AMISOM and African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security Challenges

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Abstract
The success of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) seems to vindicate emerging scholarly and policy optimism regarding Africa’s potential to solve its peace and security problems through Africa-centred responses. To explain this African-led intervention’s success—despite Africa’s apparent institutional and resource limitations and in the context of the 1992-93 US-led Operation Restore Hope’s failures—this desk-based inquiry underlines the commitment, shared values, and ownership that typify AMISOM. I advance an “African-Centred Solutions” (AfSol) perspective that is rooted in Afro-optimist analyses which, basing on Africa’s past dealings with foreign actors, argues that “borrowed fists” cannot solve [most of] Africa’s security problems. Evidently, unlike non-Africa-centred interventions, AMISOM relied on the AfSol approach whose pillars—genuine commitment, shared Pan-African values, and a sense of ownership—engendered its success by incentivising states to withstand the Mission’s costs and to tirelessly mobilise foreign support. Throughout, Africans incorporated and reflected AfSol principles, by: initiating the Mission-building upon IGAD’s efforts; persisting amidst the Mission’s human, resource, and politico-security costs; involving both local and foreign Somalis; and integrating disparate intervention programmes into a single, AU-sanctioned Mission. AMISOM’s success underscores the need to harness Africa’s potential to address its peace and security challenges.

Keywords: AfSol, AMISOM, IGAD

Introduction

This is an inquiry into the puzzling success of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peace support operation (PSO) initiated and led by African states and international organisations with apparent incapacity to succeed where more powerful western actors had failed. From its 1991 state collapse up to the deployment of AMISOM, Somalia had no stable functioning government. But after establishing AMISOM as “a peace enforcement mission mandated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations” (Nduwimana, 2013:3),

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the Transitional Federal Government/Institution (TFG/I) was constituted and enabled to govern the country from 2008. With functioning TFIs, the parliament elected Somalia’s president more than once, and the “first permanent president” was elected in 2012 (Fisher, 2013) to lead the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Through steady engagement of the cessationist groups, support for the referendum, and technical endeavours, Somalia’s security forces, which had disintegrated, have been reconstituted and are undergoing training by AMISOM trainers (AU, 2014).

AMISOM restored peace and security, repulsing al-Shabaab from their strongholds. This pacification allowed Somali leaders to engage different stakeholders over the conflict. AMISOM forces sustained a military presence and undertook counter-radicalisation programmes (AU, 2014). These achievements are slowly restoring Somalia’s state sovereignty (Fisher, 2013). No previous intervention registered these successes, a reason why radical groups like al-Shabaab became strong. Progressive politico-security sanity returned to Somalia only after the AMISOM. Why? To explain this phenomenon, this desk research maintains that AMISOM’s “African-Centred Solutions” (AfSol) approach to the Somali question engendered the observed success by creating incentives for withstanding capacity limitations, persistence amidst the mission’s mounting costs, and integration of hitherto disparate intervention efforts into a single, more effortful, Africa-sanctioned Mission. This puzzling phenomenon is demonstrable.

The Puzzle of AMISOM’s Success

AMISOM’s achievements are puzzling because initial expectations that African states and organisations could succeed where more powerful actors had failed were dismal. UN and US interventions during the 1990s, “exacerbated rather than mitigated the problems, let alone solve them” (Moller, 2009:i; Menkhaus, 2007). Ethiopian intervention, December 2006-January 2009, also “produced utter chaos and a severe humanitarian crisis” after which Islamist extremists established control over Somalia. Moreover, the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), “was unable to deploy successfully” mainly because it lacked funding; the neutrality of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) was questionable as most of the potential TCCs neighboured Somalia. IGASOM “was also seen as a US-backed western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement” (Nduwimana, 2013:11). These failures made it appear as though Somalia had crossed the Rubicon Point
of politico-security rescue, thereby diminishing regional and continental hopes in AMISOM.

Nevertheless, AMISOM’s successes seem to underscore Africa’s hitherto underrated capability while re-echoing pan-African conviction that an AfSol approach can reliably solve Africa’s peace and security problems (Touray, 2005). A major 1990s foreign-intervention failure in Somalia was the US-led, UN-sanctioned, multinational United Taskforce (UNTAF) which followed a UN Humanitarian and Ceasefire Monitoring Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-I) that ended in December 1992. The UNTAF, a US-led Mission codenamed “Operation Restore Hope”, lasted till 4 May 1993, failing from an “alien place lacking civil order and legitimate political institutions” (Crocker, 1995:2). The UNTAF’s successor, UNOSOM-II, also wound up in 1995, leaving Somalia ungoverned (Clarke, 1997). These intervention botches climaxed with US distancing itself from African conflicts: “the Clinton administration’s refusal to respond to the genocide in Rwanda…” (Clarke and Herbst, 1996: 70) signalled to Africa that western ‘fatigue’ left Africa to fend for itself. Somalia progressively worsened: by 2007 AMISOM-related pessimism was judicious because Africa lacked UNTAF’s capabilities; the west was half-hearted about Somalia due to “Western military overstretch, advice that external intervention was likely to be treated as hostile by several armed groups, and the absence of a clear pathway from large-scale military intervention to exit and sustainable Peace” (Bellamy, 2011:6; Moller, 2009).

Further to western withdrawal, initial AU response itself was dismal, making Somalia difficult to salvage for four reasons: first, IGASOM was discussed between 2002 and 2004 but by 2006 it had not deployed because of disagreements between the AU and IGAD on one hand, and with the UN on the other; fragmented role of regional organisations; funding limitations; the UN’s failure to lift the 1992 arms embargo on Somalia; and other limiting factors internal to Africa (Mays, 2009: 3-17). Second, only Uganda and Burundi contributed troops while more powerful countries like South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria looked on. Third, Somalia’s conflict had become structural and uninviting: By 2002 the UN was pessimistic as Kofi Annan stated that “Somalia was still too dangerous for the [UN peacebuilding] Mission to deploy” (Page 2003:186). Groups like al-Shabaab reportedly hobnobbed with the fearsome al-Qaeda, thus fusing Somalia’s crisis with global terrorism that seemingly defies Africa’s potential. Fourth, AMISOM personnel were caught in a “complex insurgency of clan and Islamist opposition” which had been “the
culmination of a series of political miscalculations and misjudgements on the part of Somali and external actors since 2004” (Menkhaus, 2007: 357). Amidst this “humanitarian catastrophe” (ibid), AMISOM initially seemed “unable to bring peace”, deployed “only 6,000 of its mandated 8,000 troops”, and became “a party to the conflict” (Bellamy: 6). AMISOM’s failure appeared more imminent than its future reality proved to be. The game-changer in AMISOM, however, was the determinate desire on the part of the now frustrated African actors mainly in IGAD to rely on an Africa-centred response to the Somali crisis. This resolve is expressed in Resolution 2073 of the AU Peace and Security Council (AU, 2007).

AMISOM, “the only peace operation launched under AU command and control” and the “biggest and most complex peace operation ever conducted by the AU” (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 2), initially faced limitations of troop commitment, suffered many personnel losses (ibid : 3), and exposed the AU’s material, financial, and bureaucratic limitations. Nevertheless, the mission has scored military, political, and state-building successes. A multi-pronged criterion can be used to demonstrate this success: First, AMISOM has engaged key stakeholders on possible solutions to the conflict, thereby bringing different factions to negotiating table. Second, AMISOM helped restore minimum political-governance structures, instituting the Federal Government as a permanent central-state authority in 2012, replacing the TFG. Security was restored for government officials, humanitarian service-providers, and people (Segui 2013). Effective engagement of the UN led to supportive UN Security Council resolutions (Table 2) extending AMISOM’s mandates and enhancing its international support (AU, 2012 and 2014). Third, AMISOM engineered state restoration processes by training Somalia’s security forces mainly from Jazeera Training Center, undertaking police training, extension of state authority via confidence-building, providing political goods (AU, 2014), and facilitating negotiations between competing groups. Finally, al-Shabaab’s military advances of 2005-2012 were reversed through Operation Indian Ocean, Operation Eagle, Battles of Gashandiga, Mogadishu, Kismayo, Elwark, and others (Mooulid, 2011; AU, 2012 and 2014). By 2012 AMISOM was very promising despite expectations to the contrary, because African actors, under AMISOM, had overcome the previously fragmented approach (Mays 2009) and put the whole Mission under the AU; effectively engaged the international community (Fisher, 2012); and exhibited persistence amidst the initial challenges they encountered in Somalia. Consequently, “The overall political developments in Somalia
remain encouraging, with evidence of progress in the State formation process, constitutional review, and preparations for elections by 2016” (AU, 2014:2). Considering Somalia’s condition before the operation, previous failures between 1992 and 2006, and the initial challenges of AMISOM, these successes are puzzling.

Explaining the above puzzle contributes vitally to understanding and managing Somalia’s and Africa’s peace and security challenges. Such an effort underscores AMISOM’s key ingredient which previous interventions lacked; stresses AfSol’s potentialities in addressing Africa’s security issues; rekindles Africa’s need to trust in and develop its peace and security potential; and builds on other Africa-centred successes especially in West Africa (Draman and Carment, 2001). Possible explanations for AMISOM’s successes may include: the foreign support thesis; intervening states’ selfish interests (Fisher, 2012; de Waal, 2009); and the war-state-making thesis (Tilly, 1990). These explanations are, however, inadequate for they cannot methodologically and empirically link past failures in Somalia to AMISOM’s successes. I will analyse these viewpoints before stressing the AfSol approach. Caveat: saying that AMISOM succeeded by no means implies that Somalia’s insecurity has been erased quite the contrary (Anderson and McKnight, 2014). “Success” is herein measured based on a multi-pronged criterion stressing the failure of previous interventions mainly, Operation Restore Hope and IGASOM; AMISOM’s achievements vis-à-vis pre-AMISOM politico-security and humanitarian conditions; restoration of the state; and comparison with equally successful PSOs in Africa, particularly in West Africa where regional intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone rescued states from collapse (Pitts, 1999; Draman and Carment, 2001). While AMISOM, unlike ECOMOG, found an already-collapsed Somali state, “ECOMOG’s efforts in Liberia have helped the region as a whole” by providing “a rapid but positive learning experience for the peacekeeping nations of West Africa, improved regional stability, and an emerging regionally-based conflict management capacity” (Draman and Carment, 2001:iii). AMISOM’s successes, while not an end to Somalia’s deep-seated politico-security challenges, constitute building blocks upon which Somalia will be rebuilt.

