Political Dynamics in the Horn of Africa:
Nurturing the Emerging Peace Trends
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The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University (AAU), which serves as the Secretariat of Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa, is pleased to present a collection of policy briefs to inform discussions at the 8th Tana Forum. This year’s theme is “Political Dynamics in the Horn of Africa: Nurturing the Emerging Peace Trends”. Over the course of 2018, emerging political and security dynamics have brought about a new wave of hope in the Horn of Africa (HoA). Improved diplomatic relations between and among the countries of the region, including between Eritrea and Ethiopia; Eritrea and Djibouti as well as Eritrea and Somalia have ignited a renewed momentum for peace with the prospect of spill-over effects occurring beyond the region. To effectively reap the peace dividends from the renewed rapprochement, it is imperative that countries of the Horn and other relevant stakeholders, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU), understand the complexity of regional dynamics in order to devise a comprehensive strategy to build on progress and sustain the gains made thus far.

This collection of policy briefs seeks to contribute insights on the evolving political dynamics in the region, as well as provide policy recommendations to best nurture the emerging peace trends to sustainably resolve the political, economic and security challenges in the sub-region. It is my firm belief that this publication will contribute to knowledge generation on the theme and serve as a useful reference for researchers, policymakers and other relevant stakeholders in the region and beyond.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the authors who have contributed their time to write these briefs for their time and sharing their valuable insights. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to our partners and friends for enabling IPSS to continue to serve as the Secretariat of the Tana Forum and for making this year’s Tana Forum a success once again. I am also very thankful to the IPSS editorial team for making possible the timely and successful publication of this collection.

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INTRODUCTION

The Horn of Africa has experienced remarkable developments in peace in 2018. The no-peace-no-war deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea was broken after the Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 2018 and approached the Eritrea’s leader Isaias Afwerki in July 2018. Following the peace deal between the two former adversaries, Eritrea and Djibouti also agreed to resolve their border disputes through peaceful mechanisms. Furthermore, these peace deals led to a tripartite collaboration between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Analysts point out that the peace deals are not only inter-state collaborations but also contribute to intra-state stability in the individual countries.

The Horn of Africa is a conflict-ridden sub-region. This sub-region has been affected by colonial inherited border disputes that resulted in protracted wars for independence, including the Eritrean war (1961-1991) and the South Sudan war (1983-2011), and inter-state wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000). It is also one of the poorest sub-regions in the world due to climate change, environmental degradation, and economic mismanagement. Hostile inter-state relationships and an authoritarian rule in domestic politics have created a foreign policy relationship of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ among the states in the Horn. Some scholars hypothesize that these relationships operate through a concept called ‘political marketplace’, which gives emphasis to the greedy interests of leaders who want to sell their political power and political influence for money. This tendency has exposed the countries to transactional diplomacy, which uses money as an instrument of diplomacy to maintain the security and economic interests of external actors in the sub-region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has been vulnerable to intervention from regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

According to this year’s policy brief contributors, the peace deals have created opportunities for dealing with these and other security threats. First, the peace deals have narrowed the communication gap between leaders and their communities over the last 20 years leading to a win-win situation in conflict resolution. Second, bilateral and tripartite state relationships greatly contribute to implementing international agreements and decisions with regard to border disputes and the normalization of relationships between states and communities. Moreover, the movement of people across borders, as well as cross-border trade, also contribute to the de-escalation of conflicts and to the sustaining of peace agreements.

Third, peace deals can also add to regional integration due to the opportunities created for integrated infrastructural development and subsequent corridor development along sea ports. Such developments can also help regional communities like IGAD to play its role by strengthening conflict management institutions, which in turn creates favourable conditions for the AU to maintain collaborative engagement in the sub-region.

Fourth, peace deals have also created opportunities for countries to deal with their democratic and governance deficiencies. Following the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal, many Ethiopian rebel groups harboured in Eritrea signed peace agreements with the Ethiopian government to pursue their political agendas through peaceful mechanisms.

The contributors noted some challenges to sustain the fruits of these peace deals. Though the peace deals are very promising, they have not been ratified by their respective parliaments or the institutions responsible for doing so. Detailed directives to encourage cross-border trade and the free movement of people across borders into normalization have been delayed. Agreements made at the level of state leaders, unless they are institutionalized and made transparent to the public on time, can also easily make vulnerable the national interests of the countries involved in transactional diplomacy.

The countries in the Horn also face a number of domestic problems that can undermine any positive developments. There are people who are displaced due to civil war and internal conflict; policies that result in forced migration of citizens; and governments that lack the capacity to maintain the rule of law.

Hence, to sustain the fruits of the peace deals, additional institutional efforts are required to engage national and regional institutions such as IGAD and AU. The countries of the Horn need to enhance the capacity of state institutions to maintain the rule of law on the one hand and to strengthen democratic institutions to organize democratic elections on the other. The Horn should also work towards a more integrated infrastructural development that contributes to corridor development and subsequently regional integration.

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ETHIO-ERITREA PEACE DEAL:
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Awet T. Weldemichael
Executive Summary

If the Horn of Africa is to fully utilize its resources and potentials, overcome its challenges and thrive, regional integration remains its only option. The thawing of Ethio-Eritrean relations has injected a new sense of urgency and enthusiasm to that eventuality. The years of Eritrea’s isolation ended with Ethiopia and Somalia advocating for the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions and its return to IGAD. Free movement of people and goods and emotional scenes of loved ones meeting after two decades of separation due to the border war- portend the dividends of sustained peaceful relations. Much as the gains are great and deserve to be celebrated, the challenges ahead seem to loom large. The Ethio-Eritrea peace deal remains opaque and both countries, like the other countries in the region, face domestic challenges that directly affect their relations and risk undermining regional integration yet again.

Background

At the height of their honeymoon, newly independent Eritrea and post-Derg Ethiopia under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) spearheaded the project of regional integration in the Horn of Africa. In 1996, member countries revitalized the former Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to serve as an organizational vehicle of achieving that objective. IGAD was specifically mandated to “promote joint development strategies...” and to “harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote the free movement of goods, services, and people within the region,” among other lofty goals (IGAD-a). Shortly after IGAD’s launching, however, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war (1998-2000) and, until mid-2018, remained locked in a destructive state of no-war-no-peace. Coming as it did in the midst of Somalia’s layered fratricidal conflicts, the falling out between Addis Ababa and Asmara hampered regional integration and Somalia became another subject and theatre of their confrontation. Following Ethiopia’s December 2006 invasion of Somalia and unprecedented occupation of its capital Mogadishu, Eritrea suspended its membership in the regional body in April 2007 (Senai, 2015:364). With no Ordinary Summits convened, Ethiopia has since held on to IGAD’s rotating chairship (Byiers, 2017) and utilized it to isolate and internationally sanction archrival Eritrea.

On learning the hard way, the cost of its voluntary exit from the regional scene, Eritrea reversed its position in July 2011 and announced that it was reactivating its membership in IGAD (Senai, 2015:368-369). It accordingly sent its representative to a meeting of the organization in Addis Ababa but was denied a seat at the table (Argaw, 2011; Senai, 2015:369). For the seven subsequent years, Ethiopia persisted in its refusal to allow Eritrea’s return. The ongoing fast rapprochement between the two countries has broken down the layered political barriers to regional integration that included Eritrea. But much remains to be done – both at the political level and physically on the ground – in order to achieve meaningful integration.

Key Points

As the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean border war and subsequent tensions severely hampered the prospects of regional integration in the Horn of Africa, the recent peace deal between the two countries has injected a new sense of urgency to regional peace, synergy and economic integration.

If seriously pursued, equitably realized and consistently sustained, free movement of people and services across borders, and transboundary mega infrastructural projects are crucial vehicles and manifestations of genuine regional integration.

The speed with which Ethiopia and Eritrea (and Somalia) seem to be aspiring to realize this much-delayed project is a source of as much optimism as it is of concern.

Withholding of critical information from citizens of the region about understandings, agreements and substantive projects that have been and/or are being discussed risk denying them legitimacy and long-term sustainability.

Domestic challenges within the countries of the region and differences among them carry the potential of undermining the project of regional integration as has been the case in the past two decades.
The Ethio-Eritrean Peace Deal: Opportunities for Regional Integration

The coming to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia seems to have ushered new approach toward Eritrea and the region; one that is of hope, synergy, and integration. Since taking the oath of office in April 2018, Prime Minister Abiy extended the olive branch to Eritrea, and travelled to Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan, speaking consistently for regional integration and all along implementing groundbreaking domestic measures at breakneck speed.

Interstate politics centred on – and national fixation with – the inherited colonial borders persisted as leading hurdles to concrete and sustained regional integration, i.e. free movement of people, goods and services across the region. The formal end of the state of no-war-no-peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea in July 2018 removed such political hurdles with immediate dividends of opening the surface roads and air spaces connecting the two countries. Ethiopians and Eritreans crossed the erstwhile frontline border to meet loved ones they had not seen in two decades in emotional scenes; business people freely moved their goods and capital with Ethiopian traders finding new markets in Eritrea and the prices of basic consumer goods dropping sharply across the latter; and military personnel who had been on a war footing against each other for years on end were seen mingling.

The momentous summits of the Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders in Asmara and Addis Ababa in July 2018 and subsequent summits that brought on board President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” of the Somali Federal Government marked an effective end of the tensions and proxy war that had hamstrung regional integration. In sharp contrast to 2009 and 2011, when Ethiopia was at the forefront of regional and continent-wide pressure to sanction Eritrea at the UN Security Council, the new Ethiopian government – with Somalia in lockstep – spearheaded the diplomatic offensive to see those sanctions lifted and Eritrea brought back into the fold of the regional bloc. Eritrea was officially invited back into IGAD following the September 2018 opening of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border crossings at Bure and Zalambessa.

Eritrea’s possible re-entry and active role in IGAD is particularly encouraging as it bodes well for the organization’s second and third pillars on “Economic Cooperation, Integration and Social Development” and “Peace and Security; and Humanitarian Affairs” respectively. IGAD’s own 2016 report on the state of the region identifies the need for “regional infrastructure as well as the gradual harmonization of policies for removal of barriers to inter-state communications” (IGAD-b, 2016:22): Accordingly, from the point of view of tangible regional integration, transboundary infrastructural mega projects between the Ethiopian heartland and Eritrean coastline to the North can have a long-term integrative impact. Some media coverage and passing remarks on the rehabilitation of roads, construction of railways and building of natural gas/oil pipelines between the two (if actually implemented) are strategic in furthering regional economic integration. These northerly projects would also compliment the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) to the South. There are some pointers that indicate the prospective inclusion of South Sudan into the infrastructural planning linking the Eritrean Red Sea ports to the vast transborder hinterlands.

The Ethio-Eritrean Peace Deal: Challenges to Regional Integration

Much as the impressive thawing of Ethio-Eritrean relations has brought the prospects of the regional project nearer again, the relationship is beset with incipient challenges that demand country-specific and region-wide sustained engagement. These challenges have to do with:

1. The lack of transparency about the terms of the agreements between the two countries;
2. The elements of haphazardness and lack of institutionalization of the budding relationship between them; and
3. Domestic developments in both countries that have direct bearing on the nature of their relationship.

