ABOUT THE REPORT

The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to national, regional and continental decision makers in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SITUATION ANALYSIS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTORS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSES</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCENARIOS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC OPTIONS</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMALIA CONFLICT TIMELINE (1960-2019)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael (Editor in Chief)
Tsion Belay (Author)
Alagaw Ababu
Chedine Tazi
Cynthia Happi
Moussa Soumahoro
Muluka Shifa
Pezu Mukwakwa
Tigist Kebede Feyissa

## EDITING, DESIGN & LAYOUT
Michelle Mendi Muita (Editor)
Abel B Ayalew (Design & Layout)

© 2019 Institute for Peace and Security Studies | Addis Ababa University. All rights reserved.
Located in the Eastern part of Africa, Somalia is one of the world’s most geographically strategic countries, connecting the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. During the colonial era, Somalia was divided into five states: Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French-controlled Djibouti, and sections of Kenya and Ethiopia. These fractures became a source of pan-Somali nationalism following independence in 1960; leading to irredentist wars with Ethiopia and strained relations with Kenya. While Somalis are homogenous in language and religion, they are divided along patrilineal lineages called clans, which are Somalia’s primary mode of social organization and identification.

In the post-1960 period, Somalia experienced a period of democratic followed by military rule for over three decades. In 1991, a civil war overthrew Siad Barre’s authoritarian regime and the country quickly plunged into an extended period of anarchy. The clan infighting that followed eventually led to state collapse. Since then, Somalia has been wracked by political instability, violence and widespread famine that have cost the country immensely, both in human and financial terms. Subsequently, two of its regions (Somaliland and Puntland) broke away.

As a result of several peace and reconciliation efforts by international and regional actors, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in 2000. The TNG was later replaced by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that was established as an interim government in 2004 and subsequently transformed into the Somali Federal government (SFG) in 2012. However, despite modest progress in reconstructing the federal government and its institutions, peace and stability remain elusive in Somalia. The SFG continues to face several challenges including winning the fight against al-Shabaab, breaking the cycle of a crippling clan-based politics, and building capable institutions to efficiently deliver security and services. In sum, the government is extremely fragile while its security and economy remains dependent on external aid and support.

---

CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

1. Identity politics/political clannism

Clan and sub-clan identities are fundamental pillars of Somali identity. The four major clans in the country are the Darood, Dir, Hawiyya, and Digil-Mirfe, alternatively called the Rahanwayn. Politics in the country is principally formed around clanism and clan allegiances; hence clan dynamics significantly influence the political landscape. This was further entrenched and institutionalized by the 4.5 power-sharing structure implemented following the Arta Peace Conference in 2000.

Following the collapse of the state in 1991 and the establishment of a federal government in Mogadishu, clan conflicts intensified as various armed groups struggled for power and resources. The protracted conflict destroyed state institutions and ushered in a society deeply divided along clan lines. The power struggles that initially started as competition over access to and control over resources, later evolved into power struggles among various political actors both at the national and local levels.

Today, clan identity and dynamics continue to be manipulated by political actors as an instrument for mobilization. They are used to facilitate violent clan-based rivalries, hinder internal cohesion, and shape federal and regional political/security policies in the country. This inherent tension became even more visible after the establishment of the SFG in 2012, particularly in the relations between the SFG and the newly established regional states; as well as within the SFG’s organs. The sustained struggle and ensuing lack of elite consensus effectively weakened the federal government and its institutions.

2. Sustained political economy of state collapse

State weakness and the accompanying disorder in Somalia have been sustained by the political economy of state collapse. The prolonged conflict facilitated the emergence of a plethora of actors - warlords, criminal networks, and powerful businesses – who have ‘vested interests’ in a weakened state. These parties benefited from the absence of state institutions by providing alternative security and other forms of social services through various means – including taxation and extortion. Hence, they often resist, and at times subvert, state building efforts in order to sustain the conditions of a state collapse.

Somalia’s economy has suffered immensely due to the destruction of socio-economic infrastructure following the civil war. The economy remains weak and vulnerable to external shocks. Its activities are primarily informal, based on livestock production, fishing, remittances, and services such as telecommunications. Formal economic activities are hampered by security challenges and poor infrastructure. The absence of regulatory frameworks, a weak tax base, and limited foreign investment also stalled economic progress as well as the SFG’s capacity to create economic opportunities for its unemployed youth. This has led to heavy dependency on foreign aid to meet these needs.

The country has also experienced recurrent droughts, famine and food insecurity. As of March 2019, 4.2 million people in Somalia required humanitarian assistance, and nearly half of them were highly food insecure.

A recurrent drought also triggered the massive displacement of close to one million people. In the absence of a capable federal government to meet the humanitarian needs of its citizens, groups such as al-Shabaab have been able to capitalize on these conditions.

---

5 4.5 is a power sharing formula where each of the four major Somali clans get equal political representation while the smaller clans share the remaining 0.5 slot. The presidential, prime ministerial, parliament speaker and the head of the judiciary positions are also shared among the 4 dominant clans.
12 According to third Somalia Economic Update (SEU) published by the World Bank, “the Somali economy grew by 3.7% between 2012 and 2014 and it’s projected to grow at an annual rate of 3–4%. Nonetheless, this modest progress registered in the economy has not meaningfully improved the livelihoods of Somali citizens.”
unfortunate events by engaging in the distribution of food and water to those affected. These circumstances, while undermining the government’s authority, create an opportunity for such groups to garner popular support and expand their territorial control.

3. Weak state and state institutions

One of the major challenges facing the SFG is the absence of functional state institutions. Despite efforts to reform, most of its institutions are extremely dysfunctional. The legislative and executive branches are overwhelmed by infighting due to the lack of political consensus. Security institutions remain weak and dependent on external resources, and the civil service and judiciary barely function leading to a reliance on customary law. Naturally, this institutional malaise has given way to incessant corruption and impunity. According to Transparency International, Somalia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 180th of the 180 counties assessed. The recurrent emergence and multiplicity of actors who benefit from the political economy of state instability also contribute to the weakness of the government and its institutions. Furthermore, while a federal government was established in 2012, many aspects of the federal nature remain contested. This has intensified political infightings and tensions at national and regional levels, resulting in a high vulnerability to political violence. The inherent lack of consensus among the political elites has also had a destabilizing effect across the political system and hence significantly hampered the development of functioning state institutions.

