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The Journal of African-Centred solutions in peace and security (AfSol Journal) is one of the research products of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) which serves as a platform for critical debate and solutions on African peace and security challenges. It aims at meeting peace and security as an intellectual challenge and avails theoretical and practical knowledge to academia and policy makers.

AfSol Journal would like to draw this knowledge from newly-emerging practices and from past experiences to be found hidden in oral verses and practices of Africans, written in academic publications, daily periodicals, and policy documents. It is embedded in what Africa has achieved in the past and in what it could have done better; it is entrenched in its history, its traditions, values and its people. Our vision is to bring this knowledge together, publish papers with high academic standards, yet presentable to policy makers and to everyone devoted for a peaceful and prosperous Africa.

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Editor’s Note

Reflecting the interest among scholars and practitioners of peace and security in Africa, this Journal of African-centred Solutions in Peace and Security (AfSol Journal) sets a foundation for the on-going investigation and research on how Africa can develop its peaceful responses to peace and security challenges. Born out of a series of workshops since 2011, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) has been leading this effort with a clear understanding that a successful pursuit of the concept and practice of AfSol requires the development of a world-class mechanism for the continuous scholarship, synthesis and application of AfSol to address peace and security challenges and issues.

In establishing this journal, IPSS has committed to the highest standards of academic and scholarly rigor and review processes. With an international board of scholars and practitioners in the field of peace and security from Africa and the rest of the world, and with a systemic process of peer review and editorial support, IPSS is striving to make the AfSol Journal a scholarly anchor in the field of peace and security in Africa.

As the scholarly development of AfSol is still at its infancy, a regular periodical such as this journal is intended to continuously synthesize and develop concepts and practices with the aim of ensuring the sustainability and replicability of successful African solutions. The journal is therefore scheduled for publication semi-annually. Contributions from scholars, practitioners and students of peace and security in Africa will be pursued and encouraged. IPSS hopes that the journal will offer valuable knowledge and guidance to all involved in peace and security on the continent.

IPSS is grateful to all the contributors to its first volume of the AfSol Journal. Their commitment, valuable insights and rigorous pursuit of knowledge have made this first volume a success.

Congratulations to Africa, IPSS and all those who have committed their work and scholarship to the advancement of peace and security in Africa.

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Regional Intervention in Fragile African States: Comparative Case Studies of South Sudan and Lesotho: Any Lessons Learnt?

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Abstract

African conflicts have continued to be protracted and unresponsive, frustrating conventional interventions. Consequently, the concept of African Solutions for African-Centred Solutions (AfSol) has increasingly become the default alternative. To this end, politico-military crises in South Sudan and Lesotho in 2014 and the interventions by IGAD and SADC respectively, have shown remarkable similarities. South Sudan, saddled with an unclear leadership succession as the country approached the scheduled 2015 national election, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) National Liberation Council convention of December 2013 became a battleground that dragged the country into civil war. Curiously, the same happened in Lesotho when the country was faced with a vote-of-no-confidence in June 2014 and Prime Minister Thomas Thabane dismissed key government officials, prorogued the parliament and removed the Army Commander plunging the country into civil war. When each of the fragile states reached this stage, the sub-regional economic and security organisations (RECs) of IGAD and SADC, respectively, intervened. This paper assesses the implications and impact of those interventions, under the rubric of AfSol in order to discover any lesson learnt. Findings of this case study reveal that the philosophy of AfSol is a possible tool of intervention that could also be extrapolated to other conflict scenarios elsewhere on the African continent.

Keywords: African fragile states, RECs intervention, AfSol

Introduction

On 19 December 2013, the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) rushed to Juba, South Sudan, for an emergency three-day intervention to stop what has become accepted as the “ethnic cleansing” of Nuers by mainly Dinka armed elements associated with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GOSS). (UNMISS South Sudan Crisis Report, May 2014;
Amnesty International Report, May 2014: Nowhere Safe: Civilians under Attack in South Sudan; IGAD 23rd Extraordinary Summit 27 December 2013). The IGAD intervention was complimented by the UN Security Council passing UNSC/RES 2132 (2013) which authorised the immediate increase of UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) force from 5 700 to over 14 000.

The fighting broke out on the evening of 15 December and soon spread throughout Juba city over the next couple of days. It resulted in the power struggle between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Dr. Riek Machar who were competing before the sitting National Liberation Council (NLC) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to choose a leader who would be the movement’s choice for the presidency in the scheduled national elections in 2015 (International Crisis Group (ICG), Africa Report 223: 2015; Okello, 2015: 134, 136, 149).