The rest of the chapter begins with conceptual and methodological issues, by, first, outlining research methods, and then conceptualizing AfSol. The empirical section focuses on AfSol and AMISOM’s successes. It begins with an outline of the background to AMISOM, its initial setbacks, its fatalities, and demonstrates the
relationship between each of AfSol principles and AMISOM’s success. Thereafter, I outline potential counter-arguments, and the implications of AMISOM’s successes for the AfSol approach. The conclusion sums up the main arguments and makes research and policy recommendations.

**Conceptual and Methodological Issues**

The analysis employs desk research. The main data sources are IGAD, AU, UN, and states’ official documents, speeches and reports by public authorities, and scholarly/research publications on AMISOM. I synthesise these data into evidence of AfSol, my independent variable, and categorise the data along AfSol’s pillars. An empirical and more in-depth inquiry would have offered more rigour. However, I reveal that AMISOM remains work in progress and so do futuristic studies related to it: this is not an evaluation of AMISOM but an inquiry into the relationship between AfSol and AMISOM’s achievements.

The chapter reveals that AMISOM’s successes, 2007-2015, result from the “AfSol” approach used in the Mission. To say that AMISOM’s successes result from the AfSol approach is to indicate that they were rooted in Africa-centredness unlike previous futile interventions (Moller, 2009). I appreciate possible concerns regarding the conceptual, methodological, even empirical, basis of the AfSol approach, as well as states’ and foreigners’ interests in PSOs. Yet, the AfSol’s conceptual clarity remains work-in-progress (IPSS, 2014). While conceptualisation is key to social sciences (Sartori, 1970), specifying AfSol’s measurable indicators—beyond its pillars herein used—requires more work and time. Using AfSol’s pillars as its indicators tentatively solves this conceptualisation problem. The tenability of “Africa-centred solutions”, which are devoid of foreign control/direction, seems challenging for a developing-world politico-economic space. Which approach(es) fit(s) AfSol and is(are) generalisable across cases and experiences eludes determination. While reconciling states’ and foreigners’ interests and AfSol requires more work, I need say that interest convergence informs international politics. At least “African states benefit in specific ways from being seen to contribute to ‘African solutions to African problems’” (Beswick, 2010:739). This indicates minimum convergence of interests as happened during the 1960s in the creation of the OAU/AU (Tieku, 2004).

Second, “a single template for intervention, could produce dangerous over-
simplification” (Cliffe and Luckman, 1999: 29); AfSol by no means makes a one-size-fits-all remedy. Instead, it stresses learning from other experiences and relying on African solutions to avoid a misreading of African contexts that bedevilled Africa during the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, UNTAF (Cliffe and Luckman, 1999), and Libya. Finally, the AfSol approach utilises “crucial cases” (Gerring, 2007) that exhibit Africa-centred success to draw reliable conclusions, a key element in my conceptualisation.

**Conceptualising AfSol**

The AfSol approach builds on Afro-optimist viewpoints which stress Africa’s potential to best understand and manage African affairs. The approach is rooted in the works of earlier pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah, and contemporary Afro-optimists like Omar Touray (Touray, 2005). Kwame Nkrumah, for instance, argues that once Africa unites politically and economically, it will secure a niche in a competitive world and survive neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1963). Such unity, he proposes, should include “a common defence system with a single military high command” as a means to security self-reliance (Touray, 2005:637). Nkrumah’s call sowed seeds of present-day security cooperation evidenced in the Common African Defence and Security Policy (Vines, 2013; Touray, 2005; AU, 2002). Thus, AfSol combines idealism, realism, and political pragmatism that foreground Africa-initiated solutions. It stresses Africa-centredness, which arose from three sources: historical exploitation–slave trade, colonialism–which evoked a realisation that Africa must unite and determine its politico-security and socio-economic destiny to escape perpetual exploitation and marginalisation (Nkrumah, 1963); Cold War apathy to Africa’s insecurity that “brought home to African leaders the imperatives of self-reliance and allowed them for the first time to see sufficient gains in collective security” (Touray, 2005: 637); and experiences like US withdrawal from Somalia, Rwanda’s 1994 “betrayal” (Melvern, 2009), and inadequate response to the crisis in Darfur. These lessons forced Africa to strive for self-reliance, including considering a shift from non-intervention to non-indifference policy (Bah, 2009:2 69-71; Williams, 2007). This desire for self-reliance sowed AfSol’s seeds.

AfSol stresses that Africans should assist one another, instead of relying on “borrowed fists” (IPSS, 2014) to solve Africa’s peace and security problems. Foreign assistance should supplement African initiatives since foreign interventions can be misguided, detached from reality, lack genuine commitment, or be driven
by interests that hardly benefit Africa (Touray, 2005). AfSol involves three key pillars: commitment; shared values; and ownership. These pillars, combined, led to “AMISOM successes” evidenced in: (i) the pacification of the country and consequent restoration of peace and security for most parts of Somalia, (ii) restoration of governance structures evidenced in the presidency and parliament, and (iii) restoration and facilitation of state building processes through training Somalia’s military and police forces.

Figure 1: AfSol and AMISOM’s Successes

The main mechanisms through which AfSol led to AMISOM’s successes (Fig. 1) are: incentives and persistence. Incentives may be difficult to measure, but proximate evidence consists in the expressed desire to intervene and “remain seized of the matter.” Persistence is traceable from withstanding a costly intervention, engaging the international community for resource and institutional support, involvement of non-military aspects of the intervention, and state building endeavours. One may empirically argue that changed thinking at the AU, from non-intervention to non-indifference; AMISOM’s peace-enforcement and achievable mandates, which previous interventions lacked; and its political, reconciliatory, stabilisation, protection, and state building approaches explain AMISOM successes (Nduwimana, 2013). These factors fall within the AfSol because it was not impossible for interventions like Operation Restore Hope to acquire peace-enforcement mandates except that it was controlled by different actors with non-African interests. It took changed thinking at the AU, that African peace and security problems require African solutions, which engendered relevant diplomatic engagements leading to success. AfSol principles incentivised states to withstand resource and capacity limitations that would have stifled the Mission. It also sustained resource-mobilisation momentum in and beyond Africa to
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- Africans develop the capacity (institutional, resource, politico-diplomatic, techno-scientific) to identify, examine, and originate solutions to Africa’s peace and security problem(s) through consultations, investigations, experience sharing, and strategic analysis

- Africans rediscover–and adapt–relevant indigenous or traditional conflict-resolution measures to Africa’s different post-modern peace and security challenges

- Africans mobilise and utilise resources, technology, and knowledge, to solve peace and security problems, seeking needful foreign assistance, but assuming central responsibility and accountability for these solutions.

- Africans avoid over-reliance on foreigner-imposed solutions/decisions to design and implement security solutions–hence collaboration with, not dependence on, foreigners.

- Convergence of states’ interests and political will to address insecurity. Not that states’ interests cannot conflict but that a mechanism for securing minimum interest convergence is developed to solve peace and security problems.

Pan-African self-help is central to AfSol ideals and practice. Common values and beliefs in Africans’ shared destiny overtake selfish interests. Not to say all values are anti-conflict, or that rational self-interest is inherently conflict-generating, but that some value-systems and practices may be used to discourage violent conflicts. Accordingly, AfSol IS NOT:

- Afro-separatism or Afro-self-isolation–Africa’s desire, even attempt, to delink itself from the world when solving our peace and security problems–as though living in autarchy

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42 Example: Rwanda and Uganda, with security interests in DRC, did not contribute troops for the Neutral Intervention Force under the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region. However, they agree with other Regional States that insecurity in the DRC should end through, inter alia, neutralising “negative forces” there.
• Ideational, ideological, or politico-diplomatic rejection of interdependence with the wider world, ideas, or values that can help Africa. Interdependence inheres in human relations. AfSol stresses mutual interdependence and respect amidst Africa-centred security efforts.

• Finally, AfSol does not contradict–but reflects, foregrounds, underscores, operationalises, and augments–pan-Africanism. This is achieved by tackling security hindrances to pan-African desires like African unity, peace and security, socio-economic and techno-scientific progress, and respect for the African person.

The foregoing specification of what AfSol is and is not can be summed up into three pillars–commitment, ownership, and shared values (Fig. 1) – which can be measured and tested by examining how and why, together, they impact specific African peace and security interventions.