4. Rise of Islamist insurgencies and youth radicalization

State weakness, combined with the growing presence of foreign actors, prompted the rise of extremist views and radicalization of young Somalis. The dismantling of the Coalition of Islamic Courts (ICU) by Ethiopian forces in 2006 fragmented the group. Movements such as al-Shabaab galvanized cross-clan support and began to fill the void created by the absence of local justice, security and public services, tapping into deep-seated grievances within the community, manipulating clan dynamics, mobilizing members through religion, and also creating their own administrative structures.

Over 70% of the Somali population is below the age of 30. They are also largely illiterate, unemployed (67%), and lack state governance experience. This presents favourable conditions for radicalization given the lack of space for political participation, and socio-economic safety nets. Several studies reveal that young people dominate the membership of many of the Islamist movements in Somalia - including al-Shabaab - as most of these youth see conscription as an opportunity to support “Jihadist, nationalist movements” and rise up against “foreign aggressors”, but also as a potential source of income. The lack of economic and political opportunities have rendered Somali youth vulnerable to radicalization and pushed them to engage in illegal activities such as the charcoal industry, piracy, and informal migration.

Furthermore, the proliferation of small arms and weapons has fuelled the conflict by facilitating the radicalization of disengaged youth. Although the federal government, in collaboration with other international actors, undertook efforts to counter violent extremism, the impact was insufficient, largely because the approach was state-centric, highly militarized, and fell short of addressing the root causes of the problem.

5. Competing interests of regional and international powers

Since the overthrow of Barre’s regime in 1991, several actors have been involved in security and state-building processes. However, these actors lack coherence in their “diagnosis of the challenges facing Somalia”, and their involvement has largely been characterized by competition for dominance and the promotion of their own interests. Despite the signing of the 2013 Somali Compact - an agreement for the provision of support to the government and its institutions – the international community has been using diverging approaches and prioritizing different areas in their engagement, at times undermining each other’s efforts. Some of these efforts...

---

15 This shows a shift from al-Shabaab’s former strategies where it had banned the population from accessing aid and obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly during the 2011 famine. Indermuehle, J (2017), Al Shabaab’s Humanitarian Response. Retrieved from: https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/al-shabaabs-humanitarian-response
16 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
actors have also been involved in sponsoring competing groups, further aggravating resentment within the Somali community.25

For instance, with the aim of counter-balancing a strong Ethiopia, Egypt and other Arab countries have been supporting actors working towards the revival of a steady centralized Somalia state. Ethiopia has historically supported forces that eschew an Islamic agenda and prefer a decentralized system.26 Ethiopia’s former arch enemy, Eritrea, has been supporting forces that have an anti-Ethiopian agenda until recently.27 Furthermore, Gulf countries and Turkey have also been financing and promoting competing interests in Somalia, which further intensifies the conflict.28 The quest by these actors to secure their interests has significantly contributed to sustaining the conflict in Somalia. The recent tension between Ethiopia and Kenya over the regional election in Jubaland is a clear manifestation of the continuance and adverse impact of conflicting regional interests in Somalia.29

---

ACTORS

Somalia Federal Government (SFG) and Somalia National Army (SNA)

Established in 2012, the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) is the governing body of Somalia. Its primary objective is to improve security, rebuild basic state structures and prepare the country for democratic transition. Despite attempts at containing al-Shabaab, rebuilding its institutions, completing the state-building process and most importantly unifying its deeply divided society, the SFG remains weak. It has limited administrative capacity and is characterized by pervasive corruption and political infighting, which significantly undermines the effectiveness of its undertakings.30

Owing to the prevailing political and security dynamics, particularly existing ambiguities around resource and power sharing, the relations between the SFG and its federal member states (FMS) has been marred with mistrust and tension. The SFG accuses FMS of trying to amass more autonomy while FMS accuse the government of interfering in their internal politics and taking unilateral decisions, thus undermining their authority.31 This has further complicated the task of state building in Somalia. These already shaky relations became further convoluted following the Gulf crisis. Despite the federal government’s declared neutral stance regarding the ongoing Gulf crisis, its ties with Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) has deteriorated steadily since 2017. The situation worsened following the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s unilateral dealings with the FMS on matters including port development and setting up of military bases.32 These actions triggered anger on the part of the SFG who saw the action as a clear violation of its sovereignty. As a result, the SFG ended military cooperation with UAE in April 2018, and consequently tightened its relations with Turkey and its allies.33

According to the Somali Provisional Constitution of 2012, the Somalia National Army (SNA) is mandated to ensure the nation’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The national army is estimated to have around 20,000 personnel from various clans. However, it is highly fragmented and weakened by corruption and clan-based rifts.34 Albeit the signing of the London Security Pact of 2017, which aims to integrate regional security forces into the national army, FMS continue to maintain their

---

32 Ibid
33 This decision came after Somali security forces temporarily held a UAE plane carrying around $10 million allegedly going towards the President’s rivals. Consequently UAE suspended its aid to Somalia, including training of SNA forces.
own security forces. This has effectively weakened the army, making it highly inefficient and ineffective.

Furthermore, the SNA has been criticized for professional indiscipline and corruption through the misappropriation of public finances. It has also suffered from defections to al-Shabaab, partly attributable to the lack of sustainable funds that negatively affect soldiers’ morale, and also to the unrelenting clan loyalty that continues to hamper the creation of a unified national army. The resulting impact has been boosted morale of militant groups such as al-Shabaab.