The opacity of the dealings between Addis Ababa and Asmara, the Eritrean president’s deafening silence about any of its immediate and long-term tangible aspects, and the Ethiopian prime minister’s nonchalant talk about integration have failed to adequately inform citizens and calm their anxiety, which risk denying the initiatives toward regional integration the needed legitimacy and sustainability. More than nine months after the signing of the declaration of peace and friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia in July 2018, no details of the understandings and/or agreements between the two countries have been fully and formally disclosed to the public. In February 2019, Ethiopia’s Ambassador to Eritrea, Redwan Hussein, announced that the two countries had concluded their studies to lay the ground for implementation following
parliamentary approval. While there is no parliament to speak of in Eritrea, the Speaker of Ethiopian House of People’s Representative, Tadesse Chafo, told Ethiopian media outlets around the same time that no agreements had come to parliament for approval.

Such sluggish substantive work and nondisclosure seem to confirm lacking procedural and institutional backstopping for the ongoing process. The lack of institutionalized engagement and elements of haphazardness are also apparent in the prospects of Eritrea’s resumption of its membership in IGAD. Eritrea did not show up for the September 2018 meeting of the organization that took place shortly after it was invited back – and remains absent in the meetings that have since taken place. It is said that President Isaias did not want to return into the old framework and instead wanted IGAD reformed first. Although reforming IGAD has been an ongoing concern of the member states, it is not clear what Eritrea’s reform demands are. Be that as it may, its continued snub of IGAD is but an indicator of the myriad challenges of the project of regional integration in spite of the Ethio-Eritrean peace. IGAD Council of Ministers’ 46th Ordinary Session of late February 2019 deliberated on the implications of the ongoing geo-political wrangling in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and the dangers thereof in the absence of Eritrea, which controls the longest part of that coastline.

Both Eritrea and Ethiopia, like the other countries of the Horn of Africa region, have domestic challenges that risk holding back their budding relationship as well as regional cooperation and integration. Eritrea is now a shell of its former self due to a combination of the consequences of the wars and post-war tensions and isolation as well as government actions and inactions. The flight of a large number of Eritreans from their country severely degraded its (wo)manpower. That, combined with its decayed economic and administrative institutions and corroding strategic infrastructure, render Eritrea a less reliable partner – irrespective of intentions – to carry on and sustain constructive engagements that are essential for meaningful regional integration.

Moreover, the Eritrean government straddles dissonant positions, reality and rhetoric. While announcing the dispatch of an Eritrean delegation to Addis Ababa, President Isaias declared in June 2018 “game [was] over” to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which he characterized as vulturine, scavenger. Bent on making the TPLF to change position and allow the implementation of international law. These and other uncertainties and challenges bode ill to the two countries’ internal stability and the sustainability of their newly restored relationship.

Beyond contradicting the rhetoric of peace, synergy and integration, the president’s total disregard of a region that shares the longest border with Eritrea, along which the most intense battles were fought, does not only leave the peace along the border in limbo, but it also risks worsening the precarious internal situation in Eritrea and Ethiopia.

For its part, Ethiopia is going through a rough passage of transition, in which the federal government in Addis Ababa has seen some of its de facto powers curtailed as ethnic tensions became more widespread and the regions/kilils more assertive (Michael, 2018vi; ICG, 2019xii:24-25; Mehari, 2019). Within this context of contested division/distribution of powers, the TPLF-administered Tigray regional/kilil government has held on to Addis Ababa’s old position of the need to re-negotiate the disputed border with Eritrea. Ranking TPLF/EPRDF officials argue that the two peoples on both sides of the border know their territories and should be consulted in the resolution of the border issue – if not left alone to resolve it themselves. Short of that, according to the TPLF position, there would not be any territories changing hands, a position that remained a deal breaker for Eritrea for nearly two decades.

Prime Minister Abiy’s command of federal forces appears uncertain especially in Tigray Regional State or kilil (along with the Ethio-Eritrean common border) much less implement the 2002 court ruling by handing over territories to Eritrea. At least twice, civilians along the border with Eritrea blocked the rotation of troops and heavy weapons away from the border in a gesture intended to ease tensions (Shaban, 2019xii; ECADF, 2019). Asmara prioritized strengthening ties with Addis Ababa over having its occupied territories vacated and the border demarcated. Nevertheless, it is not clear how long its policy would last nor is it clear what it would take for the TPLF to change position and allow the implementation of international law. These and other uncertainties and challenges bode ill to the two countries’ internal stability and the sustainability of their newly restored relationship.

Conclusion

The Horn of Africa has a plethora of local challenges that have so far hamstrung – and could forever forestall – regional integration. Yet, the imperative of regional cooperation and integration among the countries therein cannot be overstated. The concerned peoples and countries stand to benefit from genuine integration that is incremental, institutionalized, and bound by transparent, predictable and equitable rules. Not only have the majority of the current borders persisted as
barriers separating families and peoples, but they have also placed a stranglehold on otherwise complementary economies by restricting the free flow of goods and services across the region. Turning the national boundaries into enduring bridges requires collective and inclusive reflection on how best to harmonize the strategic interests of the region as a single whole. And for that to happen, it is vitally important that the countries resolve tensions and disputes within and among them, clean up their respective domestic governance, guarantee fundamental freedoms of their citizens, and abide by the rule of law (domestic and international) before they can be expected to guarantee free flow of people, goods and services among them.

Policy Recommendations

- Place the renewed Ethio-Eritrean relations on stable footing now and on legitimate grounds for the future through:
  - Transparency about and appropriate disclosure (to citizens of both countries) of the terms of any memoranda of understanding, agreements and/or treaties signed or under discussion.
  - Institutionalization of the relationship between the two countries beyond the two leaders and current governments.

- Ensure that the Ethio-Eritrean peace does not negatively affect the peace within and among the countries of the region by deepening the scope of the talks and expanding the ‘tent of peace’ to include all stakeholders in order to, inter alia, harmonize the relations among civilian populations and local administrative structures on both sides of the once-disputed Ethio-Eritrean border.

- Ethiopia and Eritrea, like the other countries of the region, need to work to promote human security and overcome domestic governance and constitutional challenges through the respect of the rule of law – both domestic and international.

- Ensure that the drive toward regional integration that Ethiopia and Eritrea seem to espouse are feasible on the basis of skills and resources (now and the foreseeable future), equitable distribution of dividends, and allaying the concerns of the Ethiopian and Eritrean public.

- Institutionalizing the process of cooperation and economic integration through the rehabilitation and/or expansion of strategic assets and infrastructure to effect incremental synergistic enhancement of the region’s comparative advantages.
Endnotes


About the Author

Prof. Awet T. Weldemichael holds a Ph.D in history and the LL.M. in public internal law. He studies Northeast African contemporary history and political economy. He has authored and co-edited several books and academic journal articles, most recently Piracy in Somalia: Violence and Development in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge, 2019). He teaches at Queen’s University in Canada.
2. Accelerating & Sustaining the Peace Process: Challenges & Opportunities

Darlington Tshuma
Persistent challenges involving violation of peace agreements and deals continue to hamper the peace process and threaten peace in countries like South Sudan and Somalia. Recent political upheavals in Sudan pose a significant regional security threat.

The nature of conflicts in the Horn has made previous interventions not only complex but extremely difficult. This is because regional alliances are formed based on different and often complex configurations ranging from formal military alliances between state leaders to state support for rebel movements, ethnic and clan alliances and in some instances; complex alliances between rebel groups and their leaders.

Recent political developments in the Horn which include the reopening of borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea; Eritrea and Djibouti; Eritrea and Somalia and the unfolding peace process in South Sudan that followed the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on 12 September 2018. The brief also highlights challenges that if not urgently addressed threaten to keep the region embroiled in conflict and violence. These range from unresolved border issues to constant violation of peace agreements, recent political upheavals in Sudan and the intractable conflicts in both South Sudan and Somalia aided by a growing threat of terrorism. Ethiopia also faces the monumental task of preparing for crucial elections next year amid renewed ethnic clashes and communal violence in some parts of the country. By way of conclusion, this brief offers a raft of recommendations that if implemented could possibly aid in accelerating and sustaining the peace process.

Global and regional partners like the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and donor partners must stand ready to seize these emerging and unfolding peace trends to consolidate peace, strengthen democratic practices and institutionalize peacebuilding.
Intrastate strife has occurred in almost all countries and today, the conflict in Somalia is on-going and is fast spreading into neighbouring Kenya and Uganda; while South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation remains embroiled in a series of severe intrastate conflicts since gaining independence from Sudan in 2011. The region has one of the world’s largest number of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In 2010 alone, Sudan had in excess of 4 million IDPs and about 2 million refugees in neighbouring countries. The intractability of these conflicts and civil wars and the constant threat of terrorism combined with rising environmental challenges and food shortages continue to complicate the security situation in the region by challenging and undermining the very notion of statehood.

The Recent Peace Processes and Opportunities

In the past months’ significant political developments have taken root in the Horn. The developments not only promise to transform the peace and security outlook of the Horn but have also reignited hope and optimism for peace and stability. Among these are the election of a new Prime Minister in Ethiopia, peace deals signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) leaders in South Sudan and the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia.

Preliminary indications point to improved diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, Sudan and Eritrea as well as Eritrea and Somalia. Also significant is the signing of the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia in Asmara (Eritrea) on 05 September 2018; bilateral arrangements between Eritrea and Djibouti; ands the R-ARCSS; also signed on 12 September 2018 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). R-ARCSS negotiated by Presidents Omar Al-Bashir (Sudan) and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda) managed to contain further outbreak of violence in South Sudan although concerns are rife that the peace accord may be too fragile. The Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti is expected to deal with unresolved border issues which have been a source of conflict for decades.

In April (2018), Ethiopia elected a new Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed - leader of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The new Prime Minister has signaled his intention to pursue a range of ‘corrective measures’ which if implemented could have far reaching implications for both Ethiopia and the region in as far as consolidating peace and security. Although Mr. Ahmed came on the backdrop of years of civil unrest in Ethiopia and general regional instability; he has pledged to undertake wide and far reaching reforms expected to have a significant impact on the security outlook of the region. Since assuming office; he has released political prisoners charged with various offences by his predecessor’s administration and has opened domestic politics to previously banned groups. He also extended an olive branch to several rebel leaders and pledged to follow a policy of reconciliation and to crack down on the once powerful security agencies.

The Prime Minister’s cabinet is also equally divided between men and women. He appointed Ethiopia’s first female defense minister; Aisha Mohammed and also made attempts to limit the powers of the notorious and feared Secret Intelligence Agency by placing it under a new ministry; the Ministry of Peace. The new ministry is expected to lead peace efforts in the country which include tackling the challenge of ethnic violence in western Oromia believed to have displaced in excess of two million people in addition to other displacements.