Table 1: Conceptual/Measurable Indicators of AfSol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AfSol Pillar/Indicator</th>
<th>Clarification</th>
<th>Testable Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Responsibility for each other and for Africa’s P&amp;S problems</td>
<td>Public statements promising response to the P&amp;S problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guarantee of unconditional involvement</td>
<td>Finding common ground for unity of purpose and action – institutional commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant choices/decisions/actions that validate/evaluate P&amp;S achievements and limitations.</td>
<td>State and institutional commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Proactive readiness to take central responsibility</td>
<td>Africans-initiated solutions that show inclusiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claim over moral and legitimate reason to be involved</td>
<td>African-controlled processes, and finance ownership/contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claim to share pain with affected societies</td>
<td>Africans-defended choices and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Values</td>
<td>Regional and Continental Principles</td>
<td>Evoking shared ideals and principles like Pan-African brotherhood, self-reliance.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-cultural and ideational commonalities</td>
<td>Readiness to sacrifice for others</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reference to shared historical experiences</td>
<td>Interests’ convergence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reference to common ideas and principles</td>
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Table 1 outlines AfSol as a conceptual category with its pillars as measurable indicators. In multi-actor environs, Commitment implies actors’ willingness,
indicated by their promises, their decisions, and their actions. This includes readiness to sacrifice for and liberate troubled states, followed by resolute involvement in the mission regardless of costs. Evidence of this readiness includes joint efforts at organisational level, showing institutional commitment at the AU and IGAD levels; states’ engagement of one another to undertake the Mission (Fisher 2012); and consistency in Mission-related choices and actions shown in actual deployment of troops. Commitment also involves promises to respond to the problem whether or not that problem affects the actor directly or indirectly. In security affairs, when actors show willingness to address others’ security problems, the former are committed (Table 1). When states address issues in a joint institutional environment, they show institutional commitment.

Commitment problems may arise when rational actors think they might benefit from non-cooperative behaviour in future (Powell, 2006). This requires guarantees of unconditional involvement that signify commitment. Such guarantees may be made through interstate bargains or negotiations that generally typify international security-cooperation agenda setting (Rwengabo, 2014). Finally, actors’ consistent choices and actions on a specific issue indicate commitment. States which consistently help other troubled states over time are committed to this cause. Official assertions expressing the need to help insecurity-afflicted states, decisions that follow pronouncements, and their actual execution demonstrate commitment. Rhetoric or pronouncements differ from action—but rhetoric plus action equals commitment. We need evidence that states expressed willingness, made relevant decisions, and actually intervened, unilaterally or in concert with others, in Somalia. States should then own the Mission.

Ownership entails readiness to take central responsibility, when action is required, in pursuing the common good. This includes claim over moral and legitimate justification for one’s involvement; and claim to share pain with affected societies. While actors’ selfish involvement may be cloaked in legitimising rhetoric, the degree of involvement and costs withstood measure ownership. States need not hide their real, legitimate interests whenever these interests are at stake (Rice, 2000) as happened in Somalia and Kenya. But the degree of involvement is seen in inclusiveness - is a state ready to get involved beyond unilateral participation? The inclusiveness of African initiatives, African-controlled processes, and African-defended choices can be seen in states’ wiliness to sacrifice unilateral measures
at the altar of joint interventions. When Africans initiated AMISOM, hitherto disjointed interventions became joint (Fisher, 2012). Evidence of ownership includes the inclusiveness of the initiative: AMISOM involved as many interested African parties as possible. It also includes African-controlled processes: Africans arrogated to African actors decisional and operational control over AMISOM. Ownership, finally, is seen in African-defended choices: state and organisational standpoints on AMISOM are evident.

Critiques may argue that AMISOM is foreign-funded, hence not Africa-owned. The AU has funding limitations. These challenges forced Africa to seek outside funding for AMISOM. For instance, following IGASOM’s failure to take off following its authorisation by the AU PSC (AU, 2005, PSC/PR(XXIX)), the IGAD authorised its then Chairperson, Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni, to solicit external funding: “IGAD turned to the European Union and dispatched officials to Scandinavian countries, Italy, and the Arab League for assistance” (Mays, 2009:8-9), leading to subsequent EU funding (Vines, 2011: 279-280). Is AMISOM ‘co-owned’ due to foreign funding? I argue that donors did not fund an inexistent initiative. Instead, I consider such funding “support for” and not “foreign ownership of” the Mission, which reflects AfSol’s notion of interdependence. Self-reliance is not inimical to interdependence.

Shared Values are principles that are common to all or most actors within the system. Commonalities like belonging to Africa and pan-Africanism are examples, but their reflection in Africa’s instruments makes them shared by IGAD and AU member states. Shared values are rooted in historical experience, like slavery and colonialism, identity, geographical contiguity, and convergence of ideologies and interests (IPSS, 2014). Reference to shared experiences reflects and even propagates shared values. Reference to common ideas and principles like democratic freedom, human rights, pan-Africanism, and Ubuntu signifies shared values. Evidence of shared values includes the extent to which actors evoke shared ideals and principles like African brotherhood, solidarity, tolerance or collective security in dealing with one another; actors’ readiness to sacrifice for those values; and convergence of actors’ interests—that is, subjecting selfish interests to common pursuits–on the issue. While interests may converge among actors without shared values, interests converge more easily and differences are easily resolved between

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43 Consider liberal democratic values in some western societies, Confucian values in some Asian societies, or Weber’s “protestant ethic” in west-European capitalist societies.
actors sharing common values and identity (Bially-Mattern, 2001). This affinity eases dealings with one another, neutralises conflicting interests, and minimises tensions where actors’ interests clash (ibid). This is the basis of the principle-and-procedure value system.

The Principle and Procedure-based shared value system stresses international principles, such as respect for state sovereignty concurrent with cooperative security. Examples include the maintenance of peace and security through “effective collective measures” as espoused in the UN principles, and delegation of the UN’s security-promoting responsibility to regional-international organisations (ROs) (UN, 1945, Ch. VIII) in recognition of regional specificity. This regionalism vindicates the relevance of Pan-African values that inform such AU principles as “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly with respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2000, Art 4(h)); and “promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union” (Art 4(k)). The procedure by which these principles are operationalised is reflected in the AU’s peace and security instruments (AU, 2002a and b), as well as the practical shift from non-intervention to non-indifference (Touray, 2005; Williams, 2007; Bah, 2009; Vines 2013). Other procedures include cooperation between the AU, UN and Africa’s ROs. Thus, pan-African solidarity and the principle of “promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union” informed AMISOM.

The forgoing principles reflect African states’ belief in interconnections, shared historical experiences like slave trade, colonialism, and post-colonial marginalisation (IPSS, 2014); and Africa’s common peace and security destiny. Evidence of shared values consists in actors evoking shared ideals/principles, like African brotherhood, solidarity, tolerance or collective security, in dealing with one another; actors’ readiness to sacrifice for those values; and convergence of actors’ otherwise disparate interests on the issue in reflection of AU principles. African states’ did express desire to solve a problem they considered to be “closer to home”, hence ideationally enmeshing themselves in a common destiny (Fisher, 2012).

The AfSol approach, fusing these pillars, created incentives for African states to endure the mission’s costs and circumvent their capacity limitations in order to sacrifice for Somalia: “You would be shocked to learn that, maybe, it is up to 3,000
AMISOM soldiers that have been killed during these years when AMISOM has been there. Uganda and Burundi have paid a tremendous price” (UN, 2013). AfSol allowed African actors to consistently mobilise resources, and to steadily fight on despite human, political-security, and resource costs. One need not demonstrate these mechanisms beyond showing how AfSol naturally led to AMISOM’s success.

AfSol and AMISOM’s Successes

In this section I demonstrate why and how AfSol led to AMISOM’s successes. After a brief background to AMISOM, I outline the operation’s initial challenges to be followed by the examination of the relationship between AfSol and AMISOM’s successes. This analysis is important because Somalia’s insecurity which had defied UNOSOM-I, UNIFAF, UNOSOM-II, IGAD’s reconciliation efforts, and IGASOM had surprisingly given way to established state authority in Somalia by 2014 (AU, 2014). These developments are attributed to AMISOM.

Background to AMISOM

Somalia’s state collapse in 1991 engendered insecurity and a humanitarian crisis which progressively alarmed the international community. By 2005, this insecurity threatened regional and international security while attempts, since 1992, to fill the politico-security void had been fruitless. Lengthy diplomatic engagements, among and between African actors and the rest of the international community, and background intelligence not worth detailing here, resulted in a decision in which the AUPSC created AMISOM on 19 January 2007. On 21 February 2007, the UNSC (Res. 1744) approved AMISOM with a 6-month mandate to support Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), build Somali security structures, and support the war against al-Shabaab. Ever since, the UNSC has passed several resolutions extending AMISOM’s mandate (Table 2).

Unlike other troubled African states which retained minimum authoritative control over their governance domains amidst ongoing armed conflicts, political instabilities, personal rule, and coup d’état (Roessler, 2011),44 Somalia’s state collapse of the 1990s exemplifies “complex political emergencies” (CPEs) (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999). This approach is useful for it reveals that in CPEs, state failure and total breakdown of politico-security order are visible, as happened during the

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44 Most fragile African countries faced armed conflicts, coups, and other instabilities but remained functioning during the 1990s, including: Uganda, Zaire/DRC, Rwanda-Burundi, Nigeria, and others.
1994 Rwanda genocide, the Sudan-Darfur crisis, and the 1990s Liberia instability. The Somali crisis is rooted in post-Cold War western relegation of Somalia, a country which initially received Soviet support amidst political conflicts that led to President Abdirashid Shermarke’s assassination in October 1969, followed by Maxamed Siyaad Barre’s coup d’état of 1969. Barre declared “Scientific Socialism” in Somalia, thus aligning with the East, but fell to armed opposition in 1991 (which had started in 1988) coincident with the “Fall of the Berlin Wall”, a major incident in Cold War politics in which most developing-world states had been ensnared. This state collapse bred ethno-political violence between armed clan-based fighting groups that ushered in Somalia’s prolonged anarchy (Clarke and Herbst, 1996).

The version of ethno-politics that typified clan conflicts in Somalia was unique in that it involved intra-ethnic infighting between ethnic Somalis. These armed clan antagonisms were so acute that by 1992 the country had been torn apart, plunged into anarchy, with attendant ineffable human/civilian suffering. Somalia became a route for illicit small arms and light weapons (SALWs), transnational contraband, a piracy stronghold, and a terrorism safe haven. The resulting insecurity alarmed the international community, which issued an arms embargo on Somalia (UN 1992). In response to this anarchy and civilian suffering, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992, which created the Unified Task Force (UNTAF) with responsibility to provide relief/food protection services.