Aiming to professionalize the military and establish a central command and control structure, the SFG has undertaken reforms such as the introduction of biometric registration of soldiers. The SNA receives operational support from the African Union (AU) - through AMISOM - as well as financial and logistical support from the UN and other external partners including, the EU, US, Turkey and UAE in the form of military training, personnel salary as well as equipment provisions. However, it has so far been unable to confront al-Shabaab without the support of AMISOM.

Federal Member States (FMS), clans and clan leaders

Somalia has six regional states, and though the provisional constitution stipulates that all FMS should be equal in status, representation and power, in practice the regional states have a highly differing degrees of autonomy and status. Somaliland, a self-declared republic located in the north-west, has been a self-governing region for over two decades with its own constitution, elected government, security forces, and currency. Furthermore, Somaliland has enjoyed more relative stability compared to the rest of Somalia. Since calling for independence, the region has constantly clashed with the SFG and unity talks stalled in 2015.

Puntland state, on the other hand, is a semi-autonomous state in the north-eastern part of Somalia. It declared itself a semi-autonomous state of Somalia in 1998. In contrast with Somaliland, Puntland is in favour of a united federal Somali state and hence is recognized by the SFG. It also has collaborative relationships with the federal government on counterterrorism-related issues – in the fight against Islamist militants and piracy – although some of its authorities were implicated in piracy incidents. Mostly due to lack of clarity regarding the state formation process, including border demarcation issues, relations between the FMSs have been strained as witnessed by the violent confrontations between Puntland and Somaliland over Sool and Sanaag regions; and between Puntland and Galmudug over the Galkayo district. The fact that regional states are formed along clan lines also contributes and fuels tension among the states owing to the decisive nature of clans in Somali politics.

Clans, clan leaders and their militias are decidedly significant actors in Somalia. Their influence has been further entrenched by the continued absence of a legitimate central governing body in the country. The disintegration of the Somali state and collapse of the central government gave rise to several clan-based and religious militia groups who claim to provide security to their own clan members. Despite efforts at reconciliation, clan militias continue to be very active in various parts of the country. However, over the past years, some of these militias have played a vital role in the fight against al-Shabaab and other armed groups fighting alongside the SNA and AMISOM troops.

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Established in 2007 with an initial six-month mandate, AMISOM is a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the United Nations (UN). It is the most important internationally legitimated military actor in the fight against al-Shabaab. Its current mandate is to “enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, reduce the threat of al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, and assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels.”

---

36 “According to Human Rights Watch, the Somali security forces and allied militias have committed serious abuses, including rape and looting”. Human Rights Watch 2014b.
38 See The Federal Republic of Somalia Provisional Constitution.
42 The mission mandate has been periodically revised since 2007. See UN Security Council Resolution 2272(2017)
Although the force’s initial mandate was more focused on defensive peacekeeping strategy, with the changing internal dynamics, particularly the growing attacks by al-Shabaab, the mission’s mandate grew increasingly offensive and was extended through several reviews and revisions - making it AU’s longest running operations. Its area of operation, originally centred in Mogadishu, was expanded to include south and central parts of Somalia. The force currently consists of 20,626 uniformed personnel, composed of police, military and civilian components drawn from 6 troop contributing countries (TCCs).43

Over the past 12 years of its deployment, AMISOM has registered some success in protecting the transitional and now federal government of Somalia, facilitating the conduction of two consecutive indirect elections in 2012 and 2017, as well as reducing the threat of al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups in Somalia.44 In this regard, AMISOM was successful in driving out al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other key towns mainly through three major military operations - Operation Eagle, Operation Indian Ocean and Operation Juba Corridor. AMISOM has also been involved in witnessing the signing of agreements among different contending actors, undertaking quick impact projects through its civil affairs team as well as training of the SNA and the Somali police to strengthen their capacity. To this end, the mission has been supported – both technically and financially - by international partners, including the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and later the UN Support Office in Somalia, EU, US, UK and France.

Nonetheless, AMISOM has so far been unable to dismantle the fighting capability of al-Shabaab due to several factors45. Some of the challenges influencing the effectiveness of the force are unstable and reduced funding, lack of critical force enablers, an expanded mandate, as well as the weakness of the Somali security forces to takeover security responsibilities.46

The mission’s dependency on international actors and the difference in priority and capability of the various TCCs has largely weakened the mission’s command and control structures.47 Since 2015, AMISOM’s military offensives have largely stalled.48 Furthermore, following the UN Security Council decision to gradually reduce the number of uniformed personnel and withdraw the mission by 2021, AMISOM has commenced troop reduction leaving the vacuum to be quickly filled by al-Shabaab and other armed forces.49 Some of the operational sectors under AMISOM’s administration have already been handed over to the SNA, which at the moment is too weak to effectively operate security responsibilities. This presents a major setback in consolidating the gains made so far.

**Violent Extremist Groups**

**Al-Shabaab**

Al-Shabaab is an Islamist insurgent group established in 2005 as an off-spring of the ICU.50 Although the group began as a smaller unit within the ICU, it transformed itself into a “national resistance movement” following the 2006 Ethiopian intervention which enabled it to garner cross-clan support.51 Al-Shabaab is currently the most radical, resilient, and militarily capable jihadist force in the country.52 They have been effective in administering areas under its control, weathering leadership divisions, and waging a successful conventional and asymmetrical war against its enemies.53 Its goal is to oust foreign powers and establish an Islamic State. In February 2010, the militant group announced its allegiance to Al-Qaeda.

---

46 Ibid.
49 UN Security Council resolution 2572 (2017)
50 The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was a coalition of Sharia courts emerged around 2000 in southern Mogadishu, Somalia. See Mapping Militant Organisations. Retrieved from: https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/107
According to various reports, the capacity of the group is estimated between 5,000 to 9,000 fighters. The group mobilizes funds through taxation, checkpoint fees and extortion and is known for recruiting marginalized groups, mainly young men and women from different clans. It also receives financial support from various sources including Somali diaspora and other terrorist groups. As per a UN report, the group generates up to $100 million per year. Stepping into gaps left by the absence of functional state institutions and effectively exploiting clan dynamics, the militia group has been involved in the provision of justice, service delivery as well as security to minority clans in areas it administers. This has enabled the group to obtain some level of support and credibility from the community as an unconventional stabilizing actor.

