unit, to closely supervise dissident activities against the regime (Andargachew, 1993; Tronvoll, 2001). The military’s intolerance to political freedoms and civil society manifested itself during the Red Terror that culminated in the decimation of thousands of youths who were sympathizers-cum-members of the EPRP and were calling for transferring of power to the civilian hands. Coupled by the White Terror unleashed by the EPRP, the Red Terror created a lingering apathy among the mass to actively engage in politics, as the bloody confrontation between the military regime and the EPRP has left the legacy of “memories of violence and suffering” (Tronvoll, 2001: 701).

Until 1987, the Derg ruled the country without having a constitution. Thereafter, the country was officially promulgated as “People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia” without adhering to the basic principles underpinning civic republicanism (Abbink, 2009) in the sense that the notions of popular sovereignty, pluralism, non-domination and no resort to state power to personal gain or profit. The regime’s ill-informed policies resulted in socio-economic and political crises. The military government failed to address the persistent problems that provoke the outbreak of the revolution. Rather, the government’s recourse to military approach to daunting socio-economic and political problems thereby further worsening the crisis the state is in. As a result, it “finally sealed the fate of the military regime itself in May 1991” (Merera, 2003: 151). According to Merera (2003: 152), this marked “the fourth grand failure in a series of attempts to transform the Ethiopian state and society”.

One should not overlook the patterns of interaction between the insurgencies during their struggle against their common foe, the Derg. This is mainly because their acrimonious relationship impacted their role to transform the political spectrum in the post-Derg era. The relationship between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the EPRP during 1970s, for instance, was mainly hostile due to their disagreements on the fundamental political and national issues as well as ideologies. They were also engaged in battling over the seizure of territories of Wallo, Gojam and Tigray. Their acrimonious interactions during insurency period propelled the incumbent to forcefully exclude the EPRP in post-1991 political dispensation (Walle, 1993). This follows the TPLF’s/EPRDF’s tradition of exclusion vis-à-vis formidable opposition groups in the realm of politics, thereby ensuring its dominance intact.

In sum, the modern Ethiopian political history has been characterized by a winner-take-all approach whereby all actors cannot be winners in their battle to assume state power. Political actors’ interactions have mainly been mediated by force. This implies that, as Bahru (2008b: 331) succinctly noted, it is devoid of “negotiation and compromise”, in that, differences are solved through forces that often result in the vanquished and the victor. In retrospect, whatever new arrangements put in place are often dictated by the winner. This kind authoritarian political tradition is still lingering and has continued to impact upon the post-1991 political dispensation.

Structural factors impeding democratization

The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) adopted a new economic policy in agreement with Breton Woods’ Institutions. The economic reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state in

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5 Merera Gudina (2003) identified five grand failures as far as Ethiopian political history is concerned. The first grand failure accompanied the expansion and consolidation of the Ethiopian state, 1850-1900. The second failure is the ‘Nation-Building’ process between 1900 and 1935. The third grand failure is the Post-war Ethiopia. The 1974 Revolution and its subsequent events witnessed the fourth grand failure. The installation of an "Ethno-cratic state" in the post-1991 political dispensation is the fifth grand failure with regard to the endeavor to transform the political system.
the economy, promoting domestic and foreign investments, and encouraging the establishment of private sector. Nevertheless, the state is in full control of land and “strategically” significant state-owned enterprises, such as telecommunication, railway, major financial institutions, electricity, etc. As Eshetu (1994) noted, the formulation of Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Project (ERRP), upon the agreement between the TGE and the World Bank, marked major development in the post-1991 political dispensation. The ERRP is a precursor to the Structural Adjustment Program that envisaged manifold reforms in the economic domain. These economic reforms cannot be conceived in a political vacuum. The TGE took these radical economic trajectories because of the following factors: the declining importance of socialist-oriented economy at domestic and international levels; to crush the bases of the opposition by reducing bureaucracy expenditure; to garner Westerns’ legitimacy; to implement decentralization as part of the liberalization scheme and the expediency of revitalizing the economy (Alemayehu, 2001).

Another major development in the post-1991 is political reforms taken by the incumbent. These include institutionalizations of “decentralization, multi-partysm, press freedom, election and unionism”. Notwithstanding radical measures taken by the incumbent to open the political space, the notion of democracy and pertinent values are curtailed (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009; Melaku, 2006) thereby making the course to democratization perilous. Against this backdrop, this part of the paper examines the structural barriers that have impeded political transition to democracy that fulfill minimum requirements of political democracy for the last two decades. To this end, political economy approach is employed.

**Narrow economic spaces of civic actors**

The current debacle to transform the political system on the course of democratization should be viewed from the prism of socio-political exclusion and poverty. Although the country needs the active role of the civic sector to address the daunting crisis it is facing, the ruling party’s role is directed at excluding the civic sector from the public domain. This is mainly because of its cardinal principles underpinning the organization, the Revolutionary Democracy creed. As Melaku (2006: 200) stated the “EPRDF’s policy in this regard is to deliberately exclude independent non-state actors or make them party affiliates and follow the party diktat.” The authoritarian policy of the EPRDF, although it officially proclaims the necessity of the civic sector, is practically limiting the space in which civil society can play minimal roles (ibid.).

It is also imperative to lend attention to the economic base of the political parties that are mushrooming in the post-Derg era so as to address the tortuous path to the consolidation of democracy for the last two decades. This could be viewed from the vantage point of the legal framework which stipulates the manner by which political parties can generate revenue. In this case, Article 28 of Proclamation No. 46/93 obliges political parties to garner their revenues only through the following means: membership dues, subsidies and grants from the government, and special events such as organizing bazaars. Other possible sources of income, such as foreign governments and political parties, welfare and religious organizations, are prohibited. Furthermore, they are also barred from engaging in profit-generating activities (Kassahun, 2003). The paucity of resource base for most opposition groups has continued to jeopardize their endeavors to put pressure on the incumbent, thereby crippled the hopes of liberalizing the political space. As a result of this condition, the EPRDF entrenched itself by blocking any possible means of resources to opposition political parties by using the legal infrastructure. Paradoxically, the incumbent party has run a number of conglomerates on the pretext that they are inherited

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6 The ERRP intended to undertake the following major economic reforms: devaluation of the national currency, implementation of safety net program, creating a propitious environment for the private sector, uplifting restriction on price of items and privatization of some state enterprises.

7 Freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative source of office, free and fair election and making government policies depend on votes.
from the time of struggle against the Derg regime (Vestal, 1999).

The role of the ruling party in the economic sector should also be given emphasis as far as the place of private sector in the economy is concerned, since it gives a degree of independence to the private sector in relation to the state and the ruling party. It is increasingly documented that the TPLF-affiliated companies8 are engaged in agriculture, cement production, textiles and garmenting, livestock and leather, mining and exploration, transport and finance sectors, pharmaceuticals, engineering, construction and consultancy (Vaughan, 2003, Vestal, 1999). Pualos Chane (2007) estimates the TPLF’s 50 companies are worth approximately half a billion dollar. In a similar vein, Berhanu (2011) identifies one of the TPLF’s conglomerates, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), as by far the largest company in terms of its assets, geographical coverage and branches in the country. The Amhara National Democratic Movement’s (ANDM) five companies under the name of Endeavor (Tiret) is estimated to be worth 44.7 million dollar. Business companies (Tumsa Endowment) under the custody of Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) and Wondo group controlled by Southern Ethiopia People Democratic Movement (SEPDM) are worth 19.5 and 16.8 million dollar respectively. This trend has weakened a movement towards market economy whereby independent business sectors and middle class could flourish (Paulos, 2007) as preferential treatment is given to the incumbent’s conglomerates. Although the government claimed that the establishment of EFFORT is for a sole purpose of supporting war veterans and victims of civil war, its executive committee is largely filled by members of the central committee of the TPLF.

The economy is increasingly monopolized by the incumbent. There is no vibrant private sector unless we talk about conglomerates owned by foreign companies. This tendency has further blurred the distinction between party and state. Although the government claims it is engaged in building market economy, private sectors that are bidding party-led conglomerates and state-owned enterprises are facing discrimination with regard to access to credit facilities, foreign currency, letter of credit and discriminatory tax system. In this regard, Vestal (1999: 174) has noticed in the following way:

The government’s fiscal policies have favored state enterprises and companies allied with the Front. Tax breaks are extended to party approved businesses, and using its power to control the banks of the country, the Front has extended credit at very low rates or given direct start-up capital to its affiliated companies.

As a result of covert and overt preferential treatment to party-affiliated conglomerates in the forms of access to loans, policymakers and government as a market (World Bank, 2009), the emergence of bona fide private sector is stifled. The problem gets worse due to the ruling party’s ideological conviction that “the private sector is not always seen as the natural ally of ‘revolutionary democracy’” (Vaughan and Mesfin, 2011: 27). The EPRDF justifies its position on the ground that Ethiopia is in pre-capitalist mode of production so that the party should play a vanguard role in managing the economy in the interests of the majority until the economy is fully transformed into an inclusive capitalist economic system (ibid.). This marked the incumbent’s aspiration to control the commanding height by expanding and consolidating the party-conglomerates at the expense of the private sector.

8 TPLF, for instance, has owned large business and development-oriented organizations, such as EFFORT (Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray), TDA (Tigray Development Association), the Dedebit micro-credit and REST (Relief Society of Tigray). TPLF owns over 3.5 billion birr. (see Paulos, 2007; Vaughan, 2003; Vestal, 1999). Berhanu Abegas named TPLF-business companies as Paribus (Party business companies). These include Hiwet Mechanization, Guna Trading House, Mesebo Cement Factory, Almeda Factory, Sheba Tannery, Meskerem and Ezana mining and exploration companies, Trans-Ethiopia and Selam Bus Company, Mesfin Engineering, Sur Construction, Addis Consultancy, and Addis Engineering; Wegagen Bank and Africa Insurance. Furthermore, Mega Publishing Company and Walta Information Center are parts of TPLF-run businesses.
Furthermore, the incumbent has had a tradition of marshalling economic resources under the state’s custody to marginalize the perceived and real threats during the time of election. It is possible to look at the strategy employed by the ruling party in Hadiya in 2000 pre-election period. As Tronvoll (2001) succinctly noted by interviewing the local inhabitants of the Hadiya zone, the EPRDF proposed carrot and stick strategy to the electorate. The carrot illustrated by promising to peasants to provide them with seeds, fertilizers, money and grains, if they voted for the incumbent. This proves the economic approaches pursued by the incumbent to win the hearts and minds of the citizens. In fact, at worst, it manipulated the state bureaucracy to manage the state resources aimed at rewarding and punishing electorates. The stick or the punishment was intimidation, harassment, jailing at best and extra-judicial killings of candidates of the Hadiya National Democratic union (HNDU). The problem is further worsened when the opposition party is unable to hire legal experts to support the prisoners due to lack of resources.

After a landslide victory scored by the HNDU against the EPRDF at the federal election, the ruling party resorted to use foreign aid assistance for victims of drought and hunger as a weapon to penalize the electorates voted for HNDU (Tronvoll, 2001; US State Department, 2000). This has proven how far the local attempt to transform their political course towards democratization is responded by harsh policy of the government to the extent of using food aid to revenge peoples voted for change. Furthermore, it signifies the situation incapacitated to the electorate to ensure their “sovereign choice” (Ninsin, 2006) in that they were deprived to employ election as the ultimate political instrument to choose their governors.

**Land-tenure system**

The present land-tenure system impedes not just the productivity of agriculture but also the growth of democratic institutions (Sisay, 2003). This is mainly because of the monopoly of land by the state which empowers the state to take measures against any trends of peasants’ tendency to develop independent position vis-à-vis the incumbent. Peasants often hardly oppose the ruling party explicitly for fear of losing their land. As a result, lack of ownership of land continues to stifle the emergence civic groups’ hinged on the support of peasants in rural areas of Ethiopia. The policy of state ownership of land relegated peasants to the status of tenants of the state. This has in turn impacted on the flourishing of democratic institutions and independent political parties that can voice the demands and interests of their constituencies in rural areas. Given the paucity of authority and rights over their land, it is difficult to imagine, not to say impossible, peasants’ endeavor to pose explicit opposition to the flagrant violation of human rights committed by local level administrators. The current land policy is retained by the incumbent due to ideological and political rationales. The government, however, argues the privatization of land would lead to the concentration of land in few hands and the creation of absentee landlords. As has been noticed for the last four decades, the land issue has been dominating the political terrain of the country. After all, it is a political and economic issue. As a result of this circumstance, the incumbent seeks to maintain the status quo, since it is a modus operandi of “old strangulation of the peasantry by the cadre systems of the vanguard party” (Berhanu, 2006: 46).

In a similar study conducted by Eva Poluha (1997) in selected Peasant Associations in the regional states of Oromia, Amhara and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State attested that the government used various mechanisms, including promising of land redistribution as an incentive to those who voted for 1995 federal election. However, those who failed to vote during that election’s day were warned not to benefit from the projected distribution of land. As a result of monopolization of land by the state, cadres are exploited this economic opportunity to use it as an instrument of carrot and stick, meaning that the land can be given for those peasants voted for the incumbent and not be accessed for those perceived to be sympathizers or members of the opposition groups. The researcher also noticed how far the peasants in the selected study sites were in a position to avoid any wraths unleashed by the EPRDF so as to get access to agricultural
inputs, such as fertilizers, pesticides and advices. Furthermore, lack of employment opportunity in the rural areas for the youth provided a fertile ground for the EPRDF to recruit young cadres there from. At the same time, the youth considered joining the party as a future career, given the paucity employment opportunity in towns. This condition of meager economic base to create employment for the youths and viewing the Party as the only viable alternative to host aspiring youths as would be cadres enabled the ruling party maintain its control over the peasants (ibid.). In such conditions, it is difficult to imagine the flourishing democratic institutions.

The reinvigoration of the institutional apparatuses of the military regime after the incumbent assumed state power further reinforced the incumbent’s strangulation over the peasants. The Urban Dwellers Association (Kebelle) and Peasant Associations were retained by the EPRDF by molding them in its favor to continue their role as an appendage of the state to carry out the order of the government and the ruling party. The foggy zone between these administrative apparatuses and the ruling party enable the latter to use the former as a tool of political control over the inhabitants (Tronvoll, 2001). In 1992, for instance, the Peasant Association was reinstated to fulfill its functions as it was performing during the Derg regime. The Peasant Association has begun to function as a link between the inhabitants and the government through collection of tax, money for the purchasing of fertilizers and seeds, as well as ensuring peace and security (Poluha, 1997).

Furthermore, the establishment of new structures within Peasant Associations in the forms of got, mengestawi-budin and lematawi-budin, are in response to the 2005 election results. Although the government claimed that they are established as sub-Kebelle structures to deliver social services to the grass root level promptly and efficiently, as sources (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009) confirmed their purposes are political in the sense that they are used by the ruling party to control the population, to punish the opposition and to buy loyalty. This shows that the structures are not purely administrative organs. Rather, they are used to secure victory during the time of election. The monopolization of the public sphere is not just backed by the intransigent position of the incumbent over its unrivalled control over the land, but also the politicization of development including education, agricultural inputs, safety net program, food aid distribution, employment and training opportunities as means of carrot and stick to buy support.

**Politcization of development**

As a report by the Human Rights Watch (2010) confirmed, the EPRDF-led government has used various techniques to repress the opposition sympathizers and members. To this end, it is accustomed to use the education, agriculture, the safety net public works programme, food aid distribution, the civil service, and training programs for civil servants as carrot and stick vis-à-vis the society to monopolize the public space. As a result of its monopoly of these sectors, it is difficult to be free from the control and supervision of the incumbent. The monopoly of the commanding heights by the incumbent enabled the regime to put pressures on the opposition members to renounce their independent political membership so as to get access to agricultural inputs, food relief, and employment in public services, and further education. Furthermore, the EPRDF used 30,000 community health workers to undertake political activities in support of the incumbent (ibid.). This discriminatory practice unleashed against the perceived or real members of the opposition group in rural parts of the country by withholding fertilizers and improved seeds to scale up production and productivity is aimed at monopolizing the political arena, hence it has crippled to the flourishing of political pluralism. This action is also supported by using the micro-credit services to punish the member of opposition political parties in various parts of the country by withholding credit services, despite the fact that the institutions are the properties of the public. The safety net programme is also another political tool managed by the incumbent to buy loyalty from the victims of drought. Manipulating humanitarian assistance to reinforce political control has proven that the ruling party is also hinging on foreign assistance to use as a reprimand tool against the opposition groups.
This state of affairs has proven how far the incumbent manipulates its advantages over the monopoly of distributing inputs of agriculture, land, public service and food aid to ensure its hegemony at the expense of ensuring fundamental freedoms and liberties that are the bedrock of democracy. The EPRDF’s action also attests to the inseparable relationship between the state and the ruling party. This is corroborated by Vaughan (2003: 41) in the following way “the administrative and political structures in Ethiopia overlap and interweave in such a way that, in practice, the local administrative units (kebele, wereda and zone levels) are infrequently politically neutral or independent bodies”. As Lipset (1994) argued the possibility of having a free political community is hinged on the fewer resources marshaled and controlled by the state. In view of this, the monopolization of state resources by the incumbent would stifle the birth of an independent polity that can mediate divergent interests amicably without favoring a given party through patron-clientelism as it is being observed.

**Meager size of the middle class and lower rate of urbanization**

Empirical evidence shows that there is an increasing interdependence between the size of the middle class and the propensity to good governance (Lipset, 1959; 1994). This is mainly attributed to the thinking that people in the category of middle class have the capacity to put leverage on the political system to move towards the rule of law, transparency, accountability and protection and promotion of human rights. In fact, the emergence of a sizeable middle class is the result of economic growth. As African Development Bank’s (AfDB) report (2011) confirmed 21.5 per cent Ethiopian population is deemed as middle class. Out of this, 8.2 per cent is middle class without floating and 13.3 per cent is middle class with floating class. This data has proven there is a tendency on the part of middle class with floating class to slip back into poverty trap if there are economic shocks illustrated by inflation and declining of real wages. This is mainly because of they are spending $2-$4 on consumption per day. As a result of this condition, it is difficult to have a sizeable stable middle class. The meager size of the middle class in Ethiopia, compared to 39.04 per cent of the people living on less than $1.25 a day (ADfB, 2011), is making it difficult to conceive the structure of the society a hospitable environment to the democratization process. This corroborates the argument of Lipset (1959) in the sense that if a society resembles an elongated pyramid, having large segments poor people at base, it is unable to mitigate anti-democratic trends that jeopardize the democratization process.

Given the small size of the private sector and that the economy of the country is heavily dependent on agriculture the increasing in size of the middle class is not possible in the foreseeable future. The process is further stifled when the ruling party’s recruitment strategy is directed at those civil servants and professionals who are affiliated with the party. However, the expansion of tertiary education at the current movement, despite with its limitation, would increase the size of the middle class. Currently, the existing middle class is not in a position to bid for further political liberalization and reform of the political system. As Abbink (2009) contends despite the changing patterns of the social and economic structures propitious to the emergence of middle class, its capacity to challenge the mounting political repression is crippled by the increased rate of poverty and skyrocketing inflation.

As far as urbanization is concerned, not more than 17% of the total populations inhabited in urban areas. Viewing this small size of urban segments of population against the theoretical assumption of Martin Seymour Lipset (1959; 1994), the country lacks a structural factor that could facilitate the transition to democracy. In fact, it should be noted that the leaders of most opposition political

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9 African Development Bank (2011), in its market brief, defined middle class in terms of income and daily consumption. Accordingly, persons who earn more than 3,900 US dollar annually and spend between 2 and 20 dollar on consumption daily are categorized within middle class. It further classified the group into three categories depending upon their daily consumption: Floating middle class ($2-$4 per day), lower-middle class ($4-$10 per day) and upper-middle class ($10-$20 per day).

10 www.indexmundi.com/ethiopia/urbanization.html
parties mushroomed in the wake of the Derg period reside in urban areas, exposed to elements of modernity and most of them are ex-civil servants, business people and educated (Melaku, 2006). This state of affairs has proven the modernization theory in the sense that elements subscribed to modernity can contribute to democracy. However, it still needs large scale urbanization, middle class, industrialization and wealth to support the transition to democracy in Ethiopia. The manipulation of urban dwellers associations (UDA) by the incumbent has crippled the creation public sphere that could countervail the authoritarian tendency of the regime to independent outlooks. As Lyons (1996) asserted the EPRDF has benefited from maintaining the UDA as the local structure to distribute social services to the inhabitants so that it enables to construct effective party machinery. Furthermore, the existence of close contact between the urban dwellers and Kebelles with regard to renting government-owned houses, people living in rented houses could be subjected to any actions of Kebelle’s official as a result of electoral affairs. Indeed, the issues of middle class and the trend of urbanization cannot be seen separately from the school life expectancy of any society, which will be covered in the following sub-section.

**Education**

It is increasingly recognized that there is a positive correlation between culture of democracy and education. This is mainly because education presumably broadens one’s outlook, thereby increasing the need for norms of tolerance and pluralism. As Lipset (1959: 79) argued, it “restrains men from adhering to extremists and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational choices.” Although an increasing rate of literacy has been achieved in Ethiopia, it is still only 39% of adults are literate. 45% of youths are still illiterate. The 2011 Ethiopian school life expectancy, according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, is 9 years. This shows Ethiopia is categorized under authoritarian regime category as per school life expectancy and democracy index is concerned.

The recent expansion of tertiary education is in an embryonic stage to nourish civic culture by making individuals less fatalistic and less parochial. It is, however, paralyzed to be the lynchpin of democracy because of high level of state control on education in the sense that it is being observed the increasing political recruitments of students by the incumbent. Given the highest rate of unemployment in the country, becoming a member of the ruling party in order to get employment opportunity in public services up on their graduation is viewed favorably by students. In such circumstance, as Kamens (1988:118) argued in his theoretical nexus between democracy and education, “higher education ... may act to rationalize the capacity of the state and the competence of its personnel. In such systems, education may operate to support state-sponsored change or revolution from above.” As a result of political ‘capture’ of tertiary education in Ethiopia, it has continued to adversely impact on the role of academic institutions to entrench political democracy.

The politicization of educational facilities is a strategy employed by the EPRDF to curb the political space. This was manifested when days approached the 2010 federal and regional election by exploiting the resources of higher institutions to train cadres. The civil servants in each bureaucracy are required to attend ‘trainings’ under the pretext of capacity building. In actual fact, as Human Rights Watch (2010) stated, its intention is recruiting members for the EPRDF and to indoctrinate them the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy. It is also reported that

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11 Only five percent of labor force is employed in the industry sector. The agriculture sector employs 85% labor force. 11Stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=125&IF_Language=eng&BR_Country=2300&BR_Region=40540 13Hueller.blogspot.com/2008/12/democracy.html 14 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, full democracy is characterized by school life expectancy beyond 16.1 years. Flawed democracy is characterized by 12.8 years and above as far as school life expectancy is concerned. Hybrid regimes have 9.8 years and above school life expectancy while authoritarian regimes have less than 9.6 years school life expectancy.
partisan political activities are undertaking on school premises to indoctrinate the ideology of EPRDF among high school students. This is against the principle of separation between schools and politics. Teachers, who are not members of the incumbent party, are subjected to pressure to sign to party membership. At worst, they may be dismissed if they are found to be members or sympathizers of opposition parties. As a result of these precarious conditions as well as to secure salary increment and scholarship, they join the ruling party (US State Department, 2009). This endeavor to recruit students for the ruling party membership is part of an attempt to manufacture consent among the youth.

It is also possible to argue our educational system is Banking education, to use words of Freire (2005), in that memorization, absence of critical thinking and top-down approach between students and teachers are the hallmarks. In such an authoritarian educational tradition, it is difficult to conceive critical thinking on the parts of students thereby failing to perceive the socio-economic and political contradictions within the Ethiopian society and to take action against the oppressive political system. As Freire (2005) argues, education should expose the oppressive nature of the political system and human sufferings. Students are instrumental in uprooting these oppressive systems accordingly. Against this view, the Ethiopian educational system is not in a position to transform state society relationships that geared towards democratization unless it breaks itself from authoritarian political tradition.

**Authoritarian political culture**

It is believed that political culture and political socialization are indispensable to build and sustain a democratic system. Political culture in the form of “collective political memory” (Paulos, 2009) and citizens’ attitude vis-à-vis society, state and politics have impacted on the stability of any political system. The political culture can take the forms of participant, subject, parochial and a mix of the three what is called a civic culture. Against these assumptions, Paulos argued that Ethiopia has experiences subject and parochial political culture. The former one expressed in the inability of the public to impact on the political system, although they participate in regular election since the demise of the military regime. The latter one often manifest itself in rural Ethiopia and particularly in places of Southern part were “people feel helpless in the face of intimidation and denial of rights meted out by Kebele officials and security personnel” (2009: 689).

In a similar vein, Abbink (2009) contends that Ethiopia’s hierarchical political culture is not nourishing a democratic-republican political culture whereby its fundamental aspects, such as public debates and discourses on national affairs, are primarily discouraged and prohibited. Rather, the current political dispensation has inherited from its predecessors, the military and the imperial regimes, political traditions illustrated by hierarchy, obedience and forceful authority. As Kassahun (2003: 142) also clearly noted “The autocratic mentality bequeathed by past rigid political culture and the tendencies that uphold the politics of command are very much alive today, as they were during imperial and revolutionary times.” These authoritative assertions contend the institutionalization of democracy in the post-1991 period cannot be conceived without deeply looking into the political culture of the country. As a result, intimidation, suspicion, division, violence and suppression have continued to dominate the political terrain of the country for the last couple of decades. This state of affairs manifests itself in crisis ensued elections, armed insurgency,

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15 The participant political culture is characterized by higher sense of citizenship in the sense that citizens are well aware of their rights and duties, they participate in politics, they proud to belong to their respective state and pay allegiance to the political system. In the subject political culture, citizens do not believe in impacting on the political system, although they are participating in election. Therefore, they do have lower sense of citizenship, despite the fact that they are engaged in politics. This condition paves the way for lower efficacy in politics. Parochial political culture is characterized by people felt alienated from the system. Their foremost allegiance goes to primordial ties rather than to the political institutions. As a result, they are not participating in politics. According to Almond and Verba (Cited in Newton and van Deth, 2005), civic culture, a culture mixed of participant, subject and parochial political culture, is necessary to maintain a democratic system.
interethnic conflicts, harassment and intimidation of perceived members or sympathizers of opposition groups. The political tradition of the country is still unable to break itself from the logic of ‘winner-takes-all’ approach whereby the state is the only source of wealth, prestige and power. Hence, the political struggle among groups is reinforced by such principles, thereby making political activities deadly, a struggle for life. In such circumstances, democratization process is further derailed, leave alone its consolidation.

Elites in any society can be instrumental in influencing their society, thereby shaking the foundation of the old system and replacing it with a new one. Ethiopian history has witnessed the role of the intelligentsia in speeding up the demise of the monarchical system in the February revolution. The contribution of the elite political subculture for today’s tortuous political course to political transition which favors political opening should be recognized. Although it is difficult to generalize the Ethiopian political culture in general and the elite in particular, it is fair to say that they can be categorized in an authoritarian political culture rather than democratic one. Across the successive regimes, the predominant feature of authoritarian political sub-culture upheld by the elites, as Paulos (2009: 691) argued, “subverts democracy”. The litmus test of democratization, such as allowing fundamental freedoms and liberties to all segments of society, are curtailed. This is partly related with authoritarian nature of elite political culture whereby the dominance of one man/one party, un-constitutionalism as well as “the unwillingness of the elites to appreciate the need to disentangle the country from this undemocratic web” (Paulos, 2009: 692). As a result, the culture of demonization, the politics of blame and hate as well as conspiracy have continued to stifle the onset of political dialogue and the establishment of democratic institutions (Sisay, 2003).

The problem is further aggravated, given the agents of socialization to transmit democratic values and norms are monopolized by the ruling party. In any democratic system, mass media is deemed as a fourth estate in that it has a capacity to check the power of the state. Furthermore, it takes measure as soon as the rules, regulations and laws of the country are undermined. In Ethiopia, however, national TV and Radio as well as government-owned press are being instrumentalized for conveying government’s information rather than being actors of a two way of communication. As a result, they fail to critically evaluate government’s deeds at each levels (Poluha, 1997). It is also possible to argue that fostering “an alternative value system and framework” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) that is expected from mass media has become elusive. The purpose of the mass media relegated to the creation of “manufactured consent” whereby political dissent or alternative views do not get any space vis-à-vis the dominant perspective that sanctify the status quo. This has in turn jeopardized the germination of political pluralism within the society. Furthermore, the political climate of the country is dictated by the principle of “winner-takes-all” approach whereby actors in politics has two fates: inclusion or exclusion. If you are a ruler of this country, all privileges and powers are monopolized under your control. On the contrary, other parties are excluded from taking part in the direction of the political process. As a result, the persistent nature of authoritarian political culture is inability to nurture democratic system.

