A Case for African-promoted Peacebuilding Strategies with Specific Reference to AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in South Sudan

Jacqueline Nakaiza *

Abstract

This paper reports the findings of a study that scrutinized the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Juba Peace Process and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan to: 1) reach value judgments on the potential of African solutions to resolve the ongoing conflicts on the African continent; and 2) disaggregate the role of both African and non-African actors in promoting the effectiveness of these solutions. Using evidences from relevant reports and related literature, the study contends that, in concurrence with past authors on the subject, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts have potential for capitalizing on the values those parties in conflict situations share, thereby promoting ownership of and commitment to peaceful resolution. Notwithstanding, the study also reports that these efforts have been associated with constraining limitations, adding that interventions by multi-national organisations are supposedly undertaken to address these limitations. Therefore, the paper argues that interventions into peacebuilding efforts by non-African organisations are to be seen as having pros and cons. Contending that, despite their known shortfalls, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts give better promise of more sustainable peace; the paper propounds—for relevant organisations and policy persons—actionable recommendations towards enhancing the prioritisation and effectiveness of African-promoted peacebuilding strategies.

Keywords: Sustainable peacebuilding; AMISOM; South Sudan

Introduction

Traditionally, peacebuilding efforts on the African continent have attracted the input of local, national, regional and multi-national organisations. Scholarship on these efforts (e.g. Schreiter, Appleby and Powers, 2010) suggests that the effectiveness of these efforts depends on a multiplicity of variables, including the nature of the conflicts and the nature of the interventions that the peacebuilding

* Jacqueline Nakaiza (kibirigejackie@yahoo.uk) is a researcher based in Uganda.
organisations implement. An apparent justification for the intervention of these organisations in peacebuilding efforts is that it is part of their mandate to do so (cf. Bourantonis, 2007; Dallaire, 2009). However, a small but growing body of literature (e.g. Mamdani, 2010; AfSol, 2014) suggests that, in some instances, the involvement of certain actors in peacebuilding processes exacerbates rather than alleviates conflict. Indeed, this realisation forms a major part of the call for African-promoted peacebuilding strategies for resolving ongoing conflicts on the continent. In particular, organisations like AfSol argue that African-promoted peacebuilding strategies will emphasize shared values in the conflict situation(s) and, subsequently, achieve ownership and the commitment of the parties involved in the conflict situations (AfSol 2014). In as much as this argument is credible, however, review of related literature leads to the conclusion that evidence supporting it is anecdotal. Accordingly, there is a need for quality data and analysis demonstrating the efficacy and effectiveness of home-grown peacebuilding strategies in addressing the ongoing conflicts on the continent—to promote the prioritisation of these strategies.

This paper reports on the findings of a recent study that attempted to respond to this need, taking the case of AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan. Starting with an analytical exposition of the conflict situations and respective peace processes, the paper scrutinizes the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the peace processes. This is with the conclusion that, in concurrence with literature on the subject, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts carry the potential for capitalizing on the values those parties in the conflict situations share, thereby promoting ownership of and commitment to the peace processes. Notwithstanding, the study also reports that the strategies have been associated with constraining limitations, adding that interventions by multi-national organisations beyond the continent are supposedly undertaken to address these, among other constraints. Therefore, the paper argues that interventions into peacebuilding efforts by non-African organisations are to be seen as having pros and cons. Contending that, despite their known shortfalls, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts give better promise of more sustainable peace, the paper propounds—for relevant policy persons—actionable recommendations towards enhancing the prioritisation and effectiveness of African-promoted peacebuilding strategies. To scrutinize the efficacy and effectiveness of home-grown peacebuilding strategies in addressing
the ongoing conflicts in Africa, the study posed several guiding research questions:

1) What is the setting of these peace processes?

2) Who are the facilitators of these peace processes?

3) Who are the actors in these peace processes?

4) What is the content of these peace processes?

5) What are the successes of these peace processes?

6) What are the failures of these peace processes?

7) To what extent are the successes and/or failures of these processes attributable to their setting, actors, facilitators and content?