Between 2009 and 2011, al-Shabaab controlled most of the south-central parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu. Nevertheless, following collaborative efforts by SNA and AMISOM, the group lost substantial territory and its main source of revenue. Moreover, due to changing internal and external dynamics, particularly the 2013 purge of al-Shabaab senior officials, the death of its prominent leader in 2014, and the emergence of contending jihadist groups such as Hizbul Islam and later on the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), the militant group experienced major infighting that jeopardized the group’s morale and strength.

Nevertheless, al-Shabaab continues to maintain its operational capacity by staging attacks using both conventional and unconventional tactics including suicide bombings, roadside bombings as well as assassinations of government officials and civilians in Somalia and neighbouring countries – mainly Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti. They staged attacks on AMISOM military bases and quickly re-captured towns evacuated by SNA and AMISOM troops, putting the sustainability of the offensive in question and further deteriorating the security situation in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. In 2018 alone, the militant group was involved in over 1,339 violent events and was behind the most significant terrorist attack that killed 587 people in Mogadishu in 2017, making Somalia the most violent country in Africa.

Islamic State in Somalia (ISS)

The Islamic State in Somalia is an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-affiliated group that emerged in 2015 as an al-Shabaab splinter. Although the size of its force is unclear, some estimate the group to have around 300 active fighters, most of whom are al-Shabaab defectors. The group initially began its operations in the semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia. However, over the years ISS expanded its operations in central and southern Somalia, specifically Mogadishu, forming operational cells and extorting taxes from several businesses operating in the areas it controls. Similarly with al-Shabaab, clan dynamics also play a part in ISS’ ability to survive and expand. The group relies heavily on Somali clans that disagree or have fallen out with al-Shabaab.

Since its establishment, ISS forces have frequently clashed with al-Shabaab. Their rivalry reached its peak in 2018 resulting in a declaration of war by both sides. Although the strength of ISS forces remains considerably lower compared to other insurgent groups, the largely foreign-backed group has contributed to Somalia’s insecurity by carrying out targeted assassinations and attacks using improvised-explosive devices.

65  Initially, ISS used to receive financial and equipment support from the Islamic State through Yemen, however in the recent years its source of income has largely depended on contributions from the locals, hence competing with al-Shabaab for revenue collection. See European Institute of Peace. (2018). The Islamic State in East Africa. Retrieved from: http://www.eip.orgsites/defaultfiles/Report_IS%20in%20EastAfrica_October%202018.pdf
67  Al-Shabaab wants to maintain its monopoly on religious violence in the Somalia and see ISS as a significant threat to its predominance.
In the year 2018 alone, the group was responsible for over 60 attacks, with a majority of them taking place in the southern part of Somalia.

**Diaspora**

Somalia has a large diaspora population – estimated at 2 million people worldwide. These groups play a crucial role in the politics and economy of the country as central drivers of Somalia’s economic reclamation though high remittance flows as well as participation in humanitarian aid, public service provision and investment. According to a World Bank report, the Somali diaspora sends $1.4 billion in remittances every year, accounting for 23% of the country’s GDP. In 2015, they contributed an estimated $1.6 billion in remittances. They are also involved in mediation, peace and state-building initiatives. However, the diaspora community has also been accused of fuelling inter and intra-clan violence by using their economic power to influence decision-makers and clan leaders.

---

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

In 2006, the ICU took control of Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, prompting an intervention by Ethiopian troops to eliminate the militant group and re-establish central authority. Following the defeat of the ICU and the signing of an agreement between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and moderate factions of the Union, Ethiopian troops withdrew in 2009. However, the security vacuum left in the wake of Ethiopia’s withdrawal was quickly filled by al-Shabaab as the AMISOM troops deployed in 2007 were not capable of countering the group. This prompted the 2011 Ethio-Kenya joint unilateral intervention to strengthen AMISOM’s firepower. Subsequently, in August 2012, the TFG handed over state responsibility to the SFG, under the presidency of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for a term of four years.

Upon assuming office, Mohamud’s administration adopted Vision 2016 which, among others, prioritized the review of the provisional constitution, establishment of the FMS, the organization of public elections by 2016, and the legislation of political party formation and electoral laws. As a result, a political roadmap that catered for the above-mentioned priorities was adopted. Although the implementation of the roadmap was envisioned to be completed by 2016, most items remained unfulfilled except the FMS formation. The SFG established four additional interim federal administrations alongside the already existing 2 regional states, however, these new administrations are in various stages of consolidation due to their nature and date of formation.

In September 2015, in consideration of the security situation and limited time before the planned 2016 election, the government conceded that a universal poll would not be feasible. An abridged electoral process - combining an Electoral College model with the 4.5 power-sharing mechanism - was established to enable a smooth transfer of power. Consequently, in February 2017, the country conducted its second indirect election, voting President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ Mohamad into office. Although the electoral process had been more inclusive than its predecessor, it was marred by intimidation, harassment and vote buying.

The new administration made several promises, including tackling insecurity, fighting corruption, reforming the national army, as well as promoting reconciliation. President Mohamed’s government took some positive steps towards ensuring the organization of universal elections in 2020, for instance through the establishment of the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties under the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), the adoption of a new electoral model, as well as the drafting of an electoral law that is expected to provide the legal basis for conducting multi-party elections. These actions are believed to serve as a building block in the transition from a clan-based to a party-based political system that promotes national cohesion and legitimacy.

Despite these developments, the progress made towards building a strong and capable federal state and institutions, as well as fostering inclusive politics, has been rather slow. The government’s operational capacity, particularly outside of the capital Mogadishu, remains minimal and its institutions are characterized by inefficiency and lack of transparency and accountability.

Its limited reach also remains skewed by political infighting and heavy dependency on external actors.