To demonstrate his resolve to stabilize the region, the Prime Minister went on a diplomatic re-engagement process which included normalizing relations with Mr. Afwerki, the leader of Eritrea. The meeting of the two leaders was followed by reopening of the Eritrean embassy in Addis Ababa and reopening of a border with Eritrea which had been a source of war and conflict for decades. The reopening of the border and resumption of commercial flights between the two capitals is seen as the first sign of commitment to build lasting peace.

These welcome developments are expected to facilitate commerce and movement of people between the two neighbours. Reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is believed to be significant in the sense that it not only led to a series of diplomatic engagements between other countries; for example, Eritrea opening lines of communication with Somalia and Djibouti but also averted a conflict which had the potential to poison the whole region. Recently, the Prime Minister also met with the President of Somaliland Administration, H.E Muse Bihi Abdi to discuss a range of issues among them strengthening their people-people relations and cooperation on peace and security.

H.E Ahmed became the first high ranking public figure to persuade President Kiir to meet his former nemesis; Vice President Machar in June 2018 in Addis Ababa. The face-to-face meeting was their first - since violent clashes in 2016 that led Machar to seek safety in South Afri-
A month later in July; H.E Yoweri Museveni attempted to re-establish peace talks with President Kiir and Machar but again talks collapsed after disagreements over power-sharing arrangements and the nature of the transitional mechanism. After numerous failed peace attempts, on 12 September 2018, parties in South Sudan committed to R-ARCSS facilitated by H.E Al Bashir and H.E Museveni. R-ARCSS is expected to resuscitate the possibility of a transitional government that will put an end to the conflict in South Sudan and place the country on a path to recovery and stability.

**Challenges to the Peace Process in the Horn of Africa**

In spite of these welcome developments, persistent challenges and problems remain which if not urgently addressed, threaten to keep the region embroiled in deadly conflict and violence. Although there are prospects for peace and stability; the intractable conflicts in Somalia and South Sudan seem to dash the slightest hope. South Sudan is presently engulfed in violent and deadly conflicts which have claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions. In Ethiopia, ethnic clashes have resurfaced in some parts of the country. These come on the backdrop of a crucial election set for 2020.

Challenges to the peace process in the Horn are further compounded by the poisoned and complex political environment that makes intervention and mediation extremely difficult and complex. Examples include leadership wrangles within the rank and file of SPLM/A between supporters of President Kiir and his Vice President Machar which led to the Nuer Massacre in Juba. Today, the South Sudanese Opposition Alliance (SSOA); a merger of key opposition parties in the country faces internal rebellion which threatens the revitalization of R-ARCSS. The opposition accuses government forces (South Sudan People’s Defiance Forces [SSPDF]) in Juba of launching new attacks on their territories.

The peace deal struck in September 2018 is a build-up on previous foiled peace attempts among them the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) signed in 2015 and President Kiir’s plea for National Dialogue in 2016. The September peace deal provides for the integration of government and rebel forces into a single national army by 12 May 2019 and the creation of a unity government where Machar will serve as one of the four Vice Presidents. However, less than a month to the deadline, the integration process is yet to begin amid renewed fighting and ethnic clashes in the southern parts of the country. Funding challenges have further compounded the demobilization and cantonment process amid suspicions and concerns that the integration process could result in a new recruitment drive as some groups seek to increase their influence in a future army.

Further North in Sudan, anti-government protests and demonstrations have engulfed cities and towns across the country since mid-December 2018 caused by a spike in bread prices although the root cause[s] go deeper. Security forces have killed between 30-50 people while thousands have been arbitrarily arrested. President Al-Bashir, in power since 1989 is under immense pressure to resign on the back of a collapsing economy and internal power struggles within his own party, the National Congress Party. The President’s response to protests has been brutal and uncompromising. On 22 February 2019, he imposed a state of emergency which is expected to last for at least a year, in addition to dissolving the cabinet and replacing some ministers with his loyalists drawn from the military. Government security forces’ response to protests is expected to worsen a deteriorating security situation.

In Ethiopia, H.E. Ahmed faces the twin challenge of insecurity abetted by renewed ethnic clashes and communal violence and the need to prepare for a crucial election next year, perhaps what could be the country’s first democratic poll in decades. The Prime Minister has pledged to hold free and fair elections but this will require major shifts in the current political system. To usher in a new democratic political system, H.E. Ahmed needs to work closely with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and opposition parties. However, this is not a simple and straightforward process given that there is division within his own party over the future of both the party and the country. To effect the changes, he desires, H.E Ahmed needs to demonstrate decisive leadership but also compromise where necessary.
Conclusion

Efforts to accelerate and sustain the peace process in the Horn requires a great deal of political will from both political actors themselves and conflict mediators. Unfolding political dynamics in the Horn offer opportunities to strengthen regional cooperation on peace and security. Global and regional partners like the UN, AU, IGAD and donor partners need to seize these emerging and unfolding peace trends in the region to consolidate not only peace but also strengthen democratic practices and institutionalize peacebuilding. By way of conclusion, the brief outlines a raft of recommendations based on past experience in order to accelerate and sustain the peace process.

Recommendations

Despite the challenges highlighted in this policy brief; there exist opportunities to accelerate and sustain the peace process in the Horn. These include:

• The need to deal not only with the causes of conflict in countries like Somalia and South Sudan but also engage latent harbingers and threats of violence that usually find expression through inequality and feelings of marginalization. If not addressed, these vices present ethnic and political entrepreneurs with opportunities to mobilize along ethnic and tribal lines which often leads to complex webs of violence and conflict. For example; previously the peace process in South Sudan focused exclusively on the north-south dimension between Garang – SPLM/A leader and Tahan, the first Vice President. Inattention to other potential sources of conflict resulted in renewed fighting and clashes.

• There is a need to broaden the peace process in South Sudan by involving not only political parties but also CSOs, community organizations, churches, smaller opposition parties, women and youth organizations. In 2017, a network of women's organizations drawn from South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda played a crucial role in influencing the peace process in that country. This holds true for Sudan where the deteriorating security situation is a cause for concern.

• Mediators to the peace process in both South Sudan and Somalia must also look to address persistent governance problems. Issues that need to be tackled include democratic participation, the conduct of elections, and respect for human rights, human security and poverty reduction. As previously noted, some of these may actually be latent causes of conflict.

• There is a need for the international community, UN, AU and IGAD to help mobilize resources needed for the demobilization and integration process in South Sudan. This is particularly important as donor fatigue creeps in with the US ostensibly taking a back seat. Failure to mobilize adequate resources will plunge South Sudan into a series of unending conflicts. At present, about United States Dollar (USD) 350 million is needed for the demobilization and integration process alone.

• Finally, given that the 12 May 2019 deadline is fast approaching yet no concrete progress has been achieved almost six months after the signing of the peace deal in September 2018, parties to the conflict in South Sudan, mediators and donors need to agree on a new date and set time lines that are both realistic and achievable. Rushing to implement the peace deal without first hammering out new political deals on security and internal boundaries risk collapsing the agreement.
A Collection of Policy Briefs


Ibid.

Ibid.


About the Author

Darlington Tshuma is a PhD Candidate in the Peacebuilding Programme at Durban University of Technology, South Africa. He works as a Regional Analyst with Political Economy Southern Africa (PESA) with a specific focus on Kenya and East Africa. Darlington has extensive experience in research and policy analysis, mediation support and peacebuilding. He has contributed numerous academic and policy papers on the peace process in Zimbabwe. Some of his work has been published by top think tanks among them the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). His current research interests are in transitional justice, electoral conflicts and human security in the Horn of Africa. Darlington currently serves on the African Leadership Institute’s (AFLI) Project Pakati as Change Leader. Project Pakati is funded by the Ford Foundation for the period 2018-2020 and seeks to find innovative and creative ways to implement the African Union’s Youth Charter (2006). Darlington holds a Masters in Sociology and Social Anthropology from the University of Zimbabwe and a recipient of the prestigious Canon Collins Postgraduate Scholarship.

Endnotes


NURTURING TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE ROLE OF GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND OTHER COUNTRIES

Laeed Zaghlami
**Executive Summary**

The geo-strategic position of the Horn of Africa has been a hot spot of economic and political regional and international challenges manifesting in the vulnerable, insecure nature that has made the region dependent on external military presence and economic aid to sustain and achieve its peace and security objectives. Currently, at stake and under a multitude of pressures and constraints, the region faces a series of challenges that make its future uncertain. In spite of this, Gulf states have advanced a multiple presence - politically, economically and from a security perspective. Furthermore, by virtue of geopolitical position, regional security concerns, political interests, shared cultural values and common history, Gulf states have considered the Horn of Africa as their second security belt. Thus, on economic ground, they have initiated a trade and investment policy in the region in order to expand their political and economic interests and preserve their security concerns.

**Introduction**

**The geo-political and geo-economic interests of GCC**

Gulf states have launched a trade and investment policy in the Horn of Africa, regardless of their internal crisis which may have had in one way or the other, an impact on the degree and nature of their economic and financial involvement. Although it is early to assess this policy, their long-lasting commitment will for sure yield some palpable results in terms of peace and security, as long as the country recipiendaires are seriously undertaking practical steps to bring about political and economic changes. Horn of Africa countries must advocate more democracy, transparency and essentially resolve their internal rivalries and boundary border disputes. More practically, they ought to comply with principles of good governance, the rule law and order, freedom of the press and alternance in power. The principle of ‘I help you to help yourself’ should be also the leitmotiv in any policy, otherwise, Gulf states investment policy will not be economically productive, neither will it bring about substantial changes for ordinary citizens who are striving for survival.

Gulf states have advocated for multiple presence in both political, economic and security forms. Besides, the military support they are providing, they equally initiated a trade and investment policy. In this paper, we will see how this policy has yielded tangible results and subsequently contributed to strengthening political stability, economic growth and peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

Geo-political, Economic and social facts of Horn of Africa are indicators to have an objective approach to this topic. Countries in the Horn of Africa are still facing a political vulnerability due to the absence of democratic governance, social justice, freedom of the press and lack of law and order. Poverty, diseases, drugs, piracy among other crimes are some of the dreadful facts that characterizes society. The economy is neither in good shape; it suffers from a lack of raw materials, skills, efficiency and a growing phenomenon of corruption (Nolte, 2010). With regard to...
peace and security dimension, the Horn of Africa remains unfortunately the typical example of an unsecured and unstable region, notably with the presence of so many foreign military forces that makes it complicated.

For the purposes of this paper, the geographic grounds underscored, the Horn of Africa is a peninsula of North Eastern Africa, comprising of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and parts of Ethiopia. It has a 4,000 km coastline that runs from Sudan in the North to Kenya in the South and lies astride vital Indian Ocean trade routes. Ethiopia is also seen as a major player; politically, economically and security wise in the Horn of Africa region as it is on relatively good terms with all of its other neighbours. Horn region covers also the Bab al-Mandab straits, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Yemen which is just 30 km from Eritrea and Djibouti is not included, although it is also another source of security concerns and worries, in particular, its Aden port is closer to Mogadishu and Hargeisa. This means that Yemen’s location is strategic for Gulf states, mainly Saudi Arabia as it represented its soft underbelly space, but also the importance of the straits for both Gulf states and world trade (Richter 2014).