Famed “Operation Restore Hope” (December 1992-May 1993), UNTAF had around 28,000 American troops out of about 38,000 from more than 20 countries (Perito, 2008). During the 3-4 October 1992 “First Battle of Mogadishu”, Somali mobs (reportedly supporting warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid, whom the US pursued ostensibly on grounds that he defied the disarmament of clan fighters) dragged Staff Sgt. William Cleveland’s body through Mogadishu streets. This alarmed the US whose soldiers killed hundreds of Somali civilians and militiamen while suffering 18 killed and about 70 wounded (Dauber, 2001a and b): “News of the causalities and images of gleeful Somalis abusing American corpses prompted revulsion and outrage at home, embarrassment at the White House, and such vehement objections in Congress that the mission against Aidid was immediately called off” as the US public demanded withdrawal (Bowden, 1999: 333). Bill Clinton, then US president, ordered withdrawal of US forces, ending UNTAF. As US forces withdrew, General Robert B Johnston turned over command to General Çevik Bir of Turkey as UNTAF became UNOSOM-II (Clinton, 1993). These other
foreign forces under UNOSOM-II also withdrew in 1995. UNTAF had reflected biases in disarming clans and neglected Somalia’s intricate clan politics that required prior political engagement. Boutros-Boutros Ghali himself had apparently preferred a military approach and evoked Chapter VII of the UN following the apparent failure of diplomatic efforts (Sorbo, 1997), but the military solution was not sustained long enough to fruition due to limited commitment and lack of a sense of ownership for the problem at hand. The withdrawal of foreign missions without providing alternatives left Somalia in a political-security abyss.

In 2002, African actors under IGAD undertook reconciliation efforts. IGAD established TFIs which lasted 2004-2012. The endeavour, however, did not prevent the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), “an Islamist coalition of moderates and extremists”, from extending its control over south-central Somalia. By 2006 Somalia was down the abyss of statelessness. Meanwhile, the UIC’s offshoot, Harakat al-Shabaab, quickly gained prominence due to its claimed links with al-Qaeda (Fisher, 2012: 416). Africa could not stand by and watch ungoverned/ungovernable Somalia engender insecurity for its neighbours. Following the IGAD’s futile attempts to replace Ethiopian forces then defending Mogadishu, the AU realised the need for wider and deeper African involvement especially after the UN failed to take responsibility for the mission (Segui, 2013). The AU Peace and Security Council made “decisions on the deployment of a peace support mission in Somalia” (AUPSC, 2007: 2). The final resolution creating AMISOM was passed on 19 January 2007 and on 21 February 2007, the UNSC (Res. 1744) authorised the deployment of AMISOM forces. Though the UNSC passed supportive resolutions, central to AMISOM are African states and ROs (Bruton and Williams, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNSC Resolutions</th>
<th>Key decisions and links</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2177 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at UNSC’s 7268th meeting, 28 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2167 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at 7228th meeting, 28 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2158 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at 7188th meeting, 29 May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2142 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at 7127th meeting, 5 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2125 (2013), 18 November 2013</td>
<td>Adopted at 7061st meeting, 18 November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2124 (2013), 12th November 2013</td>
<td>UNSC Extends AMISOM Mandate. Requests Increase in Troop Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>2111 (2013), 24th July 2013</td>
<td>Adopted at 7009th meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2102 (2013), 2nd May 2013</td>
<td>Adopted at 6959th meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2093 (2013), 6th March 2013</td>
<td>Adopted at its 6929th meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2077 (2012), 21st November 2012</td>
<td>Renewed for 12 months the authorisation in place since 2008, for international counter-piracy action to be carried out within Somali territorial waters and on land in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2073, 7th November 2012</td>
<td>Renewed AMISOM Mandate for four months; expanded UN logistical support package for AMISOM to include funding for an additional 50 civilian personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2072 (2012), 31st October 2012</td>
<td>Adopted AMISOM’s 7-day technical rollover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2067 (2012) adopted by the SC on 18th September 2012</td>
<td>UNSC laid out its expectations for the next phase after transition. Secretary-General tasked to come up with a report on the UN’s future presence in Somalia by 31st December 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2060 (2012) adopted by the SC on 25th July 2012</td>
<td>Extension of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea’s (MGoSE)’s mandate for 13 months. The council granted humanitarian exemption to the Somalia sanctions regime for a one-year period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2036 (2012), 22nd February 2012.</td>
<td>Widened AMISOM’s operational scope to four sectors as set out in the Strategic Concept of 5th January 2012. AMISOM called upon to take necessary measures in coordination with TFG forces, to neutralize armed groups in Somalia. In compliance with international humanitarian law, Somalia authorities to ban export of charcoal. UN Member states to prevent direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (2011), 30th September 2011.</td>
<td>AMISOM troop deployment extended until 31st October 2012. The FTG called upon to abide by the roadmap of key tasks and priorities to be delivered over the next one year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 (2011), on 11th April 2011.</td>
<td>Called upon states and regional bodies (ROs) to join hands with the TFG to tackle piracy comprehensively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date and Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 1964</td>
<td>Adopted by the SC on 22nd December 2010. AMISOM’s deployment extended to 30th September 2011. Further suggested that AMISOM troops be increased from 8,000 to 12,000 to enhance its capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1950</td>
<td>23rd November 2010. Condemned piracy off Somali coast and called for ROs and states to assist the TFG in tackling the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1918</td>
<td>27th April 2010. Resolved that failure to prosecute suspected pirates was undermining the international community’s efforts in tackling the vice. Member states called upon to criminalize piracy under their domestic laws and to consider prosecuting suspected pirates apprehended off Somalia’s coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1897</td>
<td>30th November 2009. Condemned acts of piracy off Somalia’s coast and called upon ROs and member states to support the war against piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1872</td>
<td>26th May 2009. Called upon all Somali parties to support the Djibouti Peace Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1863</td>
<td>9th July 2009. Renewal of AMISOM’s mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1851</td>
<td>16th December 2008. Authorized the use of force to condemn piracy off Somalia’s coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1846</td>
<td>2nd December 2008. Authorized states and other regional bodies/ROs assisting the FTG to enter into Somali territorial waters and combat piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1844</td>
<td>20th November 2008. Called upon states to prevent individuals threatening Somalia’s FTG and AMISOM from entering into or transiting their territories. Member states would freeze economic resources or assets controlled by these individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1838</td>
<td>7th October 2008. Called upon countries to deploy naval vessels off Somali coast, and fight piracy by all means necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1831</td>
<td>Adopted by the SC on 19th August 2008. Renewal of AMISOM’s mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1816</td>
<td>2nd June 2008. Authorized willing states and ROs to join forces with the FTG and combat piracy and armed robbery incidences off the Somali coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1814, 15\textsuperscript{th} May 2008.</td>
<td>Resolved that United Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and Somalia UN country team would continue supporting the peace process. Called for enhanced support for TFI’s, aimed at developing a constitution and paving way for elections in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1811, 29\textsuperscript{th} April 2008</td>
<td>Extension of the MGoSE’s mandate by six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1801, 29\textsuperscript{th} February 2008.</td>
<td>Extension of AMISOM’s mandate by six months. AMISOM authorized to take necessary measures aimed at providing security to key infrastructures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1772, 20th August 2007.</td>
<td>Extension of AMISOM’s mandate by six months. UNSC also agreed to take action against parties threatening AMISOM, the FTG, and the Somali peace process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1766, 23\textsuperscript{rd} July 2007.</td>
<td>Extension of MGoSE’s mandate, tasked with enforcing an arms embargo on Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1744, 20\textsuperscript{th} February 2007.</td>
<td>Authorized establishment of AMISOM within six months, tasked with protecting the TFG. Enforcement of an arms embargo on Somalia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 reveals supportive UNSC resolutions that show institutional commitment at the UN level, which legitimised AMISOM’s continuity. These resolutions followed African engagement that started with African states, IGAD and the AU (Fisher, 2012; AUPSC, 2007), for the UN’s involvement had been fruitless during the 1990s and Somalia was considered “too dangerous” for western intervention (Page 2003:186). Contrary to claims that western donors feared the UIC/al-Shabaab’s increasing influence, they lobbied IGAD and the AU with promises of training, military equipment, and technical assistance if Africans intervened in Somalia (Fisher, 2012: 416-7); IGAD had masterminded the TFG’s formation while the UNSC only came in to approve of the AUPSC decision of 2007. Hence, African agency, which is central to AfSol, informed initiatives that metamorphosed into AMISOM. Countries contributed troops and progressively augmented the efforts of Ugandan-Burundian troops.
Figure 2: AMISOM Troop Contributions, 2007-2014


Figure 2 shows states’ troop contributions since 2007. It reveals that initially, Uganda and Burundi took the mantle of the initial 6,000 troops that deployed in Somalia. This was a much smaller number than the task at hand required. However, as progress started to become visible over time, more states contributed troops. Kenya also joined AMISOM in 2012. This is not to say that AMISOM did not face initial setbacks.