Many of the challenges currently facing the Somali state-building process can be attributed to the failure of Somalia’s political elites to forge political consensus through a shared national governance vision. The contestations within the SFG have effectively blocked progress on several fronts. To make matters worse, despite the formation of the Council of Interstate Cooperation, the relationship between the centre and its regions has deteriorated in the past few years. This was largely due to lack of clarity around fundamental issues of governance, which in turn delayed the completion of the constitutional review process.

The review process is of extreme importance in the Somali political process because it encompasses a range of crucial issues that are vital to establishing a stable and functional federal state. This includes resource and power-sharing arrangements between the SFG and FMS, the structure of federalism to be adopted, and the status of Mogadishu and harmonization of federal and member

---

83 The Council of Interstate cooperation was established to negotiate member state’s issues vis-à-vis the federal government.
state constitutions to mention few. While the review was planned to be completed by December 2019, so far only the drafting and technical review of the first five chapters have been completed. As it stands, the absence of an agreed constitution and federal model gives ample room for member states to flex their muscle, particularly those with sizable regional forces.

Another source of strife between the government and member states emanates from the alleged interference by the federal government in the internal affairs of regional states (and vice-versa). Tension escalates around regional elections, notably during the recent elections in South West and Jubaland states. The state election-related crisis in South West – particularly the delay of the election and the arrest of Mukhtar Robow by the SFG – demonstrated the federal government’s determination to influence and control regional politics. It also jeopardized or, at a minimum questioned, the government’s resolve to reach political settlement with insurgent groups such as al-Shabaab. The Jubaland regional election also accentuated the strife between the two levels of government.

The situation became further exacerbated by the recent Gulf States rivalries, as the regional powers i.e. GCC countries and Turkey vie for influence, dominance and control of resources in Somalia. The disagreement between the SFG and FMS significantly worsened in September 2018 when leaders of Galmudug, Jubaland, and Hirshabelle suspended their的声音 to the SFG authorities in August 2017. The former al-Shabab deputy commander; and later on defected from the militant group and turned himself over to the SFG authorities in August 2017. Mukhtar Robow was a Presidential candidate in the South West region. He was a target of US-led military efforts to hamper state-building and stabilization efforts is the sustained security threat posed by militant groups such as al-Shabaab. Since 2012 (particularly between 2014 and 2015), the SFG with the support of AMISOM and other international partners, undertook a series of operations through which al-Shabaab was ousted from major towns, including Mogadishu and Kismayo, and lost control over its revenue acquired from the export of charcoal. This success was further bolstered through targeted US strikes of its leaders and operations. However, the fight against al-Shabaab has halted since 2015, with only occasional operations (including air strikes) being undertaken by SFG and its allies. This, to a certain extent, has allowed the militant group to re-organize and reinforce itself by conducting recruitment and training of fighters. As a result, the security situation in Somalia remains elusive.

Albeit weakened, al-Shabaab has not been sufficiently destroyed and continues to pose a formidable threat to Somalia’s peace and stability partly due to the SNA and AMISOM’s own challenges, as well as the ever-changing tactics of al-Shabaab that make the task of ensuring security in Somalia highly complex. Al-Shabaab’s ideologically committed middle-level leaders and its loose structure diminish the effect of targeted killing of its top leaders. Second, its increasing transnationalization and expansion to other parts of Somalia rendered its fighting capabilities impervious to territorial losses. Third, the group adopted a strategy of division into smaller forces and shifted its area of operations into rural areas where the AMISOM and SNA forces are not operational.

relations with the federal government. The current political impasse can potentially stall the implementation of key reform initiatives on several fronts.

On the security front, a significant challenge that continues to hamper state-building and stabilization efforts is the sustained security threat posed by militant groups such as al-Shabaab. Since 2012 (particularly between 2014 and 2015), the SFG with the support of AMISOM and other international partners, undertook a series of operations through which al-Shabaab was ousted from major towns, including Mogadishu and Kismayo, and lost control over its revenue acquired from the export of charcoal. This success was further bolstered through targeted US strikes of its leaders and operations. However, the fight against al-Shabaab has halted since 2015, with only occasional operations (including air strikes) being undertaken by SFG and its allies. This, to a certain extent, has allowed the militant group to re-organize and reinforce itself by conducting recruitment and training of fighters. As a result, the security situation in Somalia remains elusive.

Albeit weakened, al-Shabaab has not been sufficiently destroyed and continues to pose a formidable threat to Somalia’s peace and stability partly due to the SNA and AMISOM’s own challenges, as well as the ever-changing tactics of al-Shabaab that make the task of ensuring security in Somalia highly complex. Al-Shabaab’s ideologically committed middle-level leaders and its loose structure diminish the effect of targeted killing of its top leaders. Second, its increasing transnationalization and expansion to other parts of Somalia rendered its fighting capabilities impervious to territorial losses. Third, the group adopted a strategy of division into smaller forces and shifted its area of operations into rural areas where the AMISOM and SNA forces are not operational. The group also operates in cities as a clandestine force.
Al-Shabaab has also shown great flexibility in its technique and tactics combining conventional approaches with asymmetric warfare. Although the number of violent incidents associated with the group has reduced in recent years, the number of recorded fatalities involving the group has increased. In the conventional way, the group has overrun AMISOM bases, the notable ones being the Burundian base at Leego in June 2015, the Ugandan base at Janaale in September 2015, the Kenyan base El Adde in January 2016, the Ethiopian base at Halagan in June 2016, and the Ugandan base in Bulomer District in April 2018. The group has also undertaken high profile targeted killings of members of parliament, elders and other political officials. In 2017 and 2018 alone, al-Shabaab launched deadly attacks on a number of hotels in Mogadishu and parts of the country, particularly the Lower Shabelle region. The major attacks were the bombings in Mogadishu on 14 October 2017 that killed over 500 people, the attack against the Sahafi Hotel on 9 November 2018 that killed over 50 people, as well as two suicide bombings in Baidoa on 13 October 2018 that killed more than 20 people and injured 50.