The lingering authoritarian political tradition is also reinforced by EPRDF’s understanding of democracy, which is antithetical to the entrenchment of political pluralism. It is engaged in molding the republic on the line of “Revolutionary Democracy.” The ruling party has viewed democracy as popular participation at the grass root’s level so that it is able to mobilize the public to meet the party’s program. It is not aimed at entertaining debates and votes between different political opinions. As Abbink (2009) clearly argued, democracy for the EPRDF implies public participation through the channels of the ruling party and the government machineries. Without the domain of these, any participation is perceived as a threat to the status quo in that it is being perceived as challenging the hegemonic dominance of the incumbent. This kind of understanding of democracy coupled by the persistent nature of authoritarian political culture was reinforced in the wake of the 2005 federal and local election. Since then, people perceived as
sympathizer or member of the opposition groups have been subjected to harassment, intimidation and exclusion from social services. This is a sign of “a firm authoritarian hand trying to intimidate critical voices and dissidents and to reinforce power from above” (Abbink, 2009: 16). Therefore, the EPRDF’s conviction of having the “right” policy does not give opportunity to the opposition political parties, civic groups and the public to have discussion on national issues. This trend of monopolization of the public space by the ruling party shows its relentless effort to play a vanguard role within the society.

In short, the prevailing structural factors that are exemplified by the increasing involvement of the ruling party in the economy, the strangulation of peasants by the cadre system, marshaling state resources for political ends by the incumbent, meager size of the middle class, the existence of a sizeable size of illiterates, as well as lower rate of urbanization are hindering the possible political transformation geared towards democratization. Furthermore, authoritarian political tradition inherited from the past has adversely impacted on the flourishing of political pluralism.

Concluding remarks
The above discussion showed that various structural factors have impeded Ethiopia’s political transition to democracy. The incumbent party, since its assumption of power in May 1991, has monopolized the public sphere, which is detrimental of fundamental values and principles underpinning democracy. In its endeavor to preside over the helm of power without any contestant, it has marshaled state’s resources under its custody. Furthermore, it has employed politico-legal frameworks, which are the advantages of its incumbency, to further entrench its influence within the society. Although the EPRDF’s commitment to stay in power can provide an essential explanation to look at the derailed path to democratization in the post-Derg periods, the structural obstacles are by far the most potent force that impeded the political transformation. These are the narrowing economic bases of the civic sectors, strangulation of the peasants by the cadre system, the politicization of development assistances, meager size of the middle class, slow rate of urbanization, lower rate of school life expectancy coupled by large sections of illiteracy. These further reinforced by lingering authoritarian political tradition that we have inherited from the past.

The incumbent’s endeavor to monopolize the commanding height has had a detrimental effect on the emergent of vibrant private sector. This state of affairs has continued to erode the economic bases of the civic sector, thereby narrowing the political space. Furthermore, managing local administrative apparatuses to ensure regime security by the incumbent has further impeded the democratization process. Another obstacle to the democratization process is the meager size of the middle class while looking back to two decades. The current states of inflation and aggressive political recruitment strategy by the EPRDF further stifled the existing middle class so as not to play a potent role against the authoritarian orientation of the regime. The current conditions of urbanization, lower school life expectancy and sizeable sections of illiterate population are also hindering factors as far as democratization is concerned.

The ‘winner-takes-all’ approach, that has been the hallmark of the political formulae of the country, has continued unabated and reinforced by the predominant political culture, a culture of monopolizing the political space by actor in power, thereby excluding the rest. In this case, the EPRDF has unleashed the politics of exclusion against perceived and real political threats to the incumbent. The paucity of negotiation and compromise as parts of political language has further impeded the political transition to democracy. Indeed, we have seen some developments that may provide impetus to the opening of political space that could entertain political pluralism. The expansions of tertiary education accompanied by the youth bulge as well as the emergence of middle class are particular examples. Nevertheless, the constraint factors outweigh the opportunities. As a result, political transformation geared towards democracy is unlikely to
prevail in the foreseeable future. Consequently, the state remains the appendage of the ruling party so as to entrench itself intact.
References


**Internet Sources**


PART III
Liberal Peace Agenda in Post-1991 Ethiopia: Merits and Challenges

Mesay Hagos Asfaw¹

Abstract

In Ethiopia, the liberal peace project can be traced back to the American-brokered London Peace Conference. With the war against the Derg approaching an end, a conference organized by the United States was held in London in May 1991. It was attended by leaders of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and representatives of the Derg. “No democracy, no cooperation!” was the message of the then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, who chaired the meeting. Thus, following its assumption of power in May 1991, the EPRDF government promised the country and its people multiparty democracy, respect for human rights, a decentralized system of governance and a liberalized economy. The aim of this paper is twofold: (a) to identify and critically discuss the merits of liberal peace agenda in Post-Conflict Ethiopia and (b) assess the challenges of liberal peace projects in Ethiopia since 1991.

Introduction

Externally driven peace settlements guided by the liberal peace agenda have proliferated throughout African states that have emerged out of armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War (Dobson, 2014:1). The proponents of liberal peace agenda argued that liberal states embracing liberalized economy and multiparty democracy are fundamentally against war and therefore desirable (Macmillan, 1998). However, the outcome of the liberal peace project in most post-conflict African settings was quite dismaying. Even countries that are often described as liberal peacebuilding success stories, such as Namibia and Mozambique, have experienced high rates of inequality and persistent insecurity among some segments of the society (Curtis, 2012:10). The failure in Angola (1992), Rwanda (1993–1994), Sierra Leone (1999), Sudan (2005), and Côte d’Ivoire (2010), have further overshadowed these partial success stories (ibid).

In Ethiopia, the liberal peace project can be traced back to the May 1991 American-brokered London Peace Conference, which was attended by leaders of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and representatives of the then collapsing Derg regime. At the conference an agreement was reached to meet in Addis Ababa and prepare a draft Charter by which Ethiopia would be administered for a transitional period. Despite the demise of the Derg, one of the actors presumed to be part of the transition process, through the military victory of EPRDF, the latter spearheaded the July “Peace and Democratic Conference” that produced the Transitional Charter. Through the charter, EPRDF introduced three radical reforms: the decentralisation of the state, the democratisation of politics, and the liberalisation of the economy (Sarah Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). Predicated upon the ideals of liberal peace agenda, these reforms have sought to reverse a history of centralised autocracy and violent political conflict (ibid). The new political order has passed through more than two decades of praxis now. This paper seeks to examine how the political practice fared to the stated objectives of the liberal peace building project. Its objective is two-fold: i) to review the theoretical underpinnings of liberal peace agenda as experimented in

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post-conflict African settings; and ii) to discuss the merits and challenges of liberal peace agenda in post-1991 Ethiopia.

The paper has four sections. The first section deals with the theoretical underpinnings of liberal peace, and touches upon its outcome in post-conflict peace settlement in Africa. Section two provides a brief historical description as to how the liberal peace project unfolded in post-1991 Ethiopia. Section three identifies and discusses the merits and challenges of liberal peace agenda in post-1991 Ethiopia. The last section analyses the status of multi-party democracy and democratization project in Ethiopia through the prism of the pillars of liberal peace agenda.

**Liberal peace in post-conflict African settings: an overview**

Drawing on initial successes in Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique, the transformation of war torn societies through political and economic liberalisation became the norm since the end of the Cold War (Curtis, 2012:10; Hoffman, 2009:10). According to the liberal peace thesis, multiparty democracy and liberalised economy are inherently peaceful and desirable (ibid). In effect, the liberal peace agenda aims at creating post-conflict peace settlement through the “export of liberal frameworks of ‘good governance’, democratic elections, human rights, the rule of law, and market relations” (Chandler, 2010:138). Its theoretical underpinning is the idea that “certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are” (Newman et al., 2009:11). Put simply, it assumes the idea that liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics promote lasting peace in war-torn societies (Tom, 2011:94). Thus, as Richmond (2004: 87) rightly observed, “[p]eace is understood to lie in the establishment or reconstructive and transformative processes that culminate in states that mirror the liberal- democratic state.”

There are two components of liberal peace agenda: economic marketization and political democratization. The first component is concerned with trade and free market. The argument here, as Barbieri (2005:1-2) puts it, “included an explanation of how economic interdependence creates incentives for cooperation, reduces misconceptions, and fosters formal and informal mechanisms conducive to resolving conflicts of interest that might arise between states.” So liberal peacebuilding involves liberalisation of trade, promotion of foreign direct investment, downsizing of the public sector in favour of private competition, and so on (Greener, 2011: 369). This has not only become the dominant model for promoting economic development but also part of post-conflict peacebuilding (ibid).

The second component focuses on the realm of politics. Here, it was contended that liberal states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war (Macmillan,1998). In post-conflict settings thus democratization has become a critical component of liberal peace agenda. Peacebuilding was equated with democracy building, which included reconstruction of political institutions, rules and activism tailored in terms of neoliberal values (Ismail, 2008:19). The obvious assumption is that due to the institutional checks and balances inherent in democracies, nonviolent negotiation and compromise including voting, democratic states are peaceful in their relations with each other, and are less likely to experience civil wars as well (Greener, 2011:359; Rummel, 2005).

Despite these ideals, liberal peace agenda has been subjected to fierce criticisms. According to Chandler (2010), one group of critic “tends to see the discourse of liberal peace as an ideological and instrumental one, arguing that the rhetoric of freedom, markets and democracy is merely a representation of Western self-interest, which has little genuine concern for the security and freedoms of those societies intervened in.” Others argued that “attempts to universalise Western models in non-liberal contexts will merely reproduce, and maybe even exacerbate, the problems
of conflict and instability” (ibid). Similarly, there are scholars who argue that liberal peace “was an elite driven, top-down, outside-in, technocratic and overly formulaic experiment in social engineering that lacked local legitimacy” (Hoffman, 2009:10). In post-conflict African settings, the outcome of liberal peace agenda should be democratic, incorporate liberalised and globalized market, and aspire to human rights protection and the rule of law, justice, and economic development (Newman and Richmond, 2006). Yet, these ideals of liberal peace were not the case in most post-conflict Africa states (Salih, 2008:182). Even countries that are often described as liberal peacebuilding success story, such as Namibia and Mozambique, have experienced high rates of inequality and persistent insecurity among some communities (Curtis, 2012:10). The failure in Angola (1992), Rwanda (1993-94), Sierra Leone (1999), Sudan (2005), and Côte d’Ivoire (2010), further overshadowed the partial success stories of liberal peace agenda in Africa (ibid). Also, as liberal peace agenda was essentially externally driven, it would garner limited domestic support, and thus remain intrinsically weak (Dobson, 2014).

Moreover, the liberal peace is said to be neoliberal in its content and purpose (Salih, 2008:182). According to Harvey (2010:10), neoliberalism, “[m]asked by a lot of rhetoric about individual freedom, liberty, personal responsibility and the virtues of privatisation, the free market and free trade, legitimised draconian policies designed to restore and consolidate capitalist class power.” Thus, as Salih (2009: 133) succinctly puts it, “while the dominant political economy of the liberal peace has led to stability, nurtured the politics of democratic hope and a modicum of respect for human and civil rights, [...] it has largely failed to deliver tangible developmental or economic benefits to the majority of the African poor.” Thus it has generally failed to promote the social conditions of the African poor (Salih, 2008:182). Rather, “the market-driven beneficiaries, private sector and free market operators, with sufficient financial resources to contest elections and patronize the post-conflict states, are the very criminal elements that benefited from the political economy of war and exacerbated conflict” (ibid).

Besides, premised on the logic of inclusion and exclusion, liberal peace project in post-conflict African settings undermines African conception of peace which is mainly concerned with rebuilding social relations and communal harmony (Karbo, 2008:117). Regarding this, it has also been argued that whereas Western conceptions of peace place heavy emphasis on prosperity and order, African conceptions are based on morality and order (Albert in Curtis, 2012). Accordingly, the underpinnings of peace in Africa can be found in the commitment to cultural values, beliefs, and norms as well as in societal role expectations (ibid).

Generally, liberal peace agenda was implemented in post-conflict African settings solely by focusing on electoral democracy and market economy in almost all contexts. This one size fits all approach alone cannot address multidimensional and complex causes of conflicts in the post-conflict settings. Peacebuilding in these cases should have been approached holistically and as a comprehensive package involving tackling any perceived or real grievances, income distribution, land reform, human security, corruption, gender equality, refugee reintegration, economic development, ethno-national divisions, environmental degradation, transitional justice, and so on. If liberal peace agenda goes beyond electoral democracy and marketization to address these issues, it will be an ideal and viable option to a continent that has long been defined by the scourge of military dictatorship and undemocratic governance.

Liberal peace agenda in post-1991 Ethiopia
At the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy had emerged as “the only model of government with any broad legitimacy and ideological appeal in the world” (Cooper in Paris, 2010:346). Given this prevailing zeitgeist, the then rebel movements were able to reach an agreement on democratic transition in Ethiopia though some were originally Marxists in their orientation. There were two agreements that defined the course of the transition. First, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (ERDF), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the representatives of the nearly collapsed Derg met in the U.S. brokered London Conference (Harbeson, 1998). In this conference the then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, who chaired the meeting, told EPRDF representatives that they would enjoy continued U.S. support only if they undertook to democratize Ethiopia (ibid). “No democracy, no cooperation” was his precise message (Lyons, 1996:122-123). At this conference, a consensus was reached to meet in Addis Ababa and establish an inclusive and broad-based transitional government.

Thus, as agreed upon at the London Peace Conference, the second landmark conference took place in July 1991 in Addis Ababa. The victorious EPRDF had managed to bring to the conference a combination of veteran and swiftly self-constituted ethno-national political organizations (Lyons, 1996:123). Most notable among these organizations was the OLF, “a potentially powerful political force to the extent it could mobilise the Oromo [the largest ethnic group] behind its programme”. There were also “small ethnic parties, newly organized under EPRDF tutelage, led by urban elites with weak ties to the countryside” (ibid). However, members of the discredited Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) of the regime that had collapsed and several non-ethnic parties that had united in exile to form the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF) were excluded (ibid). Prominent Amhara attended the conference in their individual capacity but the Amhara lacked an organized voice at this crucial conference (Harbeson, 1998:116). The major party formed to represent the Amhara interests was established only after the conference (ibid). At any rate, the representatives at the Addis Ababa conference formed a Council of Representatives, which approved the Charter for the transitional period and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) (Merera, 2003b:152).

Then, for the first time, Ethiopia conducted local and regional elections, in June 1992, with some fundamental flaws (Harbeson, 1998). The following factors contributed to the flaws of these elections: logistical difficulties; unavailability of sufficient lead time to complete electoral preparations and processes; insufficient progress in demilitarizing the countryside before electoral activity; insufficient transformation of all militarized movements into civilian political parties; insufficient civic education for voters and local election officials concerning election regulations and processes; and failure of the political organizations to reach consensus on rules of political competition (ibid). Most importantly, there were legal ambiguities over the encampment of armies and formation of neutral security forces which fuelled bitter misunderstandings that prompted the OLF and other movements to withdraw from the regional elections (ibid). Harbeson also noted that “[t]he EPRDF capitalized on what international observers were to describe as a less than free and fair electoral process in order to enhance its de facto political hegemony [drove the OLF] to decamp its armies and mount a short, futile military challenge to the EPRDF” (ibid).

Be that as it may, the election of a constituent assembly was held, and the newly drafted liberal constitution was ratified as a precursor to elections to the new parliament in 1995. According to Lyons (1996:121) “[t]he well-managed May 1995 elections ended the transitional period and served to consolidate the EPRDF’s dominance.” Lyons added that “[w]hat had begun with a noisy diversity of views among a broad array of political organisations ended quietly with the clear hegemony of the EPRDF” (ibid).

Generally, the incoming government embraced both political and economic components of liberal peace from the very beginning. Politically, it transformed a highly centralised single party arrangement into a federation of nine Regional States; introduced multi-party democracy and formal separation of powers; and adopted a number of international human rights instruments (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). Economically, it implemented the World Bank/International Monetary Fund neoliberal package called Structural Adjustment Policies including restructuring
of the hitherto command economy with the introduction of market forces into most sectors. These reforms were designed to “reverse a history of centralised autocracy and violent political conflict” (ibid).

Since May 2005, however, the Ethiopian government has publicly bashed the marketization/neoliberal component of liberal peace agenda, and declared to adopt the developmental state paradigm (Abbink, 2011:598) while simultaneously extolling the virtue of multiparty democracy as “an existential necessity”. For instance, the Ethiopian government, in its very recent official statement, claims that “democracy with all its operational modalities of periodic election, freedom of expression, due process, separation of the three branches of government etc, could not have been a matter of choice to famine-prone, conflict-ridden, and terror-stricken Ethiopia, but an existential necessity” (FDRE Government Communication Affairs Office, 2015:46). Hence, the focus of the next sections is only on one component of liberal peace agenda: political democratization. Also, assessing whether developmental state and multiparty democracy are compatible or incompatible or complement each other requires a full-fledged research in its own right, and is beyond the scope this paper.

**Merits and challenges of liberal peace agenda in post-1991 Ethiopia**

**Merits of liberal peace agenda in post-1991 Ethiopia**

In a country that emerged from a long bloody civil war like Ethiopia, the ideals of liberal peace agenda had enormous advantages. Formally, the peace process guided by liberal peace paradigm was begun in the London Conference just before the EPRDF forces captured the capital, and at that meeting an agreement was reached to hold another peace conference in Addis Ababa. Thus the transfer of power in Addis Ababa took place with a relatively minimum bloodshed when the capital fell into the hands of the EPRDF forces in May 1991. The then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen who chaired the London Peace Conference “publicly ‘recommended’ that [the EPRDF forces] enter Addis Ababa, ‘in order to reduce uncertainties and eliminate tensions’, after receiving reports of growing disorder and hoping to prevent the sort of chaos that had devastated the Liberian capital of Monrovia and Somalia’s Mogadishu in somewhat similar circumstances” (Lyons, 1996:122). This can be viewed as the first merit of promises of liberal peace agenda. Only on this light should the subsequent successes of discouraging the combatants from returning to war, restoring key state functions and addressing transitional justice, with their flaws, be seen.

Second, although the causes of conflict in Ethiopia are complex and multidimensional (Geda, 2004:11), the root cause of the 1974-91 Civil War was Derg’s policy of centralization, refusal to share power with either the politically conscious middle classes or the emerging ethno-regional elites (Markakis, 1989:130). According to Lefort (2011), the ERDF “considers that the hypercentralisation, even Jacobinism of its predecessors had exacerbated the centrifugal forces, mainly ethnically driven, to the point of threatening the unity of Ethiopia.” Consequently, a decentralisation measure it took since 1991 to accommodate ethno-linguistic diversity has diffused the factor that generated violent conflict (Clapham, 2009:187). Also, a level of autonomy to largely ethnic-based regional governments gave rise to a sense of regional ownership and representation unknown under the previous regime (ibid). Consequently, for the first time in decades, the country now enjoys relative peace.

It is, however, argued that the creation of sharp divisions along ethnolinguistic lines has created conflicts of its own kind. For instance, Abbink (2006:390-391) has argued that the relative internal peace brought about by the new arrangement is achieved by defusing ethnicity and ethno-regional tensions as a source of armed rebellion. He further suggested that “traits of contemporary conflicts are their reduction in scale - in specific locations, dispersed, or in a sense, ‘democratised’ - and their non-state directed nature” (ibid). However, these conflicts have to be seen as the lesser of two evils: large scale civil war due to hypercentralisation, or decentralisation generated local conflicts.
There is no magic formula to avoid low intensity and localised conflicts in the foreseeable future. Yet, it is important to develop specific policy and strategy to addresses these conflicts and mitigate their impacts.

Third, in post-1991 Ethiopia, “[p]olitical space was opened to a dramatically greater extent than ever before in Ethiopia’s history, with the establishment for the first time of an independent press, and other trappings of an expanded civil society.” (Clapham, 2009:183). There was also relatively an improvement in human rights situation, at least in the early stage of the transition (Kumar, 1998:224; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:18).

Besides, by committing itself to the desiderata of liberal peace agenda, the EPRDF-led government, as Clapham (2009:189) describes, “rapidly succeeded in placing Ethiopia in a highly advantageous position within the global and continental networks that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, and using this position both to become a favoured recipient of international aid, and to pursue its own regional and domestic political agendas.” As a result, it was maintained that “Ethiopia’s international standing was transformed from near pariah status into a favoured position in the new global order” (ibid: 183).

Last, according to Geda (2004:26), “[c]onflict is the major and fundamental explanatory factor for the poverty and backwardness of Ethiopia.” Conflict diverts resources from productive to destructive activities and thereby negatively affects the prospect of economic development. Consequently, during the civil war (1974-1991), the country’s economic growth rates were very minimal at best or negative at worst, and “where they were high, an inherently unstable growth which exacerbated rather than reduced poverty”. But after the conflict was settled within the liberal peace paradigm and with a relative peace subsequently achieved, dramatic improvement was seen in economic terms. For instance, Ethiopia’s average GDP growth between 1992 and 1997 was 6 per cent (ibid). More recently, the country has been rated as one of the fastest growing economies in the world (UNDP, 2014).

**Challenges of liberal peace agenda in post-1991 Ethiopia**

Although the causes of violent conflict in Ethiopia are complex and multidimensional, the most devastating and destructive conflict is motivated by competition for political power (Geda, 2004:11). In illustrating this, Geda stated that “[e]ach aspirant revolts against the government in power, mobilizing people by appealing to the oppression meted out to them by those in power. The new usurpers treat the people no better, and often worse, than those they unseated” (ibid). The question is whether multiparty democracy and democratisation offer any hope to get out of this cycle of violent conflict and maintain peace. Obviously, the radical reforms were adopted since 1991 hoping that democracy will be a key to get out of this vicious circle. With this backdrop, the following sub-sections identify the main challenges of multiparty democracy and democratisation in Ethiopia.

**Long history of violent transfer of political power**

Ethiopia has never had any regime claiming multiparty democracy prior to 1991. Nor did its rulers relinquish political power peacefully while few naturally died while in office (Geda, 2004:11). Deposed leaders have either been killed, imprisoned or went into exile (Clapham, 2004:73). Only after 1991 did Ethiopia hold multiparty elections with their flaws. Of course, the past does not necessarily determine the future of democratisation as some countries have succeeded in transforming themselves from brutal dictatorships to stable democracy (ibid). The success stories of Germany and Japan after WWII are cases in point. Yet, history set patterns that may guide people’s expectations, which make the success of the transition to democracy harder or easier (Clapham, 2004:72-73). Unfortunately, history in Ethiopia makes the consolidation of multiparty democracy harder, if not impossible (ibid).
Additionally, multiparty democracy, as historically originated and developed in the West, is a political culture of literate society (Bujo, 1988). Thus, successful transition to multiparty democracy depends on a certain degree of education of the general population (ibid). An effort to enforce democracy based on the Western model in Africa means that largely illiterate person is open to arbitrariness and manipulation by despotic political elites and their parties (ibid). On top of the level of illiteracy, the power elites in Ethiopia have additional leverage. All rural land was nationalised in 1975 and this nationalization has further been constitutionalised in 1994, giving the government control over rural land and enormous power over the substantial majority of the country’s rural population (Young, 1998:201).

Structure of state “dogged by a premise of inequality”

According to Clapham (2004:73), African states, which were arbitrarily formed by external colonial forces, have been facing enormous difficulties in establishing the basis for stable governance. The same is true for Ethiopia which was established by internal forces (ibid). Clapham added that the “historic” core of the Ethiopian state lies in the northern region inhabited by largely Amharic and Tigrinya speaking Orthodox Christians. Almost three-quarters of its present land area and a substantial majority of its population were incorporated into Ethiopia by the conquests of Emperor Menelik II (Harbeson, 1998:112). The incorporation took place in many places with the ruthless exploitation and marginalisation of the conquered peoples, who were generally regarded as inferior (Clapham, 2004:74; Baxter, 1978:285). A large proportion of the population in the incorporated regions follow Islam (Harbeson, 1998:113). Thus, as Clapham (2004:74) succinctly puts it, the country was “dogged by a premise of inequality.”

Paradoxically, the very ethnic federal arrangement which was introduced as a means of diffusing the factors that led to a long bloody civil war has undermined the prospects for multiparty democracy at the national level in the long-term (Harbeson, 1998:117). For instance, the redrawing of boundaries largely on the basis of ethnicity “discouraged existing ethnically defined movements from transforming themselves into national political parties for the purposes of (1) reaching across ethnic lines to build national coalitions and (2) developing issues along lines that crosscut ethnic divisions” (Harbeson, 1998).

At any rate, Ethiopia’s ethno-linguistic, religious and ecological variation is enormous, and this, together with complex state formation by internal forces, makes the maintenance of consensual political structures considerably difficult (Clapham, 2004:74). Thus, any effort to consolidate multiparty democracy in Ethiopia requires an extra effort including “a careful construction of those political structures and institutions that are able to mediate and accommodate diversities, not those that exacerbate differences at the cost of shared commonalties” (Merera, 2003b:160). This cannot be achieved without committed “political leaders who think and act on a broader scale than that of their own ethnic groups and who have a sense of history” (ibid).

Hierarchical expression of political culture

Despite its cultural diversity, according to Clapham (2004:75), “Ethiopia has a ‘state culture’ derived from its long imperial history and from the societies especially of the northern highlands.” He has observed that “the conflicts that have long structured Ethiopian politics result from the incompatibility between a particular conception of the state – which itself springs from the peculiarly hierarchical and authoritarian notions of governance associated with the cultures and societies of the northern Ethiopian plateau” (Clapham, 2009:181). This culture “has placed enormous emphasis on hierarchy and obedience, and taught Ethiopians that people are not equal, and that those in authority are worthy (at least in public) of unremitting deference, obedience and respect” (ibid). Similarly Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003:11) maintained that the “[d]ominant socio-political culture in much of Ethiopia has historically been vertically stratified, and rigidly hierarchical. As a result, it is often the case that processes of socialisation from birth teach
Ethiopians that people are not equal.” Due to this, they further argued, “[m]ost of Ethiopia’s rural citizens do not imagine that they should debate and select from alternative means of asserting control over their own lives. Nor do they consider it appropriate that their peers should do so, let alone those they regard as superior or inferior” (ibid: 35). Putting this in terms of electoral democracy, the idea of voting against the government is for many rural Ethiopians a strange one (Clapham, 2004:75). Doing so, without implicitly challenging the government’s right to rule and resorting to violence, is regarded as a downright subversive act (ibid).

Furthermore, the hierarchical expression of political culture polarizes public political debate (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:35), which is a bedrock of multiparty democracy. Indeed, both the government and the opposition, “do not enter into public dialogue on issues and ideology, but tend each to be entrenched in their own inwardly-informed political positions, from which they communicate against each other, rather than with each other”. Polarization of political debate has led to a tradition of talking “with the barrel of the gun” (ibid). In this political atmosphere, the idea of a “loyal opposition” is difficult to be grasped by both the power elites and their potential contenders (Clapham, 2004:75). Thus, the idea of loyal opposition, bargaining and compromise on which multiparty democracy depends are lacking (Asefa, 2003:102).

**Underdeveloped civil society groups**

As an intermediary between the state and its citizens, civil society groups have a pivotal role in consolidating multiparty democracy (Smith, 2007:6). Certainly, civil society in the form of a complex of organizations, outside the state serves as a means to nurture the habits of peaceful participation in public affairs on the part of the population, while at the same time placing constraints on the arbitrary exercise of power by the government (Clapham, 2004:83). Successful democratization thus presupposes the existence of, among others, a vibrant private press, and the freedom to form associations and advocacy and interest groups (Asefa, 2003; Smith, 2007). In post-1991 Ethiopia, particularly in the early phase of the transition, dramatic progresses were made with the establishment of an unprecedented private press and mushrooming civil society groups (Clapham, 2009: 183; Smith, 2007).