The key justification for selecting these processes is that they each attempt to resolve conflicts that are protracted and significant in many ways. Secondly, the peace processes, just like the conflicts to which they attempt to respond, have attracted the participation of a multiplicity of stakeholders, the inference being that they provide particularly useful cases for pinpointing the deserving place of African-led responses to the ongoing conflicts on the African continent. Specific attention was paid to the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the peace processes because these provide workable parameters within whose framework the role of African solutions to African problems can be scrutinized (cf. Mamdani, 2010).

The discussion that this paper builds disaggregates the potential for African solutions to resolve conflicts on the African continent. Moreover, by following a systemic analytic approach, the study also highlights the deserving role of non-African actors in promoting the success of the African solutions. That way the study may promote efforts of African organisations that stand for AfSol.

**Related Literature and Knowledge Gap**

In responding to the questions raised above, reference was made to related literature (i.e. Collier, 2002; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2001 and 2002, 2002; Hoglund, 2001; Kriesberg, 1989; Manson and Fett, 1995; Nduwimana, 2013; Pillars, 1983;
Rothchild, 2000; Villaveces, 2003; Walter, 2002; Zartman, 1989) to identify relevant parameters and variables within whose framework the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts may be appraised.

Darby and Mac Ginty (2001; 2002) explain five features that define a (successful) peace process. First, the protagonists in the conflict situation must be willing to negotiate. Second, the key actors must be included in the process. Third, the negotiations must address the central issues in dispute. Fourth, the negotiators must realize that they cannot use force to achieve their objectives. Fifth, the negotiators must be committed to a sustained process. Carefully considered Darby and Mac Ginty’s views are plausible because these conditions are necessary in peaceful conflict resolution. From this theoretical point of departure, it is important to examine the African Peace Processes to see if they integrated these factors in their attempts. However, survey of literature relating to the Juba Peace Process, AMISOM and the South Sudan Peace Process indicates that no thorough scholarly scrutiny has been done on the processes to determine the extent to which they typify the aforementioned features of effective peacebuilding processes. This study was conducted to fill this gap. The significance of filling the gap derives primarily from the understanding that although Darby and Mac Ginty (2001; 2002)’s views are plausible and corroborated by other authors (e.g. Villaveces 2003, Nduwimana, 2013), a host of authors (e.g. Kriesberg 1989) note that contenders on either side of intractable conflicts tend to resist possible solutions, exhibit inclination to harm and involve conflict intensifying features instead of being inclined towards negotiating as recommended by Darby and Mac Ginty (2001; 2002).

Nduwimana (2013) argues that peace processes would be more successful if they have clearly defined and robust mandates. Incidentally, Nduwimana goes on to highlight a dichotomy between UN and AU-sponsored Peace Processes that is relevant to the present study. He notes that conflicts on the African continent have presented a serious dilemma for the UN in relation to its philosophy of peacekeeping. The AU is more flexible when it comes to its mandates and tactics. This being the case, it is reasonable to think that the nature of mandate in the peace processes might have had implications for the effectiveness of the processes.

According to Zartman (1989), peace processes are likely to be more successful if the conflict situations being addressed have reached a hurting stalemate—when the parties in a conflict are going nowhere, and when the cost, both human and
economic, of pursuing the conflict begins to mount. For example Zartman (2001) argues that warring parties can present pain, fatigue and boredom from being at war and lower their benefits from war. Incidentally this view is in concurrence with that of Darby and Mac Ginty (2001 and 2002) who argue that there should be willingness to negotiate from the parties. In the context of the study—which was concerned with the effectiveness of the Peace Processes in Somalia, South Sudan and Northern Uganda—Zartman’s views point to the need for interrogating whether the conflicts had reached a hurting stalemate and how this related to the effectiveness of the Peace Processes.

The decision to negotiate or not is also determined by the perceived costs and benefits of a unilateral victory or a negotiated settlement (Villaveces (2003). Zartman (2001) further argues that both the political reform and hurting stalemate are the two main components that change the behaviour and incentives of parties. The prospect of an inclusive political reform, accommodation and devolution can reduce the benefits of war and increase chances of negotiation yet the mutually hurting stalemate can get the process started by pushing parties to listen to incentives and negotiate. Both types of incentives require being credible and mediation of a third party may provide credibility to the incentives. From this perspective, this study sought to establish whether the LRA rebellion, the South Sudan conflict and the civil war in Somalia had reached a mutually hurting stalemate and how this influenced the effectiveness of the respective peace processes.