AMISOM’s Initial Setbacks

Besides the earlier IGASOM’s failures and the reluctance of African states to contribute troops to supplement Uganda’s and Burundi’s initial contributions, AMISOM faced considerable setbacks beyond its involvement in counter-insurgency operations (Bruton and Williams, 2014). First, by 2009 AMISOM had had limited impact in Somalia as its deputy force commander was killed in a suicide bombing in September 2009, bringing AMISOM fatalities by then to 60. Initial budgetary constraints were haunting AMISOM. Western interest had waned; only did the EU Council, on 23rd April 2007, and with encouragement from the US, amended its joint action on AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to include a
military support element to assist AMISOM (Vines, 2011:279). Second, though the number of fatalities is difficult to arrive by, partly because TCCs were unwilling to release actual figures of battle- and operation-related deaths ((Bruton and Williams, 2014), “AMISOM became one of the world’s most dangerous peace operations. Measured by the number of fatalities per peacekeeper deployed, AMISOM is probably the most deadly peace operation ever conducted in Africa” (Williams, 2015): Williams estimates that more than 4,000 troops died. In 2013, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, in a press conference, estimated up to 3,000 AMISOM soldiers killed (UN, 2013a), but the UN withdrew this number the following day (UN, 2013b).45 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), a reasonably reputed source, estimates 13,384 battle-related fatalities involving all parties to Somali’s conflict (Melander, 2015). The Armed Conflict Event and Location Data Project (ACLED) recorded 3,485 AMISOM-related fatalities between 2007 and 2014 (see Raleigh, et al., 2010). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that between 1st January 2009 and 31st December 2013, AMISOM suffered 1,039 fatalities: 200 in 2009; 300 in 2010, 94 in 2011; 384 in 2012; 261 in 2013, and 69 in 2014, bringing the total to about 1,108 (Williams, 2015). This is by no means a small estimate of AMISOM’s cost to TCCs. 

Though it remains difficult to estimate the exact number of battle-related deaths, it is reasonable to argue that most of these deaths occurred because AMISOM was more than an ordinary peacekeeping operation: it has an extended mandate, and engages in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations (Bruton and Williams, 2014). It partook in state building processes aimed at restoring state structures and minimum control for the Somali state (Williams, 2013). This showed “renewed determination of the IGAD countries to take steps required to effectively address the situation”, including “the promotion of a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia, the persistence and escalation of which constitute a serious impediment to Africa’s efforts to promote peace, security and integration, as well as a serious threat to international peace and security” (AU, 2008, POW/PR(IV)).

45 While retracting this claim, the UN (2013b) stated: “The casualty figures used by the Deputy Secretary-General were an estimate based on information from informal sources; dissemination of exact casualty statistics is solely the responsibility of the African Union and the individual troop contributing countries. The focus of the Deputy Secretary-General’s remarks was to express his, and indeed the entire UN system’s admiration for the remarkable work AMISOM has done, at great sacrifice, over the past several years. Their efforts have been instrumental to the recent progress made in the security situation and underpinned the successful political transition in 2012 in Somalia”
In addition to the above fatalities, Uganda and Kenya have suffered al-Shabaab terrorist counter-attacks (Rwengabo, 2014). These terrorist attacks targeted civilians and socio-economic infrastructure, which may not be counted alongside AMISOM-related losses. Besides, AMISOM estimates, which remain undisclosed as all sources rely on estimates (Kelley, 2015; Bruton and Williams, 2014), exclude Ethiopian and Kenyan losses suffered during these countries’ unilateral interventions in Somalia. Therefore, to say that AMISOM has been a successful operation in no way implies scot-free fighting in a troubled landscape. It shows that the AfSol principles of commitment, ownership, shared values, constitute the resolve with which TCCs approached the Somali crisis. Through persistence, inclusiveness, and use of integrated approach–mechanisms which are empirically demonstrated in the coming sub-sections–AMISOM covered ground that previous fragmented interventions failed to trample upon.

Commitment and AMISOM’s Successes

AfSol’s first pillar, Commitment, was vital to AMISOM’s founding and successes. African leaders who seemed to have been willing to liberate Somalia pronounced themselves on this difficult decision. Political and diplomatic engagements followed these state-level choices through IGAD and beyond. TCCs, initially
Burundi and Uganda, expressed willingness, decided to, and actually intervened by deploying security forces there (Fisher, 2012). At the institutional level, a major decision followed by action was the creation of an AU Commission on Somalia and a technical evaluation mission—the Military Staff Committee—on the proposed deployment of an AU Mission in Somalia. IGASOM had exhibited similar institutional commitment. The Committee held consultations with the TFG on the planned deployment of a peace support mission in Somalia, 13-15 January 2007. The Commission and the Staff Committee reported to the AUPSC. Following the report, the AUPSC authorised “the deployment of AMISOM, for a period of 6 months with the mandate (i) to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia” (AU, 2007: 2). These decisions and actions signify AU-level institutional commitment. Following these decisions, AU member states were asked to contribute troops to what came to become AMISOM. Burundi and Uganda’s response to this call led to the deployment of the first 6,000 troops in Somalia (Bellamy, 2011: 6). This commitment engendered the persistence needed for AMISOM’s success.

Preceding institutional commitment was state-level commitment. Following resistance from Somali groups to IGASOM and other constraints to its deployment (Mays, 2009), IGAD deliberately decided, in 2006, that countries that neighbour Somalia should not intervene directly. Sudan and Uganda were willing to deploy should the international community support the mission by, among others, lifting the arms embargo on Somalia as IGAD had been persuading the UN to do (Mays, 2009: 10). Where previous IGAD’s efforts at forming the TFIs in August 2004 and the Djibouti Peace Process were consistent choices and actions showing institutional commitment, Uganda, not neighbouring Somalia, was willing to deploy under IGAD. Kampala, like many western actors and other IGAD states, reasoned that Somalia was degenerating into terrorist hands. Through IGAD and unilaterally, Kampala brought to western attention, Fisher argues, the imperative of pacifying Somalia through joint efforts beyond Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention. When the mandate was given, and the AU took over the mantle, Uganda and Burundi were the first to deploy troops. Fisher (2012) reasons that Kampala’s efforts were intended to hoodwink donors who were then concerned about politico-
constitutional changes in Uganda.

It appears Kampala’s consistent suggestions cannot be reduced to the 2005-2007 period because it was already part of IGAD’s processes: “This initial suggestion by Kampala of what would later become AMISOM very much sought to depict a Ugandan intervention as part of a fight against global terrorism and drew heavily on already established donor perceptions of Uganda as a key ally in the GWOT [global war on terror]” (Fisher, 2012: 417). If there were “already established donor perceptions of Uganda as a key ally in the GWOT”, need Uganda have altered donors’ perceptions? This contradiction indicates that like fellow IGAD states, which were at the centre of IGAD initiatives, Uganda was committed to the pacification of Somalia. This commitment was expressed through lobbying foreign support. These consistent choices were actuated when Uganda deployed UPDF troops, police, and civilian officers under AMISOM, and remains the largest troop contributor in Somalia since 2007 (Williams, 2013).

If Uganda was deluding the west, what did Burundi and Kenya hope to gain? Kenya might have had national security interests, not Burundi. These interests in and by themselves are, however, hardly distinguishable from general regional interests expressed by Ethiopia and Uganda, and indeed by other IGAD states that had been involved in the Somali crisis. According to Bruton and Williams (2014: 55–9, 61–2) and Anderson and McKnight (2014:4), three factors explain Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi in Somalia: the persistent refugee inflows to Kenya from Somalia which worsened famine in Kenya’s north-eastern region and turned it into a food-security problem; increasing regional security concerns, “fuelled by Ugandan and Ethiopian concerns”; and “the threat posed to Kenya’s economy by the destabilization of the coastal regions through Al-Shabaab activities.” Another factor can be added: the encouraging “AMISOM’s success against Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in August 2011” (Anderson and McKnight, 2014:4). They trace Kenya’s intervention from 2009 and hold that with US and French support, the intervention was aimed at creating a satellite region in Jubaland (ibid : 4-5) wherefrom the war against al-Shabaab might be connected with AMISOM in a move to pacify Kismayo-Lamu and kick-start mega-development projects connecting south Sudan, northern Kenya, and Ethiopia to the Indian ocean. Port Lamu would become an oil terminal. If this claim is true, then the motive transcends Kenya’s specific national interests and fuses with the global oil politics. Perhaps Kenya’s
intervention was indirect because IGAD had decided against direct intervention from neighbouring states, and Ethiopia was also withdrawing. The International Crisis Group also alludes to the terrorist threat, the refugee crisis, and the desire to secure and establish a buffer zone in Jubaland. The kidnapping of tourists in Lamu and Dabaab seems to have acted as the Rubicon Point for Kenya (ICG, 2012:1-3; Johnson and Tierney, 2011).

If the aforementioned were exclusively Kenya’s selfish national interests devoid of a regional and international component, then it remains difficult to distinguish the two kinds of interests. It surfaces, clearly, that closer to home and other AfSol-linked motivations ought to be considered. Fisher admits, of Uganda: “domestically, the Ugandan government has maintained that its intervention was premised on considerations closer to home” (Fisher, 2012: 418). “Closer to home” is even more relevant to Kenya and Ethiopia, which directly neighbour Somalia. These states argued that Somali insecurity, terrorism, and proliferation of SALWs threatened their security and tourism industries. State interests seem to have converged under IGAD as Museveni once said: “IGAD specifically requested us to provide troops to be deployed in Somalia long before the UN and the African Union got involved. The contribution of the Government of Uganda to the stabilization of Somalia has cost Uganda lives of gallant soldiers” (Museveni, 2008). This indicates that Uganda was fulfilling its responsibility under IGAD, indicating institutional and national commitment. Even if such contribution might reap pecuniary benefits for the UPDF, it involved clear costs that Uganda was willing to pay. If this can be justified in Uganda, then Kampala’s interest lay in more than “managing donor perceptions” (Fisher, 2012) or pursuing selfish interests when for many years, as a member of IGAD, the country had been involved in efforts to end the Somali crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Est. Number of Troops</th>
<th>Period of Contribution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Since 2012 (initially a unilateral intervention in Oct. 2011)</td>
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46 Ethiopian Intervention was controversial. “On 21 March 2007, a Somali mob dragged the bodies of Ethiopian and TFG soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu and set them on fire. Over the next two years, outrage over Ethiopian atrocities—particularly the systemic use of rape—prompted more than 20 members of Minnesota’s Somali diaspora to return to Mogadishu to fight the Ethiopian and TFG forces.” (Brutoin and Williams 2014:11).
In addition to these troop contributions (Table 3), there was an additional “two 140-strong Formed Police Units (FPUs) from Uganda and Nigeria” (Williams, 2013: 2), which makes AMISOM an IGAD, AU, and UN affair. While some states, mainly Ethiopia and Kenya, had intervened unilaterally, IGAD, the AU and UN developed a “new Concept of Operations for AMISOM” to encompass these initial unilateral interventions. Following a Memorandum of Understanding, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone pledged to join AMISOM (ibid, 2-3), thereby integrating hitherto disparate interventions into a single AU- and UN-sanctioned mission. What initially was an uphill task for AMISOM’s fight against al-Shabaab and its allies in Somalia now acquired greater military and politico-diplomatic support, reflecting broader commitment.