Yet, civil society in Ethiopia is not strong enough to hold the ruling regime democratically accountable (Harbeson, 1998:124). Similarly, most private publications spawned in the early transition “were almost unanimously hostile to the new regime, and all too eager to find fault” (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 72). This created a climate of mutual hostility, and then “[i]nexperience, political passion, and a culture of political exclusion led to exaggeration and misinformation, and gave the government reason to crack down” (ibid).

Furthermore, after the May 2005 election, the promises of democratic openness has largely been reversed (Smith, 2009: 878). According to Abbink (2011:598), the post-1991 Ethiopian political discourse has gone through four phases from the early transition and stabilization phase (1991-2000) to building the developmental state since May 2005 to date. At this phase, the government has elevated economic development above anything else and even to the extent of entirely trumpping “the quest from democracy, civil society facilitation, and plurality in domestic politics” (ibid). In illustrating this, Abbink further stated that “a spate of post- 2005 laws (Press Law, NGO Law, Anti- Terrorism Law), with narrow and restrictive clauses, has thwarted the development of civil society organizations and a concomitant democratic culture” (ibid).

Certainly, these laws have legitimate purposes in their face. For instance, there is a threat of radicalization and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Given this, the Ethiopian government has legitimate concern to deal with this particular threat through, among others, legislative measures. Having this in view, the government has enacted antiterrorism law. Then it claimed to have...
a flawless antiterrorism law which was adopted from advanced democracies. But whether Ethiopia’s antiterrorism law has been copycatted from advanced democracies like the United States or the United Kingdom, its interpretation and application in the atmosphere of embedded exclusionary political culture will render it to be a double-edged sword. As such, it can be used against violent religious fanatics, rebel movements, civil political opponents, critical journalists and dissenting bloggers.

**The Post-9/11 international discourse**

Although democratization is primarily a domestic process, the international community may play a pivotal role. That is why Brigaldino (2011:332) suggested that “[w]ithout reliable democratic friends amongst its international partners, Ethiopia will most likely be waiting for a long time to experience […] a popular democratic political system.” Indeed, “[n]o democracy, no cooperation!” was the massage of U.S. representative to the Ethiopian political forces at the London Peace Conference in May 1991. In consonance with this, the U.S. government contributed over $5 million to the 1992 local elections and post-election civic education in Ethiopia (Harbeson, 1998).

Yet, after the 9/11 attack on the U.S. and with the subsequent declaration of global “war on terror”, things have dramatically changed. As Ismail (2008:7) noted, “[t]he post-2001 American-led War on Terror and major revisions of the global geostrategic security calculus have made Post-Conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and state-building not only buzzwords, but key drivers of foreign policy in Western capitals.” This dynamics fundamentally and negatively altered the normative framework for liberal peacebuilding (Goodhand, 2006). After 9/11, peacebuilding is equated with stabilization. Peacebuilding as stabilization “shares the liberal concern with order, but rather than focusing its attention on order within states, it sees peacebuilding as being primarily concerned with maintaining the international status quo” (Curtis, 2012:11-12). Unlike liberal peace agenda which equated peace with democratisation and marketization at the end of the Cold War, peace builders in post-9/11 discourse were preoccupied with the creation of stable, secure states with well- policed borders. Consequently, low-intensity and localized violence or repression may be tolerable so long as it does not affect international order and stability (ibid).

In East Africa, prior to 9/11, Al-Qaeda’s attack on the U.S. interests in the region, notably the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings, together with the absence of functional government in Somalia since 1991, led the Western powers to see the Horn of Africa region as an incubator for the next generation of terrorists (Clapham, 2009: 189-190). On this backdrop, the Ethiopian government swiftly signed up to the “global war on terror” (ibid). In its position as a powerful state in a turbulent region, where stability is more important to the interests of the West than human rights or democratization, Ethiopia became a key regional ally of the West in the “War on Terror” (Love, 2011:498). Promoting regional stability becomes top priority of the U.S. in its relations with Ethiopia (Ploch, 2010: 47-48). This makes the country one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid). This assistance has increasingly focused on bolstering the country’s capacity to counter insurgencies, improve regional security, and prevent terrorism. Even other development aids have intended to mitigate conditions that may lead to violent extremism, or that may indirectly contribute to such ends (ibid).

Taking this development into account, some observes went on to say that the global efforts to combat terrorism and commitments to pressure the implementation of democratic reforms have virtually collided (Smith, 2007:1). Thus, in a troubled Horn of Africa, as Brigaldino (2011: 330) suggested, “a state even with intermittent stability and a highly questionable human rights record is still considered to be a prized development ‘partner’.” It has further been argued that the U.S. has held on to this prize by underwriting the ruling regime in Ethiopia, regardless of its democratic track record (ibid).
Concluding remarks
As has been the case in most post-conflict African settings at the end of Cold War, the then transitional government of Ethiopia, led by EPRDF, adopted three radical reforms in early 1990s. These reforms include decentralisation of the state; democratisation of politics; and liberalisation of the economy. Having the liberal peace thesis in view, these reforms have sought to reverse a history of centralised autocracy and violent political conflict. Although the Ethiopian government has recently bashed the economic component of liberal peace agenda and publicly claimed to adopt the developmental state paradigm, it has still exolted the virtue of multiparty democracy as “existential necessity”.

However, as this essay argued, more than twenty years on, multiparty democracy in Ethiopia was initiated but remains far from being realized due mainly to historical, structural, cultural and institutional challenges. The post-9/11 change in global discourse has also negatively affected the prospects of multiparty democracy in Ethiopia. Thus, what existed to date in Ethiopia are merely periodic elections with a range of electoral process and outcome manipulations or malpractices by the ruling party (Merera, 2007: 14). These make it difficult for opposition political parties to use the liberal democratic legal and institutional framework to challenge and change the dominance of the ruling party (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 19).

Some optimist observers maintained however that as far as elections continue to take place, the process of democratization could continue to be promoted (Green, 2011: 1098). But democracy should be seen beyond the ritual of elections. If it is taken seriously, it will help the country to get out of the cycle of violent political conflicts. Indeed, the country’s peace and stability, according to Geda (2004), depend on the extent to which political leaders are made accountable to the people, and if they are not made accountable, a return to further political conflict is a real probability. Similarly, Merera (2003: 160-161) argues that the incomplete transition to democracy will lead to political instability. And, if the government’s view of democracy as “an existential necessity” to the country is a genuine one, it corresponds with the conclusions made by these two scholars. This consensus must be matched with real commitments to restore hope to transform the politics of gunfire into the politics of peaceful competition.

Yet, consolidating multiparty democracy in Ethiopia requires a broader approach than merely installing formal legal and institutional frameworks. These include radical changes in the ways in which Ethiopians have conceived basic questions of governance and authority (Clapham, 2004:76); nurturing the idea of bargaining, compromise and loyal opposition among Ethiopian political elites; and facilitating the proliferation of independent civil society groups just to list few. External factors also influence the democratization process either in negative or constructive ways. But what matters most is a genuine commitment of the power elites in treating democracy as “an existential necessity”, and bringing the democratization processes back on track. Otherwise, history will repeat itself and let all learn a hard lesson.
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Abstract

Discourse on African peace support operations (PSOs) is gaining increasing traction for a variety of reasons. African PSOs are often depicted as showcasing the limited capacity and resources of the African Union (AU) in planning, deploying, and managing complex humanitarian interventions. They are also considered as having limited impact in bringing peace to the respective environments in which they are deployed. On a more abstract level, they are presented as embodiment of a burgeoning and putative African agency in the area of peace and security that has only crystallized since the AU established its African Peace and Security Architecture, commonly known as APSA. Departing from these observations, this paper argues that African PSOs deployed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with all their limitations, contribute a more tangible and practical meaning to the UN Charter’s provision for UN’s cooperation with ROs. To this end, this paper contextualizes the growing role of African PSOs within ongoing discourses of peace and security as having their own distinct agency in shaping the broader UN-ROs relations. The paper also analyzes the specific contribution of African PSOs in refining the normative, institutional, and operational dimension of the UN-ROs interaction/cooperation. Beside these contributions, the paper further highlights the epistemological and theoretical ramifications of the study of African PSOs mainly in terms of enriching the study of inter-organizational cooperation and regional-global partnership in the area of peace and security.

Introduction

African peace support operations (PSOs) are gaining increasing attention for a variety of reasons. In many cases, they are depicted as showcasing the limited capacity and resources of the African Union (AU) in planning, deploying, and managing complex PSOs. In others, they are associated with their relatively limited impact in bringing peace to the respective environments in which they are deployed. On a more abstract level, they are presented as embodiment of a burgeoning, putative African agency in the area of peace and security that has only crystallized since the AU established its African Peace and Security Architecture, commonly known as APSA.

Perhaps a less explored dimension is the contribution of African PSOs to redefining the relations of the United Nations with regional organizations (ROs) globally. The UN’s role in matters related to international peace and security is self-evident, whether it takes the form of intervening in various crises or simply existing as a primary and globally mandated entity with its authority duly enshrined in its Charter. Much less evident, or even less tangible, is the relationship between the UN and ROs.

An important provision of the UN Charter, Chapter VIII, defined the UN’s relationship with regional arrangements with respect to international peace and security. Notwithstanding the Charter’s provisions on the legal rationale for regional action in resolving crises, the UN made little or no use of such arrangements for of the major part of the Cold War. Now, in an apparent turnaround, the engagement of regional arrangements in the area of peacekeeping, either acting alone or alongside UN operations, has become the norm rather than the exception (UNSC 2015) or the the sine qua non for the management and resolution of conflicts (Akpasom, 2014).
Against this background, this paper argues that African PSOs deployed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with all their limitations, contribute a more tangible and practical meaning to the Charter’s provision for the UN’s cooperation with ROs. To this end, this paper will first provide a historical overview of UN’s relationship with ROs. The paper contextualizes the growing role of African ROs within ongoing discourses of peace and security as having their own distinct agency in shaping the broader UN-ROs relations. This will be followed by a discussion highlighting the specific contribution of African PSOs in refining the normative, institutional, and operational dimension of the UN-ROs interaction/cooperation. Consequently, the specific challenges surrounding the on-going deployment of African PSOs will be briefly discussed. The paper finally concludes by revisiting the practical, epistemological and theoretical contributions of the study of African PSOs and offers some recommendation to the same end.

UN’s Relationship with regional Organizations: an Historical overview

Regional organizations, as institutional representations of world regions, have been constitutive parts of the UN-centered international security system in one or another way. RO have increasingly become an integral component of the international security architecture albeit some level of resistance and distrust on their role and lacking a clear definition of what they stand for (Langenhove, Felicio, and Abass, 2013). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provided a room for regional involvement in resolving (regional) conflicts and offered a formal recognition of their participation. Notwithstanding the Charter’s provision, the UN-ROs cooperation did not automatically take effect in a more tangible and practical manner. Rather, the UN-ROs relationship traversed through a fragmented historical trajectory which can be broadly categorized in three phases. The three stages symbolize (i) the initiation and the subsequent stagnation phase (1945-1990s); (ii) the growing reassertion of the role of ROs as important partners to the UN in the field of peace and security (1990s-2006); and (iii) the operationalization phase of the UN-RO partnership, particularly with the African Union (2006-up to now).

The first phase (1945-1990s) is characterized both with the initiation and the subsequent stasis of UN-RO partnership in peace and security. The inactive cooperation between the two levels during this period was largely attributed to the prevailing Cold War international environment which largely permeated thinking and policy making in international security (Berdal, 1999). The rivalry between the two competing camps inarguably paralyzed the UN (Rivlin 1992; Barnett 1995) and precluded any form of substantial cooperation on most of its forums. Thus, the UN had made limited use of RO during this period (Barnett 1995). In the very few cases where the ROs contributed towards managing conflicts in their respective regions, their cooperation with the UN was lacking clear-cut pattern of working relationships or any satisfactory division of labor (Wilcox 1965); largely competitive rather than cooperative (Haas, 1986); not well-defined and short term in its nature (Barnett 1995); and haphazard and ad hoc (Graham, 2008). Likewise, UN’s cooperation with African ROs in the area of peace and security was largely intermittent and deficient during this period. Such deficient relationship can be evidenced, inter alia, by the fact the UN authorized and deployed only one peace operation in the first fifty years of its existence albeit the prevalence of major conflicts in the continent (Boulden, 2013).

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2 In the Post WWII era, the role of ROs in international security was not a pre-given. Rather, it was a thorny issue pitting the Universalist and Regionalist camps during the drafting of the UN Charter (Wilcox 1965).
3 An important provision of the UN Charter, chapter VIII, had broadly defined the UN’s relationship with regional arrangements with respect to international peace and security. The Charter also recognized the importance of regional arrangements.
4 The terms cooperation, relationship and partnership, albeit slight nuances in their meaning, will be used interchangeably in this paper.
5 As in the case of the broader UN-ROs partnership, the AU-UN partnership was also changing in accordance with these broad patterns.
The second phase of the UN-RO partnership between 1992 and 2006 is characterized with the growing (re)assertion of the potential of ROs in the realm of peace and security, which was recognized in the landmark UN Secretary General’s Report “Agenda for Peace” by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This period witnessed attempts to move the UN-RO relationship from a sporadic and spontaneous phase to a more organized and systematic collaboration based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Langenhove et al., 2012). These moves were largely borne out of specific factors namely the changes in the nature and levels of security threats in the immediate post-cold war period and the attendant UN capacity overstretch to deal with the various regional conflicts (Gelot, 2012).

As in the broader UN-ROs cooperation, the partnership between the UN and African RO, particularly with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), also started to evolve significantly during this period. This was evidenced, for instance, by the spike in the number of UN mandated peace operations in Africa. Already by the year 2005, the UNSC had authorized about 10 peacekeeping operations in Africa accounting for the bulk of the 65,000 UN personnel deployed globally (Bergholm, 2010). Other substantial indications of a growing OAU/AU-UN relationship include an increase in the UNSC debates and resolutions on African conflicts (Boulden, 2013); the passing of UN resolutions dealing with different ways of strengthening African regional and sub-regional arrangements for conflict management (cf. UNSC 1998); and the appointment of joint OAU/AU-UN Special Representatives (SR) for various African conflicts such as the SR for the Great Lakes region (Gelot, 2012).

Notwithstanding, the UN-RO cooperation during this phase can be considered far from complete and very much work in progress. As shown by Kennedy Graham and Tania Felício (2005), the UN-RO partnership across the board remained largely “complex, informal and constitutionally invertebrate” (p. 16) and “their formal collaboration and institutional relations have been thin and slow to formalize” (Holt & Shanahan, 2005, p. 47). On a more positive note, the cooperation was also considered to be showing signs that it was on the cusp of transforming from “declaratory to substantive operational stage” (Graham 2008, p. 177).

The third and final phase is characterized with the more practical steps towards operationalization of the UN-ROs partnership most notably the one between the AU and UN. Arthur Boutellis and Paul Williams (2013) argue that since 2006 the partnership between the AU and the UN has progressively entered a new phase witnessing unprecedented mechanisms of operationalizing the cooperation. Such is evidenced, for instance, by UN’s Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union, joint deployment of AU and UN peacekeepers in Darfur, joint efforts to resolve crises in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Guinea, Somalia, etc. (United Nations, 2013).

However, this dynamic phase of operationalizing the AU-UN partnership is evolving against a backdrop of a complex and dynamic conflict milieu in the absence of clearly defined practical guidelines governing the cooperation (Tavares, 2010) and in the face of a number of doctrinal and practical hurdles. Age old teething problems associated with the divergent interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter still dodge the cooperation as the two organizations sometimes clash over which of the two commands supremacy in conducting specific peace enforcements actions and how. Unclear division of labor, lack of subsidiarity and appropriate modalities of collaboration (strategic versus operational); divergent views on the partnership; doctrinal differences over peace operations are some of the issues which are still prevalent within the AU-UN partnership (AU PSC, 2012; Boutellis and Williams, 2013).

Two major analytical observations can be made in concluding this short snapshot of the historical evolution of the UN’s cooperation with ROs. The first observation refers to how the cooperation, especially in its current stage, signifies a history of both change and continuity in the realm of
international security policy making and implementation. On the one side, the cooperation symbolizes a historical trajectory of continuity having its roots in the provision of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which was significantly shaped by the debate and the compromise between the Universalists and the Regionalists. In this sense, contemporary forms of UN-ROs collaboration including with African ROs signify a stage along a continuum of an uneasy cooperation dating back to the establishment of the UN. On the other hand, the cooperation also marks a break with tradition as it symbolizes qualitative changes in addressing regional security threats with global implications through different regional mechanisms such as joint peacekeeping deployments, financial and technical support, special joint AU-UN envoys, etc.

The second observation is the appreciation of historical contribution of African ROs which are embedded within and helps in redefining the broader UN-ROs relationship. As will be illustrated further in the coming sections, African ROs can be considered instrumental in drawing out invaluable insights on unique ways of addressing regional security threats through specific regional-global partnership arrangements.

**Contextualizing the growing involvement of African regional organizations (ROs) in the area of peace and security**

The international security landscape is in a state of flux especially since the end of the Cold War both in its mutually constitutive discursive and practical dimensions. The collapse of the global communist camp ushered in tremendous shifts in the conceptualization and implementation of international security policies. Since then the international security agenda was expanded as a function of the changing nature of conflicts (Malone, 2004). Besides, new structures, agents, and norms of providing security to diverse set of referents emerged. More importantly international multilateral institutions like the UN and ROs assumed a growing role in international conflict management (Buzan 1997; Kistersky 1996).

In the case of Africa, increasing involvement of African ROs in dealing with regional conflicts peace-making became a key feature of the prevailing security environment. This new development was largely transpired by two factors namely proliferation of conflicts in the continent and changes in the normative contexts within major institutions such as UNSC as well as the OAU/AU (cf. Gelot, 2012). As instability and conflict unravel in different parts of the continent, African ROs became the first responders to the growing instability in places such as Liberia and Sierra Leone (1990-1998), Burundi (2004), Sudan (2004) and Somalia (2007).

Besides, normative transformations also took effect in the UNSC and later in the OAU/AU which legitimized interventions including humanitarian emergencies within state’s boundaries on the ground that they constitute “a threat to international peace and security” (Gelot, 2012, p. 25). Dubbed as African PSOs, most of the interventions took the form of “peacekeeping” and were undertaken within the provisions of the UN Charter; UNSC authorization sought either before the interventions or after the fact. African PSOs increasingly emerged as one of the key facets of the trend in cooperation between UN and ROs, which has taken hold especially since the early decades of 2000 (Boulden, 2013). The involvement of African ROs has thus become the new normal and a constant dimension of ending crises in the continent. In light of this, it is often argued that UN operations in the future, at least in the overall security dynamics, case of Africa, will not be undertaken in isolation or without the involvement of African ROs.

**African PSOs: Contribution in shaping the UN’s relation with regional organizations (ROs)**

*Normative contributions in redefining the UN-RO cooperation:* The African continent has been ground zero for producing and testing a number of new international norms as well as other operational concepts. Sovereignty as responsibility, responsibility to protect and the principle of
non-indifference as enshrined in the AU Constitute Act are some of the most notable norms which were transpired by African experiences and are also simultaneously shaping crises management in the continent and beyond. On the operational level, (operational) concepts within the UN peacekeeping lexicon such as Katanga Rule (peacekeepers using force in self-defense and to assist missions to fulfill their task) or the Mogadishu line (peacekeepers avoiding “mission creep”) were both influenced by African experience (cf. Adebajo, 2011). The debate on the normative dimensions of the use of force and the protection of civilians significantly drew from African realities.

Moreover, the African experience helped in accentuating some of the guiding principles of UN-ROs relationship. Successive AU and UN reports highlighted some of the basic principles of the UN-RO relationship (cf. AUC, 2013). Primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), complementarity, division of labor, subsidiarity, and consultative decision making and common strategy are some of the normative dimensions underscoring the sharing of responsibilities between UN-RO. Nevertheless, these normative dimensions got their practical significations largely in the context of African PSOs, albeit imperfectly and in an ad-hoc manner. This point is illustrated below using the principle of division of labor. African PSOs in Burundi (2004), in Sudan (2004-2007), Somalia (2007-now), and Mali (2012) all featured a very broad pattern of division of labor between African ROs and the UN. As part of it, African ROs provided troops on the ground and the UN availed political legitimation, financial and logistical support, as well as technical expertise. This unequal exchange of African lives for UN finances and logistical support remained a constant feature in the UN-ROs peacekeeping partnership narrative whether in the case of UNAMID’s hybridity; AMISOM’s experience in Somalia; or in the re-hating of AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali. Even as missions get transitioned from the AU to the UN, predominant and sometime exclusive troop contribution by African states became a key aspect of the new mission configurations under a UN mandate.

As yet another facet of the existing division of labor, the UN and African ROs also shared responsibilities where one takes the lead on the political front and the other assumed peacekeeping tasks when dealing with some of the complex crises in Africa. The cases of Somalia and Mali are important examples in which the two organizations played these interchanging roles respectively. To say the least, this emerging division of labor was underpinned by the recognition of the comparative advantage of the respective organizations and was meant to ensure complementarity of their actions.6

**Institutional and operational contribution:** One of the key characteristics of African PSOs is the so-called “ambition-resource/capacity gap” (Wiklund 2013, p. 21). This refers to the willingness and assertiveness of African ROs to deploy PSOs at times without the requisite capabilities and resources as observed in the cases of Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, and of late in Mali. As a consequence, African ROs and the UN were compelled to forge various forms of institutional and operational cooperation before, during, and after the deployment of these PSOs.

The different forms of cooperation between RO such as AU and UN were already identified as comprising “consultations, mutual diplomatic support, mutual operational support, co-deployment of field missions and, joint deployment of a mission” (United Nations, 1995, § 86–8). However, none of these forms were occurring in a pre-given or preordained manner and got their significations largely through the practical experience of African PSOs. In essence, African PSOs deepened our understanding of how and why these specific forms come to being.

The Somalia case showcased multiple forms of interactions with the UN including the use of assessed contribution to finance the logistical support for AMISOM. This arrangement broke

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6 Despite best intentions, the activities of UN and ROs can also be competitive and conflicting rather than complimentary.
new ground in terms of giving a regional PSO access to UN funds. In addition, jointness (UN planners working side by side with their AU counterparts) was employed to buttress the AU’s capacity in planning and managing its PSO in Somalia and later in Mali. Besides its operational relevance, such forms of joint undertakings also helped in building the technical capabilities of AU’s experts and planner and became new models of capacity building in the longer term. The case of Burundi, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR) featured the transition of regional PSOs into UN peacekeeping missions. As missions were re-hatted from AU to UN in the various cases, important lessons for consolidating the broader UN-ROs interaction were drawn with potential future applications globally.

Over and above these PSOs related mechanisms, various institutional instruments were also established given the need to coordinate and harmonize UN’s approaches of managing the various crises with that of the ROs. The United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security are two institutional arrangements striving to foster greater coherence between the UN and AU including in the area of peace operations (UNSC, 2015). Among other things, these mechanisms significantly helped in engendering better understanding on how the two organizations operate, especially in terms of their decision making processes.

**African PSOs as sites for “two-way” cultural exchange and learning:** By virtue of their very nature, the AU and UN have different norms, values, histories, bureaucracies, and in essence different DNAs. Given their distinct organizational attributes, the two institutions possess and reflect distinct organizational cultures which impact the modalities of their mutual interaction. The UN is a big machinery; an international organization with a big budget, staff, dedicated planners and teams and expertise. In contrast, the AU lacks the requisite amount of budget and staff and the existing expertise are very scattered. The resultant disparity in resources (both human and financial) -- often considered as manifestation of the structural configuration of power -- created an imbalanced structure of values, norms, working cultures and methods. Not surprisingly, the UN often appeared to be largely dictating the modalities of the dealing with regional counterparts as it often has comparative advantage in terms of the requisite technical know-how as well as the financial wherewithal.

But as observed in the case of Africa, African PSOs also provided the context for some level of “reverse learning” to the UN-RO cooperation to occur. Perhaps their most important contribution in this regards is in terms of engendering mutual understanding of each other. As the two institutions interacted in the context of the various African PSOs, they gradually learned to understand each other. Specific technical acumen such as working across different institutional cultures thus became a key asset, which both institutions acquired from their cooperation African PSOs.

African PSOs are often deployed in non-traditional security context. Such is often marked by an intrastate security having less-defined configuration of belligerents in which insecurity emanates from non-traditional and asymmetric source of threats such as terrorism. African PSOs deployed in Somalia, Mali, and later in CAR all operated within these forms of security environment. On the contrary, UN’s peacekeepers often operate in conditions where there is some level of peace and stability. As the UN interacted increasingly with African RO in some of these instances, it gained operational competences operating in non-benign environments.

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7 Skype interview with Somalia/AMSIOM expert, June 26, 2015.
8 Skype interview with Somalia/AMSIOM expert, June 26, 2015.
Challenges of African PSOs in the context of the United Nations’ cooperation with regional organizations

The AU has acquired increasing level of agency in dealing with peace and security matters in the continent and African PSOs has been instrumental in the process. The continental organization was arguably considered to be “in many ways, ahead of the curve” when it comes to adapting to and dealing with changing security dynamics (de Coning et al., 2015). However, such characterization must not overshadow some of the structural challenges of African PSOs especially as they pertain to the UN-ROs relationship.In the ensuing sections, two broad challenges will be discussed; one internal to (the design and mandating of) African PSOs and the other related to the interaction between the AU and the UN in the context of African PSOs.

African PSOs are not homogeneous in their nature and are not always the result of predefined and well- thought through decision-making processes either. Rather they come in different adhoc, reactive and improvised forms and embody diverse set of operational designs (cf. Lotze, 2015). In terms of their operational design, the deployment of some of the missions dubbed as African PSOs did not follow any of the six ASF mission scenarios but were following different deployment models (Lotze, 2015).9 This raises a major question on the predictable character of these missions and to what extent, the AU as continental organ, exercise oversight as stipulated in the African Standby Force (ASF) doctrine. The fundamental issue here is that the operationalization of African PSOs seemed to be delinked from the underlying processes of its conceptualization. Beside this operational design-related issue, mandating of African PSOs also entails some complexity as it often involves multiple levels of endorsement and approval such as by the UNSC, by the AU, by the national legislative body and sometimes by the RECs/REMs. Such multi-layered and multi-actor mandating process has its adverse consequences on the timely deployment of the missions.10

The second challenge is related to the dissonance between the two levels (i.e. the global and regional) in terms of differences in working methods as well as doctrinal and normative frameworks that underlie their interventions. These differences are associated with at least two major practical challenges namely (i) the mismatch between the operational needs of African PSOs on the ground on the one hand and the nature of the UN support they receive on the other hand and (ii) in terms of delays or difficulty in the transition of AU missions into UN peacekeeping operations.

The peacekeeping doctrines guiding AU’s and UN’s contemporary missions appear to differ especially when it comes to requisite operating environments prior to their respective deployments. Generally, AU missions are transient in their nature; seek to stabilize the peace and security conditions in most of the violent contexts and are meant to hand over to UN peacekeeping missions. The latter are deployed as a follow-up to the AU missions once some level of peace to keep was created. This is mainly due to the UN’s peace keeping doctrine which precludes the deployment of (UN’s) peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep or in the absence of viable peace agreements. On the contrary, the AU peacekeeping doctrine appears that it (AU) must create the peace it strives to keep (cf. AUC, 2012).

In addition to this major doctrinal difference, the two organizations have differences when it comes to the interpretation and implementation of certain international norms (Williams & Dersso, 2015). In the context of the deployment of PSOs, some of the major normative differences occurred when it comes to the implementation of Protection of Civilians (PoC) or some human rights related norms (Williams & Dersso, 2015). The conception surrounding the level of the use of

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9 In contrast to what is provided in the ASF mission scenarios, the missions were deployed following the AU- REC/RM model as in Mali and CAR; AU-TCC/PCC model in Darfur (2004) and Somalia (2007) in which the AUC approached TCCs/PCCs for troop contribution; AU-Lead nation model as in Burundi (South Africa), Comoros, or in Liberia (Nigeria in ECOMOG); and finally the AU-authorized coalitions (such as those mandated against LRA in the form of the regional taskforce or against Boko Harm in the form of multi-national joint task force) (cf. Lotze, 2015).

10 Own note during APSTA 13 AGM Meeting in Addis Ababa, September 9th, 2015.
force can be cited also as another difference, particularly when it comes to the working methods of the AU and the UN in the realm of PSOs. The underlying question to be raised at this point pertains to the practical consequences of some of the differences in terms of doctrine, norms, and working methods.