Manson and Fett (1995) argue that a rational calculation over the utility and cost of war is important to reach a peaceful settlement. Although warring parties may not act out of rationality throughout the peace process (they could be influenced by emotions, for instance), the likelihood that they agree to a settlement rather than continue to fight will vary depending on each party’s estimate of its probability of victory. It also depends on the parties’ expected payoffs from victory versus those from a settlement, the rate at which it absorbs costs of conflict and its estimate of how long it will take to achieve victory. They argue that the probability of a peaceful settlement being reached will depend on the duration of the conflict, size of government army, uncertain effects of the negotiation settlement, casualty rates and the role of third parties.

From an economic perspective, Collier (2002) argues that civil wars occur where rebel organisations are financially viable, mostly in countries with low income, low
growth and economies based principally on the export of commodities. Hence, the way to end the conflict depends on how public policies reduce the economic risk factors, change the pattern of the economy, and diversify production and international cooperation to reduce the incidence of illegal trades and sanctions making the economic and military circumstances of rebellion more difficult. The greater the benefits of war economy, the less chances to initiate a negotiated and peaceful settlement. Villaveces (2003) argues that a successful peace process is influenced by the presence or absence of outside mediation or third parties. This is corroborated by Rothchild (2000) who argues that parties may regulate the use of coercive and non-coercive incentives in the process of prevention and resolution of a conflict. This is also in consonance with Walter (2002) who suggests that third parties have an active role in terms of mediation, verification and coercion to create a credible commitment between the parties.

Hoglund (2001) argues that a peace process is a changing and fluctuant process and one of the issues that alter its dynamics is the existence of violence during the peace process. The violence might be part of the strategy of the parties to achieve their goals or might be the outcome of dissidences and differences within the party. Incidences of violence have different effects on the negotiation depending on who uses violence, timing and targets. She suggests that violence by parties inside a peace process is more likely to dislocate the negotiations than violence by parties who are outside the peace process. This type of violence is seen as lack of commitment toward the peace process and may lead other parties to withdraw their support to negotiations. This is in consonance with Pillars (1983) who suggests that the use of violence might be expected to increase in the final phase of the negotiation process when the settlement is close to its establishment. This being the case, it was important to study the incidence of ongoing hostilities during the peace processes, to try and understand the impact that they had on the effectiveness of the peace processes, if any.

We also sought to investigate the role played by third parties in the peace processes and the mission in Somalia. Literature indicating that third parties influence the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts points to the need for establishing the role that these third parties played in the processes as well as the ways in which these roles influenced the overall effectiveness of the processes. However, review of the literature shows that with exception of reporting the involvement of the third parties in the said peace processes, the impact that this involvement imposed on
the effectiveness of the peace processes has not been scrutinized. The present study sought to fill this gap, among others, by looking beyond the sheer involvement of the third parties to interrogate the impact of the involvement on the successes and failures of the peace processes.

**Conceptual Underpinning**

Figure 1 delineates the relationship between sustainable peace and the attributes of peacebuilding processes identified in the foregoing literature.

![Conceptual Framework for the Study of Efficacy and Effectiveness of Peace Processes in Africa](image)

1. Willingness to negotiate
2. State of the conflict
3. Financial viability of conflict
4. Mandate & role of third parties
5. Public Opinion

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the Study of Efficacy and Effectiveness of Peace Processes in Africa

In Figure 1, sustainable peace is expressed as a function of successful peaceful resolution of conflicts. The foregoing literature indicates that, in turn, successful conflict resolution will depend primarily on five factors (i.e. willingness of the warring parties to negotiate; state of the conflict; perceived financial viability of the conflict situation; the mandate and role of third parties in both the conflict and peace processes; and relevant public opinion).

However, when critically considered, each of these factors would benefit significantly from ownership of and commitment to pertinent peacebuilding
A Case for African-promoted processes. In turn, the ownership and commitment would benefit from the prevalence of shared values (among the warring parties and even third parties). Therefore, in investigating the efficacy and effectiveness of the South Sudan peace process, AMISOM and Juba Peace Process, attention was paid to these factors and to the cross-cutting issues of shared values and ownership of peacebuilding processes and the subsequent commitment to the processes that these enlist. In so doing, the study endeavoured to scrutinize when these factors are optimized for the benefit of the peacebuilding processes so as to pinpoint the critical success/failure factors in the peace processes examined. This was done in the hope that the resulting analysis would clarify what African actors should and can contribute towards peaceful resolution of African ongoing conflicts.