The above state and institutional commitment incentivised states to “remain seized of the matter” (AU, 2007: 2), and to persist amidst the operation’s costs. Unlike previous foreign interventions, which were informed by populist policy choices in the US—mainly the hope that Operation Restore Hope would quickly disarm Somali warlords and their fighters, capture and possibly kill Aidid, restore order in Somalia, and thereby increase Clinton’s popularity at home (Clarke and Herbst, 1996; Bowden, 1999)—AMISOM was based on the realisation that Somalia needed a lasting politico-security solution. Steady, consistent, and costly engagement was necessary to rescue the Somali state, hence the AU’s realisation of the need to “create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction, and development in Somalia” (AU, 2007:2). With such an objective in mind, AMISOM either succeeds or the TCCs and Somalia’s neighbours suffer the blunt of al-Shabaab counter-attacks. Beyond the aforesaid desire to end Somali insecurity, stabilise and reconstruct the country, pan-African interests which indicate Ownership, also informed states’ interest in the Mission.

**Ownership and AMISOM’s Successes**

Africans can claim ownership of Somali’s crisis for several reasons: (i) it is “closer to home” for Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda which suffer Somalia-originated

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<th>Troop Contribution</th>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
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Source: Williams (2013)
SALWs and terrorism (Rwengabo, 2014); (ii) Africans pay for Somalia’s crises through refugees, terrorist hide-outs, a stain of an unending conflict on the psyche of IGAD leaders, and strain on their economies; and (iii) African states have learnt lessons from persistent conflicts and this creates incentives for reversing protracted conflicts such as the one in Somalia. Ownership also entails willingness to bear costs and to claim minimum legitimacy. Africans bear the responsibility for and cost of the intervention for specific reasons: First, Kenya claimed retaliation against al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory and the group’s involvement in kidnapping of tourists (Williams, 2013: 3; ICG 2012; Anderson and McKnight, 2014). Even if one argued that Kenya sought to create a satellite region in Jubaland, it appears the geo-political considerations and interests involve other countries too. Second, Uganda claimed that Somalia was turning into a terrorism safe haven, threatening its security through SALWs proliferation and terrorism, indicating “the evolving anxieties of regional insecurity, fuelled by Ugandan and Ethiopian concerns” (Anderson and McKnight, 2014: 4). These states participated in IGAD initiatives to promote regional security, to mitigate the kind of threat exemplified by the July 2010 terrorist bombing in Kampala. Third, African states claimed ownership of the regional initiative, mainly through IGAD and the AU (Museveni, 2008), and sharing pain with Somalis. Were these selfish interests could be distanced from regional interests, it might be helpful to consider that states need not hide their real, legitimate, interests as did Kenya and Ethiopia. To say that African states were deployed in Somalia on pan-African grounds is not to say that they had no specific national interests in the mission but that such interests can be subsumed within the pan-African ideals that have informed Africa’s international politics as espoused in the principle of self-reliance within the AU (Bah, 2009; Touray, 2005).

Inclusiveness also shows ownership: evidence of inclusiveness consists in AMISOM’s involving multiple actors. When IGASOM failed to take off in 2005-6, IGAD states accepted to engage the AU and UN in the 1992 arms embargo (Mays, 2009). They passed on the mantle to the AU and through which they sought foreign support. The AU, then, assumed AMISOM leadership and appealed for other TCCs to come on board (Fisher, 2012; Bruton and Williams, 2014). This expanded the mission beyond IGAD. IGAD and the AU member states defended this involvement on pan-African grounds. They also involved Somalis in the mission (AMISOM, 2012 and 2014), making it further home-grown. Though one might argue, for instance, that Kenya’s Jubaland project; the training and facilitation
of Azania, a rebel group led by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (aka Mohamed Abdi Ghandi); or support to Sheikh Ahmed Madobe’s Ras Kamboni Brigade (Anderson and McKnight, 2014: 4-5) were schemes in proxy warfare, in which surrogate forces were to fight Kenya’s war, one needs to critically examine the motives behind these proxies: the refugee crisis, terrorism, and regional geo-security considerations. It would appear, then, that regional actors were desirous of involving Somalis in the fight against al-Shabaab, indicating inclusiveness of the mission. When Kenya joined AMISOM, it acquired a broader regional, continental, and international mandate to supplement a broader mission.

Ownership carries a high price: Bruton and Williams write:

“AMISOM would not have occurred and certainly would not have endured without the commitment and perseverance of several thousand soldiers from Uganda and Burundi and their political leaders. Both countries proved willing to take on a risky operation and mandate and suffer large numbers of casualties without withdrawing” (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 3).

Willingness to “suffer large numbers of casualties without withdrawing” reveals a sense of ownership, which was absent in previous, especially UNTAF operations, for they were non-African and lacked the innate justification to pay such a high price. Though Bruton and Williams believe these states’ unwillingness to reveal their actual numbers of casualties feeds suspicion that the numbers were high, this in no way erodes the essential element of AfSol, namely, Africans’ willingness to pay a high price for Somalia (Museveni, 2008). AMISOM’s risks became especially higher when Ethiopian forces withdrew in 2009, leaving TFG forces unable to contain al-Shabaab. This gave AMISOM larger-than-previously-experienced counter-insurgency operational demands. The resulting gap called for more training of Somali troops, in Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, to augment the number of Somali security forces (Bruton and Williams, 2014). Uganda further endured costs when the al-Shabaab bombed Kampala in July 2010 in which 74 people died (Fisher, 2012). Recently, the crashing of combat helicopters left 9 Ugandan men dead (Matsiko, 2012). Kenya has also suffered several retaliatory attacks since its deployment in Somalia. None of these countries has reconsidered its involvement following these costs.

Yet, when the US-led ‘Operation Restore Hope’ faced the realities of the conflict in 1993, the US withdrew because its public and leadership lacked a sense of
ownership for Somalia’s problems: ironically, President Clinton described the mission as a success (Clinton, 1993). It is level-headed to argue, basing on Africans’ readiness to pay a high price, that Africans own the mission regardless of foreign/EU/US support. Africans, more than foreigners, have the moral justification to withstanding the PSO’s costs. Hence, instead of revulsion and outrage that erupted in the US in 1993 (Bowden, 1999: 333), more determination and resolve followed Uganda’s and Kenya’s pains suffered in and outside the battlefield (Williams, 2015). States’ readiness to withstand the pain of the mission’s continuity led to AMISOM’s successes.

The final element of ownership is the claim of legitimacy under IGAD and AU security-cooperation principles. The TCCs claim moral obligation to intervene to improve regional security; close relationships between Somalis and other East Africans; the link between Somali crises and SALWs proliferation in East Africa; and countries’ desire to honour their IGAD, AU, and UN obligations (Fisher, 2012:418; Museveni, 2008). Honouring IGAD and AU obligations may reflect institutional commitment but it also entails ownership when we consider the desire to help others as a morally legitimate consideration. A wounded Ugandan officer, Maj. Duncan Kashoma, believes the UPDF is morally obliged to Somalia: “If you see what happened in our country [Uganda] before we liberated it, it was chaos, like in Somalia. I think that’s what gives us a reason to liberate our sisters and brothers in Somalia” (Damon, 2014). Wounded Kashoma’s belief that Somalis are “brothers” and “sisters” who deserve help to reverse the chaos afflicting their country reveals moral obligation, hence a sense of ownership. It is difficult to know whether a similarly wounded American soldier would conceive of the problem in a similar manner, or whether Uganda’s pecuniary interests, for instance, compensate for the human and security costs it has incurred (UN, 2013; Williams, 2015).

A similar viewpoint can be extended to Burundi. The country had benefited from an African initiative during the 1990s. A protection brigade was provided for its Hutu leaders in exile and in the bush, including President Pierre Nkurunziza. Under the arrangement, Africans used the concept of “immunité provisoire” (provisional immunity) for all stakeholders to allow them participate in dialogue (Rugunda, 2012). Tanzania and Uganda were involved in Burundi’s reconciliation process. A country and its leadership that previously benefited from other states’ assistance, Burundi feels morally obliged to reciprocate. This explains why Burundi justifies its involvement in Somalia on similar grounds. In fact, to enhance its
security and reduce potential for al-Shabaab terrorist retaliation, Burundi, instead of withdrawing, deepened counter-terrorism cooperation with Uganda after the al-Shabaab threatened to attack Burundi over its involvement in AMISOM (Rwengabo, 2014). A common argument from different states, and the AU’s intent in authorising and supporting such claims, shows ownership.