The Human Rights UNMISS and Human Rights Watch reports cited above reveal that elements drawn from National Security Service (NSS), National Parks Service (NPS), the regular Presidential Guard, the Tiger Battalion and a militia group recently transferred to Juba from Greater Bahr al Ghazal for a mission known as the Mathiang Anyoor which in Dinka is Dut-ku-Beny, meaning, “Rescue the President”. The force totalled to 15,000 cadres drawn from four brigades. (Sudan Radio Tamazuj, The Mathiang Anyoor, 30 March 2015). The result of the military action produced a pogrom, forcing ethnic Neur to flee into Police Stations and UN sites for safety with many relocating to the Northern Counties of Malakal and Upper Nile. With unremitting intent, the cleansing continued during the last week of December 2013. While scenes of bodies mounted on the streets in Juba, in this television war, as well as thousands of internally displaced people (IDP) reduced to misery, the calls for robust intervention grew into a crescendo. Externally, the United Nations Security Council, on 24th December 2013, unanimously agreed to increase UNMISS’ strength from 5 700 to over 12 0000 with a mandate to partly provide security for civilians. As the conflict continued to escalate, the sub-regional body, IGAD converged for a meeting in Juba, in a bid to bring to an end the infighting. In undertaking this rapid intervention, only days after the fighting broke out, IGAD demonstrated the important and inherent advantages of AfSol that include proximity, a historical sense of unfolding conflict and the flexibility and commitment to respond. For example, some of the fleeing people from the conflict had become internally displaced and destitute while others already sought refuge in the neighbouring states of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan (Khartoum).
Furthermore, IGAD’s intervention also confirmed the structural integration with the characteristics of the conflict as well as demonstrating the organisation’s sub-regional mandate to maintain peace and security contained in the regional founding documents and inherent mandate (Ijejiaku, 2011: 62-66). It is also true that the intervention by IGAD member states was at each country’s expense including subsequent support from the existing peace fund. The priority for IGAD was, therefore, to restore the stability of the imploding central government while responding to humanitarian distress as it sought to curtail the ethnic pogrom between the Dinkas and the Neur that had the potential to engulf not only the country but also the sub-region (ICG 29th January 2015, Africa Report: 233).

In the search for comprehensive agreement that followed, significantly, the IGAD/AfSol intervention was able to open lines of dialogue and communication between the warring security commanders, which was fed directly into the political process. Within days, this culminated in a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) during a meeting hosted in Addis Ababa on 23 January 2014. However, several fundamental questions remain for us to understand the nature and context of the conflict in South Sudan better. These include, why did the fighting within the SPLM, characterised by ethnic, linguistic and even regional divisions, erupt with such ferocity on 15 December 2013? This can also be viewed differently, reflecting the determination of the current leadership of the SPLM to block Dr Riek Machar from ascending to the presidency? In executing this through military means, how was it possible for Salva Kiir to be able to have a ‘willing’ readily available force against actual and perceived opponents? Finally, because this discussion is about the utility of AfSol in African problems, we need to ask whether or not the IGAD intervention is likely to provide a sustainable solution to the crisis in South Sudan.

The second comparative case study of the intervention by sub-regional bodies exercising AfSol characteristics was conducted in 2014 in Lesotho, Southern Africa. This followed the deteriorating political relations in a fragile coalition led by Dr Thomas Thabane, President of the All Basotho Congress (ABC) party, who had been precariously in power since May 2012. At the time of the consummation of the Coalition by parties that had a single thread in common, hatred of the outgoing Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, experts expressed scepticism that the new government would last. These fears were soon to be proved correct. Early in the new year of 2014, charges of serious corruption were being laid before Coalition partner, Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Metsing, and leader of the Lesotho
Congress of Democrats (LCD). Faced with the possibility of a parliamentary vote of no-confidence by parties that were able to muster a majority, Thabane reacted by proroguing parliament and denying them the platform to constitutionally remove him from power. In parallel, his administration continued attempting to arrest and detain the identified corrupt members of the Coalition. With the threatened political elite facing incarceration, on the night of 30 August 2014, the Lesotho Defence Forces (LDF) launched a military coup at 3:00 AM in the morning. The coordinated targets of the military coup were instructive. First, the armed units attacked and disarmed occupants of the Police Headquarters and surrounded police stations in the capital. Lesotho’s sixth military coup in Lesotho since independence reflected serious political and civil-military relations characterised by a sharp division between the army and the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police (RLMP).