As the Somalia case illustrated, UN logistical support was considered “the logistical backbone of AMISOM” and a vital component of the mission’s operational activities and its relative success. This logistical support was provided by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). UNSOA’s design was meant, however, mainly for non-combat UN operations in which peacekeepers often strove to maintain their impartiality and thus engaged with little use of lethal force except in self-defense. On the contrary, AMISOM was engaged most of the time in offensive combat operations which entail substantial use of force beyond self-defense and for protection of civilians. The latter were partly due to the nature of some of its mandated tasks such as support to the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and VIP protection, which rendered AMISOM being party to the conflict and a target of fierce opposition from some of the belligerents (Wiklund, 2013). As such, UNSOA was facing a major challenge to support AMISOM especially as it did not cater for the provision logistical support of lethal nature (Gadin, 2012). UN logistical support delivery tailored for traditional peacekeeping mission was thus considered not flexible enough and not in sync with the operational demands of AMISOM and consequently affecting the tempo of AMISOM operations and its ability to effectively establish presence in Somalia’s various sectors (AU Commission, 2013, §20). The case of UNSOA thus underscores the incongruity between the operational requirements of African PSOs and the design of the UN support in highly volatile security environments such as Somalia which owes its origin to the doctrinal differences between the AU and the UN.

Some of the doctrinal difference alluded earlier also contributed to difficult or delayed transitions from AU to UN missions. Transitions of missions were delayed as in the case of Somalia or underwent under difficult conditions as in the case of Mali. In Somalia, the UN persisted on its doctrine of not deploying its peacekeepers where there was no peace to keep (Boutellis and Williams, 2012). More than seven years after the deployment of AMISOM, transition into the UN mission did not take place as conditions were considered not conducive for a UN peacekeeping operation. In the case of Mali, an AU PSO, AFISMA, was transitioned into a UN mission, MINUSMA, under certain difficulties also owing largely to institutional differences on issues related to certain human rights standards and the capability of AU to operationalize and implement some of these standards.12

During the re-hatting of troops in Mali, for example, some of the troops from the existing African mission, AFISMA, were not compliant with some of the international human rights norms and standards. Some of the TCCs, particularly Chad, appeared in the “List of parties that recruit or use children, kill or maim children, commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, or engage in attacks on schools and/or hospitals in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council”13. This meant re-hatting of Chadian troops, which were considered essential for the peacekeeping operation in Mali, had to be suspended until Chad was officially delisted. This happened once Chad released its child soldiers with the assistance of the relevant UN offices following the full implementation of the action plan to end the recruitment and use of children.14 The other issue was related to the standard and capability of the AU troops which were not in line with the UN requirements and consequently were impacting the re-hatting process. This relate to the lower level of training of some of the AU troops as well as the technical status of some of the equipment deployed in Mali owing partly to the “amateurish way force generation was done.

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11 Interview with UN expert conducted in Addis Ababa on March 25th 2015.
12 The transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA was considered to be problematic in light of its swift and untimely transfer of authority, lack of sufficient consultation, as well as some of the specific challenges associated with the modalities of the re-hatting process.
13 Annexed to the Report of the Secretary-General’s annual report on “Children in Armed Conflict” (UNGA/UNSC, 2015).
14 Skype interview with UN DPKO informant, June 20th, 2015.
in Mali". During the time of re-hatting, apart from Niger and Chad (which received bilateral trainings from the US in the context of the latter’s counter-terrorism efforts) most of the troops were below the level of UN and even AU peacekeeping standards.  

Conclusion
Against a backdrop of dynamic and changing peace and security environment as well as a changing normative context, UN’s interaction with ROs is currently being redefined. Given the security realities of the continent, Africa is at the forefront of this historical dynamism and African PSOs are increasingly becoming instrumental in shaping the existing contours of “UN-RO nettle” (Adebajo, 2011, p.12). The UN’s relationship with ROs, particularly African ROs, has passed through a number of key milestones. In line with the major thrust of this paper which illustrated the role of African PSOs in deepening the UN-ROs cooperation, the latest Report by the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) recognized the unique and pivotal role of African ROs. To this effect, the Panel’s report underscored the relevance of the UN’s cooperation with African ROs by pointing to the underpinning principles of the AU-UN strategic cooperation “which might serve as a baseline set of principles for UN engagements with other regional organizations in future” (UN 2015, §227).

This concluding section winds up by highlighting some considerations which underscore the relevance of the growing study of African PSOs. The first consideration is a practical one pertaining how research in the field of African PSOs may help in drawing relevant insights and recommendation that inform policy makers regarding the AU-UN global-regional partnership. As hinted earlier, the contextual analysis of African PSOs have already generated relevant insights in terms of UN support to AU peacekeeping missions (cf. Gelot et al. 2012, Gadin 2012); financing (Jentzsch, 2014); or re-hatting of AU missions (de Coning et al., 2015). Some of these insights are rightly featuring in the relevant institutional policy documents such as the 2015 UNSG Reports on Partnering for Peace or on the UNSG letter to the President of UNSC on lessons learn from transition of mission in Mali and CAR. Recently, the report of the UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) emphasised the need for financing African PSOs on a case by case basis. The HIPPO report also cautioned against the use of UN peace operations in military counter-terrorism operations as it (i.e. the UN) is poorly suited to such operating environments and further points out others must come forward to respond (UN, 2015). In essence, Panel’s recommendations appear to entrench the emergent division of labour between AU and UN in which African PSOs are increasingly being used in combatting terrorism and counter-insurgency. The above insights attest the potential for a synergy between academic research and policy making processes.

The second and final consideration denote to the epistemological and theoretical ramifications of the study of African PSOs. At the heart of any epistemological inquiry lies the question of “how do you know what you know” (Creswell, 2007). In this sense, the study of African PSOs can be considered, for example, as the new frontier to enhance our knowledge and understanding of the field of inter-organizationalism addressing the central issue of how and why organizations interact (cf Biermann 2008) or the interface between global and regional security architectures. Besides, as sites of two-way cultural exchange and learning, the study of African PSOs also challenges the dominant and one-sided diffusionist approach to institutional learning common in some political science literature (cf. Jetschke & Lenz, 2013). In combination, these considerations validate the burgeoning study of African PSOs beyond academia’s infatuation to be a la mode or to keep up with current trends or hot topics.
References


PART IV
The Future of Small Arms in Pastoral Lowlands of the Horn of Africa: A case of the Nyàngatom people in southwest Ethiopia¹

Mercy Fekadu Mulugeta²

Abstract

A cattle herder using a gun as a staff is the popular picture of the East African pastoralist. Attention given to armed groups has always depended on their ability to challenge the legitimacy of the central government or, since 9/11, their association to terrorist organizations. Most pastoralists in Ethiopia fell under neither group for a long time. The state and the pastoralist struck a balance where the state ignored their arms and they not only provided security to themselves but also guarded the border in an ad hoc arrangement. Currently, this balance is challenged by two important developments, namely, the growing international and regional policy documents and the newly found interest and consequent presence of state in the lowlands. The interest of the state first manifested through the planning of development schemes like the sugar plantations and industry. Though these plans have not proved successful, their ability to shake the balance remains significant since the schemes are accompanied by infrastructure development, settlement (villagization) schemes and an influx of workers for the projects. The state has assumed the responsibility of securing these large-scale agricultural investments from threats, one of which would be unnecessary intrusion by local communities, complicating further the security structure. In a related process, the government conducted arms registration process followed by a disarmament campaign, although not explicitly stated. This paper explores ways in which current government development schemes might alter the security relations of pastoralist communities of Eastern Africa. It identifies emerging security needs in pastoral lowlands and attempts to guide policy attention to these emerging issues. To meet the research objectives, primary data collected from the field through FGDs and in depth interviews has been analyzed in light of existing literature on the subject.

Introduction

A while after the end of the Cold War the UN Secretary-General’s report ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1995) recognized the huge amount of small arms, “billions of dollars being spent yearly on light weapons, representing nearly one third of the world’s total arms trade” and the number of people killed by Small Arms³ and Light Weapons (SALW). A Cold War of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the hands of states made the AKs in the hands of pastoralists ‘small’ arms, and the attempt to monopolise small arms a ‘micro disarmament’⁴ as opposed to a global nuclear disarmament. Some argue that both the theory and the practice of arms control developed during the Cold War. However the talks and to some extent the theories were born even earlier. For example, The Hague Peace conference in 1899 and 1907 tried to address technological developments such as use of expanding bullets and certain kinds of gases (Declaration (IV, 2/3), 1899). For pastoralists of the Horn of Africa the small arms war was never ‘cold’, and small arms disarmament⁵ has been on the

¹ This paper is a modification of Chapter 7 of the authors PhD thesis titled “(Re) Negotiating Statehood and the Future of Arms Governance”.
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³ The focus of this paper is Small Arms, manufactured since 1899, “weapons designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles, and semi-automatic rifles.” (Nairobi Protocol, 2004)
⁴ Referred this way on the ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace’ published by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in January 1995
⁵ Although many documents that try to prescribe solutions to African peace and security challenges mention disarmament, very few bother to define it. In this document it is understood as “the monitoring, collection, control and final disposal of small arms, related ammunition and explosives and light weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible weapons and ammunition management programs”. (SEESAC 2006)
Pastoralists in southwest Ethiopia have maintained a certain degree of autonomy for a long time. These pastoralists have been their own ‘police’, devising mechanisms of internal stability through a set of traditional beliefs and institutions (Mulugeta, 2016). They also are their own ‘defence army’, fulfilling their need to protect themselves from other pastoralists, both in and outside their country. Although the state aspires to monopolize the instruments of violence widely distributed among the pastoralists, it has not succeeded due to its inability to control its territory fully. Besides potential threats to central governments, growing attention to terrorist acts and counter-terrorism at the global, national and regional level, has dictated the response given to an armed group. The attention given to an armed group depends on ability to challenge the legitimacy of the government and (especially since 9/11) its relation to international terrorist organizations. An officer in the Special Forces of Ethiopia speculated that the security condition of the Nyàngatom Woreda does not get enough attention because there are no armed ‘secessionist’ groups and threats of terrorist organizations in the area, as opposed to other regions of the country. Currently, two important developments are changing the context in which the Nyàngatom live.

First, there is a surge in large-scale government led agricultural and industrial investment in pastoral lowlands of the country. The development projects are accompanied by settlement (villagization) schemes that include the shift in lifestyle and livelihood. Second are the growing international and regional policy instruments. However, findings by Saferworld (2011) indicate that the process of formulating and implementing these policy instruments had a “superficial ownership by national governments” while the process is really being driven by ‘international initiatives’. Small arms control institutions and policies, found at local, national, regional and international levels are often linked with each other forming a horizontal and vertical chain of institutions and policies, forming what Laurance and Stohl (2002) call a ‘global public policy’ of SALW control and management.

Inclusion of disarmament in major peace agreements in the Horn of Africa are linked to the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol or the UN resolutions that were rooted in the UN Programme of Action (PoA) (UN Document A/Conf.192/15, 2001). In Kenya, projects with UNDP financial and technical assistance have their roots in such policy documents (Parker, 2010: 48). These documents do not imply uniformity among the laws of the various countries, in fact there are major inconsistencies like the variation in the minimum age for the possession of arms (in Uganda 25 while in Kenya it is 16) and the difference in defining mental and physical capability (Small Arms Survey, 2011: 2001).

Literature on these small arms control frameworks focus on the lack of implementation, assuming that implementation is the ‘bliss’ everyone anticipates. Saferworld (May 2011) observed, “...unfortunately practical action at the regional and national level has not always followed”. Follow-

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6 Chew (2012) writes that upon “the completion of the Jibuti-Harrar railway at the end of 1902, when it was again apparent that arms were penetrating the British and Italian spheres via Harrar and infiltrating into the interior, the colonial authorities braced themselves for the implementation of a more draconian policy of native disarmament” (Chew, 2012: 118)
7 Some of the disarmament campaigns by Kenyan governments are the Shifta Counter-Insurgency (1963-1968), Garisa operation (1980), Malka Mari operation and Wajir operation (Wepundi 2011). In Uganda, in addition to the joint disarmament with Kenya in 1983-84 there have been violent campaigns by the New Public Management (NPM). (Muhareza 2011)
8 Interview, Assistant Sgt Melaku Garedew, Special Force, Nyàngatom woreda, Ethiopia, 26 August 2014
9 The Special Force in the Nyàngatom woreda is stationed at the border between Ethiopia and Kenya. It comprises of 30 men who, unless cleared by the regional government cannot use force to internal conflicts or external aggression.
10 woreda is the second lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia
11 Ethiopia, in its plan to increase sugar production from 314,000tn in 2009 to 2.3 million tonnes by the end of 2015 has decided to plant factories in several regions. The large amount of land (275,000 ha of sugarcane plantation field) allocated to this project is partly found in the study area of this research, South Omo. http://www.etsugar.gov.et/
up researches by Saferworld, on the Ugandan and Kenyan National programs, observed that they have implemented only a small portion of what they first planned and mentioned human capacity and bureaucratic challenges as key factors.

This case study on the Nyàngatom pastoralists in southwest Ethiopia documents major changes taking place in pastoral areas and analyses them in terms of their implication to the security dynamic of the region. It focuses on implication on areas that need policy attention concerning small arms, placing the provision of security at the centre of analysis. The Nyàngatom, are among the large collection of pastoralists in peripheries of Ethiopia, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda known as the Karamoja cluster or the Ateker. An extensive literature review has shown that the Nyàngatom are the least researched of the groups in the Karamoja cluster on the issue of small arms: for instance, publications by the Small Arms Survey and Institute for Security Studies focused on Sudan/South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya; the Ethiopian side has clearly been neglected.

Nyàngatom and Toposa are usually considered to be aligns who speak the same language, which is also shared by the Turukana of Kenya, whom both seclude as a traditional enemy. They also consider the Súri, Hamer, Kara, Dassanech, Murle and others as foes. Geographically the Toposa live in the State of Eastern Equatoria located in the southeastern part of South Sudan. The Ilemi Triangle, the disputed land bordering Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan is also located in the vicinity. These border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda have generally been marginalized by the successive governments of the past and have very low access to basic social services. They are prone to drought and there is a widespread cattle rustling.

The conceptual trilemma of development, peace and security

Security and development are brought together as inter-related agendas since the focus of security studies shifted to Human Security. The “Human Security” agenda served as a platform to discuss Security Sector Reform (SSR) and development together, abandoning the traditional form of security. SSR found itself on a discourse on security-development nexus. The OECD DAC handbook (2007) builds upon the 2005 DAC Reference Document on Security System Reform and Governance by acknowledging that donors are now convinced of the security-development nexus. The discourse affirms that poor people are vulnerable and hindered from progress “because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear” (OECD, 2007: 13). In other words, according to donors, like the Canadian International Development Agency, small arms represent “lost development opportunities”.15

The recognition of the state’s inability to provide security and, sometimes, its potential to pose threats to its people has pushed SSR in to the International Development Agenda. Here, development and security concluded their merger since “international security actors have realized that their short term operations will not bring sustainable benefit without coordinating their activities with longer-term development work. Similarly, development practitioners have realized that is impractical to consider development without talking security issues into account” (GFN-SSR, 2007: 3). Although these arguments are used by international development agencies driven by donors, the facts are shared by government-led development projects since security remains important for sustainable development even when governments own the development projects.

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Another similar angle where peace and development overlap is the concept of negative and positive peace, where development is a subset of positive peace. The goal of disarmament, a component of SSR, is to “avoid armed conflict” (direct violence) which in other words is known as negative peace. On the other hand, this negative peace is a pre-condition for development. Further, the development is meant to achieve peace\footnote{Positive peace to be exact is “a process rather than an end in itself. It does not involve rejecting conflict” (Peinado ND)} between communities, who will, hopefully, stop warring because of the disarmament.

On the other hand, the development activities by the government surely need an environment ‘conducive to development’; an outcome believed that could result from SSR. Such reform process brings the agency of the state in the forefront. “This relies on the ability of the state to mitigate its people’s vulnerability through development and to use a range of policy instruments to prevent or address security threats that affect society’s wellbeing” (GFN-SSR, 2007: 1).

The understanding of how pastoralists live in a community with power balance (since all are armed) and how they could take advantage of the other’s lack of arms or information suggests how instrumental guns can be in pastoral conflicts. Thus, one cannot totally rule out the possible contributions of disarmament to peace. This presents us with a catch 22 situation where peace is a pre-condition to development and development to security and security to peace et cetera.

**Disarmament in policy documents**

Civilian (in this case, pastoralist) disarmament is most difficult, for reasons that are not limited to lack of established norms or standards. For many the difficulty of civilian disarmament elucidates the dangers of SALW. Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards by IDDRS (2014) states that “if the possession of weapons is of cultural significance to the populations and has been considered a habit that existed before violent conflict broke out, weapons collection programs are likely to fail.” Even though policies on small arms control warns against disarmament in areas where small arms have cultural significance, it does so without clearly establishing what cultural significance entails or giving an example of such community.

The approach by RECSA and the Nairobi declaration does not adhere to the above principle. Narrowing the discussion to east African pastoralists, such articles are not incorporated in regional documents yet institutions such as RECSA and Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) (Hailu, 2010) indicate that small arms have cultural value to pastoralists of the Horn of Africa; as opposed to the academic literature (Knighton, 2003, Eaton, 2008; Sagawa, 2010). Despite their stance on the cultural value of small arms, RECSA promotes the complete disarmament of civilians in the region. The Nairobi Protocol (2004) entered by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other plenipotentiaries of eleven countries.\footnote{Republic of Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Djibouti, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, State of Eritrea, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Seychelles, Republic of the Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Uganda.} They reached an agreement on the meaning and use of important words in the transaction and control of small arms, laying ground for a regionally harmonized policy. The provisions on the declaration affect the whole of Karamoja pastoralists that are most commonly armed with rifles and assault rifles. Among those provisions are “the total prohibition of the civilian possession and use of all light weapons and automatic and semi-automatic rifles and machine guns” and “the regulation and centralised registration of all civilian-owned small arms in their territories” (Nairobi Protocol, 2004).

Under this provision the countries party to the declaration should start registering and take steps towards disarmament. The Nyàngatom, located in the border area of Ethiopia, South Sudan and
Kenya, have had access to arms mostly from their South Sudanese neighbours, the Toposa. This being a place of minimum state presence, the place has been deprived of sufficient border control or any other law enforcement mechanism.

The Nairobi Protocol insists that states should “adopt within their domestic legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of small arms and light weapons that have been illicitly manufactured or trafficked” (Nairobi Protocol Article 9a 2004). In Ethiopia, the House of Peoples Representatives under proclamation 429/2004 has ratified the Nairobi Protocol. The Federal Police Commission has the mandate to develop the implementation procedure but needs laws on SALW to be adopted to start acting. The laws had to be in harmony with neighbouring countries, an activity that should have been completed by 28 April 2006 according to the ministerial declaration on practical implementation of Small Arms. Implementing the declaration requires resources and strong governmental security apparatus, elements that are usually missing from developing countries and their peripheral territories. Other provisions (Article 9) that require capital and human resource are:

(b) Maintain and further develop joint and combined operations across the borders of States Parties to locate, seize and destroy caches of small arms and light weapons left over after conflicts and civil wars;
(c) Encourage law enforcement agencies to work with communities to identify small arms and light weapons caches and remove them from society;
(d) Establish an effective mechanism for storing impounded, recovered or unlicensed illicit small arms and light weapons pending the investigations that will release them for destruction.

Furthermore, Article 12 (sub-articles a and b) of the declaration focuses on the types of programs governments will introduce to encourage voluntary surrender. Civilians that have acquired such arms illegally are to surrender it voluntarily, and there are no mention of incentives; however, those who have acquired them illegally, are to submit them and their incentive would be that “the State may consider granting immunity from prosecution” (Nairobi Protocol 2004 Article 12). Given the history of the Karamoja cluster and the reality on the ground, the meaningless line of legality and illegality will make the implementation of the above article quite difficult.

Government development interventions and emerging security issues
Ethiopia, in its plan to increase sugar production from 314,000tn in 2009 to 2.3 million tons by the end of 2015 has decided to plant sugar factories. The large amount of land (175,000 ha of sugarcane plantation field) allocated to this project is partly found in the study area of this research, South Omo (Sugar Corporation 2015). Pastoralists that, according to the government, do not use the land optimally occupy the arid and semi-arid pastoral low lands. This development activity will turn the “unused” land in these pastoral lowlands to productive sugarcane plantations and industrial sites that will produce 2.25 million tons of sugar (worth 661.7 million USD) and produce alternative energy sources (304,000m3 of ethanol per year and 607 MW electricity) (Tewolde and Fana, 2014: 118).

According to the Nyàngatom woreda administrator, the benefit of the sugar plantation surpasses what is listed above. He expects that the woreda, which is now with no infrastructure of any kind, will finally get clean water, electricity and roads. He further anticipates that there is high probability to achieving sustainable peace with neighboring tribes such as Dassanech and Súri due to the anticipated increased economic interaction between communities of the people. The reason would be increased Ethiopian nationalism because of inclusion in a national project. Reduction of proliferation of small arms is also a foreseen by-product of these development activities. Increased

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18 Interview, Cmdr. Girmay Kahsay, National Interpol Head and National Focal person for Small arms control and management, Ethiopia, 1 July 2015
19 Ministerial declaration on Practical implementation of Small Arms, action in the great Lakes Region of the Horn of Africa (2005)
20 Interview, Lore Kakuta, Deputy administrator of Nyàngatom woreda, Nyàngatom woreda, Ethiopia, 25 August 2014
government involvement in the security sector will have a direct effect on the trust and an inverse effect on arms demand, according to the National Focal Person for SALW. Although this is a long-term plan (ambition), the local police and the population in the woreda anticipate immediate actions of disarmament because of the arms registration that is coincidentally (or not) taking place at the same time as the developmental projects.

A police in the woreda described the arms registration process in southwest Ethiopia saying “the arm will have a registration number, you will receive an ownership card with your photograph on it and it will be handed to you. Planning to attain peace in the near future, the police received orientation on the arms registration process. The words of the police commissioner who conducted the orientation were, “we will disarm the people [the pastoralists]. We will collect all of their arms and all will start carrying farming equipment around. Small arms will not be significant to the people anymore”. Although this is a simple speech act and not a statement from a policy document one can still understand the vision the government is selling through this and other similar statements. The firearm here is not just depicted as an instrument of violence whose removal will result in peace. Small arms are a symbol of the pastoral way of life. For the proponents of this view, disarmament either gradually or immediate, will result in a shift of conflict patterns as well as livelihood, changing the people from cattle herders to farmers. Because of water available from the irrigation the pastoralists will be able to farm and lead a sedentary life on the farmlands they will each be allocated. A vision among others pronounced by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi at the 13th Annual Pastoralists’ Day celebrations in 2011: “The pastoralists who live around this area will be given some fertile land from this irrigation system, which can be used for their own cultivation. There will be support for the pastoralists to combine agriculture with modern cattle herding” (Meles, Speech, 25 January 2011).

In imperial Ethiopia, pastoralists, or known by the derogatory word Zelan (can be understood as both mobile and rude, uncultured), were a class of people, who along with any producing class, considered inferior by the clergy and aristocracy (Tibebu, 1995). Among other factors “a superiority complex of an agricultural mode of production over a nomadic-pastoralist mode of production” made the Zelan stand at the bottom of the hierarchical society (Tibebu, 1995: 6). Even after the removal of the imperial regime, consequent governments have not really shown appreciation to the pastoral way of life either in policy or practice. Instead, this development activity in the “unused” pastoral lands (Tewolde and Fana, 2014: 118) can now be seen as a way of ‘demobilizing’ pastoralists from their way of life.

This process of lifestyle change is not going to be without challenge to the government; and small arms might be instrumental in the response of the pastoral population to the government projects. Other emerging security challenges can be seen in other areas where the development projects have started. The government is facing some challenges from local communities, who violently responded to unfulfilled promises and killing people in response to mishaps like traffic accidents, which are unavoidable once roads are built and traffic flow increases. An example from a neighbouring woreda is:

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21 Interview, Cmdr. Girmay Kahsay National Interpol Head and National Focal person for Small arms control and management, Ethiopia, 1 July 2015
22 This is a simple process of registration, yet to follow is the actual marking and labelling of small arms
23 Interview, Lomo Naske, Crime prevention process owner in Nyàngatom police station, Nyàngatom woreda Administration, Nyàngatom woreda, Ethiopia, 19 August 2014
24 Interview, Kassahun Tamene, Assistant inspector in Nyàngatom police station, Nyàngatom woreda Administration, Nyàngatom woreda, Ethiopia, 19 August 2014
25 In military DDR, it represents the process of transforming the person into a civilian, indicting him/her into the society. The usage of the word here is to connote that a change in attitude and action is required from one whose arms are taken from. He now, like the soldier would turns into a civilian, will become a civilized agriculturalist leaving the life of a pastoralism.
The Bodi perceived repeated car accidents as intentional attempts to kill their kinsfolk, and, infused with the culture of vengeance killings, intended to kill the “kin” of the killers, i.e. the drivers. As they consider all non-indigenous people as Amhara, they simply targeted everyone else. (Tewolde and Fana, 2014: 139)

According to the Nyàngatom Woreda police guns are only used in interethnic conflicts, reports of gun violence in intra-ethnic clashes are virtually non-existent. Since arms are only a factor in the inter-ethnic relations of these pastoral communities, development projects are likely to further intensify their interaction by encouraging movement among the communities. Although inter-ethnic interaction due to the development project can be seen as an opportunity for inter-ethnic cooperation, the police are concerned that, pastoralists across the border might attack the plantation and factory.

The prospects of the security situation in the Nyàngatom woreda described by the woreda police are different from the one by the development project officers. To the later, the sugar plantation will be a job opportunity to the neighbouring communities and result in greater integration resulting from cross-border employment opportunities. Given this grave security situation, keeping the Nyàngatom armed is the way forward for the police.

Obviously, the development project has created a need to intensify such arms control activities; something that has not been convenient to the government, until now. The Nyàngatom should leave their land for large-scale agricultural investments; and make livelihood changes to make the development projects successful. Unlike the opinion of the local police, the strongest resistance to the development projects will not come from the Turkana but is likely to be from the residents of the land whose life as mobile pastoralists will be interrupted. The Pastoralist and his way of life (pastoralism) pose the threat.

The costs of disarmament
Among the major objectives of disarmament is to create “an environment in which people feel safe” (GTZ, 2004: 39). In pastoral communities’ such development activities and subsequent change in livelihood represent means a shift in the role of some armed youth. Some might get employment in the government security sector while the rest will have to be ‘demobilized’ from their traditional security provider’s position. Now the Nyàngatom woreda is a place where people feel safe only when they carry guns, this is going to change into a place where people should learn to feel safe because the government security forces have monopoly over the means of violence.

Whether gradually or not there are pre-conditions to be fulfilled for the Nyàngatom to willingly give up their arms. The first and the most important is provision of security and the second is compensation for the arms.

Compensation
An individual under desperate conditions pays 15 or 20 cows to buy a gun to protect his property and family from the enemy. When the person is not economically stable he sells back the gun in exchange for cattle to feed his family, serving as some kind of emergency saving, cashed in difficulty. Their question for compensation shows the economic value guns have as opposed to cultural values. Most of what the Nyàngatom do ceremonially and economically with gun show that the Nyàngatom’s true treasure is their cattle, not gun. Another manifestation of the

26 Interview, Kassahun Tamene, Assistant inspector in Nyàngatom police station, Nyngatom woreda Administration, Nyàngatom woreda, Ethiopia, 19 August 2014
27 When first bought cleansing ceremonies are held for guns. This represents another way of coping with a different form of insecurity contrary to what some people see it as – an expression of the cultural value small arms hold. A gun passed on from father to son does not need such cleansing.
economic value of arms is that guns are not given as dowry but might be exchanged for cattle with the purpose of increasing the number of cattle available for dowry.

However, even if cattle are of most value, the Nyàngatom are willing to pay it for a gun. This shows the severity of the insecurity. Guns are what they need to protect their life and property (cattle). The only service the government would like to provide in exchange for voluntary arms surrender is security; also keeping in mind there is to be a financial incentive for disarmament, speaking from previous experience, there is the (likely) outcome that financial incentive will achieve is, create many outlaws as people buy more guns from across the border to benefit illegitimately from the system. The lack of best practices of civilian disarmament hinders one from offering alternatives, however, factors like porous borders (Isima, 2004) are a challenge to DDR in military disarmament, and the same factor is likely to play a critical role in civilian disarmament.