Ownership, however more qualitative and implicit than tangible and explicit it might be, informs states’ and organisations’ feelings of obligation. As Bah (2009) and Touray (2005) reveal, Africa is taking steady steps to own its peace and security problems. This initiative incentivises states and organisations to withstand costly engagements, and through persistence, achieve goals that previously eluded more powerful actors. IGAD retained ownership over the process, including the 2009 Kampala Accord, which extended former president Sharif Ahmed’s mandate by a year, until Hassan Sheikh, the first ‘permanent’ president of Somalia for nearly two decades, oversaw “the re-establishing of diplomatic ties with the US and the International Financial Institutions.” Hassan Sheikh used “these trappings of sovereignty” to reposition Somalia vis-à-vis regional and international players (Fisher, 2013: online), indicating a rescued Somali state. Considering “the AU’s growing commitment and competence in leading such missions and Western nations’ reluctance to pledge their own troops to them” (ibid, my emphasis), we are entering an era of African regional and continental ownership, “when neighbours are building or re-building neighbours” as has happened in Somalia (ibid) and did occur in Burundi and Liberia during the 1990s. Accordingly, “despite years of bloody fighting” with limited resources and “a significant number of casualties among soldiers”, an assessment of AMISOM reveals that a high sense of ownership was an important factor in stabilising Somalia. Without doubt, “The eradication of Al-Shabaab forces from the control of strategic areas and the protection of key Government … figures are among the most notable achievements of AMISOM” (Segui, 2013: 1) though contextual and structural challenges that remain may take long to resolve. Moreover, Africans reflect shared values of pan-African solidarity that informed their involvement.

Shared Values and AMISOM Successes

Shared values arise from common historical experiences like slave trade, colonialism, ideational and epistemic plunder, persistent psycho-epistemic destruction, as well as observable socio-cultural similarities between the Somalis
and other East Africans. For example, Euro-American affinity informed US-Europe security relations (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002), an affinity that is observable with Pan-Africanism: “Museveni himself has long held genuinely pan-African views and observers have often attested to his desire to be seen by continental counterparts as a regional statesman in the mould of Tanzania’s Nyerere” (Fisher, 2012: 418). Nyerere placed pan-African ideals above other interests like Mandela placed collective freedom above individual freedom. Delineating Uganda’s selfish interests from its pan-African pursuits is difficult given the beliefs Ugandan security officers themselves hold (Damon, 2013). After all, where national interests converge with regional interests, it is misleading to stress only national interests and forget regional ones. Regional interests are rooted in national interests of states forming a particular region, hence convergence of those interests. Critiques may dismiss some African leaders’ pan-African convictions, but these leaders’ consistency reveals Pan-African persuasions notwithstanding pressures that sometimes dilute these beliefs (Museveni, 2014; Fisher, 2012).

States also appealed to shared African principles, mainly the principle of “promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union” (AU 2000, Art 4k). Within this milieu, “African states benefit in specific ways from being seen to contribute to ‘African solutions to African problems’” (Beswick, 2010: 739). This indicates Africa’s emphasis on self-reliance with resulting solidarity with fellow Africans. Solidarity can be adduced from the AU’s initiatives to widen African involvement. The AUPSC stressed “the critical role of” countries of the region “in the overall efforts aimed at bringing about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia.” It strongly appealed to states “to demonstrate the necessary cohesion in support of the TFIs and their efforts” (AU, 2007: 2), provide logistic and personnel support, and “remain seized of the matter”. Initially, “logistic support for AMISOM” was to “be based on self-sustenance by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).” The AU Commission was tasked to “mobilize logistical support for the TCCs” and “funding from AU members states and partners to ensure that TCCs are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment” (ibid: 2-3). Besides foreign support, the AU stressed resource mobilisation, for AMISOM, from within Africa or by an African body. These solidarity-exhibiting decisions were rooted in the shared principle of self-reliance.

International decisions are useful in gauging internationally-shared values. This
occurs especially where decision-making or agenda in IOs is free from stringent inter-state bargains (Rwengabo, 2014). AU decisions on AMISOM involved non-stringent bargains and decisional unanimity among Africans on most issues. This reflects the shared conviction that Africa should address its problems. States’ persistence in implementing their decisions, once the Rubicon Point was reached (Johnson and Tierney, 2011), reveals this conviction. The conviction ignites actors’ resilience in implementing the joint/common decision: Uganda, for instance, did not withdraw its forces after the UN/AU refused to compensate it for the recent loss of combat helicopters and men enroute to Somalia (The Red Pepper, 2014; Tumwine, 2014). Ethiopia and Kenya had intervened unilaterally; Kenya later joined other TCCs because the AU had authorised AMISOM. This shows pan-African solidarity. States’ readiness to jointly sacrifice for AMISOM (Bruton and Williamson, 2014)–sacrifices which the US and other UNTAF members could not withstand though more capable than African states–demonstrates shared values. States’ interests seem to have converged under the common realisation that Somalia’s peace equals regional peace (AU, 2007; Anderson and McKnight, 2014). All told, shared values engendered AMISOM’s success.

How, then, did AfSol generally engender AMISOM’s success? I stress persistence, inclusiveness, and integrated approach which followed a change in AU thinking on when, where, and how to intervene (AU, 2007; Williams, 2007). These mechanisms have been demonstrated. In Somalia, an African solution was the only viable option amidst western disinterest and previous failures (Bellamy, 2011). This realisation created incentives for African states to “remain seized of the matter”, amidst heavy costs. For instance, “IGAD has been a key stabilising factor in the Somali conflict, and remains key to the very existence of Somalia. IGAD is the one organisation that has never abandoned Somalia” (Maalim, 2009: 1) even when IGASOM initiatives had earlier failed (Segui, 2013). Through persistence, AMISOM became adaptive to changed realities of the mission. As AMISOM expanded beyond Mogadishu, it faced an al-Shabaab force resorting to harassment of its supply lines and terrorist attacks. Open confrontation was no longer effective following AMISOM’s military victories over al-Shabaab. As AMISOM “entered a new environment where building cooperative political relationships between Somalia’s de facto governing authorities became more significant than projecting military power” (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 90), it embarked on reconciliation and state building processes. This new integrated approach also entailed involving local and foreign Somalis in
AMISOM via negotiation and reconciliation efforts.

Persistence, inclusiveness, and an integrated approach informed the fight against the ICU/al-Shabaab, as integration of Kenyan and AMISOM forces into a single AU intervention force reveals. The AU’s effective engagement of the international community, especially the UN, its appeal for support from non-African sources, augmented intra-Africa efforts that were intended to widen and deepen African involvement. The UNSC’s mandate extensions legitimised AMISOM’s pacification campaigns in Mogadishu and other cities (AMISOM, 2012), all this resulting from Africa’s, notably Uganda’s, Sudan’s, and Burundi’s persistence informed by the desire to effect IGAD’s and the AU’s decisions on and actions in Somalia (Fisher, 2012; Mays, 2009). Had Kampala only desired to sugar-coat Uganda’s then ongoing constitutional changes, the regime would have lost interest after political changes took root. Yet, Uganda persisted, and worked with other states and organisations, despite rising human costs (Williams, 2015), the July 2010 Kampala bombings (Fisher, 2012), and the 2012 plane crashes (Tumwine, 2014). Uganda’s objectives, therefore, transcend regime selfishness.

From the foregoing, commitment, ownership, and shared values created incentives to withstand a costly intervention in which “al-Shabaab lost the war as much as AMISOM won it”, through, among others, “AMISOM’s own evolution” that resulted from increased troop levels and reduced civilian casualties in urban warfare (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 88). Kenya and Uganda suffered al-Shabaab’s counter-attacks and foiled several attempts but persisted (Damon, 2012). Burundi was compelled to make structural-institutional changes in its security architecture, in response to al-Shabaab’s threats, intensifying counter-terrorism cooperation with Uganda. To say that states had selfish security interests, in any case, is only part of the story: terrorism in East Africa predates the Kampala regime and the Somali crisis. Fighting terrorism has been ongoing since 1981 (Okumu, 2007; US Dept. of State, 2010; Rwengabo 2014). Somalia, then, becomes another experiment in “self-reliance within the framework of the” AU. This AfSol principle, which informed AMISOM’s success, underlies the changing African agency in international politics.

Possible Counterarguments

The world has recognised the importance of burden sharing, that is, of inclusive and integrated responses to insecurity, hence the observed enhancement of the
role of ROs in countering threats to regional and global security (Wulf and Debiel, 2009). UNTAF and IGASOM attempts may be seen in this light, AMISOM being a developed element of it. This may explain why no previous intervention recorded AMISOM’s successes. Notwithstanding this empirical reality, there are possible counter-arguments to my AfSol thesis. The first possible argument, the foreign support thesis, might hold that African solutions are insufficient without foreign support. Euro-American–financial, technical, and diplomatic–support is key. When the west relegated Rwanda genocide followed. Accordingly, only foreign support allowed AMISOM to succeed. Moreover, the USA, UK, and EU pledged US$68 million, and the EU hearkened the US’s appeal to look to Somalia (Vines, 2011). The USA, for instance, “has provided over US$185 million to support AMISOM as of 2011” (Fisher, 2012: 417). The AU itself and African states are donor-funded. Foreign support under the UN, instead of possible sabotage using UN veto power, led to AMISOM-supporting UNSC Resolutions (Table 2).

Second, the selfish-national interest thesis might build on rationalist theorising in International Relations to argue that TCCs had selfish interests in Somalia. According to this viewpoint, mainly national interests motivated these states (Tavares, 2011; Fisher, 2012). Kenya and Ethiopia did underline their national security and economic interests threatened by Somalia’s insecurity. Fisher argues that Uganda instrumentalised the Somali situation to hoodwink donors who were then concerned with politico-constitutional changes in Kampala. Were such interests minimal, it would have been difficult, one might argue, for states to pay a high price for Somalia.

Finally, pessimists may claim that al-Shabaab remains at large, Somalia remains fragile, and AMISOM suffers limitations (Segui, 2013). There is simply no success to celebrate, one might argue, because generally African states are still undergoing the Tillian war-state-making process (Tilly, 1990; Centeno, 2003) and lack authoritative control over their territorial domains (Herbst, 2000). Bruton and Williams (2014) underline the persistent challenges AMISOM has faced, originating within and without Africa, related both to AU capabilities as well as to difficulties of interest convergence. These challenges, which had stifled IGASOM (Mays, 2009), remain unresolved even as AMISOM has made tremendous successes.