Security Matters

The growing interest in the Horn of Africa includes a number of competing international actors with different agendas that is certainly aggravated by the presence of failed states (Al Meziani, 2012). The results are that geopolitics of the region, security issues, religious radicalisation, resource competition and food shortages have become sources of concern, worry and also interests. In spite of that, Gulf states seize the opportunity for business investments in a number of domains. According to a think tank, Clingendael database on commercial investments, Saudi Arabia and UAE are the main investors; from 2000 to 2017, 434 investments were made in 13 district sectors worth of 13 billion US dollars. Although agriculture and manufacturing are the main strategic assets, Gulf states have rushed to buy farmlands in Sudan and Ethiopia as a hedge against food insecurity. Other assets for investment are construction, real estate and renting, consulting and business services, tourism, medical care and social care, banking, education, telecommunications, logistics and shipping, trading, ports, oil and gas and mining.

In summary, Ethiopia and Sudan appear to be the main recipients of the investment policy, making them the main players in this ‘business adventure. Analysts describe their external policies as “quiet diplomacy”. However, it is worth recalling that Saudis have used oil and Islam as the main leverage since the 1960s, while foreign aid and personal networks were the basic policy tools of the Emirates. Although, both countries were characterized by low-profile initiatives, behind-the-scenes they launch negotiations with their regional partners aimed at promoting amicable relations and guaranteeing the peaceful settlement of disputes.

As mentioned above, Gulf states have expanded their diplomatic ties with sub-Saharan African states to bolster their growing economic and security interests, while also advancing their ambitions to play a more prominent role in international foreign policy. Mediating conflicts is also critical to increase their international prestige. Their perceived neutrality and ability to deploy substantial economic incentives to bolster peace agreements has afforded them some notable successes where others have failed (Ragab, 2017). The Gulf states desire is to enhance their international reputation as serious partners in the fight against extremism, a policy repeatedly advocated for by President Trump. Their security interventions in Africa have been motivated by objectives to protect economic interests, enhance their power projection capabilities, and also to improve their international reputation. In addition to economic interests, Gulf states have also expanded their security presence. They are supporting anti-piracy efforts in waters off Somalia, enhanced their military projection capabilities by building their first overseas bases in the Horn of Africa (Manjang, 2017). The United Arab Emirates as a matter of fact is likely to follow suit in the military, economic and diplomatic sphere. It has also increased its military cooperation with some African states and plays a more prominent role in international operations across the world.

The expansion of the Gulf states’ security influence in Africa has been possible thanks to their ability to wield their growing economic power. Their security interventions have been principally motivated by threats emanating from the Horn of Africa. Piracy and terrorism as cited, were among the major threats that led to the upgrade of the African Horn’s importance in the Saudi and Emirati foreign policy agendas (Taylor, 2016). Seeing threats from Al-Qaeda offshoots across the Sahel to the Al-Shabaab movements in Somalia that had developed close ties with the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states recognized that across the Horn of Africa countries; hosts of violent and extremist groups were ranged against both their interests and the security of their nations (Guzansky, 2015).
The Role of GCC in Trade and Investment

Generally, the Gulf states are intervening more assertively in Sub-Saharan Africa to capitalize on economic opportunities their security interests. They view Africa as a relatively uncontested arena in which they can experiment with foreign interventions as part of their strategy to prove their rising status on the world stage. Thus, expanding their economic influence in the region has provided them with important source of leverage to advance their security and diplomatic goals (Khatib, 2013). Furthermore, they have advanced their strategies of economic diversification and reduced reliance on oil by investing in African markets, which became even more critical when oil prices crashed in 2014. UAE invested an estimated $11 billion in the capital in Africa in 2016, overtaking Saudi Arabia- to become the largest GCC investor and the second largest in the world after China (Odhiambo, 2015). Building economic ties in Africa has helped the Gulf states to capitalize on their geostrategic location, increase their food security, and enhance their reputation as benevolent Muslim actors. It is clear that the Gulf states’ geostrategic location explains why Africa has been their focus economic activity. By investing in infrastructure development and trade, they are able to benefit from Asian trade and investment flows to Africa. As facts, China pledged $60 billion in financing to Africa in 2018 alone increased its total trade with Africa by 180% from 2010 to 2017.

Although Gulf states have traded with Africans for centuries, the global financial crisis of 2008 motivated them to deepen their economic ties with them. With economies in the Western countries slowing down, Africa’s fast-growing economies and expanding middle classes became an increasingly attractive prospect for investors across the world. It is worth to recall that key factors prompted Gulf states to turn to Africa and principally to its Horn region are building economic ties to capitalize on their geostrategic location, increase their food security, and enhance their reputation of ‘philanthropic policy’ (Kerr, 2013).

Opportunities

Gulf states exports to East Africa and its Horn region are still dominated by oil and gas (Peel, 2013). Traditional imports include primary resources like precious stones, copper and food. Their companies have heavily invested in banking, agriculture, extractive industries, real estate, retail, education and, above all, transport. More so, they have provided significant aid to the region, especially in the form of soft loans. Much of this aid has been provided bilaterally with no conditionalities and has substantially increased in the recent past in both volume and sectoral spread. Since 2011, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia ‘have generated new aid mechanisms, including non-restricted cash grants, injections to central banks, and in-kind oil and gas deliveries,’ and have given significant amounts to facilitate private investments.

In summary, Gulf States aid and its private sector have tended to focus on different infrastructure areas. The majority of state funds have gone to transport and energy projects, while the telecom sector has been the main infrastructure focus of the private sector. Furthermore, Gulf states have provided a substantial labour market for East African nationals. With respect to the economic aspect of Gulf-East Africa relations in general, there is significant potential for investment in transport.

However, in agriculture and other sectors, Qatar and Kuwait are displaying a timid presence and their prospects for promising investments are still embryonic and have thus far yielded mixed results. Trade continues to be largely one-sided: The Gulf states export oil and import a rather limited list of consumable goods (mainly agricultural products). The extent of further investment will depend on oil prices, which have been low for a considerable time, but will also require Gulf states to diversify their economies, if they are to continue to grow and provide for their own people. More practical, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have overtly provided critical diplomatic and financial support to help both Eritrea and Ethiopia to take first steps toward a rapprochement policy that could prove beneficial for wider Horn stability.

UAE’s active role in Horn of Africa peace-making process is recognized through their investment in ports as strategic sectors to shape political and economic alliances in the region. Thus, UAE’s presence heralded a new era in their foreign policy that placed an important significance on the Horn of Africa, which straddles the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden; vital passageways for international shipping (Harman, 2013). The quartet of nations that comprise of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and dominant but landlocked Ethiopia, are therefore guardians of global trade. The region, once one of Africa’s most unstable and a locus for violent conflict, in 2018, completed a stunning year of peacemaking, beginning with the policy rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Although, Gulf states’ aid and investment in the region has been a lifeline, notably for many Somalis. However, the rivalries between them, increasingly on display for influence around the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa, have brought a dangerous new twist to Somalia’s instability. Mogadishu’s adoption of a position of strict neutrality between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf states is quite hypothetical. It is time that Gulf
states should cease meddling in Somalia’s domestic politics; and Somalia’s various actors should stop exploiting for their own gains (Katz, 2017).

Countries of the Horn of Africa region have clearly been content with giving Saudi Arabia and UAE a significant credit, given the summits based in the Gulf and the frequent visits between top leadership. In many ways, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are serving as external backers of the deals. Their increasingly prominent role is noticeable in the absence of traditional power structures in the region unless they are ‘proposed’ to play a subcontracting or secondary role in this part of Africa.

Recently, there has been a flurry of activity in the Horn of Africa, where decades-old political disputes have temporarily been put to rest. The resulting changes are about to shatter the status quo in the region, putting it on a new path where state-to-state relations; no longer marked by regional competition and frozen borders. While this has undoubtedly been a positive development for the region, one big piece of the puzzle remains - the role of external actors in the process and the degree to which these developments are organic or externally imposed. One fact is that Saudi Arabia and UAE influence in the region has only expanded since Gulf crisis, even at the expense of Qatar. They have leveraged their growing economic, security and diplomatic influence in the region in an attempt to push back on their rivals’ influence and gain international backing in disputes. They have promised aid and investment, offered to enhance security cooperation, and even agreed to improve African migrants’ rights in Gulf states, at the same time encouraging African states to give them diplomatic support. They have used these tools of influence to convince some African states to downgrade their ties with Iran, thereby containing its presence in the Horn of Africa (Manjang, 2017).

Risks and Opportunities

African states have been most significantly affected by the fallout of the 2017 Gulf dispute, which highlighted the risks and opportunities created by the Gulf states’ zero-sum rivalry. It has also revealed that although they hold influence, they have not yet managed to achieve the loyalty of most African states. On the contrary, some African countries have managed to benefit from the crisis by enhancing economic ties with some of them and playing them off against each other. For instance, South Africa increased its commercial trade with Qatar by 70% helped Qatar to overcome its subsequent food insecurity resulting from regional isolation after the blockade was imposed. More importantly, is their approach to security matters in the region; Gulf states’ credentials as serious partners in fighting extremism, terrorism, piracy and share the burden to solve disputes remain to be seen. Also, they could benefit from working in partnership with principally African Union and its Regional Economic Communities through committing significant resources to prevent disputes. Their policymakers have to be sensitive and continue to broaden and deepen their ties with African states (Kerr, 2013).

Such engagement will help ensure that African governments continue to view them as attractive partners and make interventions safer and more sustainable. Part of this approach should involve building people-to-people ties. Lastly, Gulf states can expand opportunities for educational exchange, training collaborations, and tourism links with countries in the region.

Conclusion

In summary, the current picture of the Gulf states’ involvement in the Horn of Africa is mixed. The overwhelming financial investment in the region is only partly true; a number of projects have either underperformed or are yet to materialize. Moreover, low returns on existing projects may lead the Gulf states to write off many of their loans. However, some points are still daunting; if Gulf states as important players can maintain their commitment. After all, the ‘Gulf states’ interests in can have significant opportunities to counterbalance the already unequal distribution of power within their own region’. Inversely, in the absence of coherent and homogeneous policy, present turmoil in the region will sharply escalate as the Horn of Africa has already been militarized. Gulf states possible and foreseeable role as actors of peace, security and prosperity in the Horn of Africa should not be granted open doors for more uncertainty and instability.
Endnotes


xii. William Brown, Sophie Harman, 2013, eds, African Agency in International Politics, Routledge,


About the Author

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Dr. Zaglami is also an External Examiner at Mauritius University 2016-2019.
4. EVOLVING PEACE TRENDS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR REVITALIZING INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD)

Mehari Taddele Maru
Executive Summary

Strategically positioned at the major geopolitical and geo-economic nexus of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region belongs to the African and Middle Eastern economic, religious, historical, migratory, trade and security zones. It possesses a long coastline with deep natural ports and a busy maritime domain that links Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Europe.