**Security**

The guarantee of security that pastoral communities demand is twofold, one is the disarmament of their enemies and the other is the provision of security by the government. Currently the arms carried by the Nyàngatom in no way pose threats to a fellow Nyàngatom. In a place where traditional institutions and leadership are intact, people live in communal values that prevent gun violence in intra-ethnic conflicts. However, these guns are used against enemies (a direct translation of emoit, a word used to address their neighbours except for the Toposa of South Sudan). The Nyàngatom want their neighbours to be disarmed if they are to give up their arms. This precondition is likely to be raised by any armed community for any type of arm.

As Carr (2000: 2) puts it “To disarm without substituting the reality of protective security is to play God with the lives of those that have been disarmed”. Such protection can be provided in several forms, the most common in the Westphalian State is where the state ‘monopolizes the means of violence’ and provides security by government security forces, typically, the police and the army. This demands an understanding of ‘collective security’ at the national level. One of the preconditions for nuclear disarmament was the creation of a situation where nations trusted the League of Nations (later the United Nations); they were expected to trust that these organizations would be able to enforce the laws they pass. Similarly, countries are composed of various identity groups that have signed the social contract of being governed by a central government. If it appears too weak to enforce its laws and protect these groups, then these groups should and will remain armed. In fact, Major David Davis 1919 employed this same analogy referring to his country Great Britain; in his words, “Every citizen once armed himself against attack. Arms were necessary, because the forces of internal order had not been properly established”. Through this statement, Major Davis tried to explain that the provision of security is a necessity for national disarmament. He argued, “All are prepared to trust the efficiency of the police, whose wages

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28 As one moves closer to the Kenyan border where the Nyàngatom and the Turukana clash continually, the demand for arms increases tremendously. The Nyàngatom often sell their gun in time of need or sell an extra gun that comes under their possession as a war spoil; but they do not trade arms to meet basic consumption needs. Whenever their cattle die because of drought or disease, they sell their arms to replenish them, again putting their money where their heart is - their cattle.
29 Interview, Elias Rasbuk, Sugar development people management coordinator of pastoral communities, Sugar Corporation, Ethiopia, 25 August 2014
30 Interview, Cmdr. Girmay Kahsay National Interpol Head and National Focal person for Small arms control and management, Ethiopia, 1 July 2015
31 There are several understandings of the Social Contract, the following is chosen for the purpose of this paper. “In Locke’s view ‘men’ give-up some of their liberty to enter into a commonwealth in order to protect their life, liberty and property. Crucially for Locke this was based on consent: a consent that could be withdrawn. The justification for the authority of the executive component of government is the protection of people’s property and well-being, so that when such protection is no longer present, or the authority becomes tyrannical against the people, they have a right, if not outright obligation, to resist the authority. The social contract can be dissolved and the process to create a political society begins anew.” (Knight 2009: 12)
32 Here, I would disagree with the philosophical foundation of Carr’s (2000) argument; to him “most “Kalashnikov cultures” are the result of failures of governance, rather than from an easy embracing of Hobbesian anarchy.” To understand the proliferation and use of small arms among east African pastoralists as the result of the failure of governance is to disregard African inter-ethnic relations before the colonial era ‘modern statehood’. Although not as chaotic as some scholars portrayed it, most inter-ethnic/inter-tribal relation, alliances and hostilities have their roots in African pre-history. Particularly the discussions on pastoral conflicts clearly show that pastoralists have alliances (and hostilities) among each other that has endured the test of time.
they pay as an insurance against crime”. So here, disarmament should be seen under the bigger umbrella of SSR, where it “focuses upon the state’s delivery of security and justice as public goods.” (Knight, 2009: 15)

This direction of argument also compels one to think towards the nature and legitimacy of government who monopolizes the instrument of violence. This is why many, like Kopel et al. (2005: 4) argue that:

Although arms possession as “a last resort” protection for human rights is implied by the universal declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has, oddly, began promoting disarmament, even in countries where arms possession is the last resort available to protect human rights.

Only a legitimate body should therefore promote disarmament. The United Nation’s Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace’ agrees with this logic. He asserted that small arms control measures “can be, and most of them have been, employed by regional organizations, by ad hoc groups of States or by individual State” because the “United Nations does not have or claim a monopoly of any of these instruments”. In other words, entities that can claim the monopoly of violence as a result of the ‘social contract’ are more suited to launch direct actions towards small arms disarmament than large organizations that do not have direct contracts with citizens such as the United Nations.

The Nyàngatom trust the intentions of the government but do not trust its ability to protect the people and their property, sharing the same stand as the Woreda police. The Woreda has a security apparatus of police, militia and Special Forces in the border areas between Kenya and Ethiopia. Interviews with all three-security providers reveal that they believe the Nyàngatom people should remain armed because they will not be able to protect them during cattle raids and conflicts with neighbouring communities. The ratio of police to the population is 1: 632. The capacity of the security providers is very weak. The following is a table that shows the number and status of security providers in different Kebeles of the Woreda.

However, the people do not see this as a hopeless situation but one that can be corrected so they propose to agree for disarmament if the government provides enough protection by increasing the militia and police. As for policymakers, the (mostly illegal) armaments of pastoral communities can be used to protect the people legally. Ethiopia has a history of incorporating armed member of the community into the militia, a way of integrating them into the legal security regime.

However, given the number of armed and trained security personnel the government faces challenges to provide security using conventional Westphalian methods. In some places, the development projects are paying local armed youth to security to them, and the same might be applicable to the provision of security to local communities. These youth have been providing security to their communities and have knowledge of the area, so bringing them into the security apparatus of the government will be a way of legitimizing their activities without the hustles of disarmament.

33 “it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law” (The United Nations 1948)
34 Interview, Cmdr. Girmay Kahsay National Interpol Head and National Focal person for Small arms control and management, Ethiopia, 1 July 2015
35 Interview, Cmdr. Girmay Kahsay National Interpol Head and National Focal person for Small arms control and management, Ethiopia, 1 July 2015
The state has assumed the responsibility of securing these large-scale agricultural investments from threats, one of which would be unnecessary intrusion by local communities, complicating further the security situation. In an interview with the national Focal Person on Small Arms Control, he categorized the threat by the arms of the pastoralists as a ‘conflict’ threat and not a ‘developmental threat’. Meaning, the pastoralists might clash with each other using their arms but they will not attack the development projects. This is to underestimate the challenge, because the Nyàngatom clash with enemies and according to their definition, anyone that is not a Nyàngatom or a Toposa can qualifies as an enemy, including migrant labor force from other parts of the country.

Conclusion

Ideally, disarmament is the foundation to both positive peace and negative peace and for it to take place there needs to be a degree of compliance to the precondition set by the people. According to the government, some of the preconditions like compensation will not be met, and people have to come on board during the consultation process. According to the Nyàngatom Woreda administrator even if the disarmament does not take place, the development projects will change the life of the people to the point where they will not need arms. A part of this argument strangely agrees to the cold war situation where disarmament was discussed yet never pursued as a viable option, a situation where political scientists like Jan Oberg (1983) observed that “Peace may lead to disarmament” but not the other way round. In agreement, Hobson (1908) reasoned, “that the causes of war lie deeper than armaments and that armaments have other functions besides that of war.” Similarly, the Nyàngatom argue:

If we were disarmed, the Kara would still come and steel; and I will ask back for what is mine (retaliate). Even if we do not have guns, we will fight with stick. We would be hitting each other using axes or knifes.

The world is not ready to forget that machetes were used in Africa’s deadliest genocide. Obviously, the absence of arms will not automatically lead to the absence of conflict but the presence of positive peace (development) will eventually lead to the decrease in gun violence. The same applies to the Turkana, the Nyàngatom argue that even if they and the Turkana do not have arms our shepherds will meet each other on the road. They might use sticks and spears to fight each other, going back to the pre-modern way of doing things. The problems with steeling/raiding cattle will persist and the culture of revenge, central in triggering pastoral conflicts, will not change just because they no longer have arms. The Nyàngatom feel deep hostility towards the Turkana, an elder explains:

The Nyàngatom are also grieved over past injustices and territory losses. Our fathers and grandfathers died in a land now found in Kenya, because they were forced away. Our people do not leave a land where their grandfather dies. We might pay a lot of sacrifice but we will return there.

The hostility will not be contained by simply taking away the instruments of violence. A transformation of the relations should take place along with the disarmament. Even after disarmament, the Nyàngatom still have other enemies from which they would like to protect themselves - the other neighbouring communities such as the Hamer, Kara, Dassanech, Murle, Suri etc. and wild animals.

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36 Ibid
37 FGD 2, Men in Lorenkachaw Kebele, Ethiopia, 20 August 2014.
38 Rwanda genocide (1994) where 800,000 people died in three months
39 Interview, Lopiding Lokuwa, Kajamakin Kebele Likemenber, Ethiopia, 26 August 2014
The development projects in pastoral communities have several components that will transform the life of pastoral communities. Disarmament, although one small segment of the change to come, represents the beginning of transformation. The Nyàngatom, formerly a pastoralist woreda will ‘become’ a ‘modern’ Habesha city with no arms. Having heard of the ‘development to come’ the Nyàngatom now see education as an escape to modernity, a way of turning their woreda into a Habesha city. The way they explain the unarmed population of the Habesha city is their education. They do not need arms to protect their property (education) however all pastoralists need arms to protect their cattle because other pastoralists want to steal it from them.

Like any DDR process, disarming the Nyàngatom will play a role in redefining economic, social and gender roles. With no need for a man to carry a gun to help women water their goats the process and need of things will change in ways that will disrupt the daily social activities. Even if this is a civilian disarmament, a process that does not require demobilization and rehabilitation the principles in all DDR process applies. A certain “confidence-building measure that supports the peace process (development process)” (GTZ, 2004: 21) should be put in place.

In such societies, the security apparatus should not just include certain selected actors identified as major actors in the service of security. However, the interdependence of the social norms and the way the society functions clearly encourages all sections of society to be involved in the process. Unless, the people do not provide complete consent, it is a process that should probably be avoided.

We have entered an era where an action taken at the very local might be an extension of a decision taken at the global level. The chain created between United Nations Agenda for Peace (1995), the Bamako declaration (2000), regional frameworks like the Nairobi protocol (2004) and regional organizations such as Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA) indicate how information feeding to policy-making is aggregated from a diversified group of actors ranging from donors to international inter-governmental organizations. In the midst of the ‘global public policy’, the situation in southwest Ethiopia calls for a context specific solution that demands individual prognosis before formulation or implementation of policies. Given the fact that these communities are a cross border community, all neighbouring states should be aware of the ‘unique’ approach in place. The process should be thoroughly studied before a ‘one size fits all’ programme of small arm control is launched in the area. The Nyàngatom Woreda is a clear example of a situation where the security of a border community is infused to state’s security, and a traditional westphalian mode of security governance is not applicable. Following the era of forced, therefore, failed disarmaments; we find most states in eastern Africa being drawn into international and regional small arms control frameworks. Nevertheless, the developments at each local area should be put into consideration before any practical action and even before policy formulation. The multidimensional work on small arms requires multiple institutions to work together to address the multiple façades of the ‘problem’.

40 Habesha City is a word the Nyàngatom use for urban areas occupied by the ‘Habesha’ – Although Habesha is a term used for the Semitic speaking northerner in Ethiopia for pastoralists it means anyone who isn’t a pastoralist.
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Alliance Formations and Security Implications in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia with its Neighbors

Andualem Zewdie Belaineh

Abstract

The geographic location Ethiopia occupies, among other factors, makes her the core of the Horn of Africa. Located at the heart of the Horn, Ethiopia borders with neighboring states on land, and shares people and trans-boundary resources. This in turn compels Ethiopia to adopt informed and responsive strategies vis-à-vis some of the developments in the neighboring countries. Those developments, which are specifically associated with traditional security, have been seen at different times, putting in danger the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia. Often those vulnerabilities to insecurities among other things used to be addressed via the tradeoffs between arms and allies. The paper is set out to scrutinize the dynamics of Ethiopia’s alliance with its neighbors. With this objective, the research poses the following questions: what kind of alliances Ethiopia has formed, how, why and with whom? To meet its objective, the research used qualitative approach that employed a wider review of secondary data. The study finds that Ethiopia’s alliance formations with its neighbors have exhibited positive dynamism in the areas of security, politics, economy, and in reference to kinds of alliances. By and large the post-1998 Ethiopia-neighbor states alliance formations have been driven by common welfare (Utility Alliance formation theory) rather than alliances against a military threat (Balance of Threat theory) except with Eritrea.

Background

Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is a sub-region where Ethiopia is located. Geographically, the Horn of Africa consists Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. These countries are considered as Core Horn (Horn Proper) (Kassahun, 2013; Cliffe, 1999; Mesfin, 1999). Whereas, Sudan (which includes South Sudan) is partly Horn, and Kenya is defined as a peripheral Horn country (Cliffe, 1999). Even for some Horn of Africa includes Uganda in addition to the above listed states due to its economic and political attachments with the Horn states (Kassahun, 2013; Medihane, 2004).

Besides the geographic location, the Horn of Africa is commonly characterized by turmoil, proxy war, state collapse, birth of new states, home of large number of refugees, civil war, dictatorship, leaders mostly with military/militia background except Kenya and Djibouti; drought, famine and poverty, and terrorism (Kassahun, 2013; Buzan & Weaver, 2003; Mesfin, 1999).

This research sets out to investigate Ethiopia’s alliance formations with its bordering neighbors save South Sudan. Due to lack of detailed and up to date data on the newly born state of the Horn, this research does not include Ethiopia’s relations with South Sudan. In fact, it is difficult to chart the nature and dynamics of Ethiopia’s alliance formation with its neighbors ignoring the regional and the bigger international picture. Despite the region’s relegation in its importance as compared to the Cold War period, the Horn still attracts actors outside the region. Among other things, its location which partly constitutes the Red Sea, and also the presence of collapsed state, for instance Somalia which serves as a place where terrorists and criminals hide and act from there; religious fundamentalism, terrorism and recently piracy and so on have compelled the world remarkably

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to have an eye on the region (Kassahun, 2013; Berouk, 2012; Osiro, 2011; Weldesilase, 2010). The aforementioned factors and the consequent attractions of foreign actors to the Horn informed the kind of alliance formations among the states of the Horn.

**Brief description of Ethiopia’s context in the Horn of Africa**

Ethiopia is the only country in the Horn of Africa that survived colonialism. Although Ethiopia was not colonized, however, its current form in one way or the other is shaped by the tug and push between Ethiopia and neighboring colonial powers (Getachew, 1991). Ethiopia, which is a Core Horn state shares boundary with all Horn states (Berouk, 2012). In addition to the centrality of its location, Ethiopia as core Horn state has trans-boundary resources, and also people, which tie it with its neighbors. In fact, depending on the kind of relations, the listed connections will impact, positively or negatively on alliances Ethiopia have with neighbors (Berouk, 2012; Mesfin, 1999). Rubbing salt to the wound, Ethiopia’s borders are porous, which expose the state for any kind of external influence. Partly due to its un-demarcated boundary Ethiopia has been forced to sacrifice its manpower and resources to maintain its sovereignty. Such history seems to have forced Ethiopia to build large and comparatively strong army in the Horn (Andualem, 2015; Berouk, 2012). It is understandable that military strength plays crucial role in maintaining territorial integrity, especially in regions like the Horn of Africa (Yemane, 2009).

Ethiopia’s location in the Horn of Africa enables her to benefit and suffer from its location. What is more, being a landlocked state (after 1991) and other more factors compel Ethiopia to induce alliance that aims to accelerate interdependence that in turn produces mutual benefits. However, the situation on the ground by and large does not warrant such expected alliances. Its location and links with neighbors often put Ethiopia in complex situation rather than benefit. Therefore, the paper scrutinizes how and what kinds of alliances have been formed and also why some failed? In addition, the research examines the nexus between alliance formations and consequent security implications in the region and specifically between Ethiopia and its neighbors.

**Conceptualizing and theorizing alliance formation**

**Rationale for alliance formation**

Scholars of international relations and peace studies explicate ‘alliance’ as the chief instrument of foreign and security policies; of course it is not the only one (Sprecher, 2006; Morrow, 1993). There are different driving forces behind alliance formations. For Oppenheim (1955) and Sprecher (2006), an alliance is entered with the purpose of forging relations. That given relation can be formed either to defend a partner or all contracting parties to the treaty from invasion, or in the extreme case to invade a third state which is labeled as a common enemy. Dingam (1979) in Genene (2004:6) and Medhane’s (2004) explanation of alliance formation is more or less in agreement with Oppenheim. They presuppose mutually perceived threat as a factor for alliance formations. According to these scholars, the whole purpose of constituting alliance is to avoid or minimize the damage that would come from the perceived security threat.

Alliance possibly realizes higher pacification between partners (Kimball, 2006). Equally, alliance formation has a power to incite states outside the alliance to engage in another alliance or building a strong army in fear of the potential attack from the already formed alliance. Alliance provokes aggression among adversaries. Alliance draws on pre-emptive attack from adversary, at times it also emboldens the partner in alliance to induce war with the state portrayed as the enemy (Sprecher, 2006). In short, alliance formation has two faces; on one hand, it pacifies relations between partners, whereas on the other hand, it plays a role of either encouraging or discouraging war between adversaries in fear of one another. The aforementioned scholars, including the Correlates of War (COW) project in Sprecher (2006:363) conceptualize alliance in its narrow sense. They reduce alliance as a mechanism of safeguarding national security, specifically military security from adversaries.
On the other hand, Osgood’s (1968) conceptualization of alliance is wider than military security. He explained that states have some common interest. To meet those interests states enter into certain kind of agreements. Those interests could be economic, social, military or cultural or a blend of them. Therefore, the desire to meet those common goals lays a ground for alliance formation. In short, his conceptualization diametrically refutes explanations that reduce alliance formation into defending or invading another state.

Studies from other authors like Genene (2004) and Lenesil’s (1989) do correspond with Osgood’s understanding of alliance formation are not insignificant. They cite the unilateral inability of states to meet their goals as a driving force for alliance formation. According to Genene (2004) and Lenesil (1989), policy makers resort to alliance formation with another party to fill their security, economic and other gaps which otherwise could not be fulfilled unilaterally. The driving forces for alliance formation could be internal, external or both. These driving forces are vulnerabilities, which could not be addressed single-handedly. Lenesil (1989) argued that alliances are revealed in the form of actions or inactions that one renders to another. The areas in which alliances are expressed include: political, moral, material, financial, or joint military actions. Thus, when necessary, the research employs both the narrow and broad understandings of ‘alliance formation.’ However, I tend to emphasize on the broad conceptualization of alliance formation in this study.

Theories of alliance formations

Balance of threat theory
Balance of Threat Theory constructed its argument based on imminent threat, which is posed by rising power or coalition of powers. Therefore, a mere accumulation of power by a given state is not a sufficient condition to form alliance. In this case the emerging state’s power is evaluated against the danger it poses to another’s survival. Hence, security threat as a ground for alliance formation. In other words, amassing power alone is not enough to form an alliance. Balance of Threat theorists argue that threats can be posed by less powerful states too (Walt, 1985). Accordingly, the imminence of threat is measured against the offensive capability (equipment, manpower, preparation, commitment), proximity, visible intention and the like (Walt, 1985). In short, what matters is not whether a state is small or big power, rather the existence of perceived threat. A perceived threat among other things necessitates a balance of threat alliances.

Utility theory of alliance formation
According to Utility Theory, the rationale for alliance formation between states is to maximize their ‘Utilities,’ which is explained in terms of welfare. Self-insufficiency of a state, it could be security or other, paves the way for interdependence. For Schwarzenberger (1955:174) in Genene (2004) sovereign states alliance is characterized by symbiosis. Increasing welfare is a driving force for the alliance. So, the more powerful a state is, the higher the bid to get it on one side in the alliance than distancing from it as a threat. So, the driving force behind alliances is utility. That utility can be interpreted as economic, political, social or security gains.

This paper utilizes the blend of the Balance of Threat Theory and Utility Theory of alliance formations to explain the alliance formation between Ethiopia and its neighbors.

Ethiopia’s relations with Sudan: alliance dynamics
Ethiopia-Sudan relations between 1956 and 1991: alliance formation
State to state relation between Ethiopia and Sudan goes back to 1956 when Sudan got independence. But before Sudan’s independence, there were relations, specifically people to people as well as Ethiopia with Sudanese movements, which struggled against Anglo- Egyptian colonization. The relation between Ethiopia and the Mahidist Movement had, however, been characterized by
rivalry. The grave hostility between the two directly tied with the signing of the Hewett Treaty of 1884 between Ethiopia and Britain. As per the agreement, Ethiopia gave passage for Anglo-Egyptian colonial army, which were cornered by Mahidists in the northwestern border of Ethiopia (Both, 2004; Bahiru, 2002). Following that incident, Mahidists started to invade and destroy northern and northwestern part of Ethiopia in retaliation. The retaliatory war did cost Ethiopia the life of its Emperor, Yohanes IV in 1889 (Bahiru, 2002).

The relation between Sudanese movements and Ethiopia renewed following the 1896 victory of Adwa. The Khalife of Sudan acknowledged Menilek’s Emperorship over Ethiopia. And the two parties reached an agreement to stand up to European colonialism (Ottaway, 1985). This is a case, which provides relevant explanations of the Balance of Threat Theory, which underlined that a posed common threat causes alliance formation. However, soon after the Sudan’s independence, in 1956, Ethiopia-Sudan relations literally got rotten. Sudan’s signing of the 1959 Nile treaty with Egypt, which apportioned the Nile waters between the two in exclusion of Ethiopia made their relation tough and rough (Andualem, 2015; Berouk, 2012; Yacob, 1990). Throughout the 1960s the two countries relations were negative, exceptions were in 1960 the two heads of states exchanged state visits and the other incident was in March1964 General Aboud provided his Good Office to settle the Ethio-Somalia boundary dispute (Teklue, 1986). Besides, on 3 May 1964 Sudan and Ethiopia signed Treaty of Extradition, without improving their difference on Nile waters (Berouk, 2012; Teklue, 1986).

The strained Ethio-Sudan relations were also informed by Arab-Israel conflict. The Arab-Israel war of 1967 took a larger share in straining their relations. Their conflicting foreign policy towards the Arab-Israel war was driven by their domestic policy of Islam-Christian lines. The conflicting domestic and foreign polices made them to initiate alliances with one another’s insurgent (Both, 2004). Their differences in particular on the Nile River and Arab-Israel conflict gave room for informal alliances to take root.

However, the year 1971 saw rapprochement between the two countries. In March 1971 the two Foreign Ministers signed treaty that prohibits subversive activities. In particular, the agreement sanctioned both countries to disarm and totally dismantle rebel camps (Neguse, 1977). And their relation hit its height when the Sudanese government and the Anya-Any rebels settled their dispute through the Good Office of Emperor Haile Sellasse in Addis Ababa in 1972 (Berouk, 2012). In fact, the cordial relations did not stay long. The year 1974 saw a change of regime in Ethiopia, which brought the Derg (i.e., the military regime (1974- 1991)) to power. The Ethiopia-Sudan relation during the Derg from the beginning started to strain. Their contradictory ideological alignments of the Cold War will take the lion’s share for the worsening of their relations (Berouk, 2012; Tafesse, 2011). In an incident which could be cited as an exception, Sudan tried to broker the Derg government with Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1975/76 (Legum, 1976) with the intention of reciprocating Ethiopia’s contribution for 1972 Sudan’s peace agreement. However, the Sudan’s mediation effort was not successful. Starting from mid 1970s until the collapse of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, their relationship had been characterized by hostility. There was even a time in which they were at the brink of war in 1976 (Yacob, 1990; Legum, 1978).

After mid 1970s, the Ethio-Sudan relation went to its bottom. Exceptionally, in 1980 they signed Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty (MoFA, ND). Otherwise, they reduced the number of diplomatic staff into minimal and prohibited any kind of communication, including air transportation and kept in a proxy war (Ottaway, 1985). Berouk (2012: 92) described the then Sudan as the state that “…always overtly or covertly sponsored subversive activities in Ethiopia.” In fact, significant literature also unveiled that different measures were taken from Ethiopia’s side to retaliate Sudan’s subversive actions (Kassahun, 2013; Berouk, 2012; Regassa, 2007; Both, 2004; Ottaway, 1985; Legum, 1978).
Even if they supported one another’s dissidents, the approach they chose was mainly underground. They solidified state-rebels relations at the expense of state to state. However, none of them confirmed the support they rendered to rebels except rarely. In fact the Ethiopia’s retaliatory action came later. Ethiopia did not have the opportunity to reciprocate the Sudanese subversive act until 1983, which is after the revival of the Anya-Anyaa movement (Regassa, 2007; Ottaway, 1985). Ethiopia’s retaliation came with the establishment of Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). For instance, the 1984 study done by Ethiopia’s MoFA Policy-Strategy and Political Affairs Desk advised Ethiopia to take advantage of the SPLA’s struggle to its benefit. The same document advised Ethiopia to take part even in articulation of SPLA’s agenda (MoFA, August 1984).

By and large, throughout the Imperial and Derg regimes the two countries’ relations were not cordial. Their relationships were chiefly characterized by agreements that are short of execution, proxy war, ideological antagonism, and reduced diplomatic relations. State to state relations was volatile and negligible, whereas, states to rebel alliances were strong. In short, alliance formations between the two states from late 1950s to 1991 can mainly be explained by the analysis of the Balance of Threat Theory than Utility.

Post 1991 Ethiopia–Sudan alliance formations
Ethio-Sudan relations were smooth between 1991-1995 (Amare, 1996). In post May 1991 SPLA was expelled from Ethiopia’s soil (Tafesse, 2011). The expulsion of SPLA was followed by Ethiopia-Sudan Cooperation and Friendship agreement of 24 October 1991. Subsequently, several agreements and protocols were concluded including pledges to utilize Nile waters cooperatively (Cliffe, 1999; MoFA, ND). Contrary to the pre-1991 treaties, the October 1991 treaty and subsequent protocols had the form of multipurpose.

The cordial relation that was laid in October 1991 started to deteriorate towards the end of 1994. The reasons behind the decline of relations according to Ethiopia were: one, Sudan directly backed Ethiopian dissidents and the other was Sudan indirectly through its Aid organizations, which operated in Ethiopia, jeopardized the latter’s sovereignty. Ethiopia claimed that Sudanese Aid organizations worked hard to transport Fundamental Islam in Ethiopia (Berok, 2012; Medhane, 2004; Cliffe, 1999). Towards the end of 1994, President Melese Zenawi publicly complained as Sudan engaged in subversive activities in Ethiopia. In fact, blame for subversion was aired from both sides. Cliffe (1999:96) noted the post 1994 period in the Horn as follows: “the climate of non-interference and voluntary cooperation took some sharp blows and there was a partial reversal into earlier patterns of internal oppositions being fostered to a degree by neighbouring states.”

Adding salt to injury, the detection of Sudan’s hand behind the unsuccessful 1995 assassination of President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa severed their relation (Berouk, 2012; Woldesilase, 2010; Cliffe, 1999). Soon after the abortion of the assassination attempt, Ethiopia demanded Sudan to extradite the three assassins, referencing the incident to the treaty entered between them in March 1964 (Woldesilase, 2010) but Sudan ignored it. In the meantime, Ethiopia took unilateral measures such as closing Sudan’s Consulate at Gambella, prohibition of Sudanese NGOs operation in Ethiopia, limiting any kind of Air transport, and requested a reduction of Sudanese Embassy staff (Amare, 1996). Parallel to that Ethiopia joined Uganda and Eritrea in the Convenient Alliance,
which targeted to remove the regime in Khartoum. However, the Convenient Alliance was short of success due to the outbreak of Ethio-Eritrea war in 1998 (Cliffe, 1999).

The nonobservance of the 1980 Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty and also the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and Sudan tell us that signing treaties had more of symbolic significance than real effect. Therefore, such conditions between Ethiopia and Sudan marked the renewal of the informal alliances between states and insurgent groups.

**Post-1999: years of normalization**

Following the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrea war, the Ethio-Sudan relations have been marked by overall improvements. The renewal of relation began to take root when President Omar al Bashier paid a visit to Ethiopia in November 1999. Between 3 and 5 March 2000, they held the 4th Joint Ministerial Commission from where they stopped it (1st, 2nd, and 3rd were held in 1991, 1992 &1993 respectively). In the 4th ministerial meeting, as usual they signed a number of agreements and protocols in the fields of trade, agriculture, infrastructure, banking, investment, port, security and border developments (Berouk, 2012; MoFA, 2000).