Methodology

Evidence was gathered primarily from two secondary sources: 1) reports on the AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan; and 2) related literature. A key justification for using the sources is that both the respective conflicts and peace processes are well subscribed in the literature. The gap in these secondary sources only relates to the fact that it mostly reports on the happenings in the conflicts and peace processes albeit without a keen effort to scrutinize these happenings to highlight their implications for the possibility of peaceful resolution of the conflicts. The data were assumed to be reliable and of a satisfactory level of quality because they were already validly published (e.g. in refereed academic journals and by respected organisations like the African Union and United Nations). A documentary review checklist was used to categorize the evidence culled from the secondary sources used. The checklist was structured to cater for the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the peace processes. Information on the conflict situations, including at the time the peace processes were going on, was also captured and eventually subjected to content analysis using NVIVO 10. Thereafter, the themes identified were discussed and conclusions and recommendations reached.

Findings and Discussion

Information about the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan is summarized in Table 1.
The information shows that the three peace processes succeeded albeit to different degrees. Even though none of the respective conflicts has been fully resolved, the current state of the conflicts shows that the protracted conflict in Somalia is not only continuing but actually expanding to other countries in the region (i.e. Burundi, Kenya and Uganda). This variation in performance of the peace processes suggests that, indeed, the setting, facilitation, actors, and content are candidates for examination—to reach value judgments on critical success factors in peacebuilding efforts on the continent.

Regarding the actors and third parties in the peace processes, Table 1 shows that the protagonists in the conflict situations fall into two broad categories playing three different roles. The categories are African leaders/organisations (e.g. IGAD and AU) and non-African actors (i.e. United Nations, European Union, TROIKA, Switzerland, Finland etc.). The roles the African leaders play are to mediate these conflicts and to contribute troops (in the case of peacekeeping missions). On the other hand, the non-African actors play the role of funding/financing, providing military and technical support and observing the peace processes to give it credibility. It is noteworthy that the peace processes involved the warring parties as suggested by Darby and Mac Ginty (2002) in their discussion of the features of successful peace processes.
Table 1: Implementation and performance of AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU (with military and financial support from the EU and US)</td>
<td>• Peace enforcement and stabilisation mission</td>
<td>• Recognized, but weak, central government structure supported and sustained</td>
<td>• War is still going on • Al-Shabaab continues to be a serious regional threat, conducting gruesome attacks in Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya</td>
<td>• Setback by perception of colonialist occupation (perceived as alien agenda to foil Islamic State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD-led peace effort</td>
<td>IGAD (with financial support from TROIKA)</td>
<td>• Peace talks (demanding for signing of a peace agreement, forming a transitional government of national unity headed by Salva Kiir)</td>
<td>• Warring parties brought to negotiating table • Agreement for TNUG signed</td>
<td>• All cessation of hostilities agreement were not observed • Agreement facing challenges in implementation</td>
<td>• Ignored root causes of the conflict • Ignored demands of warring parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Content</td>
<td>Successes</td>
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</table>
| Arusha Peace Process | South Sudan Inter-Party Dialogue (i.e. Government of South Sudan, SPLM/A in Opposition and CSOs) with [non-intrusive] financial support from Switzerland and Finland | • Peace talks | • Inter Party Dialogue agreement signed  
• The two warring sides have already agreed to jointly establish a national unity government | • War is still going on  
• Al-Shabaab continues to be a serious regional threat, conducting gruesome attacks in Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya | • Setback by perception of colonialist occupation (perceived as alien agenda to foil Islamic State) |
| Juba Peace Process | South Sudan, South Africa, Kenya and Mozambique Donors contributed funding through the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN (OCHA) | • Peace talks | • Truce signed and observed  
• Five separate agreements were signed that provided a framework to address historical grievances, facilitate disarmament and demobilisation, promote reconciliation and establish accountability for crimes committed during the war | • Agreement still has not been reached on power sharing in the unity government | • The warring parties were sitting alone and had a chance to address the root causes of their conflict  
• Third parties participated as funders and observers  
• Setback by ICC indictment of top leadership of LRA |
The evidence gathered further indicated that in instances where the non-African actors tried to participate directly in the conflict situations (e.g. Somalia), the conflict worsened and the non-African actors eventually withdrew. Conversely, in the case of the Arusha Peace Process where IGAD, the LRA and AMISOM were involved, the non-African actors participated primarily as funders (Troika, Switzerland, Finland) and as observers. Yet, it ought to be noted that the negative impact of the non-African actors on the peace processes, notwithstanding their participation seems to give credibility to the respective peace processes. Other organisations (e.g. the United Nations) have also been involved because their mandate focuses on peacebuilding everywhere including on the African continent. In addition, it is important to note that both the funding and the legal mandate of these third parties are required in the peace processes (cf. Villaveces 2003; Rothchild 2003; Walter, 2002).