The presence of four peacekeeping missions with more than 50,000 that comprise of the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peacekeeping troops (Darfur-Sudan, Abyei, Somalia, South Sudan) (UN, 2019) and of hundreds of thousands of foreign military forces, accentuates the peace and security challenges of the IGAD region. Constituting one-seventh of the global displaced population, the number of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees stands at more than 10 million (UNHCR, 2018). The IGAD is also a region of secessionist movements, of which some have been successful in achieving independence (South Sudan from Sudan, and Eritrea from Ethiopia), and others exercising de facto independence, such as Somaliland from Somalia.

In consequence of tectonic shifts triggered both by a strategic global competition of great powers and undercurrent upheavals in its immediate Middle East neighbourhood as well as changes in domestic political landscapes, IGAD is now a region in fast transition. This policy brief examines whether or not these ongoing changes in the region present opportunities for another round of revitalization of IGAD institutions, and if so, what areas of IGAD should be transformed. The policy brief deals with six key points concerning the requisite processes and concludes with a series of recommendations for a further phase of institutional revitalization. The key points are:

Key Points

Despite hopeful trajectories of political transformation, fast-growing economies and infrastructure-led integrative opportunities, three decades after the establishment of IGAD, the region remains far from achieving its vision of transformation into a peaceful, integrated, prosperous and democratic region.

Extreme poverty, rising population, extremely high levels of youth unemployment, lack of constitutional democratic governance constitute major challenges. Distrust among the member states of IGAD remains a source of instability and impediment for faster integration. Regional instability arising from pressures exerted by global and regional external powers contributes to the instability.

IGAD’s notable past successes include peace and security initiatives and coordinating planning of infrastructural developments. If infrastructural growth is maintained, IGAD could soon become one of the leading, perhaps the leading, integrative Regional Economic Communities in Africa.

In order to maintain the new, optimistic trajectories of change in the region, transformation in IGAD, as an institution, and its Member States will be necessary. IGAD must focus on building the capabilities of the Member States to deliver and distribute public goods with a degree of inclusivity to bestow legitimacy; enhance security provisions and mobilise resources. Such a transformation would also require significant reform in IGAD itself through a change in its mandate and institutional setup.

Background

IGAD Region Socioeconomic situation

The total land area of the IGAD member states covers 5.2 million km² of territory, with a population of well over 226 million people. Agriculture remains the backbone of the regional economy, employing the overwhelming majority of the population, although contributing less than half of member states’ total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (IGAD, 2019a). Most member states of IGAD belong to the world’s Least Developed Countries and half of their overall populations live below the poverty line. Nationals of IGAD member states earn United States Dollar (USD) 1,000 on average a year, less than Africans in the remaining sub-Saharan countries, where yearly earnings average about USD 1,624. The region as a whole (in particular Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan) is one of the world’s highest recipients of international aid (IGAD, 2019a). A region of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, IGAD faces severe climatic changes and environmental degradation. Heavily dependent on

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agriculture and livestock, the region is prone to persistent extremes of drought and flooding. Thanks to protracted conflicts and unresponsive governance, its populations experience recurrent droughts and disasters that all too easily fester into grave food insecurity or even famine. In the arid borderlands, droughts are frequent and often devastating and can cause deaths and major population displacement and communal clashes over scarce pastures and water resources.

IGAD Institutions

IGAD was launched in November 1996. It replaced the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea and South Sudan achieved independence and subsequently joined IGAD as its seventh- and eighth-member states.

IGAD has four key organs. The Assembly is the supreme policy-making body and is composed of heads of state and government; the Council of Ministers which comprise of member states’ ministers of foreign affairs and serves as a decision-making body; the Committee of Ambassadors serves as the members’ permanent representative body and is made up of ambassadors of member states accredited to IGAD. The Secretariat serves as the executive branch of IGAD.

The Secretariat has four core functions. First, it serves as a powerhouse for IGAD and its various organs. It is the body responsible for conducting the day-to-day affairs of IGAD and more importantly, for providing expertise to the key organs and coordinates their activities (IGAD, 1966) (IGAD, 1996)xxx. Secondly, the Secretariat represents IGAD in all international and continental relations and in this capacity promotes and defends the organisation’s interests (IGAD, 1996). Third, it facilitates the convening of the summit and other meetings of member states to discuss and decide on common agenda items; it is the single most continuous platform for setting normative processes (IGAD, 1996) (UNECA, 2016)xxxi. Fourth, the Secretariat disseminates mutually agreed-upon norms and decisions taken. It also supervises the implementation of IGAD decisions. More importantly, it prepares IGAD’s strategic plan and budget in consultation with other organs of IGAD.

IGAD Achievements and Challenges

Achievements

IGAD is an infrastructure-focused Regional Economic Community (REC) (see Table 1 below). It has also achieved much in the area of peace and security by way of member states-led mediation efforts-- in Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan.

Table 1: Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Integration Index Year 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REC</th>
<th>Trade integration</th>
<th>Regional infrastructure</th>
<th>Productive integration</th>
<th>Free movement of people</th>
<th>Financial and macroeconomic integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average of eight RECs</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IGAD and integrationist infrastructural development

Although rarely studied by researchers or covered by mainstream media, IGAD has facilitated regional infrastructural development and responses to drought and resilience, particularly in border areas. According to the UNECA 2016 Integration Report, IGAD heads all RECs by almost two points (although it lags in other areas) (UNECA, 2016). With the support of the African Development Bank (AfDB), it has coordinated design and implementation of an ambitious IGAD Regional Infrastructure Master Plan (IRIMP), including a regional hydroelectric power pool (ADB, 2018). Airline connectivity in the region is among the most advanced on the African continent (UNECA, 2016).

Peace and security

IGAD has achieved much by way of member states-led mediation efforts in Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan. The peace and security agenda is a central role for which IGAD has been long recognized by the international community. IGAD’s key role in regional peace processes in Sudan and Somalia is well established, including and dates back to a bid by IGADD to end long-standing security problems by actively supporting regional peace processes, in particular in Sudan and Somalia. The actions included support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) and IGAD-led mediation in South Sudan (IGAD, 2013) (IGAD, 2019) (EU Commission, 2014). Furthermore, IGAD played a vital role in the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM (IGAD, 2019d).

Challenges

For many years the fundamental challenges facing IGAD revolved around extreme poverty; the predatory nature of states; undemocratic and corrupt political and social mobilisations; and unwarranted interference from regional and global strategic forces in the Middle East and beyond. In the past, long-standing animosity and mutual distrust between IGAD member states had inhibited progress at national and regional levels. Such distrust also opens up room for member states to succumb to pressure from external actors. The region also faces serious border and trans-boundary resource disputes between member states, which have led to diplomatic and, at times, military confrontation.

Nine ‘megatrends’, all of them transformative in nature, will determine the peace and development of the IGAD region. They are respectively: population growth and youth unemployment; public demand for economic delivery and constitutional democracy with stiff electoral contestations; climate change and a surge in demand for water, food, and energy security; fast information and technological connectivity and infrastructural development; an increase in devolution and decentralization; rise in cross-border cooperation and mobility; surge in exploration and extraction of natural resources (oil, gas, gold, and minerals); trans-boundary natural resource disputes; and global geopolitical competition in the Red Sea strait and beyond.

De jure, if not de facto, the IGAD region has highly decentralized and devolved member states, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan and Sudan, with constitutional systems that incorporate federal or devolutionary elements (IGAD, 2016). The trend in the region is towards competitive elections. Such a shift will certainly test and stress the professional neutrality, public accountability and institutional independence and strength of election management bodies and other entities such as the police, military and security forces. The IGAD Strategy 2020 document and its detailed sector strategies, therefore, dwell at length on these mega-trends. Since 2002, IGAD has tried to streamline its relations with member states’ Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in general, but without much success (Maru, Ahmed, & Abdalla, 2017). Progressive provisions concerning CSOs written into national constitutions are undermined by restrictive legislation and regressive implementation.

Revitalizing IGAD

In the light of regional megatrends and recent ongoing changes, IGAD as an institution needs another round of revitalization. Crucially, it is governments’ responsiveness that will dictate the pace of this process, and it is good governance that will determine regional peace and security, and the consequences associated with the mega-trends. National states and sub-national entities are the central actors in the transformation of the region, without which there will be no peace and security, governance, development or stability. But this proposition begs the question of precisely what pathways will lead to better-performing IGAD institutions?

The new dynamics, domestic, regional and global, offer opportunities and present challenges for the peace and security agenda in the region and IGAD. The recent surge in shuttle diplomacy and mediation in the IGAD region, though mainly stemming from domestic political changes and ongoing upheavals in member states, could offer new opportunities for cooperation in peace, security, and economic integration in the region. The opportunities extend also to cooperation to the maritime domain, partic-
Ministers instructed the finalization of a draft Treaty that aims to replace the 1996 IGAD Establishing Agreement and to establish new organizational structures for the implementation of the same Treaty once adopted (IGAD, 2012). For almost seven years, IGAD Secretariat has been waiting to present the draft Treaty and other similar instruments of reform to Ordinary Sessions of the policy organs.

Recently on 27 February 2019, IGAD Council of Ministers (CoM) held its 46th ordinary session that considered agenda items related to IGAD institutional setup (IGAD, 2019). In ordinary sessions of the policy organs, the rotation of Chairperson of IGAD will be considered after a decade of Ethiopian chairmanship, widely viewed as a key area of reform. It is to be recalled that earlier, on 21 June 2018, Ethiopia had announced that it would call an Ordinary IGAD Assembly in which it will hand over its chairmanship (IGAD, 2018a; Paanluel Media, 2018). On 16 November, IGAD decided to call for an Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers for December 2018 (IGAD, 2018b). In the same session, the Ministers decided to consider all matters of the IGAD organizational structure contained in a draft Treaty and Human Resource Protocol on Governance (IGAD, 2009e). Implementation of these progressive, normative instruments could usher in a new period of a reinvigorated IGAD with a refreshed mantra for poverty eradication and constitutional democracy as the new frontiers of progress.

**Conclusion**

It is a widely held view that democracies do not go to war with one another; they never experience famines; they have more peaceful transitions; and they respect human rights more consistently than do other forms of government. The more effective the government, the more likely are guarantees of socio-economic development. The simplest way to the economic-security nexus is to broadly define security as ‘human’ security, which encompasses economic development, social justice and hard physical protection (Annan, 2000). In parallel with the regional transition, IGAD’s institutions need to be reformed in order to ensure a smooth passage to the desired destination. Only interventions that support the transformation process can ensure that regional crises are gradually reduced and eventually eliminated. As regards to peace and security, transformation demands a build-up in IGAD’s predictive, preventive, responsive and adaptive capabilities.


**Recommendations**

**Overhaul the IGAD Secretariat**

While member states are the component parts, the Secretariat is the engine on which IGAD depends, not only for its effective functioning but also for its ability to achieve the objectives set out in various documents, including the establishing agreement and (when ratified) the treaty. These functions can only be performed if major constraints that have hindered IGAD since its creation are removed.

- First and foremost, it would be necessary to remove the present, unduly limited mandate through radical internal reform of the Secretariat, bestowing a wider mandate through a revised draft Treaty.