The situation is further compounded by the SNA’s manifold problems. Despite attempts at security sector development and substantial financial and logistical support from external partners, the national army remains unable to contain and secure areas liberated from al-Shabaab. The Operational Readiness Assessment of SNA undertaken by the government uncovered a substantial gap on the part of the army to take over primary security responsibility and highlighted the need for systemic reform to rebuild the force. Cognizant of this, a National Security Architecture – an agreement that involves the integration of regional security forces - was signed between the federal government and Federal Member States in London in May 2017. Moreover, in preparation for AMISOM’s final exit - in collaboration with Federal Member States, AMISOM, Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and external partners - the SFG launched the Somali Transition Plan (STP) in February 2018. The STP is expected to enable AMISOM to transfer primary security responsibility to the national security forces by December 2021. However, its execution has stalled and the resolve by the FMS to integrate security forces seems to have declined following the current political impasse. This is becoming particularly worrisome considering AMISOM’s ongoing drawdown and eventual withdrawal in 2021.

The present political and security landscape indicates the challenges the SFG continues to face in forming a legitimate political system, but also the inability of the various political actors/elites to sustain compromises and garner consensus. Despite years of continued efforts, deeply entrenched political concerns remain unresolved and continue to prevent substantial progress in crucial areas. The slow progress on implementation of key activities including adoption of the constitution, security sector reform and national reconciliation, coupled with the enduring clan dynamics/rivalries, symbolize the possibility of continued political instability. Neither the political nor the security situation in Somalia offers hope that the long-awaited 2020/21 universal multiparty elections will materialize. Despite the extension of AMISOM’s mandate from 2020 until 2021, the situation on the ground shows that the government and its national security forces will not be in good shape to takeover full responsibility within the stated timeframe. In this regard, it is essential that the international community prioritizes the provision of adequate resources and coordinated capacity-building for Somali security forces to meet the conditions set for the transfer of primary security responsibility from AMISOM to the national security forces.

As noted above, the current security threat to Somalia goes beyond al-Shabaab, and includes other aspects such as continuing regional and clan tensions, proliferation of arms and emergence of new extremist groups such as ISS. It is therefore crucial that the federal government find a way to mend its relations with the FMS to minimize the prospect for intensification of conflict as well as ensure the successful implementation of both the NSA and STP. It is also high time the government and international community begin to question whether al-Shabaab can be defeated solely through a military approach and consider employing political solutions to resolve the war against al-Shabaab.

99 UN secretary General Report, September 2016
and other armed groups as well. This requires the SFG to not only find a way of genuinely engaging these groups as part of the peace process (perhaps in the short run); but more importantly putting in the necessary effort to analyze the drivers of extremism in order to address the root causes and achieve lasting peace.
Since the 2006 rise of the ICU and al-Shabaab, there have been several military and political initiatives by various actors aimed at strengthening the federal government and weakening extremist forces. These include neighbouring states, AMISOM, the UN and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Neighbouring countries, specifically Ethiopia and Kenya, have significant military and political interest in the country and thus influence the political process either directly or indirectly through IGAD. While both want a non-Islamist government that can contain radicalism, they do not necessarily agree on which actor they should support.\(^{104}\) Both countries have unilaterally intervened in the past and are currently part of AMISOM forces.

For the past few years, AMISOM was focused on reconfiguring its forces with the aim of further reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and ensuring the gradual transfer of security responsibility to the Somali Security Forces (SSF) by supporting the implementation of the NSA and STP. As part of this reconfiguration, in July 2016 a joint AU-UN Review made recommendations for the “gradual and phased” withdrawal of AMISOM troops within the time frame of 2018-2020. Following the recommendation, in August 2017 UN Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017) authorized a gradual reduction of the number of AMISOM uniformed personnel (1,000 troops) and the deployment of an additional 500 police by 31 December 2017. As part of AMISOM’S exit strategy, several Ugandan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces have pulled out their military contingents - leaving behind significant power vacuums.\(^{105}\) However, the decision to withdraw AMISOM was primarily driven by the lack of funding, particularly following the decision to withdraw AMISOM by 2017, and the deployment of an additional 500 police by 31 December 2017. As part of AMISOM’S exit strategy, several Ugandan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces have pulled out their military contingents - leaving behind significant power vacuums.\(^{105}\) However, the decision to withdraw AMISOM was primarily driven by the lack of funding, particularly following the decision by the EU to reduce its contribution to the force by 20%.\(^{106}\) The required conditions for withdrawal have not been realized, i.e. readiness of the SNA and SFG to take over responsibility.

In early 2018, another joint review was conducted by the AU and UN to assess AMISOM’s implementation of UNSC Resolution 2372 and discuss modalities for supporting implementation of the STP through further reconfiguration of AMISOM in light of the transition plan.\(^{107}\) Taking into account the existing gap between the readiness of SSF and AMISOM’s withdrawal plan, in May 2018 UNSC Resolution 2415 extended AMISOM’s mandate until 31 July 2018, recalling its decision to authorize the AU to reduce the Mission’s uniformed personnel. In July 2018, the UNSC again renewed its authorization and agreed to minimize uniformed personnel by February 2019 to enable the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to SSF.\(^{108}\) To expedite implementation of key activities in line with the STP, on February 2019 AMISOM announced a more offensive strategy which, among others, seeks to undertake targeted operations against al-Shabaab fighters.\(^{109}\) However, how much of this will be put into effect is yet to be seen.