Table 1 shows that, in all the three conflict situations, the respective peace processes registered some successes. The Juba Peace Process to resolve the LRA conflict was a very big achievement because it was seen as a realistic opportunity to end the protracted conflict peacefully. Previously, there were indications (including from President Y. K. Museveni) that the government of Uganda was inclined towards a military solution to ending the conflict. Incidentally, the LRA was also reported to be shunning efforts at peaceful resolution of the conflict and was criticized for abusing ceasefires under the auspices of the 1993 peace processes to regroup and rejuvenate its supplies. However, in the Juba Peace Process, five (5) separate agreements were signed, providing a framework to address historical grievances, facilitate disarmament and demobilisation, promote reconciliation and establish accountability for crimes committed during the war. This peace process also led to the return of peace in Northern Uganda and the government managed to resettle about 70,000 IDPs back into their homes and communities.

On the other hand, the IGAD-led South Sudanese peace process managed to bring the SPLM and SPLM-in-opposition otherwise trapped in a gruesome military showdown, to the negotiating table. Indeed, the warring parties signed five cessation of hostilities agreements (Table 1) consistent with Darby and Mac Ginty (2002) indication that peace processes will be more successful if the protagonists in the conflict situation are involved in the process and are willing to negotiate. Third, the negotiations must address the central issues in dispute. Unfortunately,
the cessation of hostilities agreements were not observed and they were all short lived. On the contrary, the Inter-Party Dialogue in Arusha managed to have the different factions of SPLA reconcile their differences with the SPLM party. It was hoped that a final peace agreement would be signed but the talks collapsed in March 2015. Although the peace talks ultimately collapsed—as skeptics feared they would from the start—it is interesting to note that the African mediated peace process succeeded in securing reconciliation of the different factions in the SPLM.

With the exception of AMISOM, the peace processes shown in Table 1 took place outside the countries where the conflicts were domiciled. This is a notable observation especially when it is taken into account that past efforts to resolve the same conflicts were held within the same countries. Incidentally, review of related literature shows that there is evidence of several peace processes led by Africans themselves (e.g. the Nairobi Peace Accord of 1986 between the NRA rebels and the Uganda government, the Arusha Peace Process and the Burundi Peace Process).

In as much as the Arusha Peace Process did not achieve its objectives, as many feared it would not from the start, the negotiations seemed to be successful (for instance, in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table and securing their commitment to resolve their factions) because the warring parties addressed their own differences. This corroborates Darby and Mac Ginty (2002) view that peace processes will be more successful if the warring parties are directly involved in the peacebuilding effort. Further, considering the conflicts are on the African continent, this finding appears to justify African solutions to African problems. When the government of Uganda and the LRA rebels were engaging with each other, the Juba peace process proceeded and was seen to be on track to eventual peaceful resolution of the LRA rebellion until the ICC declared that it was upholding arrest warrants issued against the leaders of the LRA. There were indications, at the time of the Juba Peace Process, that the LRA rebellion against the government of Uganda had reached a hurting stalemate (cf. Zartman 1989), so the eventual failure of the process is to be seen as loss of a rare opportunity to end one of the longest and most gruesome conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Conversely, AMISOM is seen as a particularly costly and unsustainable operation the achievements of which is difficult to maintain as reported by authors like Nduwimana (2013) notwithstanding. A key hindrance to the effectiveness of the mission is connivance of sections of the grassroots with al-Shabaab, apparently due to negative perception
of the role of third parties, notably the United States, which was seen by some of the warring parties as fighting a cultural imperialist war against Islam.