- Second, IGAD needs more human and financial resources to discharge such a robust mandate and more of the resource needed by IGAD should come from the member states. IGAD needs to increase and also pay their assessed contribution on time, in addition to seeking alternative sources of funding.

- Third, IGAD should be mandated to recruit more competent staff based on merit and – to a limited degree – country representation.

- Fourth, and lastly, IGAD need to end norm-setting, and utilize resources for norm-implementation in collaboration with member states.

- IGAD must urgently revise the draft Treaty, so as to consider recent changes in the region, and introduce the necessary IGAD institutional reforms.

- By adopting and implementing the draft Protocol on Governance, IGAD must address the governance deficit, which is one of the main causes, accelerators and triggers of threats to regional peace and security.

- IGAD should empower democratic citizenry, addressing the ills arising from the current surge in sectarian identity politics, to build and maintain constitutional democracy through public institution-building.

- Most IGAD member states will have elections in 2020-2022 that are expected to become competitive and contested and may result in election-related violence. IGAD needs to assist member states more effectively to develop their capabilities to govern elections by investing in democratic institutions such as election bodies, the judiciary, police and the armed forces sufficient to deal with greater numbers of electoral contests.

- IGAD should build a responsive political and governance system to ensure stability. To address these issues member states need to introduce ‘progressive decentralisation’ that enhances integrative and human rights regimes and offers effectively accommodates a diversity of geographic, identity and religious and makes for the balanced development of centres and peripheries.

- Implementation of the principle of subsidiarity at the national level must be ensured, to give effect to the ultimate aim of governance, which is to enable local communities and authorities to govern and run their own public affairs. Such a process lays stress on the need for building local capacities, not only at a central state level but also at that of local communities.

- IGAD must act urgently and comprehensively on youth unemployment through education, pro-poor and labour-intensive investments designed to reduce social unrest and irregular migration, and facilitate youth employment.


About the Author

Mehari Taddele Maru holds a Doctorate of Legal Sciences (PhD) from JL Giessen University, Germany, an MPA from Harvard, USA, and an MSc from the University of Oxford, UK, as well as an LLB from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. He has more than 20 or so years of management and professional working experience in the African Union (AU), Addis Ababa.
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His recent book entitled The Kampala Convention and Its Contributions to International Law, examines the African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (known as the Kampala Convention).

Endnotes


THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION IN FOSTERING THE EMERGING PEACE PROCESS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (HOA)

Onesmus Gichuru
Executive Summary

Ever since the inception of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 1999, the efficacy of African solutions to African problems has never been as pronounced as it is currently realised in the Horn of Africa (HoA). As one of the world’s most politically dynamic regions, the HoA has invited a preconceived notion of interminable interstate and intrastate conflicts, poor governance and wanton disregard of civil liberties that have span for the last three decades. However, the changing political dynamics vested on the principles of ‘regionalism’ and mutual cooperation between regional mechanisms and APSA have redefined the roles and relationship between AU subsidiary, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the African Union (AU). The emerging peace process in the HoA, which is an accelerated interstate peace negotiation process, is marked with reinforcement of primacy of AU regional mechanisms in HoA’s peace interventions, enhancement of planning and coordination of regional peace mechanism and the redefinition of the space for AU in HoA.

Introduction

For the last three decades, the Horn of Africa has been considered one of the world’s most politically volatile regions where a combination of geopolitical forces and regional ambitions by various HoA governments has resulted in regional fragility (Hailemariam, 2019). Past security interventions in HoA have been marked by shifting patterns of external alliances which have been singled out as principle drivers of the aggravation of conflicts. With the increase of multipolarity in the global arena, embarking on external forces and alien interventions has only proved impotent in easing dissensions within the region as the forces have principally pursued their distinct self-interests rather than regional stability. Against this backdrop, the AU remains the strategic entity for coordination of peace-building initiatives in the region as it is governed by institutional frameworks, procedures, interaction processes and mechanisms, norms and principles that are designed to provide African solutions to African security, governance and development challenges.

In a bid to finding a lasting solution to the inherent security concerns in the HoA, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, shortly after taking office as the new prime minister of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and becoming the de facto chairperson of IGAD in April 2018, began a transformative journey of strategic regional engagement of different regional administrations for peace-building based on the principles, systems and structures created by IGAD (Byiers, 2019). Against this backdrop, this brief seeks to contribute to an understanding of the emerging peace process in the HoA and the role for the AU in fostering it. The brief will therefore seek to address three questions: first, what are the antecedents and dynamics of the emerging peace processes in the HoA? Second, how is the emerging peace process in the HoA defining the strategic role of regional mechanisms (RMs)? And third, how is the emerging regional peace-building mechanism redefining the role of the AU vis-à-vis the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity in the HoA security agenda? This paper is

Key Points

HoA’s emerging peace mechanism is founded on changing political dynamics vested on the principles of ‘regionalism’ and mutual cooperation between IGAD’s mechanisms and APSA.

IGAD institutional building is critical in HoA’s regional peace mechanism.

The role for the AU in fostering HoA’s peace process is founded on the norms of complementarity.

An optimal and sustainable peace and security outcome in HoA is reinforced by enhanced interface between AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) and IGAD.
The emerging peace process in the HoA

The HoA has been one of the most fragile regions in the world that has attracted many regional and international players on an individual capacity or through the UN-AU cohesive intervention through the principle of subsidiarity. The AU-APSA has been involved directly through commissioning of peace missions such as African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) or indirectly by engaging RM's to intervene on the basis of norms of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘competitive advantage.’ The efficacy of the AU’s interventions and achievement in the HoA have been vested on the concept that sustainable peace is better achieved when conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms are driven by the AU’s regional subsidiaries, especially on problems that transcend the national borders (Møller, 2005). This arrangement is explicitly stipulated in the AU 2002 Protocol upon which the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is established and the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The AU has therefore been instrumental in driving and coordinating the peace-process in the HoA.

As a politically dynamic region, local solutions to local problems were paramount since past interventions through foreign means have been deemed ineffective and bearing their own risks as they failed to establish and address the root causes of conflict embedded in resource economics and geopolitics (Tran, 2019). In this regard, the emerging peace process in the HoA founded on the basis of addressing the root causes of conflict in the HoA by engaging more of interstate diplomacy rather than militarization. The AU in this regard has been coordinating the peace process through its regional subsidiary mechanisms in the HoA as well as providing requisite technical, financial, information, humanitarian and diplomatic support to attain an optimal peace outcome (Dias, 2013).

However, the emerging processes in the HoA have not been established on a predetermined path but an event born out of failed interventions. The events of the presiding peace-building efforts by the AU and UN in what was considered a contravention of ‘norms of subsidiarity’ escalated tension in the HoA hence exposing the reality of uncoordinated modalities of peace-building in the HoA. The emerging peace process has been founded on the recognition of the potency of AU decentralization of roles and division of labour through regional mechanism in enhancing coordination, ownership and operational harmonisation of the peace building initiative.

The emerging peace mechanism in the HoA is based on the cognition that political dynamisms affecting peace in the region can better be addressed by the AU’s regional mechanisms rather than international intervention due to their vantage proximity and better understanding of the region. The peace-building mechanism is therefore centred on addressing historical legacies and regional rivalries that have prevented previous regional security intervention. In this regard, the AU acknowledges the need for capacity building and institutional coordination at the inter-state level as a mechanism to implement subsidiarity. Rather than the politically driven approach that is implemented by international bodies such as NATO and the UN, the emerging AU subsidiary-driven approach is holistic and contextual in nature. The process has been characterised by maximising outcomes of the peace-building process using resources already at the organisation disposal and mobilising regional and international support on areas that do demand additional resources (Lucey et al. 2016).

Central to the emerging peace process and the tremendous achievement of the AU regional mechanism in peace-building, is Dr. Abiy Ahmed, the new Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and IGAD chairman. Within the period he has been in office, which is less than a year, Dr. Abiy Ahmed has become synonymous with regional peace and normalisation of interstate relationship in the HoA. His strategy of expediting peace-building process has been characterised by upholding the tenets of national unity and regional cohesion through local and regional engagement. In less than one year, Ethiopia’s reforms have potentially bolstered its leadership and position as a unifying force that could result in expediency stability of the HoA. The recent achievements of the HoA interstate peace-building initiative was the signing of the Ethiopia- Eritrea peace deal, therefore, sought to restore national cohesion, normalisation of relationship with Eritrea, moderating negotiations normalisation between Eritrea and Djibouti.

The revitalisation of the peace process has sought to showcase the relevance of regional mechanisms in the HoA’s peace-building. The expedited regional peace building effort in the HoA revolves around the implementation of the regions strategic aspirations characterised by; (1) establishment of root causes of conflict involving all the warring countries; (2) identifying the conditions that would ensure peace agreements work; and (3) ascertaining the validity of peace building mechanisms on each problem, and scheduling plans to sustain elements.
of the agreements. This mechanism follows a sequence of events that seek to support warring member states renew or forge new diplomatic relationships, build stronger regional institutional frameworks and enhance capacities for sustaining peace such as stronger conflict early-warning mechanism, peace-building financing mechanisms and a more integrated economic, social and political regional organisation (EC, 2019).

The AU thus far, however, has not been directly involved in the emerging peace processes in the HoA. The new realities of peace-building processes have therefore served to strengthen HoA’s regional mechanisms in after AU’s failure to manage the HoA’s conflict due to its inefficiency:

The emerging peace process has been reinforcing local mechanisms primacy in the regions interventions: Historically different external players fragmented the approach (Rwengabo, 2016). Primary to enhancing regional peace mechanism, increased regional engagement and involvement of regional political actors have significantly decreased polarisation and chart a new path of a more vibrant, institutionalised and inclusive regional framework, hence the increasing negotiations and peace-agreement in the region.

Emerging peace process has been enhancing regional planning and coordination: A previous local intervention in the HoA as in the case of South Sudan was hampered by competing national interests, where an intrastate conflict led to interstate differing interests (UNDP, 2019). In 2013, after the outbreak of war on South Sudan, the AU subsidiary in the HoA established a mediation team made up of Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. However, the effectiveness of the approach was impaired by Uganda’s and Sudan’s self-interests where Uganda deployed its military to support the government of South Sudan fight against the rebels supported by Sudan. Before regional AU subsidiary entities endorsed the AU and the UN, UNSC took charge and acting blindly escalated the situation (Vertin, 2018).

In addressing this underlying challenge attributed to lack a regional hegemony to offer guidance and coordination of peace process in the region, current economic revitalisation, democratic reforms and regional integration in Ethiopia is gradually legitimising the country’s position. The country is deliberately streamlining its relationship with other regional countries and leveraging on the significance of other regional political and economic powers such as Kenya in building goodwill.

The emerging peace process has served to redefine the role of the AU in fostering peace in the HoA within the norms of complementarity and competitive advantage: The accelerated peace process in the HoA has exposed significant fissures of liabilities associated with ‘subsidiarity’ such as inadequate financing. The AU in this case primacy in mobilising requisite financial and political support under the principles of complementarity and competitive advantage.