In the latest development, a joint AU-UN review took place in April 2019 to assess AMISOM’S progress in the implementation of the STP. The review, revealing the continued volatility of the security situation in Somalia particularly due to the continued threat posed by al-Shabaab, highlighted the potential risk of a premature AMISOM troop reduction considering the lack of readiness of the SSF as well as the upcoming election.\(^{110}\) Subsequently, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2472 (2019) that extended the mission mandate for one year and also agreed to reduce uniformed personnel by 1,000 by 28 February 2020.\(^{111}\)

IGAD, for its part, has also been continuously engaged in Somalia’s peace and state-making process since the establishment of the TFG. It has facilitated the signing of several agreements including the ones on the formation of Interim Jubaland, South West administration and Galmudug region.\(^{112}\) In 2016, it also mediated clan conflicts and led the ceasefire monitoring team of the Gaalkacyo conflict.\(^{113}\) Despite its long involvement, IGAD’s success has been limited by its weak institutional capacity, the lack of political will and member’s commitment.\(^{114}\) Most, if not all, of its initiatives were undertaken mainly through its member states

---

105 AMISOM has already withdrawn 2,000 troops and in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2431 (2018), by end of February 2019 AMISOM is expected to draw down its troops by one-thousand.
114 Kidist Mulugeeta. (2009). The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD.
(not through its secretariat). Thus, the contributions to state and peace-building process are determined mainly by agreements among its member states which, under certain circumstances, have been challenging to achieve. To enhance the effectiveness of its intervention in Somalia, IGAD should strengthen its own institutional and implementation capacity and also foster a strategic partnership with the AU and international community.

The UN, mainly through United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSM) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have been providing assistance to advance the political process, strengthen the rule of law and justice as well as protect and promote human rights. Measures geared to these effects include providing technical and strategic advice in establishing institutions, personnel training, mobilizing state and peace-building resources and undertaking outreach and civic educations campaigns. The UN also provides logistical support to AMISOM through its UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and later the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). It has also been regularly monitoring and reporting human rights situations mainly through its Special Envoy, and its monitoring group has been investigating threats to international peace and security and recommending appropriate courses of action. As important as these measures might be, their effect on enhancing security, restoring order, and laying conditions for improved livelihoods appears to be compromised by the lack of sustained engagement and the UN’s increasingly limited support. Furthermore, following the recent election-related crisis in South-West state and the subsequent expulsion of UN’s top envoy by SFG over accusations of interference in January 2019, Somalia’s relations with UN have seemed to be strained.115

The EU, US and UK are the other major international actors in the country. The EU has been involved in the Somalia conflict since 1995, and later in the financing of AMISOM troop payments and personnel training and support to Somali’s Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS).116 However, the 2016 decision to reduce its financial contribution to AMISOM has significantly affected its operations, putting the sustainability of the mission under question.117 The US, on the other hand, has been providing both development (through USAID) and military (targeted air-strike operations against key al-Shabaab leaders) assistance in Somalia for decades with the primary goal of supporting the SFG and SSF.118 The UK has also provided support to the SFG on security, humanitarian and development sectors.

Turkey and GCC countries, on the other hand, have been crucial partners through engagement in humanitarian and development assistance, investment and security sector development including the training of SNA members and building of infrastructure.119 These countries have increased their sphere of influence in Somalia in recent years, particularly after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis both in terms of development and military assistance. Their rivalry has, however, further intensified instability in Somalia as the two blocks clash in promoting competing actors and interests. Despite the SFG’s declared neutral position, Puntland, Somaliland, South West and Galmudug states have taken a pro-Saudi/UAE stance, deepening existing rifts between the SFG and FMS.

115 UN council ‘regrets’ Somalia’s decision to expel envoy. (Jan 6, 2019) Retrieved from: https://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/un-council-regrets-somalia-s-decision-to-expel-envoy-1.809735
117 EU is the largest donor to Somalia, involved in training the Somali police forces and contributing to the salaries of AMISOM personnel among others. In 2016 it reduced its contribution to AMISOM’s payment by 20% from $1,028 to $822 per soldier per month.
SCENARIOS

**Best case scenario**

The best case scenario for Somalia will be the establishment of a workable political settlement, including at the regional level. For this to happen, the government should expedite the implementation of the political roadmap which caters for the adoption of a new constitution and holding of a universal election. This can potentially create a conducive environment for establishing a democratic system and allow Somali political actors to reach genuine political settlement/national consensus. This will also improve relations between the centre and regional states, thereby facilitating the implementation of the NSA and transition plan.

Under this scenario, the government should prioritize building the capacities of SNA, including the integration of the regional forces into the national army. This will allow the government to effectively weaken al-Shabaab to such an extent that it no longer poses a credible threat to the government. Also under this scenario, the SFG may consider engaging groups such as al-Shabaab as part of the peace process with the view of reaching a negotiated settlement. This will enable the SFG to consolidate and legitimize its authority, thereby forming a conducive environment for the foundation of a peaceful and stable Somalia.

**Most likely scenario**

The most likely scenario for Somalia would be the continuation of the institution-building process and the implementation of the political roadmap in a slow and partially inclusive manner. This will delay the adoption of a workable political settlement by key political actors as well as the organization of universal elections set for 2020/21. Despite slight improvements in the capacity and orientation of the Somali security forces, the security sector landscape would remain weak and dependent on AMISOM to contain threats posed by al-Shabaab. The stabilization of areas liberated from al-Shabaab will proceed with mixed results.

Under this scenario, the country will not be in a position to take over security responsibility from AMISOM; hence the eventual withdrawal of AMISOM will leave behind a substantial security vacuum that would reverse the gains made so far. Al-Shabaab, together with other armed groups in the country, will continue to pose a security threat to national and regional peace and security. This may put pressure on external actors, particularly neighbouring countries, to continue engaging in Somalia in an even less coordinated fashion. Under this scenario, Somalia will continue to be a fragile state that owes its survival to a delicate balance of external assistance and modest internal institutional capability.

**Worst case scenario**

The worst case scenario would be the failure of the government to implement the agreed political roadmap, including the holding of a national election in 2020/21, reforming the security sector, and garnering commitment from stakeholders to a shared national vision. Under this scenario, the SFG will continue to be severely constrained by political divisions and the rift between the federal government and its regional states will be further widened, effectively hampering implementation of key reforms such as the NSA and STP. Hence, the national security forces will also remain dependent on AMISOM.