The foregoing critiques are not without merit. Euro-American powers may have provided intelligence and logistical support as can be observed with EU
contributions (Vines, 2011). However, one needs to consider the initiatives that Africans, especially IGAD, undertook since 1993 to understand African agency in AMISOM. Neither the EU nor the US imposed such support nor demonstrated the incentive, persistence, and inclusiveness and integrated resolve that Africans demonstrated since 2007. Besides, the West’s money, intelligence, equipment/weapons, and diplomacy, during the 1990s did not reverse UNTAF-UNOSOM failures in which the US was directly involved. Second, were Africans unwilling to intervene minus foreign support as occurred during the IGAD-AU-UN debate over the 1992 arms embargo (Mays, 2009), Uganda engaged IGAD and the west in the issue. IGAD engaged the AU and UN (Fisher, 2012). Ethiopia and Kenya intervened unilaterally, Kenya first doing so through surrogate forces (Anderson and McKnight, 2014), but IGAD was the most persistent regional player: transcending its IGASOM challenges, the IGAD gave way to the AU, which led to a more successful African-led mission. One can say that institutional-ideational changes in African international politics since 2000, when the AU replaced the OAU, sowed seeds of Africa-centred responses to insecurity within which milieu the shared principle of self-reliance obtains and from which AMISOM’s success can be traced. Even if one considered donor support, the support falls under Africa’s resource mobilisation. AMISOM is one among many instances of Africa engaging the west in African initiatives: interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adibe, 1997; Tavares, 2011); AMIB (AU, 2014; Rugunda, 2012); and the regime on SALWs (Donowaki, 2004; Rwengabo, 2014) are added examples. Africa’s peace and security measures reflect African agency and regionalism converging at AU level especially since 2000 (Tavares, 2009; van Nieuwkerk, 2011). Thus, judging from the AMISOM process and experience, we are beginning to witness Africa’s politico-security effectiveness hitherto unseen under the OAU.

The selfish-interests argument downplays interest convergence, cultural and ideational forces that may inform political choices (Acharya, 2009), and the evidence thereof (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). Finally, while Anderson and Mcknight “warn against a complacent view that posits AMISOM successes as ‘victory’ without considering what the future of Al-Shabaab is likely to be” (2014: 3), Africans are better placed than non-African actors to understand and resolve African conflicts regardless of the complexities that defied US efforts due to “strategic miscalculations”, decisions and actions that reflected limited understanding of local context (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999: 28), and Somalia’s
uniqueness. I opine that AMISOM is successful because of the AfSol approach which previous interventions lacked.

**Implications of AMISOM’s Successes for AfSol**

AMISOM recorded some success due to the commitment, ownership, and shared values that Africans showed. This should inform analyses of Africa’s changing security landscape and policy responses to insecurity, with major implications for AfSol: developing and testing [politico-diplomatic, institutional, resource, techno-scientific] capacity for African self-reliance; productive engagement of the international community regarding Africa’s security challenges; the imminent decline of dependence on foreigners; and replicability of success lessons. Capacity development is an ongoing process of instituting a common African security policy following the realisation that Africa needs security self-reliance (AU, 2000; Touray, 2005). The APSA, whose design privileges the ASF’s Regional [rapid intervention] Brigades intended to rescue breakdowns of peace, is a commendable step toward security self-reliance (Franke, 2010; Vines, 2013). To achieve this, African states need political commitment to spearhead effective regional security cooperation (de Waal, 2009). In so doing, effectively engaging non-African actors augments the AfSol approach. By seeking UN support while retaining control over the Mission, Africa augments its efforts. Thus, African initiatives can acquire useful foreign support, leaving Africa more skilled and experienced without negating African commitment and ownership.

The notion of declining foreign influence underscores interdependence between Africans and non-Africans for mutual benefits instead of overdependence. Africa’s past frustrations with foreigners (Touray, 2005) engendered African-initiated measures that reveal AfSol in progress. This realisation demands replication of successful initiatives. Replicability is key to AfSol though “a single template for intervention” over-simplifies complex problems (Cliffe and Luckman, 1999:29). Nevertheless, avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach is not inimical to learning from successful practices like Gacaca (Schabas, 2005; Brehm, et al., 2014), South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process, and the East African Community’s mediation experience (Umbricht, 1989). Indigenous/traditional practices stress conciliation and forgiveness. Through them, Africans “are beginning to chart transformational paths for most of the African countries after centuries of predation by the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism” (Rugunda, 2011: 2). Libya and Zaire revealed
that potentially disastrous western-directed solutions ought to be replaced with AfSol (ibid; cf Bellamy, 2011). These experiences, again, denude earlier pessimism about AMISOM amidst western non-interest in Somalia (Bellamy, 2011: 6). Learning from successful African-initiated and controlled processes is useful for rethinking existing conceptual and methodological approaches to understanding African agency in international politics.

**Conclusion**

The achievements of AMISOM defy initial western pessimism about Somalia and claims that African states suffering resource and capacity limitations and neo-patrimonialism can hardly solve Africa’s security problems. The Mission vindicates the pan-African conception of African-centred solutions to Africa’s peace and security challenges following disappointing dealings with the outside world during the 1990s (Touray, 2005; Bah, 2009). AMISOM’s remarkable successes that are rooted in AfSol indicate Africa’s need to further develop and test its peace and security capabilities. Compared to non-African solutions, the AfSol’s key pillars of state and institutional commitment; shared Pan-African values; and a sense of ownership, created incentives for states to bear costs and sustain AMISOM’s momentum, leading to the observed military, political, state-building, and reconciliation gains. Africans incorporated/reflected AfSol through: (a) persistence amidst the human, resource, and politico-security costs of the intervention; (b) involving local and foreign Somalis; (c) integration of previously disparate interventions–Ethiopia, Kenya, and initial Burundi-Uganda deployments–into a single, AU-sanctioned, intervention; and (d) effectively engaging the UN system for support.

The aforesaid observations underline the need to develop AfSol as a theoretically testable research framework and promising policy choice. Venues for testing AfSol include: the ASF’s Regional Brigades; comparing the efficacy of African-centred solutions like AMIB and AMISOM on the one hand, and foreign interventions like NATO in Libya; and learning from successful indigenous/traditional conflict-resolution experiences like Gacaca. These practices are lived social institutions.

They transcend legality and stress reconciliation and co-existence (Clark, 2010). Being “part of a well-structured, time-proven, social system geared toward

\[I \text{ highlighted issues of measurement, AfSol's replicability, level of analysis (sub-regional vs continental), and developing indicators of commitment, shared values, and ownership. A researcher must decide which qualitative and quantitative data to collect, and within-AfSol models to develop/test.}\]
reconciliation, maintenance and improvement of social relationships”, indigenous conflict resolution measures inhere in African customs and traditions (Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo, 2015: 33).

In no way does AfSol claim that African solutions can solve all problems overnight, or that they are proof to manipulation as critics of Gacaca have underscored (Clark, 2010), or that miscalculations have not been made in Somalia and elsewhere (Menkhaus, 2007; Bruton and Williams, 2014). By no means do I imply that AfSol is beyond theoretical, methodological, and epistemological critique, or that when using AfSol all state interests will always converge. I only underscore the potential to harmonise national with regional interests in rescuing an out-of-hand peace and security situation like Somalia was. Where interests converge mutual benefits result. Through inter-state diplomatic engagements, as have been experimented in Africa, states’ security interests can converge.

Africa’s substantial donor-dependence ignites caution about praise-singing Africa’s potential. Nevertheless, AfSol consists in attempts to arrest this dependence by developing Africa’s capabilities. Appropriate AfSol-related policy measures include: state, regional, and continental/AU-level capacity development; reclaiming effective but otherwise underrated indigenous/traditional conflict management approaches; focused mobilisation of resources and technical capacity; promotion of policy-informing/applied research; reversing donor dependence; and garnering political will. Political will is necessary to subject national interests to continental interests. It requires effectively shifting from “non-intervention to non-indifference” (Williams, 2007). It entails relaxing Africa’s hitherto stringent “territorial integrity norm” (Zacher, 2001) and principles of non-interference in states’ internal affairs (Touray, 2005: 638). These measures provide a conducive political environment for real Africa-centred organisational and institutional change. By relaxing sovereignty concerns, Africans can secure interest convergence in peace and security affairs, thereby succeeding where foreigners fail.

AMISOM’s successes are not an endpoint in Africa’s peace and security efforts. Instead, the success constitutes Africa’s learning experience from an ongoing Mission. Anderson and McKnight (2014) reveal al-Shabaab’s self-reinvention and how it extended the struggle to Kenya [and Uganda] through terrorist retaliation. Militarised counter-terrorism can be inadequate unless it is followed by political and psycho-social counter-radicalisation similar to what AMISOM is undertaking in
Somalia. Somalia’s multi-faceted challenges of restoring sanity after three decades of anarchy remain (AU, 2014; Segui, 2013). Yet, by enduring AMISOM’s costs and merging disparate intervention efforts, Africans defied indifference and apathy, and demonstrated shared readiness to address Somalia’s crisis. By reconstituting the Somali state and allowing it to acquire “trappings of sovereignty” and self-reassertion (Fisher, 2013), AMISOM evolved into a Somalia-centred solution to a decades-old politico-security crisis. These realities signify Africa’s evolving security architecture, vindicating the promise of effective AfSol when the APSA (Vines, 2013) becomes fully operational. Ultimately, AMISOM lessons need to be expounded, utilised, and made stepping stones toward sustainable AfSol.
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