These observations give credence to the conclusion that peace processes on the continent have been more effective when the warring parties are the key players in their own peace processes. In turn, this conclusion appears to justify “African solutions to African problems” as a model for the resolution of the ongoing conflicts in Africa. This being the case, it is useful to point out that the results of this comparative examination of the case peace processes studied vindicate suggestions by authors like Mays (2003), Battle and Cousin (2011) and Oyinlola (2014) that efforts to resolve the ongoing conflicts on the African continent should prioritize “African solutions”. Yet a persevering question that is relevant to the determination of the place of African solutions to the resolution of conflicts on the African continent relates to the continuing involvement of non-African actors in peace processes in Africa. Why have non-African actors continued to be involved in peace processes when it is now widely recognized that ownership of peace processes, shared values and commitment, might be optimized using African solutions?

Our analysis appears to speak to the rationale underlying the persevering involvement of non-African actors in efforts to resolve conflicts on the African continent. The evidence in Table 1 shows that in all the peace processes studied, non-African actors facilitated the processes financially. An apparent justification for this kind of involvement is that peace processes require financial resources and most African actors, including the AU, do not have these resources. Table 1 also shows involvement of multilateral actors like the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs. It is important to note that peaceful resolution of conflicts like those witnessed on the African continent is part of these organisations’ mandate (see, for example, Villaveces 2003; Rothchild 2000; Nduwimana 2013; UN 1971; 1991) and that authors like Walter (2002) endorse, as constructive, the involvement of third party actors in peacebuilding processes. Even more importantly, it is to be noted that the participation of these organisations in peace processes is widely seen as endorsing the credibility of the processes, an attribute that ought to be commended.

The argument that involvement of non-African actors is, in fact, to be seen as positive intervention that suitably compliments efforts by African actors points to
an important question though: why the concern for African solutions to African problems? This question begs substantiation of the rationale for African solutions to African problems. The present study highlights three points that provide justification despite the positive contribution of non-African actors to peace processes on the continent.

First, the study shows that the peace processes did not succeed in resolving the conflicts fully, hence the need for further solutions. Second, the findings in Table 1 show that, in some instances, the involvement of non-African actors (e.g. the ICC in the Juba Peace Process) presented a stumbling block to full peaceful resolution. Third, Table 1 shows that when African actors led their own peace processes, they faced their differences and exhibited ownership of the processes thereby achieving more effective outcomes. In particular, examination of the three peace processes (Table 1) suggests that problems mainly arise when the non-African actors’ involvement deprives the warring (African) parties’ ownership of the peace processes and, subsequently, face their own challenges as well as capitalize on their shared values to build the commitments that peaceful resolution requires.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

The findings and discussion in Section 3 support three main conclusions that have implications for the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the African continent: 1) Peace processes are more effective when led by the (African) warring parties and supported by relevant African actors, hence, the case for African-promoted peacebuilding strategies. 2) Non-African actors promote peace processes in Africa by providing required financial support and credibility. 3) In some instances, the involvement of non-African actors (primarily through the provision of financial support) has foiled the success of the same peace processes that these actors seem to promote (financially) because it affects warring parties’ ownership of the processes and, consequently, lessens commitment to peaceful resolution. In turn, upon concurrent interpretation, these conclusions point to a major conclusion: African-promoted peace processes carry greater potential for successful resolution of conflicts on the continent.

However, this potential needs to be complimented with the financial resources and credibility that the peace processes require if they are to be successful. Providing these resources and building the said credibility would effectively substitute the
role that non-African actors are currently playing in the ongoing peacebuilding processes on the continent, leading to effective African solutions to African problems. This being the case, it is recommended that African governments, the African Union Commission, United Nations and similar organisations devise sustainable means of funding peace processes on the continent and promote recognition of African solutions to African problems among pertinent stakeholders at the local, regional and international levels. Organisations like AfSol also have an important role to play in making this possible.
References