AMISOM and TCCs will continue to be crippled by the lack of adequate funding, and as a result, TCCs may create a security vacuum by possibly withdrawing from the country. Considering the weakness of the SNA and the ongoing strife between the government and regional states, al-Shabaab will enhance its operational capacity, increase its attacks and continue to adapt to its operating environment. This is particularly likely considering the existing deep divisions between the centre and the regions, and fragmentation within security forces as well as weak administrative capacity of the SFG. Thus, the eventual withdrawal of AMISOM will perpetuate the prevailing lawlessness in significant parts of Somalia, with the possible recapture of previously liberated areas by al-Shabaab and other radical forces.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS

To the Somalia Federal Government:

• To ensure progress on the political dimension, the SFG should expedite the completion of the constitutional review process and implementation of the agreed political roadmap, including the planned one person one vote elections by 2020/21. The SFG should provide the necessary political and financial support to the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) and also request the Democracy and Elections Assistance Unit (DEAU) of the AUC to provide advisory and technical assistance to help strengthen the NIEC.

• To ensure success on the security front, the SFG should sustain momentum on the reform and development of the security sector, improve its relations with FMS and collaborate with them in the implementation of the NSA as well as STP. For this to happen, the SFG should convene a platform/conference to reach a genuine political settlement with FMS and other political actors on the nature of the federal model. Furthermore, in light of the planned withdrawal of AMISOM in 2021, adequate resourcing should also be secured for the SNA; as it progressively assumes primary security responsibility from AMISOM.

• The government should also prioritize activities aimed at promoting national cohesion and reconciliation; and ensure that relevant actors with a vested interest in the outcome, such as women and civil society, are represented and consulted in the process.

Regional and international actors:

• By breaking away from the past practice of focusing primarily on security, the AU should come up with a well-articulated political strategy to better support the state-building process in Somalia. It is crucial that the AU provides adequate support to the SFG in aspects of governance, provision of basic governance services, promotion of local reconciliation and dialogue, electoral preparation, etc. in order to build on progress and sustain the gains made so far.

• The AU and IGAD should draw the attention of UN and other external actors involved in Somalia towards the repercussions of a premature drawdown of AMISOM and urge them to allocate the necessary resources to sustain the mission and allow it to carry out its responsibilities effectively. In the meantime, the AU should vigorously expedite the process of operationalizing its Peace Fund and continue mobilizing resources to finance its missions to be able to cover some of the costs of AMISOM.

• The AU and IGAD should also create a dialogue platform between the SFG and FMS, to diffuse the tension and enhance communication to bring a lasting solution to the current impasse. They should also advise and support the SFG to develop an engagement strategy to bring disgruntled groups such as al-Shabaab to the peace process.

• The UN and IGAD should continue their support to the SFG, particularly in the areas of constitutional review process and establishment of an electoral system that would, among other things, set a platform for governing central authority, as well as clarify the power/resource relations between SFG and FMS.

• International actors must coordinate their assistance, including trainings provided to the SNA and the police, which should be informed by an overall strategic framework aimed at building inclusive and effective army and police structures. In the meantime, they should ensure that the required finances and critical force enablers are delivered to AMISOM to improve the effectiveness of the mission.
REFERENCES


## SOMALIA: CONFLICT TIMELINE (1960-2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 June</td>
<td>United Republic of Somalia was formed as an independent state uniting Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 March</td>
<td>Said Barre seized power through coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 January</td>
<td>Said Barre fled the capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 May</td>
<td>Somaliland declared independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 October</td>
<td>The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia was formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 June</td>
<td>The Islamic Court Union (ICU) effectively controlled Mogadishu after defeating other forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 June</td>
<td>The AU proposed to send a peacekeeping mission called African Union Mission in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 December</td>
<td>Ethiopian Military Force intervened in Somalia to flight ICU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 February</td>
<td>the UNSC resolution 1744 (2007) authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 January</td>
<td>Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed elected as president of Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 August</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 February</td>
<td>UN Security Council authorized the expansion of AMISOM from 12,000 to 17,700.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 July</td>
<td>Kenyan forces were incorporated under AMISOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 August</td>
<td>The provisional Somalia constitution was adopted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 August</td>
<td>Somalia Federal Government (SFG) established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 September</td>
<td>Parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president of SFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 September</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godani was killed by US drone strike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 February</td>
<td>National electoral Law approved by Somali Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 July</td>
<td>National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 January</td>
<td>The EU reduced its contribution to AMISOM by 20%.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2016 June - Political Parties Law approved by Parliament

2016 July - A joint AU-UN Review made recommendations for "gradual and phased" withdrawal of AMISOM troops within the time frame of 2018-2020.

2016 October - Fighting broke out between puntland and Galmudug in Gaalkacyo

2016 October - The federal state formations was completed with the formation of the HirShebele Interim Administration.

2017 February – Somalia conducted its second indirect election which voted in President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ Mohamed into office.

2017 April - UAE signed investment agreement with Puntland.

2017 May - National Security Architecture signed between the SFG and FMS in London.

2017 May - Office of the Registrar of Political Parties established under the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC)

2017 August 30 - the UNSC under resolution 2372 (2017) authorized a gradual reduction of AMISOM uniformed and the deployment of an additional police.

2017 December - SGF undertook Operational Readiness Assessment of SNA

2018 February - the SFG launched Somali Transition Plan (STP).

2018 March - UAE signed investment agreement with Somaliland.

2018 May - The UNSC resolution 2415 extended AMISOM’s mandate until 31 July 2018.

2018 July - the UNSC renewed its authorization and agreed to further minimize uniformed personnel by February 2019.

2018 September - Leaders of Galmudug, Jubaland, Puntland, South West, and Hirshabelle suspended relations with the SFG.

2018 December - Federal security forces arrested (South West state presidential candidate Mukhtar Robow

2019 January – SFG expelled UN envoy Nicholas Haysom

2019 April - A joint AU-UN review assessed AMISOM’s progress in implementing of the STP.

2019 May - UNSC resolution 2472 extended AMISOM’s mandate for a year and reduce uniformed personnel by 1,000 by 28th of February 2020.

2019 August – Jubaland state conduct election.