**Role of the AU in Fostering Emerging Peace Processes in the HoA**

The AU as the supreme continental body is at a strategic position in fostering the emerging peace process in the HoA. Acting on behalf of AU in the region is IGAD whose efficacy in the peace process is dependent of AU’s support and coordination. To achieve fostering a sustainable peace process gradually taking place in the HoA, the AU’s complementary initiatives are of critical importance:

The AU Influences international recognition of the HoA’s regional mechanisms effort and primacy in advancing peace in the region

Information coordination: the AU acts as a buffer between the Western powers and IGAD by consistently shaping and transmitting complex messages between western powers and the HoA’s regional arrangements such as the dynamics of the revision of the South – Sudan stabilisation strategy and interregional and cross-border refugee situation as a result of both inter- and intrastate dissensions.

**Complementing Efforts and Initiatives Driven by Regional Mechanisms**

Mobilising financial support: Although the emerging peace process has been marked by incredible achievement, resource constraints and limited technical capabilities to reach out to all stakeholders restrict the efficacy of regional peace-building mechanisms, a reality that has prompted the AU through the norms of complementarity mobilize continental and international support to buttress the emerging peace process in the HoA. The AU therefore is strategic in addressing the actual and potential subsidiarity liabilities through the facilitation of human, technical, technological, information and financial resources to foster capability and capacity of the AU subsidiary in the HoA and stakeholders for peace-building.

Coordinating military cooperation and peace process in Somalia: There is a general recognition of limited regional capacities and especially financial resources in addressing terrorism in Somalia and the neighbouring states.
Mobilising and building technical capacity for regional peace building mechanisms: Strengthening the position of regional mechanisms by the AU through capacity development of the negotiators is critical as it helps mitigate the previous challenges that prevented a regional based process. Previous interventions in the HoA through regional interventions were plagued by disunity among the intervening regional states, hence serving to weaken the organisation’s leverage of AU’s peace-building in the region.

**Conclusion**

The emerging peace process in the HoA has redefined and asserted the position and roles of AU in the HoA’s security intervention. In fostering sustainability of the emerging peace process in the HoA, the AU recognises and supports the successes of RM’s and hence stands as a complementary entity to provide coordination as well as technical and resource assistance. However, to achieve an optimal outcome in the region, there has been recognition of the need to improve linkages and effectuate communication within the AU and AU subsidiary entities in the region. Such realization would therefore facilitate effective coordination and knowledge sharing which are critical in negotiations and peace-building.

**Recommendations**

- Leveraging on IGAD’s contextual and geographical proximity, institutional capacity and competitive advantage in accelerating the emerging peace process: IGAD prides the advantage of proximity, a better conflict early-warning system and a better understanding of the political, social and security dynamics in the HoA’s warring regions that need recognition from the AU and the UN peace and security architectures. A fully functional, recognised and autonomous IGAD, showing independence in decision making would enhance a regionally-led peace-building initiative that is sequential, inclusive and coordinated.

- Complimenting IGAD’s peace-building initiative: AU should strengthen its capacity to offer complimentary support to IGAD including financial, human resources, technical and information capacities through institutional building and facilitating public, civil and public partnerships for co-financing, implementation of peace-building initiatives and co-ownership of the peace process.

- Enhancing interface between the AU’s PSC and IGAD: APSA-IGAD subsidiarity should be accompanied by the norms of comparative advantage and complementarity in practices and not only in principle. The focus in this case is therefore enhancing institutional effectiveness of IGAD through capacity development initiatives, and linking it to the AU under a mutually reinforcing notion. Such an arrangement and respect of the autonomy of IGAD under the concept of subsidiarity would help provide appropriate guidelines critical in reinforcing mechanisms for sustainable peace in the HoA directed by IGAD; hence avoiding the recurrent challenge of organisational rivalry.

- Awareness creation on legitimacy, reliability and effectiveness of the RM’s in HoA: The accelerated progress in the HoA enhances the legitimacy of the AU subsidiary entities and stakeholders in the region and aptness in examining regional barriers and enabling factors of peace-building. There should be an international recognition through awareness building by the AU of the flexibility, adaptability, proximity, persuasion, procedures, shared values of regional member states and the effectiveness of RM’s in the HoA’s peace-building initiatives which validate and safeguard its property of international legitimacy in HoA’s peace and security. As more of a ‘facilitator’ rather than and ‘implementer’ the AU should assign, support and help monitor activities in the HoA undertaken by IGAD which is the AU subsidiary entity in HoA under the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity.

- Effectively managing withdraw of AMISOM from Somalia: AMISOM precipitous withdraw in Somalia as scheduled would open doors to Alshabab’s terror action in the country and possible spill-over into HoA region. In this case, the AU should rethink its withdraw strategy and focus more on soliciting for more funds to facilitate AMISOM’s intervention in the country as well as improving coordination between the UN and regional dominated AMISOM troop and between the AU and Somali government (Okiror, 2019)³⁴. An AU coordinated mechanism would help schedule sustainable interventions in Somalia such as training and assistance of Somali military forces, cooperation between regional peace-building initiatives and the UN capacity interventions.


About the Author

With a background of economics, statistics, international cooperation, finance and development, Onesmus Gichuru is a development practitioner with a focus on regional economic cooperation (East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)). Onesmus has previous worked around border and resource conflict management, public finance management, CFTA- tariff harmonisation, commercial policy and diplomacy, participatory governance, and agricultural and arid & semi-arid livelihoods (agro-pastoralist resource conflict). He is a research consultant working for various organisations in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia on resource management, institutional building and conflict resilience model.

Endnotes


6. THE ECONOMIC DIVIDEND OF THE ETHIO-ERITREA PEACE DEAL FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA

Sadia Beshir Mohammed
Executive Summary

The Ethio-Eritrea peace deal is an unimagined phenomenon witnessed in 2018. The peace deal is welcomed by the leaders and people of the two states as well as the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) and internationally. The opening of borders, reconnection of telecommunication service, and restoration of mobility of people and commodities soon followed. It is likely that these developments and the peace accord signed between the two states in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 16 September 2018 will likely have dividends in the future and possibly have positive spillover effects to the countries in the Horn.

Background

Peacebuilding facilitates the human right to live and create a conducive environment for development. It is estimated that in 2016, the World Economy lost 14.3 trillion USD due to conflict and violence which is around 12.6% of world gross domestic product (GDP); an amount sufficient enough to support the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals from developed to developing countries ten-fold. Additionally, the challenges of development that contribute to conflicts manifested in the fact that a single least-developing country among the conflict-torn countries could not achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Further, business prospects in conflict-ridden countries are small locking many post-conflict states in aid reliance and economic instability. Besides creating a good environment for business, peace brings benefits of inducing profitable businesses in the long term.

The Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000) had claimed humanitarian, political and socio-economic costs for more than 20 years. The conflict between the nations further distorted the peace in the Horn of Africa as the clash diffused to Eritrea-Djibouti conflict on the islands of Doumeria and the discontent of Somalia on Eritrea for its support of the rebel group of Al-Shabab. Nonetheless, the winds of peace are seeming to blow across the region following the inauguration of Prime Minister Dr. Abiy in Ethiopia. He announced Ethiopia’s acceptance of the Algiers agreement on 6 June 2018 and led the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Ethio-Eritrean peace agreement was soon followed by the tripartite agreement of Ethiopia - Eritrea – Somalia and the Eritrea-Djibouti peace reconciliation. Through the restoration of economic ties through the Ethio-Eritrea peace agreement, it is expected that this will have a multiplier effect across the HoA. Of course, Eritrea’s strategic landscape and Ethiopia’s population and relative economic advantage will play a huge role to foster better economic benefit to the HoA. In line with this, this brief tries to address the potential economic returns of the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal to the nations in the Horn.

Key Points

Firstly, the Ethio-Eritrea and subsequent peace deals provide Ethiopia alternate port accesses in Eritrea and Somalia which possibly reduce its shipping cost and bring dividends to both in the long-run. Meanwhile, Djibouti’s dividend will be secured because of its comparative advantage of a port facility in the mid-term.

Secondly, the saving from military expenditure is another dividend: the Ethio-Eritrea and subsequent peace deals limit the sponsoring of rebel groups by every country in the region. Peace lessens the likely of cross-country conflicts which can reduce the budget allocated to the military.

Thirdly, changes witnessed in the landscape of the Horn of Africa (HoA) following the peace deal: The UN’s lifting of sanctions and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) interest in mining industries of Eritrea; the Country Programme Framework (CPF) for Somalia; Djibouti’s engagement on undersea telecommunication; and the financial assistance offered to Ethiopia from the bilateral and international organizations; can assist to alleviate some development bottlenecks in these countries.

Lastly, the initiation of economic zones between the two nations and economic integration within the Horn creates a good environment for FDI and Diaspora investment.
Expected Dividends from the Ethio-Eritrea Peace Deal

Dividends from Change in the Dynamics of International Maritime Outlet

Eritrea’s restored relations with Ethiopia enables Ethiopia to access its previous ports in Eritrea. This will likely bring a challenge to Djibouti’s monopoly of handling Ethiopia’s international trade, and also to Berbera and other ports, which have been the targets of Ethiopia’s diversification of outlets. A current example for this is a 23% cut down of planned investment by Dubai Ports World and Somaliland in the port of Berbera, which includes constructing a road connecting to Ethiopia.\(^\text{xix}\) Meanwhile, Djibouti has a currently comparative advantage on infrastructure and facility at a port with a well-developed rail and road transport to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which secures Djibouti’s dividend from Ethiopia in the mid-term.\(^\text{xi}\) Of course, Ethiopia and Eritrea have started to jointly build Eritrean ports and the roads connecting them\(^\text{x}\) and Ethiopia-Eritrea railway project study. Moreover, a pipeline from Addis to Assab will be built to transfer the recently begun oil production.\(^\text{xxx}\) Having these efforts, taking to account the proximity of the ports of Assab and Massawa as outlets to Northern Ethiopia, it is undoubted that Eritrea will have a better advantage as an outlet to Ethiopia than Djibouti in the long-run and its dividends from Ethiopia will be large. Meanwhile, Djibouti’s advanced port designed to accommodate the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries might bring future dividends from these countries.\(^\text{xx}\)

Moreover, another dividend of the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal could be Eritrea’s plan to build a new port closer to Danakil mining by 2025. Furthermore, after the peace agreements; Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to jointly invest on four ports which include an international highway.\(^\text{x}\) This helps Somalia to have competitive ports and dividends in the future. For Ethiopia, the alternate port access in Eritrea and Somalia will diversify its outlets and lessen shipping costs. Even though dividends are expected from the peace deal in the shipping industry, Ethiopia’s joint investment in Somali and Eritrean ports pose a challenge to a country which is in debt, therefore lags in development of the projects are expected. Extensive policy work and negotiation should also be done on areas of Ethiopia’s port access, use and fees.\(^\text{xxi}\) Moreover, the port development will likely create an environment of competition which could be an attraction to FDI to the HoA because of alternative outlets. But the competition may also lead to a conflict of interest unless negotiations on port use among the countries are made based on mutual benefit.