Medhane (2004) mentioned Eritrea as a major factor for Ethio-Sudan’s agreement of March 2000. Balance of Threat Theory explains such kind of alliance formation. According to the same theory, whether the source of insecurity is a powerful state or not does not matter; what matter is the nature (the proximity, capability and imminent) of the threat. When we compare Eritrea’s power vis-à-vis Ethiopia, the power of the former is insignificant (Berouk, 2012), but could not stop Ethiopia from establishing alliances with Sudan and also with Yemen by signing of the Sana’a Forum of 2000 (Tafesse, 2011; Medhane, 2004). Both bilateral, Ethio- Sudan, and multilateral treaties, Sana’a Forums, forged as a reaction to a common threat. In fact, in addition to security in which they were primarily established for, these treaties have been growing in their areas of concern (Medhane, 2004).

Subsequent to the 2000 comprehensive agreement, in April 2002, the Ethio-Sudan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed, which aimed to facilitate trade and integration between the two countries. According to Abebe (2012:9), the bilateral trade flows of Ethiopia and Sudan between 2002 and 2011 showed significant improvements. The same study revealed that Ethiopia’s “...merchandise exports to Sudan registered a growth of 2,278.27 % during 2002 and 2011 period i.e. an average increase of 228 % per annum ... The total trade flows (exports plus imports) between the two countries increased by 2,304.8 % during the same period.”

The infrastructure in particular means of communications has played crucial role in the improvement of trade and alliance between Ethiopia and Sudan. Linking the two countries with road such as Gedarif-Gelabat-Metema-Azezo, air transportation and also the direct microwave connection transformed their alliances one step forward (MoFA, January 2007). In 2010 alone, Ethiopia imported $1.42 billion worth oil from Sudan. Similarly, Sudan also serves as trade destiny for Ethiopian goods. In addition, Ethiopia uses Port Sudan as an alternative port (Berouk, 2012). As per Kibre’s (2008) projection, Sudan will be a promising trade partner and destiny for Ethiopian merchandise in the long term.

Hydropower is another area of cooperation between Ethiopia and Sudan. Ethiopia reached MoU in February 2005 between East African states-East African Power Pool- has been working to export electric power to Sudan (Andualem, 2015). Andinet (2010) citing WB 2007 Report described Sudan’s hydropower status equating to a state that is short of power supply. He saw the Sudanese deficit of power as an important condition for Ethiopia to export hydropower to Sudan. Beyond speculations, Alemayehu Tegenu, Minister of Ethiopia’s Water and Energy, confirmed that
Ethiopia already started to export 100MW to Sudan. Though little, but it signaled the translation of agreements into practice. In the future, given some limitations, energy-led cooperation (oil from Sudan and hydropower from Ethiopia) will play a pivotal role (Medhane, 2004).

Ethiopia-Sudan cooperation has shown improvement in terms of implementations and also diversification. There are indicators that prove this claim as Sudan has shown certain policy shifts towards the utilization of the Nile waters. Among them, one is the support it extended to the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The Ethiopian Herald in citing Ali Karti’s, Sudan’s Foreign Minister, interview with Sudan Tribune wrote that Sudan would benefit from the Great Renaissance Dam hydropower generation project in Ethiopia (Andualem, 2015). What is more, the deployment of Ethiopia’s peacekeeping army in Darfur under UNAMID, and in Abeyie (Berouk, 2012) shows the growing trust and cooperation between the two states. Issues of boundary discussions and decisions have been going well, according to Ethiopian government media (ETV, February 2014).

The Ethiopia-Sudan positive interaction also facilitated labor movements. According to Berouk (2012:93), “... there are around one million Ethiopian refugees and migrants, mostly very young, living and working in Sudan.” Out of this number “...140,000 have work permits.” This kind of economic benefits creates conducive environment for people to people relations and also believed to lay fertile ground for further integration. Of course we should not forget the refugee implication on peace and security of host and country of origin. According to Woodward (2003:118) “Refugees may have their own agendas with regard to their countries of origin and they may seek to pursue these from the relative safety of their sanctuaries.” He added that neighbors are not innocent about instability of the bordering state. This fact will inform states to work seriously about the problem that originates from refugees. Especially when we read what the Sudan’s Interior Minister disclosed in 1986 about the plan of arming Ethiopia’s refugees to topple down Mengistu’s regime (MoFA, 1987), we can understand the potential danger refugees could pose against the country of origin.

To sum up, the Ethio-Sudan relations showed continuity in certain areas, but also exhibited dynamic changes especially in the post-1999 period. Between 1956 and 2000, their relations were mainly bilateral and also specific purpose oriented, except between 1991 and 1994. During the mentioned period, 1956-2000, their relations revolved around territorial integrity and sovereignty. Surprisingly, those specific purpose treaties were short of implementations. For instance, the 1964 Treaty of Extradition was ignored when Ethiopia demanded extradition of those who attempted to assassinate Mubark in 1995; and Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty was violated throughout the Derg and EPRDF up until 1999. On the other hand, the treaties of 2000 take the form of multipurpose. The level of translating agreements into action is also encouraging. In the post-1999 period, state to insurgent alliances was replaced by state to state. Contrary to the past rivalry, the two states have gone to the extent of standing for one another’s peace and security. A good example is the deployment of Ethiopia’s peacekeeping forces in Darfur and Abeyie. Besides, bilateral treaties are also supplemented by multilateral cooperation such as the Sana’a Forum and East African Power Pool.

**Ethiopia-Somalia relations: state-insurgent & state-state alliances**

**Pre-1991 Ethio-Somalia Relations**

Ethiopia-Somalia relation can be traced back to 1960, Somalia’s year of independence. Somalia is the result of unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland (Ali, 2010; Neguse, 1984;
Mesfin, 1977). Soon after its independence, Somalia came up with its agenda of Greater Somalia that aimed at unifying all Somali speaking people under Somalia’s Flag, which remained a bone of contention between Somalia and its neighbors. Somalia’s claim to unify all the territories where Somali people reside was given a constitutional base in 1961 (Neguse, 1984).

The Ethiopia-Somalia relations became sour from the start. Somalia as early as 1961 established alliance with Ethiopian Somali to meet its objective of Greater Somalia. To this goal Somalia provided support for Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) (Woodward, 2003). Later on in 1964 the proxy war turned into state-to-state border skirmish. Following the 1964 boundary clash, both brought their claims over the disputed area before the July 1964 OAU’s Cairo Submit. Accordingly, the Cairo Submit passed the resolution that underlined the necessity of maintaining the boundary inherited upon independence (Neguse, 1984; Mesfin 1977). Contrary to the decision, Somalia kept on with its failed agenda of Greater Somalia till 1967. In 1967 Somalia’s election brought Ali Sharmarke to Somalia’s presidency and Ibrahim Egal to the premiership. Soon after they assumed power, Somalia’s antagonistic and militaristic posture towards Kenya and Ethiopia showed improvement. Dialogues and visits at high officials’ level were carried out. The years 1967-1969 signaled a change of approaches. Their relations turned from confrontation into détente (Neguse, 1984; Riccuti, 1995).

In 1969, General Siyad Barre staged coup against Sharmarke’s government and took power. Barre’s regime uprooted the infant Ethiopia-Somalia relations. Barre kept on building army and preparing for war against Ethiopia. With this objective, Barre established alliance with the Arab world and signed a Twenty Years Friendship and Cooperation with USSR in 1974 (Woodward, 2003). Somalia, which was equipped with Soviet’s arm and trainings engaged in subversive activities in Ethiopia even before the major Ogaden war. Minor wars were fought with the Ethiopian army since 1976. Those minor wars were done under the name of WSLF. Alongside the WSLF, the ununiformed regular Somali army fought against Ethiopia (Woodward, 2003; Neguse, 1984). Neguse (1984:662) ironically noted such Somalia’s shift of strategy as follows, “Somalia’s foreign policy stance from Greater Somalia to Western Somalia.”

Parallel to the undercover war through WSLF, in 1976 Barre demanded Ethiopia to handover Ogaden to Somalia. But the response was negative (Lewis &Mayall, 1996). In fact, Barre wanted to go to war with Ethiopia before the Ogaden war, except for the Soviets’ pressure (Woodwar, 2003). The Ogaden War, which was approached by USSR to avoid it via the Aden Conference, broke out in July 1977. The war ended in March 1978 by Ethiopia’s victory. In the Ogaden war, USSR lost Somalia to USA. USA backed Somalia in all respects. Contrary to USA, USSR supplied Ethiopia with required armors and military advisers. Following the footsteps of the Soviet Union, other socialist states supported Ethiopia with armaments. In addition to arming and logistic supports, countries like Cuba and Yemen engaged in the Ogaden war by deploying tens of thousands of armed personnel by Ethiopian side (Mengistu, 2011; Riccuti, 1995; Woodward, 2003, Dawit, 1989).

Since the Ogaden war till the ousting out of Barre in 1991, Somalia’s regime was busy fighting Somali insurgents. The insurgents got support from Ethiopia (Mengistu, 2011; Ali, 2010; Riccuti, 1995). The post Ogaden war saw a change in war approach in particular from the Ethiopian side. According to Berouk (2002), Ethiopia engaged in support of two Somali insurgent groups, Somali Salivation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali National Movement (SNM). Of course long before Ethiopia’s support to Somali dissidents, similar measures were taken by Somalia like provisions of arms and trainings for Ethiopian insurgents (OLF, WSLF, EPLF and TPLF) (Mengistu, 2011; Abbink, 2003; Legum, 1978). We can infer from the above discussions that the alliance formations transformed from the commonly known state to state into state-insurgents.
The year 1988 saw a change over Somalia-Ethiopia relations. On 13 April 1988 Mengistu and Barre signed treaty to cease subversive actions against each other in Djibouti. Internal and external pressures drove the signing of the accord. Internally, both regimes were under pressure from insurgents, lack of legitimacy and severe economic crises. Externally, as of mid 1980s the support provided to them by super powers gradually went down. Therefore, these conditions forced Barre and Mengistu to seek solutions from the round table (Woodward, 2003; Lenesil, 1989).

In fact the signing of the 1988 agreement did not save the two regimes to step-down (Riccuti, 1995). Following the agreement Barre took an all-inclusive attack against Somali insurgents. However, the retaliatory measures taken by the Barre regime against SNM (supported by Issa clan of Somaliland), SSDF (supported by Darood in Puntland) and other Somali clans in southwestern Somalia were not effective. Ironically, each military measure taken against those identified territories brought to Barre the contrary. And in January 1991 Barre fled the country (Berouk, 2009; Riccuti, 1995; Dawit, 2009). Similarly the EPLF and TPLF were strong by the end of 1980s. Consequently, in 1991 they became victorious over Mengistu’s regime (Leenco, 2003).

**Post-1991 Ethio-Somalia relations**

The year 1991 saw regime change in Ethiopia and state collapse in Somalia. Ethiopia that sweated a lot for the fall of the regime in Somalia from 1978 to 1991, has been working for the rebirth of Somalia. Somalia has become a safe haven for terrorists and anti Ethiopian forces. This situation is by far the worst to the stability of Ethiopia than strong Somalia of 1960 and 1970s. The presence of a large number of Somali refugees in Ethiopia coupled with insurgent movements aggravated the situation (Medhane, 2002). Taking all these situations into account, Ethiopia has labored a lot to promote reconciliation among Somali factions parallel to a policy of reducing damages (Yemane, 2009). As a result, Ethiopia organized peace conferences at Sodore and Hawassa for Somali factions which goaled the rebirth of Somalia. However, the peace conferences held by Ethiopia became futile due to external interventions from Egypt and Djibouti (Medhane, 2002). Between those fierce rivalries, Djibouti came with the Transitional National Government of Somalia (TNG) at Arta in 2001. TNG did not stay long; the first opposition to it came from Ethiopia. Ethiopia labeled TNG as the body that integrated terrorists like Al Ittihad. Of course, Al Ittihad is a terrorist organization that posed a threat to Ethiopia between 1996-1998 (Woldesilase, 2010; Abbink, 2003; Medhane, 2002). To offset its security threats based in Somalia such as Al Ittihad, ONLF and OLF, Ethiopia took military measures at different times and also allied with certain stable Somali regions and warlords which negatively affected TNG (Abbink, 2003; Medhane, 2002). According to Ethiopia’s MoFA 2002 policy document, Ethiopia’s alliance with Somali groups is aimed to reduce the damage that has come from collapsed Somalia (MoI, 2002).

Parallel to alliance with selected Somali insurgents Ethiopia took military measures deep into south and central Somalia to minimize the danger posed by Al Ittihad al Islamia (Menkhaus, 2007; Medhane, 2002). In addition to unilateral military measures, Ethiopia concluded memorandum of understandings with relatively stabilized areas like, Puntland and Somaliland. The agreement includes keeping common security across their borders, fighting crime, contrabands and cattle raids (Ali, 2010; Dawit, 2009; MoI, 2002; MoFA, 2007). Beyond agreement Ethiopia and Somaliland work collaboratively in the field of trade, port, road and air transportation, and security. Ethiopia opened its Commercial Consulate at Hargessa the capital of Somaliland. Their diplomatic relationship has been growing from time to time (Ali, 2010). Clapham (2007) argued that beyond the trade benefit, Ethio- Somaliland relations plays a crucial role in diminishing the threat that would come from Somali nationalism.

Similarly, Ethio-Puntland areas of cooperation showed growth. Ethiopia and Puntland work in fields of security, contrabands and crime. Puntland leaders starting form Abdulahi Yusuf
(who later became Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government president) till the 2014 elected Abdiweli Mohamed Ali have had the warm support from Ethiopia. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali in his visit to Ethiopia between 25 and 27 February 2014, told journalists that Puntland has worked with Ethiopia in security, crime and trade. He also expounded that Puntland wants to upgrade its relation with Ethiopia (Addis Zaman, 73rd Year No. 170, 2014).

In addition to Ethiopia’s ties with the stable Somali regions, the former has track of working with Somalia since 2004. The year 2004 saw the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, which was a product of Eldoret, Kenya negotiation under auspices of IGAD. TFG from the start has got Ethiopia’s support (Ofcansky, 2006). In mid 2006, TFG moved from Kenya to Somalia, Baidoa town (Sadik, 2007). Soon the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) that got popularity in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia began its attack on TFG and also declared war on Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2007). More than that UIC openly stated its claim over Ogaden (Sadik, 2007). To check the threat posed from UIC, Ethiopia in collaboration with TFG opened war against it on 20 December 2006 (Dawit, 2009; MoFA, 2007). Surprisingly, Eritrea engaged in that war in support of UIC. However, UIC was ousted out from Mogadishu within a few weeks (Clapham, 2007). After the UIC was ousted out of Mogadishu, Ethiopia reopened its embassy in Mogadishu. Subsequently, Somalia also opened its embassy in Addis Ababa. Besides, Prime Minister Meles paid a state visit to Mogadishu in 2007. Consequently, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa signed treaty of Cooperation and Friendship (MoFA, 2007).

In general, as of 2004 the two states’ relation has shown progress. The two regimes agreed to work in cooperation in the field of peace and security. Of course, the Mogadishu government is so weak even to have control over its capital city. Ethiopia, with the goal of having stable Somalia, free of terrorist and anti-Ethiopian forces, deployed 4000 peacekeeping forces in February 2014 under the auspices of the AU (Addis Zaman, 15 February 2014). Another area where the two governments allied is regional peace. Somalia showed its commitment to the regional peace by acceding to the 2002 Sana’a Forum (Berouk, 2012; Tafesse, 2011).

Shared resources are among the areas in which the two states can work together. Trans-boundary rivers, such as Genale-Dawa and Wabeshebele, are among few resources shared by the two countries (Yacob, 2007). The Somalian President Hassan Sheik Mohamoud and Speaker of Somalia’s Parliament in their interview with ETV from Mogadishu in January 2014, pledged to work on issues of port and utilization of the mentioned rivers for the benefit of the two states. Besides, the President confirmed as Somalia wanted to have a military pact with Ethiopia (ETV, January 2014), which later on accompanied by signing a military pact (Addis Zaman, 27 February 2014). The signing of Military Pact can be taken as one step ahead in the history of Somalia-Ethiopia’s relations.

In sum, historically more than state-to-state alliances, state to insurgent characterized the two countries’ relations. But recent developments speak a lot about state-to-state alliances that aim at common security threats. On the other hand, alliances between Ethiopia and stable Somali regions reveal a feature of utility and security goaled alliance formations.

**Ethiopia and Kenya relations**

**Pre 1974 Ethiopia and Kenya’s alliances**

Ethiopia-Kenya’s relation goes back to pre-1963, independence year of Kenya. Ethiopia among other things helped Kenyans in their struggle against British colonialism. Authors like Getachew (1991) and Both (2004) noted the credit given to Ethiopia by Kenyans due to the priceless support Ethiopia offered to Kenyans in their struggle for independence. Besides, Emperor Hailesilase
and President Kenyatta’s personal relations also played a lot in the growth of the two countries’ relations (Abebe, 2010). Christopher Chita currently Kenyan Ambassador to Ethiopia confirmed the contribution made by the two leaders. He also credited Ethiopia for the initiative she took by opening a Consulate in Nairobi in 1963 and upgrading it into an ambassadorial level in 1969 as another factor for the two countries flourishing relations (ETV, 23 February 2014).

In addition to the personal relations between the two heads of state as well as Ethiopia’s support for Kenya’s independence, the irredentist agenda of Somalia also forced the two countries to tighten their relations. The presence of Somalia as common threat necessitated Ethiopia and Kenya to sign Military Pact in 1963 (Tafesse, 2011; Both, 2004). Again in 1970 they signed Treaty of Boundary Demarcation in reference to those areas that were short of demarcation and also lacked clarity by the 1898 British-Ethiopia Boundary Demarcations Treaty (Getachew, 1991). Even if the boundary treaty was mainly signed with the aim of demarcating the boundary, it also contained provisions dealing with shared water resources. In particular Articles 7 and 8 of the 1970 Treaty discuss about future utilization of Dawa River and its banks, whereas Articles 9 and 10 refer about Omo River and utilization of Lake Turkana (Abebe, 2010). The Military Pact and the Boundary Agreement were followed by the Trade Agreement, which was signed in January 1970 (Getachew, 1991). The increasing numbers of agreements indicate that the two states willingness to cooperate in those mentioned spheres.

The whole objective of signing treaties is to turn them into effect. However, when we evaluate treaties entered between Ethiopia and Kenya vis-à-vis their effectiveness soon we can find that they were short of implementation. For instance, the 1963 Military Pact was not implemented when Ethiopia had a minor border skirmish with Somalia (Mesfin, 1977; 1999). Again the Trade agreement had a similar track record due to poor infrastructure like road and also production of similar goods, which crippled their implementation (Getachew, 1991). Similarly, the agreement to utilize the Dawa River and Omo-Turkana were short of implementation due to financial and infrastructural constraints until recently, except 1970 boundary demarcation (Abebe, 2010).

**Ethiopia-Kenyan relations: between 1974 and 1991**

In Post 1974 Ethio-Kenyan relation continued. In1979 Ethio- Kenya Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Addis Ababa. The agreement was designed with a focus on joint projects, such as developing river Dawa, Lake Rudolf and construction of roads. The joint road construction aimed to connect Addis Ababa to Nairobi (Getachew, 1991). Beyond signing, the two states, conduct ministerial meetings with the intention to translating agreements into reality. In those years the two states at least held one Joint Ministerial meeting in a year. The ministerial meetings were about boundary, security, shared resource development, trade, transport, agriculture and other issues. Similar to the 1960s and first half of 1970s those agreements and meetings were short of implementation except Addis Ababa- Nirobi road construction (Abebe, 2010; Getachew, 1991). For instance, the 1977/78 Ethiopia- Somalia war over Ogaden proved for the second time the ineffectiveness of the 1963 Ethio-Kenya Military Pact. According to this Military Pact, Kenya was supposed to fight by Ethiopia’s side against Somalia, but it did not happen. We can learn this from Kenya’s Acting Foreign Minister’s explanation on September 20, 1977. He stated that “Somalia’s expansion is unacceptable; Somalia is an aggressor both in word and in deed; she has invaded Ethiopia militarily; ... Kenya’s support for Ethiopia was moral not military” (Legume, 1978:387). Kenya’s Foreign Minister Munyua Waiyaki testified the same on October 25, 1977. He declared, “Kenya’s support to Ethiopia is ‘purely moral’ ” (Legume, 1978:387). These wordings of the ministers revealed that the non-implementation of the military pact, which is a tiger on paper.

Of course Kenya had an undeniable role in that war. Kenya allowed Ethiopia to use Mombasa Port for its import and export during the wartime, as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway was
damaged and blocked by Somali invaders (MoFA, August 1984). The road to Assab was also not free of damage and control of insurgents. Hence, Kenya more than providing port accesses “... impounded two Egyptian aircrafts carrying arms for Somalia which were caught overflying Kenyan airspace early in 1978” (Legume, 1978:253). Surprisingly enough the 1963 Military Pact, which lacked implementation in Ogaden war, was renewed in August 1987 in the 29th Joint Ministerial Council meeting. The agreement included the exchange of information about security and military matters and taking joint action based on founded ground. Furthermore, the same ministerial meeting came with Friendship and Cooperation agreement that stays for Ten years (MoFA, September 1987).

Throughout the Cold War Ethiopia and Kenya had different ideological orientations (Tafesse, 2011). During the Cold War, Kenya had a strong bond with USA and it continued. As part of this bond, Kenya signed the Military Pact with USA and consequently secured support from the latter. USA in return secured military facilities including military base. Contrarily, Ethiopia during the Derg regime joined the USSR-led camp (MoFA, August 1984). Despite ideological differences and insignificant economic ties, the Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs 1984 and 1987 reports classified Kenya as a friendly country (MoFA, August 1984; September 1987). Throughout the Derg period, common threat and common welfare interests, rather than ideological differences informed Ethiopia-Kenya alliance formation.

Post May 1991 Ethiopia-Kenya relations
The year 1991 as usual saw the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. Complement to the previous agreements on 23 July 1997 Memorandum of Understanding on Political, Social and Economic Cooperation was reached and signed by Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Mr. Seyoum Mesfin and his Kenyan counterpart Mr. Stephan Kalonzo Musyoka. Accordingly, eighteen areas of cooperation were identified. The major cooperation areas include: border security, immigration, refugee, trade, transport and communication, natural resources, environment, tourism, and energy (Abebe, 2010).

Though several agreements and memorandum of understandings were concluded in post 1991, their implication on economic sector is almost null according to the 2002 Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy document (MoI,2002). The Kenya’s share of Ethiopia’s export merchandise is insignificant. Kenya’s share is petty 2.2 % out of Ethiopia’s export to Africa. “This is so irrespective of the existence of the long serving road-link and long-standing stable political and trade relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya; and also despite the advantage of proximity” (Kibire, 2008). According to Christopher Chita Kenyan Ambassador to Ethiopia, in his interview with ETV on 23 February 2014, the volume of trade between Ethiopia and Kenya is not big as expected. The annual trade between the two is less than $ 60million (ETV, 23 February 2014). Surprisingly, Ethiopia’s trade with Kenya is not only insignificant but also declining over time (Kibire, 2008).

The Ethio-Eritrea 1998 war, among other things had a positive impact on Ethio-Kenya economic ties. Port Mombasa has been taken as an alternative port for import and export of Ethiopia’s goods (Kibire, 2008). As a result the two countries have been working on improving the quality of road, which connects them. Indeed, Road Project funded by the African Development Fund is already in progress to increase the use of Mombasa Port. The project is planned to connect Addis Ababa-Nairobi-Mombasa. When the road construction gets finalized, it is assumed to facilitate trade, use of the port and in general it contributes to the regional integration (Addis Ababa-Nairobi-Mombasa Road Project 2011).
In addition to connecting Ethiopia and Kenya via road and air transportation, the two countries have been working on hydropower projects. The power interconnection is part of the East African Power Pool (EAPP) and the Power Interconnection System’s project, which Memorandum of Understanding was signed in February 2005. The EAPP identified Gibe- Omo and Abby Rivers as major hydro-pools. As part of implementing the EAPP’s agreement Ethiopia began to build Gibe III Hydroelectric power project. However, soon opposition was mounted against damming of Gibe III (Abebe, 2010).

In December 2008 the Kenyan National Assembly (Parliament) opposed the construction. In the mean time Kenya established an Inter-Ministerial Committee of 14 personnel. The Committee mandated to observe the situation in the damming of Gibe III and also to discuss with Ethiopian officials. The committee visited Gibe III dam and communicated their observation results. Accordingly, the team leader Mr. John Nyaora explained that there is no clear and present danger over Omo-Turkana that might result from the damming of Gibe III (Abebe, 2010). What is more, the paper presented by Silas Mnyiri Mutia Kenya’s Minister of Water and Irrigation in 2010 witnessed as the damming of Gibe III does not have a negative impact on Kenya and Lake Turkana except positively affects the two countries’ relations through power interconnection (Mutia, 2010). On 23 February 2014, Christopher Chita Kenyan Ambassador to Ethiopia also disclosed that Kenya agreed to import 400MW power from Ethiopia by 2016 (ETV, 23 February 2014). In short Kenya’s position on Gibe III Dam has changed from opposing into policy of sharing the fruit of the dam.

Furthermore, Alemayehu Tegenu Minister of Water and Energy attested the above fact. He explained the Gibe III project as an additional area where the two countries work cooperatively. Of course he did not want to deny the existence of obstacles that held back the project from finalization. Among other things, the power interconnection project has been slowed due to financial and other problems. Parallel to Gibe III, which is a long term project, Alamayehu disclosed that in its short term Ethiopia planned to export 100MW electric power to the Kenyan Moyale town, which witnesses the growth and practicality of agreements.

Besides economic and diplomatic bonds, the two states have been working cooperatively in security area too. Regarding security, their relation can be expressed as cordial with few exceptions. Among the few cases of misunderstandings; one is that Kenya has been accused of providing shelter for Ethiopia’s insurgents in its northern part. The other is a recurrent clash between bordering communities (MoI, 2002). Another factor that requires attention is the refugee issues. Ethiopian refugees counted in ten thousand reside in Kenya and also use Kenya as a transit state (Woldesilase, 2010). According to Woodward (2003:118) “Refugees may have their own agendas with regard to their countries of origin and they may seek to pursue these from the relative safety of their sanctuaries.” For instance refugee centers in Kenya serve as one recruiting center for OLF (Woldesilase, 2010). This fact necessitates the two countries to work jointly on issues of refugees as part of the larger peace and stability policy between them.

Beyond bilateral relations the two states are working amicably on regional matters like searching solution for Somalia’s problem, Terrorism, Soudan-SPLA by their own initiatives and under auspices of IGAD (Woldesilase, 2010). In general state-to-state alliance is cordial. Relations focused on specific purpose are replaced by multipurpose alliances. Furthermore, the two countries’ alliances exhibit transformation, from alliance against a common threat into utility driven alliance formations.
Ethiopia–Djibouti’s alliance formations
Ethiopia-Djibouti alliances until May 1991

Ethiopia-Djibouti’s state-to-state relation began when Ethiopia officially extended its recognition to Djibouti on 26 June 1977 (Hassan, 2003). In fact, the Ethio-Djibouti connections go back to the date the latter was under French colony. For instance, in 1975 Ethiopia expressed its support for the independent Djibouti at OAU meeting in Kampala. Beyond support for independent Djibouti, Chairman Mengistu underlined that “…Ethiopia will oppose any annexation of Djibouti by any country” (Both, 2004: 136). Ethiopia was suspicious about Djibouti that the latter might unite with Somalia, which would leave Ethiopia prey to Somalia. So, among other things Ethiopia found extending recognition to Djibouti as a better option to protect its interest over Djibouti (Hassan, 2003). The study conducted by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1984 came with a case that could strengthen the above suspicion. Accordingly, the study recalled the fall of Djibouti under pro-Somalia government during the Ogaden War (MoFA, 1984). During the Ogaden war the Front for Liberation of Somali Coast (FLCS) party led Djibouti’s regime openly offered its support to Somalia. The support was evident when Somalia’s invading army secured training camps from Djibouti along Ethiopia’s border (Legum & Lee, 1979). Railway connection was obstructed, and Ethiopia’s access to the sea via Port Djibouti was impossible. In post Ogaden war FLCS was overthrown from power, but it did not cause quick recommencement in their relations (MoFA, 1984).