Dividends Beyond

Dividend from the Saving of Military Expenditure

The military cost incurred along the Ethio-Eritrean border for security purposes was large. In addition, both countries sponsored each other’s rebel groups.\(^\text{xxvii}\) The peace deal is also a dividend for Ethiopia as it will likely limit Egypt’s use of Eritrea to destabilize Ethiopia.\(^\text{xxvi}\) Thus, peace between the states will substantially decrease the budget towards the military and the deducted amount can be used in poverty reduction. A limit will also be made on sponsoring the rebel groups as most of the rebels have come to Ethiopia following the call for a peaceful struggle. More to this, Eritrean Government’s announcement to limit military service for 18 months after the peace deal with Ethiopia has a positive impact in decreasing government expenditure in the military. For Somalia; the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal will discourage Eritrea to support Al-Shabab group and this will ease Somalia’s government defeat of the peace deal.\(^\text{xxvii}\) This is, of course, a step forward to itrea’s plan to build a new port closer to Danakil mining by 2025. Furthermore, after the peace agreements; Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to jointly invest on four ports which include an international highway.\(^\text{x}\) This helps Somalia to have competitive ports and dividends in the future. For Ethiopia, the alternate port access in Eritrea and Somalia will diversify its outlets and lessen shipping costs. Even though dividends are expected from the peace deal in the shipping industry, Ethiopia’s joint investment in Somali and Eritrean ports pose a challenge to a country which is in debt, therefore lags in development of the projects are expected. Extensive policy work and negotiation should also be done on areas of Ethiopia’s port access, use and fees.\(^\text{xxi}\) Moreover, the port development will likely create an environment of competition which could be an attraction to FDI to the HoA because of alternative outlets. But the competition may also lead to a conflict of interest unless negotiations on port use among the countries are made based on mutual benefit.

Dividends Beyond

Dividend from the Saving of Military Expenditure

The military cost incurred along the Ethio-Eritrean border for security purposes was large. In addition, both countries sponsored each other’s rebel groups.\(^\text{xxvii}\) The peace deal is also a dividend for Ethiopia as it will likely limit Egypt’s use of Eritrea to destabilize Ethiopia.\(^\text{xxvi}\) Thus, peace between the states will substantially decrease the budget towards the military and the deducted amount can be used in poverty reduction. A limit will also be made on sponsoring the rebel groups as most of the rebels have come to Ethiopia following the call for a peaceful struggle. More to this, Eritrean Government’s announcement to limit military service for 18 months after the peace deal with Ethiopia has a positive impact in decreasing government expenditure in the military. For Somalia; the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal will discourage Eritrea to support Al-Shabab group and this will ease Somalia’s government defeat of the peace deal.\(^\text{xxvii}\) This is, of course, a step forward to itrea’s plan to build a new port closer to Danakil mining by 2025. Furthermore, after the peace agreements; Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to jointly invest on four ports which include an international highway.\(^\text{x}\) This helps Somalia to have competitive ports and dividends in the future. For Ethiopia, the alternate port access in Eritrea and Somalia will diversify its outlets and lessen shipping costs. Even though dividends are expected from the peace deal in the shipping industry, Ethiopia’s joint investment in Somali and Eritrean ports pose a challenge to a country which is in debt, therefore lags in development of the projects are expected. Extensive policy work and negotiation should also be done on areas of Ethiopia’s port access, use and fees.\(^\text{xxi}\) Moreover, the port development will likely create an environment of competition which could be an attraction to FDI to the HoA because of alternative outlets. But the competition may also lead to a conflict of interest unless negotiations on port use among the countries are made based on mutual benefit.

Changes on the Economy Landscape of the Horn and the Dividend Further

Some changes have been shown in the HoA following the Ethio-Eritrean peace deal. The lifting of the sanctions on Eritrea by the UN Security Council is the first. In addition to the Ethio-Eritrean war, the sanctions have made Eritrean economy stagnant since 2009.\(^\text{x}\) Secondly, FDI is flowing competitively on Eritrea’s mining company of Bisha gold-and-copper producer, and on Danakali potash mining.\(^\text{xxv}\) This flow creates an opportunity to engage Eritrean soldiers who finished their national service period, following the announcement on the limit on service period in the mining industries and port-related projects; which otherwise exacerbates the prevailing chronic unemployment and creates an obstacle to government stability.\(^\text{xxiv}\) Thirdly, labour movement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is currently taking place for cross border jobs.\(^\text{xxv}\) So the peace deal is an opportunity for Ethiopian workers to engage in mining and construction sectors of Eritrea and Somalia; and for the Eritrean labour force; it is an opportunity to explore for jobs in the HoA. Fourth, Ethiopia is getting a financial green light from the United Arab Emirates, France, Italy and the World Bank (EU). This can assist Ethiopia’s strive to develop the private sector, solve the foreign exchange shortage and create jobs for the youth. Fifth, Djibouti’s government took the move for providing its potential submarine telecommunication to Somalia and East African coastline countries after the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal.\(^\text{xxvi}\) This is, of course, a step forward to diversify its GDP from other potential sectors apart from

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ports. Besides, the peace agreements create chances of extending Djibouti’s provision of submarine telecommu-
nication to Eritrea and Ethiopia, and its extra energy re-
source\textsuperscript{lxviii} to power scarce countries like Somalia. Sixth, the
World Bank launched the CPF (2019-2022), which is the
first finance for Somalia government in 30 years, which
supports the exposure of agriculture to shocks and assist
the small and medium scale industries thereby assist the
country’s effort to provide jobs.\textsuperscript{lxix}

More to the above changes, cross-border trade be-
tween Ethiopia and Eritrea has currently fuelled up as
Eritreans buy goods from Ethiopia at a lower price.\textsuperscript{lix}
Hence, the peace deal provides Eritrea with the oppor-
tunity to access a market of 100 million people\textsuperscript{lx}
with manufactured goods and imported merchandise using
the coastline advantage. And for Ethiopian traders, they
can access the underdeveloped Eritrean market mainly
through agricultural products. Likewise, Somalia can also
trade its domestic animals to Djibouti. Further, the pri-
vate sector of Ethiopia has the possibility to engage in
mining, education, construction and other industries of
Eritrea. The Eritrean private sector can also engage in ag-
riculture and the FDI receiving industry parks of Ethiopia.
There is also a possibility that the private sector of the
countries in the HoA to participate in bids in a joint ven-
ture. The engagement in each other’s country business is
also an experience to engage in international business,
reveal the comparative advantage of each and provide
jobs in the region\textsuperscript{lxxv}. Besides, the peace provides the op-
opportunity to Ethiopian private sector in the hotel industry
to benefit from the tourism sector of Eritrea by opening
hotels on the shores of the Red Sea. Furthermore, since
Ethiopia and Eritrea share historical ties; pilgrims and visi-
tors travel to religious and cultural festivity in each other’s
countries and increase the dividend for both. This can be
further extended to the rest of the HoA. The peace deal
further stimulates the tourist industry as tourists coming
from outside the HoA into the region can also target the
others considering the interconnectivity of the countries
through transport.

Policy Recommendations

In order to materialize the ongoing and expected divi-
dends to the HoA;

- Demarcation of borders between Ethiopia and
  Eritrea as well as Djibouti and Eritrea should be
  accomplished sooner. Similar works also need to be
done in the high rate of migration from Eritrea to
Ethiopia following the peace deal since it adds bur-
den to Ethiopia. Internal instability of Ethiopia has to
be solved in order to materialize the dividends.

- Port access, use and charges need detailed negoti-
ation of Ethiopia with Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia
in order to minimize the conflict of interest that will
likely follow the operation of Eritrean and Somalia
ports.

- The ongoing agreements to establish special eco-
nomic zones or common market should have legal
and ratified agreements that consider the pros and
cons for each country. In the current world context;
economic agenda can no longer be set with few
countries\textsuperscript{lxix}, so steps should also be taken to inte-
grate to East Africa and COMESA region

Regional Integration and its Dividend

The Ethio-Eritrean peace deal has brought the prospect of integration of the HoA economies in the form of eco-
nomic zones, blocs or common market which reduces trade and investment restrictions, expands the market and
attracts FDI.\textsuperscript{lx} FDI has currently been increasing in the
mining and the telecom industry in Eritrea and Djibouti respectively after the peace deal. Accordingly, with the
formation of common economic bloc, well-developed ports and interconnected infrastructure, FDI can also be

diffused to all corners of the Horn. The FDI lessens the
foreign exchange shortage in the region\textsuperscript{lxxi} and creates
jobs. Besides of FDI, almost all of the countries have a large diaspora and remittances make up a large part of
the GDP in the service sector for Eritrea and Somalia. Thus,
the peace deals create an opportunity for the diaspora to
invest in their home countries and in the integration unit;
which indeed requires efforts of their ambassadors across
the world. However, it is important to highlight that eco-
nomic integration is not a new phenomenon in the HoA.
Ethiopia and Eritrea formed a common market in 1991
following Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia. The common
market lasted in 1998 because the balance of trade was
in favour of Eritrea due to the lack of formal agreements
that were ratified by the Ethiopian parliament; which fell
short to settle disputes in Eritrea’s usage of multiple ex-
change rates for Birr, Eritrea’s request for parity between
Birr and Nakfa, and many others.\textsuperscript{lxxii} Hence, recalling the
pitfalls from the previous common market, the ongoing
agreements for economic zones and common market
between the two countries and all countries in the Horn
should have formal, legal and ratified agreements based
on mutual benefit in order to create an institutionalized
framework of economic environment.
• Emphasis needs to be given to interconnecting the countries through transport and managing borders of neighbouring countries by establishing corridor authorities, border posts and Transport Service Agreements (TSAs) to enhance the economic returns in the HoA.
for Economics & Peace.

Ivi Dumasy, T. (2018) ‘3 reasons why supporting peace is more important than ever’.


Ixi ibid


Hauge, J.L. (2018), 'Eritrea and Ethiopia's economic dividend: what economic gains are in the peace deal between long-standing foes?


About the Author

Sadia Beshir Mohammed is an economist and team leader in the planning and program directorate of Ethiopian Roads Authority. Sadia has vast experience in planning, programming and appraising projects and also analyzing the impact of public investment. She also works on assessing the economic viability and financing development projects with bilateral and multilateral organizations. Besides, she has worked on developing indicators for monitoring and evaluation of programs and has the experience to write proceedings and briefs for speeches, negotiations and documents. Similarly, she has worked as a counterpart on supervising five projects. Moreover, she has engaged in training employees in the area of government plan on the Sector and concepts of economic analysis in developing projects. Sadia has contributed to various strategic program and implementation plan documents in the road sector. Her journal article based on her MA thesis, which is on the role of socioeconomic status and maternal health on child malnutrition is published in ONE World. She also works as a part-time transport economist with consultancy firms. Sadia’s current interests are to embark a new direction as a researcher. She has an M.A in Economics of Development from Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands in 2013 and received a scholarship from the Netherlands Fellowship Program (NFP) in this study period.