The two countries resumed their relation in 1981. In 1981 President Gouled Aptidon had a week state visit to Ethiopia. The visit was accompanied by bilateral treaty. Chairman Mengistu and President Aptidon signed bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that will stay for ten years. The bilateral treaty identified cooperation areas like trade, port, transport, cultural, and social spheres (MoFA, 1988). However, they signed the treaty, both kept on their clandestine support to one another’s dissidents. Djibouti pursued its support to EPLF, whereas Ethiopia supported Anti-Djibouti rebel headed by Aden Robleh. Contrary to the clandestine subversions, their diplomatic and trade relations were intact (Hassan, 2003).

Beyond fear of Somalia, Ethiopia’s alliance with Djibouti had a certain element of sovereignty claim over Djibouti. The justification for this argument is the claims expressed by successive Ethiopian regimes over Djibouti (Medhane, 2004; Hassan, 2003). To mention a few of them, Emperor Hailesilase in 1968 openly stated that Djibouti is part of Ethiopia (Hassan, 2003). Moreover, the Derg also assumed strengthening relation with Djibouti as a stepping-stone for the dreamt unification. Accordingly, “…creating strong attachment and in long run to realize unity of the two based on consensus …in that regard we should not consider Djibouti as foreign state rather we must consider Djibouti as one family” (MoFA, 1984). To offset such kind of Ethiopia’s pressures, Djibouti tightened its ties with French and Ethiopian dissidents (Hassan, 2003).

However, Djibouti remained a bone of contention between Ethiopia and Somalia, but Djibouti facilitated Ethio-Somalia agreement. Djibouti facilitated discussion between Ethiopia and Somalia at the 1988 Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and Disaster (IGADD) Summit. Exploiting the good office of Djibouti the two states reached an agreement in 1988. So, both agreed to stop the support they offered to one other’s dissidents (Woodward, 2003).

Throughout the Derg especially when Assab and Massawa ports or road to them fell under the EPLF and TPLF, the only lifeline for the government of Ethiopia was port Djibouti (Hassan, 2003). Put differently, the Derg period Ethio-Djibouti’s alliance formation was informed by common security threat (Somalia) and partly welfare driven alliances. The other side of their relations was explained by state to insurgent alliances. So the then their alliance track record was mixed.
**Post-1991 Ethio-Djibouti relations**

Ethiopia and Djibouti’s relation continued after the fall of the Derg. In 1993 Ethiopia and Djibouti renewed the previous Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which confirmed the resumption of their relations in post-Derg (Amare, 1996). However, they renewed the 1981 bilateral treaty in 1993, the Ethio-Djibouti alliance in post-Derg was not strong till the break out of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrea war. The chief reason for that was Ethiopia used Assab port for free as per the 1991 and 1993 of Ethio-Eritrea treaties (Bizuneh, 2005). The Ethio-Eritrean treaties of cooperation literally left Djibouti for economic loss. Ethiopia’s import and export goods got their way to and from the sea through Assab and Massawa. Pre-1998 Ethio-Djibouti relations had rivalry posture. Djibouti engaged in support of anti-Ethiopia and Eritrea forces, and the latter two supported the Afar insurgent groups against Djibouti. But later on all the three quit their support to the Afar insurgent group which had a long term plan to create the state of Afar, which is a blow for three of them (Kassahun, 2013; Hassan, 2003).

After the outbreak of Ethio-Eritrea war, Ethiopia-Djibouti relation has shown substantial improvements in trade, transportation and port use. The war forced Ethiopia to rely on Port Djibouti (Kassahun, 2013). According to studies done by Ethiopian Economic Association that covered 2003-2007 Ethiopia’s export to its neighbors and Africa at large exhibited certain progress. Africa consumed 14% of Ethiopia’s total export in the mentioned period. Out of the Africa’s share of Ethiopia’s export, Djibouti and Somalia took 2/3 of it (Kibre, 2008). This is an indicator that witnesses the strength of economic ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Furthermore, the two countries work on addressing issues of contraband, arm smugglings, insecurity and immigration. To alleviate such matters the two countries signed treaties and consequently established the Border Administrations Commission. With the objective of mitigating the aforementioned problems, the Ethiopia-Djibouti Border Commission has been working cooperatively in exchange of information and taking coordinated measures along the borders (MoFA, January 2007). Besides the internal insecurities along common borders, the two states have common external security threat, which is Eritrea. Therefore, they signed the Common Defense Protocol on 2 December 1999. The agreement was chiefly signed in focus of Eritrea, which is a common threat to their security (Berouk, 2011; Genene, 2004). In addition to the 1999 Common Defense Protocol, Djibouti showed its alliance with Ethiopia in acceding to the Sana’a Forum in 2002 with similar objective (Tafesse, 2011; Berouk, 2012). As stated elsewhere, treaties often become meaningless in particular in military areas. For instance, Ethiopia and Eritrea till mid-2000 were at war, and also Djibouti and Eritrea in 2008/09 had a minor border skirmish (Berouk, 2012; Woldesilase, 2010) but we could not see a single situation that confirmed these states stood together against a common enemy militarily.

Ethiopia and Djibouti’s policies on the Horn of Africa often suffered from conflicting interests. Among these contradictions one is directly connected with pacifying and consequently establishing the government of Somalia. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, both states labored a lot in a manner that destroyed one another’s effort of brokering the peace of Somalia. Their divergent economic interests chiefly inform their differences. Especially Djibouti fears that pro-Ethiopia Mogadishu will open its ports to Ethiopia, which in turn puts Djibouti’s benefit from the port into question. It is known that Djibouti derives more than 85% of its revenue from Ethiopia’s import and export goods (Kibre, 2008). According to 2002 Ethiopia’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy document, Ethiopia has an intention to use Somalia’s ports. But such intention depends on peace of Somalia (MoI, 2002). One can infer from the aforementioned Ethiopia’s policy document that Djibouti’s fear was not baseless. So its effort to establish pro-Djibouti Mogadishu regime is driven by its economic interest over Ethiopia. This in turn puts Ethiopia and Djibouti in competition to get Somalia by their sides that is a source of their conflicts.
However contradictory their regional policies are, Ethiopia and Djibouti exhibit some progress in different spheres in addition to road, railway, port, trade and investment. Since 5 October 2011 Ethiopia has started to sell power (50MW) to Djibouti. In fact Ethiopia has a plan to raise the power export to 65MW. According to Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation’s explanation, the power export to Djibouti is part of 2005 East African Power Pool agreement (Ethiopian Herald October 6, 2011). Indeed the power export relatively helps Ethiopia to offset its deficit incurred due to use of Port Djibouti. In addition to electric power, Ethiopia provides Djibouti with free water, which is another fertile area to diversify their ties.

To sum up, the Ethio-Djibouti relations in pre 1998 were characterized by suspicion, subversive actions, nonobservation of treaties, and inconsistent economic ties. On the other hand, the post 1998 political, economic and cross-border security ties have registered significant successes. Largely Ethiopia-Djibouti relations have shown change and continuity, but recent developments would better explained by Utility Alliance Formations Theory.

**Ethiopia-Eritrea relations**

Eritrea got de facto and de jure independent in 1991 and 1993 respectively (Clapham, 2007). Between 1991 and 1998 the Ethiopia-Eritrea relation was friendly. In fact, there were differences especially as of 1995/96 onwards (Cliffe, 1999). On the whole Ethiopia-Eritrea relations were cordial. In those cordial years, the two countries signed several treaties. For instance, in July 1993 the two states signed the Cooperation and Friendship accord. Based on this agreement several specific agreements were entered (Bizuneh, 2005). Defense Pact was part of the agreement (Berouk, 2011). According to Alem’s (2000) claim, Ethiopia transferred different war machineries to Eritrea during the Eritrea-Yemen war of 1995/96 as part of the military pact. Moreover, in 1995 following Sudan’s subversive act against the sovereignty of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, the three formed containment front against Khartoum under the blessing of USA (Berouk, 2011; Cliffe,1999). In fact Ethiopia–Eritrea’s relations before 1998 was beyond state-to-state relations, rather they acted as one country. Of course Eritrea benefited a lot from that ‘alliance’. Leenco (2003: 369) summed the consequent unbalanced relations as follows, “...in the period prior to 1998 ...the Eritreans were then behaving like Ethiopia’s co-rulers,’ of course, a clear portrayal of the latter as the surrogate of the former.”

The Ethio-Eritrea relation up until May 1998 did not mean free of obstacles. Even the 1993 Cooperation and Friendship agreement remained a bone of contention. Some of the challenges encountered to effect the agreement were: divergent taxation policies, issues of tariffs, currency, and investment codes were few of them. These problems required the two countries to sit for another round agreement. Thus, on 27 September 1995 they revised the 1993 agreement that resulted in harmonization of some of conflicting policies (Bizuneh, 2005).

However they made certain adjustments to the agreement, it did not resolve the problems. Issues like trade imbalances and especially the unilateral issuance of currency ‘Nakifa’ by Eritrea in 1997 against the agreement were at the core of their conflicts. The introduction of Nakifa was catalyst to the hardening of their conflict. Introduction of ‘Nakifa’ put Ethiopia under urgency to issue new currency ‘Birr’ which was realized in November 1997 with certain modification in the old one. Consequent to the introduction of new currencies, Ethiopia refused the Eritrea’s proposal of equal exchange value of Nakifa with Birr. Rather Ethiopia demanded the trade between them should be in dollar. Moreover, Ethiopia blamed Eritrea, which exported Ethiopian coffee that was agreed only for local consumption in Eritrea. In between Ethiopia stopped to use Assab Refinery mentioning the cost ineffectiveness of refining crude oil (Bizuneh, 2005). In short, the concealed differences started to unearth. These were some of the issues that led to the war from economic point.
The aforementioned rough relations and many other factors resulted in the 1998 Badme war. The war broke out when Eritrea seized Badme on 6 May 1998. Surprisingly, Badme was under Ethiopia’s administration till 6 May 1998. Leenco (2003: 374) noted as Badme was under Ethiopia, though his argument seemed that the territory belongs to Eritrea. He put it in the following manner: “It is also clear that the TPLF continued to administer the said area... until May 1998.” Besides, the 34th Ordinary OAU Summit in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso held from 8 to 10 June 1998, passed a decision that seemed to acknowledge Badme for Ethiopia. The Summit ordered Eritrea to pull off its army from Badme and its environs to the territory; its army was before 6 May 1998. But Eritrea rejected to accept that (Leenco, 2003).

Six days after Badme’s invasion, on 13 May 1998 the Ethiopian Council of Ministers ordered Immediate and Unconditional evacuation of Eritrea’s forces from Badme (Addis Zaman 57th(203) 1998). Ten months later to the Council’s order, Ethiopia took the attack to free the claimed territory and secured Badme on 27 February 1999 and recovered other areas bit by bit. Towards the end of May 2000 Ethiopia got clear victory over Eritrea (Leenco, 2003). But the victory was won with huge causalities (HRW, Vol.15. No. 3 (A) 2003). The war caused displacement and deportation of people in both sides (Berouk, 2011; Abbink, 2003; Leenco, 2003). Besides, significant land parallel to the battle fields were out of reach of people and cattle due to planted mines (Yesuf, 2010) which is another headache.

As a marker of ending the war on 18 June 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea signed ceasefire and deployment of peacekeeping force, United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) (ACHEE, 18 June 2000). Following it, on 12 December 2000 in Algiers, both agreed to settle their disagreement via arbitration- Boundary Commission and Claims Commission (Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia to Establish Boundary Commission, 12 December 2000). Based on the agreement the boundary commission gave its final verdict in April 2002. Following the Commission’s decision, both Ethiopia and Eritrea announced as they won Badme (Leenco, 2003). As a result of disagreement over interpretation of the Commissions’ decision, border demarcation has not been tried yet.

During the war and post war both of them have been busy to support one others’ opponents (Kassahun, 2013; Dawit, 2009; Sadik, 2007; Abbink, 2003). In the Proxy war Ethiopia and Eritrea followed more or less similar strategies. It is claimed that Ethiopia followed two approaches. The first strategy is, working with insurgents, which are “entirely set up by Ethiopia. Among these...the Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front ... and the Afar Red Sea Democratic Front (founded in1998).” The other strategy is backing “those already existing...” insurgents such as “...the ELF and its various faction ... Kunama movement, Afar movement, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) (Abbink, 2003:413). Among other things, Ethiopia allowed Eritrean dissidents to host meeting in Addis Ababa. Accordingly, in September-October 2002 Eritrean oppositions held a conference in Addis Ababa that intended to establish a transitional government that would take office after step down of Issayas (Addis Zaman, 62nd Year (33) 2003). According to Addis Zaman and Abbink, the Addis Ababa Conference gave birth to Eritrean National Alliance (ENA). The ENA constituted 13 groups. The hosting of the ENA Conference in Addis Ababa is an indicator for Ethiopia’s engagement in a proxy war with Eritrea.

Similarly Eritrea’s proxy war had two faces; one is working with existing anti-Ethiopia’s forces as well as Somali warlords. The groups in this category include OLF and ONLF, which work on Ethiopian soil, and Somali Islamists based in Somali (Kassahun, 2013; Abbink, 2003), and recently Arbegnoch Ginbot 7(ESAT, 2015). For instance, in the 2006 war between the joint Ethiopia-TFG of Somalia forces and UIC, the Eritrean support had a mixed track record. On one hand Eritrea offered training, shipped arms to UIC, on other hand deployed its troops to fight its archrival, Ethiopia, inside Somalia (Weldesilase, 2010; Sadik, 2007). UNs Security Council’s 2009 sanction
confirms the above claim. The Security Council among other things passed a Resolution 1907 (2009) against Eritrea on 23 December 2009 due to the fact that Eritrea supports terrorists and anti-TFG groups and in general for its action of destabilizing Horn of Africa (SC Resolution 1907 (2009)). In addition to direct and proxy wars, Ethiopia in collaboration with Sudan and Yemen opened a diplomatic front against Eritrea, the Sana’a Forum of 2002. As discussed in this study, the primary objective of the forum is to contain the Eritrea’s aggression.

To sum up, between 1991 and 1998 the Ethio-Eritrea alliance was driven by objectives of common welfare (Utility Theory of Alliance). After mid 1998 onwards their alliance formation was informed by war and consequent subversive activities. The direct war between Ethiopia and Eritrea made the two states to be busy in establishing alliances with one another’s insurgent and neighboring states, which were in conflict with the other. In short, the Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance formation has changed from utility informed alliance into balance of threat that has come from one another.

**Conclusion**

States in the Horn of Africa showed a new cooperative political stance in the early 1990s. Ethiopia’s alliances with Sudan and Eritrea were cordial in early 1990s, but started to go down as of the mid 1990s with Sudan and in 1998 with Eritrea. Indeed, Ethiopia-Djibouti’s alliance was not cordial in the mentioned period. However, Ethiopia’s alliances with Sudan and Djibouti except Eritrea have shown improvement as of late 1990s. Its alliance formation with these states has mostly been transforming from balance against threat into utility driven cooperation. For instance, in post-1998 Ethiopia-Sudan alliances have resulted in cooperation in the fields of energy, port, trade and security. Surprisingly, their relations in pre-1998 were characterized by state to insurgent alliances than state to state. Similarly, pre-1998 Ethiopia-Djibouti alliances were shaky. In the mentioned time, Ethiopia-Djibouti relations were limited to trade, port and transportation. Even those limited relations were below the expected level. The reasons for that were: Ethiopia preferred Assab port to port Djibouti and also both pursued in their support of one another’s insurgent group. Comparatively, in post-1998, due to Ethiopia-Eritrea war, Ethiopia-Djibouti alliances have gathered momentum. They are connected in trade, investment, port, transportation, security, recently also in hydropower and water supply.

Furthermore, Ethiopia-Somalia’s relations have been growing from time to time. In the post-2004 their relations in particular in areas of security and diplomacy have shown progress. Besides the state-to-state relations, Ethiopia works with stable Somalia regions like Somaliland and Puntland. Trade, port and transportation, in particular with Somaliland, accompany Ethiopia’s alliance, in addition to cross border security matters. By and large Ethiopia-neighbors’ relations are characterized by cordial and cooperation except with Eritrea. The post-1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea relations are negative. Their relations are characterized by state to insurgent alliances than the other way round.

To put niftily, Ethiopia’s alliance formations with its neighbors have exhibited dynamism. In pre-1998 mostly its alliances with neighbors were dominantly bilateral and specific purpose. Those relations were mainly established against common security threat. Even those alliances that focus on common threat uniquely took state to state and also state to insurgent forms. Alliances made around trade, port and communications were mainly short of effect except Ethiopia-Eritrea. Whereas, the post 1998 alliances primarily driven by common welfare except Ethiopia with Eritrea and also Ethiopia with Somalia in which security threat is still central. Besides, alliances have been transforming from bilateral into multilateral, and from specific purpose into multipurpose alliances. Sana’a Forum and East African Power Pool are the two showcases. In post-1998 Ethiopia’s informal alliances with neighboring insurgents is non-existent except Eritrean. By and large the post-1998 Ethiopia-neighbor states alliance formations have been driven by common
welfare (Utility Alliance formation theory) rather than alliances which purely against military threat (Balance of Threat theory) except with Eritrea. In short, Ethiopia-neighboring states alliances have taken state to state instead of state to insurgent alliance formations except Eritrea.
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The Dynamics Of Security Threats To The Horn States: Implications For “Prisoners Of Geography”

Yohannes Tekalign Beza

Abstract

The Horn of Africa is considered as one of perhaps the most insecure regions in the world as a result of intra-and-inter states conflicts that have been fought for decades in almost all the region’s states and consumed millions of lives and material resources. Causes of conflict and insecurities to the Horn of Africa states and/or regimes cut across the three major sources of conflict formations, i.e. national, regional, and international. The predominantly internal sources of conflicts in the region traverse through what have been left as colonial legacies (such as arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries and inherited embryonic state institutions and structures) and the post-independence years’ political and economic malaises (such as leaders’ autocratic nature, inappropriate economic policies, and unfair distribution of economic wealth of the state; ‘politics of domination and exclusion’; weak center-periphery relations; and frequent droughts and famines). These sources of intra-states conflicts and insecurities in the Horn easily acquire regional current due to historical and ethno-cultural factors and the culture of mutual interference of states to each other’s affairs in the region, which is dictated either by each government’s desire of dealing with its own internal conflicts or by the needs to promote the vested interests of external powers. The interplay between national and regional sources of conflicts and insecurities has therefore created fissures for the interventionism of external forces, which ultimately makes the Horn of Africa region an epicenter where the national and global security threats are met. Such dynamics web of security threats to the Horn of Africa states and its implications for the Horn ‘prisoners of geography’ – landlocked states – is missed in the existing literature due to that research works on the subject fall either into the internal or external verities of security threats and hence are short of looking at their interplay and its effects on the Horn of Africa landlocked states – Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda. The Copenhagen School’s basic theoretical postulates are used to examine how the predominant internal nature of security threats to the Horn states mutate into and assumes regional dimension to become a constraint for various dimensions of landlocked states’ security.

Introduction

The Horn of Africa sub-region is the most conflict-ridden region in the world as a result of intra-and-inter states conflicts that have been waged for decades. The prolonged civil wars that lasted for decades consuming human lives and resources were fought in Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda. Since 1991, Somalia has ceased to exist as a state with central government to ensure law and order and has become a living example of Hobbesian condition of war of each against all, where competing warlords/clan factions started to fight each other to control lucrative business areas. Djibouti once considered as ‘an island of stability in a sea of regional conflicts’ has been threatened by armed struggle in the early 1990s. Kenya that has relatively been considered as peaceful and stable has been ravaged by electoral violence in 2007, as the contested result of the 2005 Ethiopian election produced similar result. The Horn has also been threatened by inter-states wars and

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disputes of varying intensity. The two high intensity wars were fought between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-8 and Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998-2000. Inter-state disputes between Kenya and Somalia in 1964-7, Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1960s, Djibouti and Eritrea in 2008, and recently South Sudan and Sudan also led to confrontations.

The sources of almost all threats to states and/or regimes in the Horn are mainly internal. These include, among others: arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries that creates and galvanizes communal and ethnic fissures and ultimately makes socio-political cohesion difficult; colonially inherited state institutions and structures that did not mirror the interests, customs and values or the diversity of the society denied states and regimes in powers legitimacy; lack of public support of regimes as a result of ‘politics of domination and exclusion’ and unfair distribution of economic wealth; the autocratic nature of leaders and their inappropriate economic policies that have often been proven failed to meet the needs of the public; weak center-periphery relations due to resistance to incorporate and inability of the state extending its institutions and agents that resulted in marginalization of the latter; and droughts and famines that have frequently affected large population in the region and challenged states’ capacity to give remedy timely. A mixture of these factors lies at the heart of intra-states conflicts and insecurity of states and/or regimes in the Horn region. Owing to colonial boundaries that negate ethno-linguistic criteria that is reinforced by the culture of mutual interference of states in each other internal affairs in the region, intra-states conflicts in the region spill over into neighboring states and assume regional dynamics.

The mutual intervention of states in the internal affairs of each other by providing arms and other forms of assistance to insurgents across their borders is dictated either by each government’s desire of dealing with its own internal conflicts by supporting insurgents in neighboring states or needs to promote the vested interests or goals of external powers, regional and global. External power’s involvement therefore augmented the internal threats and fissures that exist within the boundaries of states in the region. This paper argues that internal threats that emanated from within the states in the Horn and transcended to the neighboring states and further fueled by external interventions implied negative ramifications on landlocked states’ search for reliable access to the sea and international markets. In other words, the interplay between internal and external threats to states and regimes in the Horn would mean negative repercussions on landlocked states’ dependable access to the sea. Consequently, three basic questions are set to be responded to in this paper: (1) How did the dynamics of security threats at play in the region constrain landlocked states’ dependable access to the sea? (2) What aspect of these states’ security is challenged by geographic isolation from the waters of the seas and oceans? (3) How strong are individual states’ strategic developmental initiatives (i.e. dam construction, oil to electricity exchange) and regional actors’ collective security actions under IGAD in overcoming the challenges posed?

The Horn of Africa is an elusive term because of different explanations of scholars of what it constitutes. For instance, Woodward (2003) defines the Horn as it emerges out from the concern of relations of states that embraces Ethiopia and Somalia and later on Sudan. Francis (1977) considers states of the Horn that share borders with the Red Sea and its outlet to the Gulf of Aden including Ethiopia (plus now Eritrea), Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan. Mesfin (1999) takes physical contact on the basis of boundaries and cross-border settlement of population with similar identity markers and categorizes states in the Horn into principal (such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia) and adjacent or peripheral (such as Sudan, Uganda and Kenya). He also considers Ethiopia as the ‘Core’ state in the region owing to the fact that it touches almost all states and provides its waters with varying degree for its neighbors and as a result of which it is considered as the veritable water tower of the region. For the purpose of this paper, the Horn of Africa comprises Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda that are members of the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD). This is due to that these states share certain characteristics and face similar problems and each of these state’s security cannot be conceived separately as it is elucidated in the discussion made under section three.

Hausmann’s (2001) supporting argument to this paper is that being landlocked as a geographic attribute of location vis-à-vis the sea makes landlocked state ‘prisoners of geography’. This is despite that he further claims other geographic factors such as latitude and attitude, and patterns of population settlement have similar effects for states. This paper attempts to show the magnitude of constraint the security dynamics at play in the Horn of Africa posed on the region’s landlocked states or in Hausmann terms ‘prisoners of geography’ search for secured access to and from the sea with its various security implications.

A Brief theoretical discussion

Security is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1956: 184). This is not to mean that the concept lacks consensus over its meaning that generally means ‘freedom from threats to core [or cherished] values for both individuals and groups.’ But the contestation is rather on what threats to whose values (i.e. individual, national or international) should accord primacy and protected (Baylis, 2001: 254). For (neo)-realists, security has long been conceived in the narrow remit of state (or national) security that considered the state as the main referent object of security assuming that if it is secure and its citizens will be secured ultimately. And the principal threat to state security is basically considered to be military in nature and from other states providing that the anarchic international system lacks supra-state authority for reconciles and mediates conflicting interests of states (Caldwell and Williams, 2012).

This state-centric and military-focused notion of security that dominated the discourse of security studies during the Cold War and revived after the 9/11 incident as part of ‘War on Terror’ has been challenged in the 1990s. This was due to its weakness both to embrace emerging security threats beyond the military to the economic, societal and environmental sectors and to open space such as for societies and individuals as alternate security referent objects to the state (Hough, 2013). And the recognition that states as the primary purveyors of security for their citizens, are also potential sources of threat for their own citizen particularly of those developing states (Acharya, 1997; Ayoob, 1995).

In response to the newly emerging security concerns, attempts to conceptualize security in the post-Cold War years have produced a galore of literature that amounts to what Baldwin (1997: 1) calls “something of a cottage industry” and have stretched the notion of security in two opposite directions – on account to issues to be included on the security agenda, ‘broadening’ and with respect to subject or referent object of security, ‘extending’ (Wyn Jones, 1999). The first direction that is taken by the so-called the Copenhagen School and centered around the scholarly works of Buzan (1991) and Buzan et al., (1998), broadened the ambit of security to include threats emanating from the economic, societal and environmental sectors, but typically framed in relation to human collectivities organized within the state. The move therefore takes the state as the main referent object of security despite that a wide range of possibilities for inclusion of nonmilitary threats across sectors. The second direction represented by the so called Critical School probes the shift of referent object of security particularly from the state to individuals – human security (Krause and Williams, 1997). This is despite the fact that human security is ‘unavoidably and inextricably about the state’ (Krause, 2007: 6).

State security can be dissected into sectors. Buzan (1991: 38) argues that the security of human collectivities organized within the state can be seen along with five major sectors – each of which has its own focal point and way of ordering priorities, but are chained strongly in a web.
Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them their legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom...

This paper takes the state as the main referent and locus of security. State or national security is also understood as ‘the ability of states to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity’ (Buzan, 1991: 107) or ‘absence of threats to their major values’ (Nye, 2005: 223) including their territorial integrity and sovereignty (polito-military security), population and culture (societal security) and economic prosperity (economic security) (Grizold, 1994; Wyllie, 2008).

Furthermore, regional security relations ‘where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other’ (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 43), is important in this paper. Regional security tightly links with the notion that security is relational and that regional security complex is to mean a set of states whose main security concerns mainly of political, military, environmental and societal are closely related and therefore cannot be realistically understood alone (Buzan and Waever, 2003). A regional security complex is predicated essentially on the ‘distribution of power and the ‘durable patterns of amity and enmity relations’ among the principle units’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 13) – that is primarily shaped by territorial disputes, cross-border ethnic distribution, ideological orientations, suspicion and fear, and sustained historical links of genuine friendship of support or protection (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Despite all these are shaped in the region through “a mixture of history, politics and material conditions” they provided fertile ground for the global powers’ “options for, and consequences of, projecting their influences and rivalries into the rest of the system” (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 47).

The Horn of Africa is a regional security complex (Berouk, 2011; Redie, 2013). It has been ravaged by intractable intra-and-inter states conflicts whose security implication is that they have staged the region the most insecure place in the world (Redie, 2013). Regional security relations in the Horn has typically been characterised by states and regimes that have long begged each other’s security – a condition that has for long been mediated by a nexus of historical and ethno-cultural factors and the interventionism of external regional and international forces (Berouk Cliffe, 1999;2011; Redie, 2013). Indeed, the quest for dependable access to and from the sea of the Horn landlocked states depends mainly on the regional security complex that has characterized these states’ security relations in the region. The Copenhagen School’s national (or state) security along with sector and regional security complex are relevant theoretical postulates for this work. This is mainly because: first, the former helps to analyze various sources of conflict and insecurity across sectors; and secondly, the later helps to examine how the internally driven conflicts within individual states in the Horn region easily acquired regional web and become regionalized. These two approaches are thus essential to seize various sources of conflict formation, the entangled nature of intra-and-inter states conflicts and insecurities in the Horn states, and based on which to assess its various security implications for the Horn of Africa ‘prisoners of geography’.

The dynamics of security threats to the Horn of Africa states
The major issue which is to be discussed in this topic is in line with the argument that the major security threats in the Horn are predominantly internal threats, however, these threats acquire regional current due to a nexus of historical and ethno-cultural factors and the interventionism of external forces, which certainly mitigate against the various security dimensions of the Horn landlocked states in their search for secured access to and from the sea.
One of the residues of colonialism that is important to comprehend where threats to states in the Horn lie is the arbitrarily drawn colonial boundaries. The authors of Africa’s boundaries drew them in accordance with their interests short of human factors and thus effected the curving up of groups having similar identity markers into different parts. And laid the basis at which interstate conflicts emerged in the postcolonial Africa states (Boyd, 1979; Ikome, 2012). The artificial borders that bisected identity groups apart posed threats to states as they gave rise to groups claiming national self-determination, separatist tendencies and of states irredentist policy (Boyd, 1979). In the Horn, for instance, colonial boundaries have divided Somali people into five: British, Italian and French Somaliland, and Ethiopia and Kenya (Bereket, 2003; Bahru, 2006). It was on this ethnic rationale that Somali’s irredentist claims over Somali settled areas in Ethiopia and Kenya has flourished and frequently led to conflicts after independence between Ethiopia and Somalia, and Kenya and Somalia (Boyd, 1979; Kidane, 2011). Bereket (2003) also argues that Eritrean quest for self- determination/secession and the prolonged war fought to that effect was on colonial borders, as border issues caused full scale war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998 after Eritrea secession (Kidane, 2011). Despite borders issues in both cases served as proximate causes, the root causes of which appeared to be in the failure of Ethiopia’s imperial and Derg regimes addressing Eritrean grievances (Keller, 2004) and the political economy and psychology of the leadership in the latter case (Bereket, 2003; Healy, 2008).

Besides, poorly demarcated borders along Uganda and Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan, Kenya and Sudan over Elemi triangle and South Sudan and Sudan though currently at dormant stage remain potent sources of conflicts given the highly prized resources found across borders (such as iron ore, copper, uranium and platinum (Okumu, 2010) and their conduit nature of internal conflicts spill over to neighboring states (Ikome, 2012; Kidane, 2011). The borders are also being used for “illegal cross-border activities that threaten national sovereignty and destabilize regional politics” (Okumu, 2010:270). Besides, IKome (2012) argues that increasing the size of population escorted by shrinking resources and intense migration would cast prospect of borders conflicts.

The inherited colonial state structures that disrupted the organic nation building process in Africa and the different colonial rules imposed on African are also variables explaining where threats to states in Africa are located. The replacement of indigenous institutions and local values with modern ones and the undermining of African traditional authority patterns through the use of chiefs for colonial duties impeded the natural process of state formation in Africa (Hrituleac, 2011). Unlike European nation states that were established after a long process through “attempts by peoples or their leaders to give a nationality or group a territory that it could control for itself” (Vasquez cited in Alexander, 2003: 628), African states were cobbled together by colonial powers via “disrupting the existing economic and social relationships and creating new political units that cut across ethnic/ religious boundaries” (Degu, 2002: 97). This hindered development and left legacies of corruption & political instability in Africa (Hrituleac, 2011).

Moreover, colonial powers did not impose their rules evenly on African communities. Different administrative rules had been imposed on African in such a way that favor some but marginalize others. This later sow its seeds for ethnic cleavages between groups to flourish and ultimately sets in motion and consolidated north-south dichotomy such as in Sudan and Somalia (Alexander, 2003). Medhane (1999) also argues that it was Italians distortion of Eritrean identity and replacing it by new/false identity that later contributed to the subsequent conflicts in Ethiopia, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea after the latter seceded from the former. The French also played off Issa ethnic group over Afar in Djibouti (Woodward, 2003). Zolberg cited in Degu (2002:97) sums up this as follows:

The dualism of Sudan (between the Arab north and the rest of Sudan) was crystallized
by the British colonial policies... In Uganda, the Buganda enjoyed an extraordinary au-
nonomous status and built up an enormous lead in entry into privileged social status,
through education and economic change. In Ethiopia, the Italian occupation exacer-
bated center-periphery tension after the war. Italians exploited ethnic antagonisms to
weaken the Ethiopians’ resistance and generally favored the Muslim over the Coptic
Christian. First the Italian and then the British colonial powers were responsible for
the creation of Eritrea as a separate political entity (on the creation of ethnic/regional
hierarchies in these countries).

African leaders failed to create socioeconomically cohesive and politically viable states using the
opportunity created after independence, which has contributed to the inherited colonial problems
to sustain and new to generate (Crummey, 2003). Despite diverse in their history and levels of
economic and political development, the Horn states have faced challenges after independence.
The first is inappropriate developmental policies most of the Horn states pursued failed to meet
the needs and expectations of their citizens (Degu, 2002; Medhane, 2004). Berouk (2011:13) explains
why developmental policies failed to meet the demands and interests of the people as follows:

Economic activities are strongly skewed towards primary commodities for export,
which are subject to the whims of the fluctuating prices of the international commodity
markets. Economic activities are also hampered by external dependence, inadequate
infrastructure, shortage of capital, shortage of skilled labor and misguided develop-
ment policies. Compounding this, the state is unable to provide adequate health and
education services or to remedy mass unemployment, which partly results from unsus-
tainably high population growth.

Political elites across the Horn were also unable to connect the center with the periphery by
stretching agents and institutions of the state. This has resulted in socioeconomic and political
marginalization of the latter and the ensuing erosion of the legitimacy of the center (Crummey,
2003; Dias, 2013). Lack of inclusiveness of the governance or what Bereket (2003) has rightly
called ‘the politics of domination and exclusion’ is also threat to states in the Horn. According
to Mkutu (ND), ‘governance in the Horn is dominated by manipulation of ethnicity, patronage
and a political culture of exclusion.’ The power of the state therefore is the center of conflict since
whoever control it assumed all resources and prerogatives of the state and in most cases, regimes
are autocracies relying on ethnic loyalties and military and security services, to which national
scarce resources have been devoted at the expense of developmental endeavors (Berouk, 2011).

Rhetoric aside, paucity of democracy is also challenge for peace in the Horn characterized by:
• Lack of governmental system based on the consent of and accountable to the people
  (Bereket, 2003);
• Lack of democratic accountability, representation in government structures and equitable
distribution of resources (Healy, 2008);
• Fault lines created in diversity management, uneven development and marginalization of
  ethnic groups, and ethnocratic nature of the state (Kidane, 2011);
• Governments’ failures to accommodate demands for reform measures and address the
  fragile livelihoods in the periphery (Dias, 2013); and
• Problems in most of the region’s leaders given their inordinate ambition and violation of
  human rights (Bereket, 2003).

Moreover, famines and droughts reinforced by scarcity of resources, rapid population growth,
and wars have often affected the Horn states (Kedane, 2011; Medhane, 2004). This coupled with
the inability of states’ to reach out to the periphery provide grounds for rebel movements and
weaponry to proliferate in the Horn and add insecurity (Dias, 2013). The constant movements
of pastoralists across borders in search of water and grazing land often led to conflicts among
pastoralists and with agrarian. The effects of famines and wars have triggered major dislocation across borders and generating huge number of refugees in the Horn (1,266,375 in 2012) mainly across Sudan-Ethiopia, Uganda-Sudan and Ethiopia-Somalia borders (Breouk, 2011; Dias, 2013). Woodward (2003: 3) claims that famine was a contributor to political instability and a reflection of it as “it helped bring down Haile Selassie in Ethiopia in 1974; it contributed similarly to the overthrow of Ga’afar el Nimeiri in Sudan in 1985; and it was intensified by struggle to overthrow Siad Barre in Somalia in 1991.”

The above internal sources of threats that emerged within the Horn states transcend their borders and assume regional dimension (Berouk, 2011; Cliffe, 1999; Healy, 2008). This is due to the intention of each regime dealing with its own internal conflicts by some degree of support for rebels across borders (Cliffe, 1999), or to promote the vested interests of external powers (Daniel, 1994). Or it is due to the fear that the presence of opposite system in the vicinity could endanger their security (Novati, 2009). This has prompted a pattern of ‘mutual intervention’ (Cliffe, 1999) and enhanced states’ rivalries and mutual suspicions (Berouk, 2011). This is the reason why “pursuing foreign (regional) policy through proxy forces in neighboring countries has been the ‘normal’ pattern of relations for decades” in the Horn (Healy, 2008: 39).

The Horn of Africa states often try to manipulate the weak links of each other to destabilize, which is mediated either by each government’s desire of dealing with its own internal conflicts by supporting insurgents in neighboring states or by the needs to promote the vested interests of external regional and international powers (Cliffe, 1999; Berouk, 2011). As a result, except Djibouti, all states have provided military assistance to insurgents in neighboring states. For instance, since 1998, Eritrea and Ethiopia have accessed support for rebel movements to destabilize each other (Medhane, 2004). Ethiopia had provided steady support to the SPLA as a counterpoint to Sudanese support for the EPLF dissident in Eritrea (Healy, 2008; Woodward, 2003). In the 1990s, Ethiopia and Eritrea provided military aids to the SPLA and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in reply to Sudan’s support for their rebels. In addition, Ethiopia’s rebels were supported by the Somali state before 1991 (Cliffe, 1999; Medhane, 2004; Kidane, 2011). The Shifta wars (1963-67) in Kenya’s Somali-inhabited areas were also supported by the Somali state meant to realize its irredentist policy. Ethiopian regimes reacted to the irredentist policy through aiding Somali’s rebel movements against the Somali state and presently through supporting the TFG against al Shebab-Hizbul Islamiya insurrection (Kidane, 2011). Moreover, Uganda’s support for the SPLA reciprocated by Sudan’s support for the Lord’s Resistance Army (Berouk, 2011; Healy, 2008). Kenya dissident groups were also accessed support from Uganda and the Sudan (Amare, 1996). Kenya also accused of sheltering Uganda’s rebels (Khadiagala, 1993).

The regional conflicts rooted in local politics with the Horn geo-strategic significance that relates to its proximity to the Red Sea and its outlet to the Gulf of Aden in addition to the Nile valley has provided reasons for external powers to be deeply involved and add insecurity for the Horn states (Mesfin, 1999; Woodward, 2003). The involvement of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (1945-1991) and the US after 9/11 under War on Terror greatly contributed to the incident of conflicts in the Horn. The US and the Soviet Union competition through proxies in the Horn making available military hardware for the Horn states’ for that purpose helped to sustain civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda (Keller, 1997; Makinda, 1982). It also caused interstate wars such as between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-8 (Mesfin, 1999; Woodward, 2003) and helped Amin’s dealing with the overly hostile Nyerere (Khadiagala, 1993). Besides, the emergence of Islam as a political ideology after the Cold War reignited the US to be deeply involved in the region. The seizure of power by the National Islamic Front in Sudan in 1989 and the aggressive policy it pursued meant to spread Islam via providing aids to Islamist movements in its neighboring states resulted in its isolation (Alexander, 2003; Medhane, 2004). In response, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda had pursued a common policy with the US support meant to contain the threat posed
This coupled with the bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1999, assassination attempt on Mubarek of Egypt in Addis Ababa supposedly supported by Sudan in 1995, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US galvanized these states’ aid to the SPLA and thus intensified the Sudanese civil war. Eritrea’s strong tie with and the assistance it provided to the Islamist forces with the US interest probed Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia (Medhane, 2004; Healy, 2008). The alliance of the Horn states with global agenda therefore translated regional conflicts rooted in local politics to global one.

The regional powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have also involved in the Horn (Lefebvre, 1996). Iran has become a close ally of Sudan due to Bashir’s support of Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Amare, 1996). Such relations helped Sudan to access Iranian support for the aggressive Islamist policy it pursued in the Horn (Medhane, 2004). This has provoked the alliance of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Israel and Uganda against Iran and Sudan (Amare, 1996). Egypt’s key concerns have been the use of Nile waters whose 86% volume originates in Ethiopia (Yacob, 2007). The unfettered access of the Nile waters at any cost has long been the policy of Egypt. This is the reason why “Eritrea secessionism was born, nurtured and brought to full maturity in Egypt” (Mesfin, 1999: 84) and Egypt has always backed anti-Ethiopian Somali’s factions (Kinfe, 2002; Medhane, 2002). Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq and Syria had also provided support either militarily or financially to the secessionists in Eritrea and to the cause of Somalia’s irredentist policy (Woodward, 2003). The concern of Israel vis-à-vis the Horn has always been preventing the Red Sea from falling an ‘Arab Lake’ thus safeguarding its access to the Indian Ocean (Lefebvre, 1996). Thus, Israel has created strong tie with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda and it assisted the SPLA (Woodward, 2003). Regional powers intervention in the Horn thus augmented conflicts that have already been set in motion.

The interplay between internal and external source of threats discussed above has ultimately generated intra-and-inter-states conflicts and:

• Brought Eritrea (24 May 1993) and South Sudan (9 July 2011) to the catalog of African states (as war-making leads to state-making) with ensuing result of the birth of Ethiopia and South Sudan as landlocked states (Dias, 2013);
• Contributed to state collapse as the Somali state ceased to exist with central government since 1991 (Bereket, 2003);
• Weaken states as the relapse into conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia compromised the state-building projects of the regime in the latter and between Sudan and South Sudan in contested areas across borders (Dias, 2013);
• Forced state reconfiguration as the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia adopted a federal system organized along ethnic lines in clear rupture with the past state building projects (ibid);
• Helped power sharing device to be used as a means to respond to ethnic grievances over power-sharing in Djibouti and Kenya (Bereket, 2013; Kidene, 2011).

Implications for “Prisoners Of Geography”
The dynamics of security threats (the tangled nature of internal and external security threats) certainly implied negative security implications in economic and politico-military terms for the Horn landlocked states in their search for dependable access to and from the sea. Ethiopia and Uganda in particular rely heavily on seaborne trade for their economic development (UNCTAD, 2013) and thus they should remain in good term with their main transit states: Djibouti and Kenya respectively. Heavy reliance on a single transit state has often exposed them for various economic barriers with substantive effects on their trade performance, economic growth and development. The first is that due to political and economic reasons transit states in the Horn often created trade barrier through increasing port service fees, sometimes unilaterally. For instance, Djibouti constantly increases port service fees on Ethiopia, which reportedly reached about US$ 3 million
The second economic burden relates to unnecessary transit traffic costs. Delays due to poor road and rail conditions and burdensome custom and clearance procedures are lengthy in the Horn. Because of such delay factors, container dwell times in East Africa (i.e. 12-15 days) are twice of the global practice (i.e. 7 days) with an extra day in ports costs more than US$35,000 for a 2,200-TEU (20-foot equivalent unit) vessel in 2006 (Foster and Briceño-Garmendi, 2010). Djankov et al (2006: 1) estimate time delay and trade inverse relations and they conclude that an extra “day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by at least 1%” on average or “each day is equivalent to a country distancing itself from its trade partners by 70 km on average.” The trade effect is even higher for time sensitive perishable agricultural goods whose additional day’s delay reduces a country’s relative exports of time-sensitive to time-insensitive agricultural goods by 6% (Djankov et al., 2006). Delays as a result of both ‘hard’ (road and rail) and ‘soft’ (administrative) infrastructure deficits are certainly jeopardize the Horn landlocked states’ trade by making their export goods uncompetitive and their imports expensive as far as the data presented in the table below are concerned.

### Table: 1 Competitiveness of landlocked states in the horn of Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>The Horn Landlocked Countries</th>
<th>Main Transit Ports</th>
<th>Time to Trade (in days)</th>
<th>Documents to Trade (in number)</th>
<th>Dwell-time (in days) Ports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Export 8 Import 11</td>
<td>Export 10 Import 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Export 10 Import 12</td>
<td>Export 12 Import 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Export 7 Import 10</td>
<td>Export 10 Import 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Besides, the Horn transit states intentionally creates delays for the region’s landlocked states export commodities at ports to take priority for their similar goods to enter the global marketplaces that require “just-in-time” delivery. For instance, transit Kenya often exploits Uganda’s dependency on Mombasa port to take the benefits of global markets (that the first come takes best price) to its export goods creating barriers intended to delay Uganda’s similar export products (Rudaheranwa, 2009). Moreover, whether the Horn landlocked countries should invest their scarce resource for transport infrastructure (i.e. road and railway) link to the outside world obviously leads them to Investment Dilemma of the necessity of it and the unreliability of their transits states due to the regional security dynamics.

Another effect of the regional security dynamics relates to the militarily weakness of the Horn landlocked states (Glassner, 1993). This claim seems to be unreasonable for one who looks at the military strength of these states in Africa. According to Global Firepower (2014), Ethiopia ranked 3rd next to Egypt and Algeria, and Uganda and South Sudan ranked 13th and 14th in Africa in their military strength, respectively. This being the case, however, they are militarily weak due to the fact that they do not produce strategic military armaments for their own as a result relying on sources abroad and a successful blockade of supplies of arms or prior notification of their origin and type put their security at stake. For instance, the denial of the French Ethiopia’s use of the Ethio-Djibouti railway (its only access to the sea at a time) for its inward shipment of arms in
the Italian invasion (1935-1941) facilitated its defeat (Spencer, 2006). In this line Pankhurst and Pankhurst (1953) wrote that Djibouti’s blockage of Ethiopia’s access to its sixteen airplanes and other armaments at the port of Djibouti handicapped the state’s defensive ability and facilitated in its defeat during Ethio-Italian invasion. Djibouti also betrayed Ethiopia denying it its port access to transit military weapons during Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000 (Abebe, 2007).

Moreover, Uganda was also deprived of military supplies and petroleum products imported by rail through Mombasa by the Kenya government in 1979 and 1987 that resulted in internal chaos and partly the toppling of Amin’s government in 1979 (Griffiths, 1995; Khadiagala, 1993). The volatile Horn region where states often search out the weak links of each other to manipulate their security also considerably reduces the political leverages of landlocked states vis-à-vis their neighboring states and the rest of the world. For instance, though Ethiopia is strategically significant in the Horn due to its population and location, its absence of outlet to the sea along the Red Sea coast certainly reduced the political leverages it enjoyed vis-à-vis the west (especially the USA) and the Middle East (especially Israel and Egypt) before 1993 (Mesfin, 1999). Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan as members of the Arab League could also easily be used as pawns of the Arab interests in the Horn (especially, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) and might deny their port services to Ethiopia at any time. Besides, Uganda has always been Kenya’s political hostage as far as Mombasa port, its main outlet to and from the sea that has often been used by Kenya to shape the behavior of Uganda. In this line, Wilson (2008) wrote that:

Being landlocked certainly carries huge costs. This is dramatically underlined by the threat any political turmoil in Kenya poses to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi’s economies. Cargo passing through the Kenyan port of Mombasa accounts for 90 per cent of Uganda’s exports and 78 per cent of its imports. The rail link to Uganda was cut apparently in protest against Ugandan President Museveni’s recognition of Kenyan President Kibaki’s re-election following the disputed poll in December 2007.

Plausible remedies and their empirical strength

There are at least two approaches in hauling the geographic handicaps of landlockedness: international law and regional integration and cooperation. The former legal means is by far secondary due to that it is twisted by two contradictory principles: the principle of free access (i.e. driven by juridical equality of States and freedom of the high seas) and the principle of sovereignty (Upreti, 2006). As a result, landlocked states’ desire for guaranteed right of transit across sovereign borders is left to bilateral agreements (Glassner, 1993) and therefore depends mainly on politics than issues of legality. The latter option seems to be a viable means in providing remedy for the security problematic of geographic isolation from the sea particularly in the volatile Horn region.

The dynamic interplay between the internal and external security threats that militate against the various security dimensions of the Horn landlocked states necessitate collective action such as through IGAD. From 1996 onwards, IGAD efforts of realizing peace and stability and thus open space for sustainable development to take root in the Horn have often been hampered, according to de Waal (2007:12), such as by: the lack of internal peace in most countries; the fact that internal conflicts are rarely contained within the borders of one country; the absence of a stable and consensual regional power order; the disputed legitimacy of states and regimes and the inability of democratic processes to provide that legitimacy; dependency on foreign financiers mainly, the U.S.; and the lack of autonomy of the key multilateral institutions. Despite IGAD has undertaken to launch a 5 year Peace and Security Strategy (2010-2014) (Alemayehu, 2011) it is “too institutionally weak to drive a strong security programme against the warring instincts of its member states” (Healy, 2008: 41). The weakness is related to lack of human and financial resources (Apuuli, 2011). The ability to appear as an honest and impartial broker in conflicts in which many of the countries of the Horn are entangled has been another problem for IGAD (Borchgrevink and
Despite the challenges, IGAD has succeeded in hosting peace negotiations leading to the CPA signed between the Government of Sudan and SPLM in 2005 in Kenya (Apuuli, 2011). Besides, IGAD has also participated in the series of Somali peace processes since 1997 despite limited achievements in the processes due to its restricted role (Kidist, 2009). The establishment of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, which is a bottom-up system for assessing and responding to conflicts relating to the nomadic people inhabiting across borders in the region is also the success of IGAD. However, this success is limited to only covering one type of conflicts and pockets of the region’s vast borderlands (Alemayehu, 2011). IGAD can be successful in one-off cases where conditions are favorable as it did with the CPA negotiations and establishing effective mechanisms at a limited scale such as CEWARN (Alemayehu, 2011). This being the case, however, IGAD lacks the potential to significantly alter the main sources of conflicts in and insecurity to the Horn states and/or regimes that are illustrated above or lead to general stabilization of the region (Borchgrevink and Lie, 2009). Overall, IGAD remains viable forum for its member states to tackle the collective security challenges they faced. What is then needed is the political commitment of its member states to strengthen it with human and material resources.

Potential areas for economic cooperation in the Horn such as intra-regional formal and informal trade, the use of ports and energy (oil and hydropower) are also identified by scholars as counter to the conflict-ridden nature of the Horn. Healy (2011) argues that the structural barriers (such as uneven capacities, the nature and types of state, weak institutions & regional conflict) and economic obstacles (such as small economies, high dependency on primary commodities export and often competition with each other and overlaps on key export products) often militate against meaningful regional economic cooperation through formal intra-regional trade. Medhane (2004) also argues that “neither the political arrangements nor the economic modalities of each country in the region look to be up to the task of regional peace and cooperation.” However, Healy (2011: Vi) maintains that the close socioeconomic ties connecting people along borders “underpin trading networks that play a vital part in the economic life of the region.” For instance, trade along borders is essential for supporting pastoralist livelihoods in Somalia as far as formal trading regime that has collapsed with the demise of the state is concerned (Healy, 2011). The flexibility of cross-border traders to fix with the changing environment also represents a robust resource for market-based cooperation and local economic security and in the Kenya-Somalia borderlines an “economic community practically exists already with free (unregulated) movement of people and capital, and free (unrestricted) movement of goods across borders” (Healy, 2011).

Port access is an essential for trading economy and economic interdependence in the Horn region as it consists of three landlocked states: Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan. More than seven ports services are available for the landlocked states: Assab and Massawa in Eritrea; Djibouti; Berbera in Somaliland; Bossaso, Mogadishu and Kismayu in Somalia; Port Sudan and Mombasa in Kenya (Healy, 2011). Despite accessibility, the actual utility of these ports was largely cancelled either by distance, the politics of the region, or lack of infrastructure and port facilities (Yohannes, 2011). Yet, the utilization of transit states’ ports by the Horn landlocked states certainly bears economic benefits for both states and it has also strong impetus for economic integration. For instance, Eritrea earned its 22.6% public revenue from Ethiopia’s continued uses of Assab (1993-1998) (Healy, 2011). Djibouti also earned nearly US$ one billion per year from Ethiopia’s use of its port (Getachew, 2013; Yohannes, 2011). One can also imagine the amount of money that Uganda’s dependency on Kenya’s port brings into the latter’s coffer.

In addition, the economic benefits the utilization of neighbors ports has potential for economic integration as “the shift of Ethiopia’s external trade to Djibouti has spawned much closer economic integration between the two countries including an electricity power line connecting Djibouti to
Ethiopia’s national grid and substantial investment in road and rail links (Healy, 2011: 31). The oil triggered positive Ethio-Sudanese relation has also stimulated Sudanese investors to invest on and engage in some business areas in Ethiopia that is responded by the latter’s eagerness to make use of Port Sudan. Such initiatives for further economic cooperation has contributed to the development of infrastructure especially road as the 880-km highway linking Addis Ababa to Metema launched in 2010 testified (Medhane, 2004; Healy, 2011). Despite such initiatives varying degree on infrastructural development such as on road and railway are important to connect the Horn of Africa state’s one and potentially drives economic integration in the region and widen alternative routes to landlocked states and thus downplays their exposure to blackmail by their transit states. However, Ethiopia’s heavy dependency on the port of Djibouti for its external trade to the extent that “when Djibouti sneezes, Ethiopia gets a cold” (Healy, 2011) and Uganda’s on Kenya, in a region, where states have hangover to exploit each other’s security, they could easily exposed to blackmail.

Economic cooperation based on energy (i.e. oil and water) is also potential area of remedies. Energy (oil and hydropower) acts as a drive for economic integration such as in infrastructure and port linkages (Medhane, 2004). Sudan (including South Sudan) is the sole oil producer in the Horn and with 6.3bn barrels reserves it became Africa’s fifth largest produces with output of about 500,000 barrels a day. Promising oil reserve areas are also identified: the Albert basin in Uganda and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia (Healy, 2008). Ethiopia increasingly dependence on Sudan for its oil supplies due to its speedy raise in fuel consumption that grew, for instance, by 47% from 1993 to 2003 (Healy, 2008; Medhane, 2004). The economic significance of Sudanese oil for the Horn states (especially landlocked) is apparent. It saves costs otherwise incurred to transport oil from the Gulf States. Its economic imperatives rings sound than others for landlocked states since they are forced to incur additional costs to transport oil through their transit states (Medhane, 2004). The oil triggered positive Ethio-Sudanese relation has also inspired Sudanese investors to invest on and engage in some business areas in Ethiopia that is responded by the latter’s eagerness to make use of Port Sudan (Medhane, 2004). Such initiatives for economic cooperation has contributed to the development of infrastructure specially road as the 880-km highway linking Addis Ababa to Metema launched in 2010 testified (Healy, 2008). Thus, Sudan’s oil is powerful impetus for regional economic cooperation and to subdue the succession of conflicts in the Horn. In sum, the economic and political barriers are powerful enough in undermining the economic initiatives that are set in motion for economic integration to flourish in the region.

Ethiopia is the water tower of the Horn with suitable terrain to generate hydropower and export electricity to its neighbors though such potential is not yet tapped sufficiently (Mesfin, 1999). It is now generating 2000MW electric power from its total potential of 45000MW and plan to generate 10000MW at the end of 2013/14 (GTP, 2010). The desire to increase power production is meant to export it to the neighboring states such as Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and including Egypt and Yemen (Healy, 2011; Verhoeven, 2011). To this effect, Ethiopia has signed power exchange agreements with all these states, save Egypt (Yacob, 2007; Reuters, 2011). Ethiopia has already started exporting electric power to Sudan and Djibouti, 100MW and 50MW, respectively (Reuters, 2011). Power transmission lines installation works have also been underway varying in success to connect the remaining states to a single electricity grid by 2016 (Healy, 2011). Water as a drive for economic cooperation due to its ability to generate electricity is also energy for agriculture. Ethiopia’s hydropower potential if exploited as planned and is able to fuse the economy of the Horn states it would accelerate regional economic integration. In sum, IGAD as regional institution for collective actions and the synergies between oil and water as engine for economic integration should be developed well to undermine the interface between internal and external security threats to the Horn states and its implications on the various security dimensions of landlocked states.
Conclusion
This paper sets to address how regional security dynamics in the Horn of Africa constraints the region’s ‘prisoners of geography’ quest for dependable access to and from the sea and weight the strength of individual states’ and collective (i.e. under IGAD) initiatives in the region against the challenges posed. From the analysis made two conclusions could be drawn. First, regional security relations in the Horn of Africa that has typically been characterised by states and regimes that have long begged each other’s security is rather a curse for the Horn region’s landlocked states’ security in economic and politico-military terms. Secondly, individual states’ driven economic cooperation particularly through energy exchanges (oil and electricity) and infrastructure development and the region’s states collective actions under IGAD to subdue the succession of conflicts in the Horn of Africa – despite it achieves a measure of successes in that end – seems to be weak in pacifying the Horn of Africa states security relations and reducing the vulnerabilities of the region’s ‘prisoners of geography.’ It is therefore that individual states’ led economic cooperation predicated particularly on energy exchanges and infrastructure development should be strengthen for two of its benefits. First is that it could set the motion for larger regional economic cooperation and integration to take place. This, in turn, would also provide the Horn landlocked states with the economic imperatives that militate against high transport and trade transaction costs through providing nearby integrated market, and a collectively developed highway systems for using alternative routes to the sea and a harmonized legal and administrative policy frameworks for easing international trade.
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