In conjunction, other hard driving units raced to the State House, attempting to eliminate the PM, as well as residences of the Police Commissioner and that of the newly installed Chief of Lesotho Defence Forces, Lieutenant General, Maaprankoe Mahao. After decapitating the executive and the commanders, the third target was the nearby Government Buildings and senior public sector officials. The immediate impact of the military coup was to comprehensively dislocate the executive, dismantle the police and the public sector.

Bloodshed was saved by the prompt action of South Africa, given the widely expressed intention to carry out the military coup against the background of failing constitutionalism. Hence, PM Thomas Thabane barely escaped with the assistance of South African intelligence services and close security agents who spirited him over the border into the nearby town of Ladybrand in South Africa only hours before his official residence came under attack. It also later emerged that Mahao escaped by hiding in an outside toilet while his residence came under sustained rifle and machine gun fire. Around the executive were also over one hundred Director Generals, Principal Secretaries and staffers fleeing to South Africa where most were quickly put up in a tent city.

The following morning, the face of military coup stepped from the shadows, in the form of DPM, Mothetjoa Metsing, announcing that he was in charge and calling for calm amongst the citizens. In this, the coup making trend Lesotho continued was described as one characterised by violence and assassinations with impunity (Makoa, 1996: 5).
In parallel, in the immediate aftermath, the Deputy Police Commissioner and Interpol representative in the country, Assistant Police Commissioner, Lehloka Maphatsoe, issued a statement, advising all police details throughout the country not to report for duty, not to wear distinctive police uniform-as the military spread throughout the small geographic country forcing police details either to seek refuge in South Africa or to stay at home. This continued for several days as evidenced below:

For five days, Maseru streets seemed normal by day. But police force was conspicuous by its absence...many police officers are in hiding, others have fled into South Africa and the remaining ones have been advised not to wear uniforms (Andrew Beatty, 2014: Agance France Press (AFP) reporter, 3 Sep 2014),

This left the country without any policing as power at the centre shifted from the Coalition Government to the putschists. Such an event was a familiar development in Lesotho; it represents a well-established tradition of politico-military crisis that dates back to the days when Chief Jonathan Leabua carried out the first coup in January of 1970. An act described as “…setting in motion an authoritarian agenda characterised by brute force, naked oppression and de-facto one party state rule” (Makoa, 2004: 86). Forty five years later, nothing changed, with the new players taking advantage of the opportunity in consolidating power through the rapid and extensive reform of quasi-state or non-state security institutions (Khabele and Pule, 2003: 41-42; Pefole, 2004: 50-51).

Against these events in Lesotho, the sub-regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), called an Extraordinary meeting in which the South African Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, was appointed to lead the intervention in Lesotho. Clearly, the SADC intervention did not invoke the usual African Union protocols on the unconstitutional removal of an elected government which would have resulted in the immediate suspension and ostracisation of the putschists in Maseru. Instead, the sub-region adopted a different approach of dialogue and engagement. This is instructive in the lesson on methodologies that emerged in this case study. Hence, SADC was prepared to engage with the political head, Metsing, and the military chief, Lieutenant General Kennedy Tlali Kamoli.

Only days after the coup, on 3 September 2014, SADC close protection forces
drawn from South Africa and Namibia returned to Maseru with Thomas Thabane to start a process of consultation with all political and military players.

When the fighting started in Juba on the 15th and 16th of December 2013 and later spread to other counties, IGAD member-states rushed to intervene, hosting the first meeting in the capital of South Sudan on 19th December. While engaging all parties in the unfolding conflict, IGAD issued a communiqué urging restraint and dialogue (African Union Communiqué 21 December 2013; Wanyeka 7 May 2014; ICG Africa Report No. 228 2015: 3, 5-10, 19). The same was true when the crisis in Lesotho broke out; SADC issued a communiqué declaring its readiness and willingness to intervene (Maseru Facilitation Communiqué 2 October 2014). However, while we have taken liberty of placing these initiatives within the AU’s AfSol alternative, strands and commitment to the sub-regional crises had long been on the agenda of the two RECs that enjoyed the advantages of proximity, historical and geo-political linkages.

However, in order to understand the dynamics in the Lesotho case that led to the military coup and SADC intervention better, there are a number of questions that must be answered. These include who, why and how the key players decided on the option of the 30th August 2014 military coup? How and to what extent did SADC respond? Finally, what lessons does the Lesotho case offer in relation to AfSol?

Conceptually, what is AfSol and can we trace its most recent policy history? Furthermore, what contemporary developments can be identified as the key drivers resulting in AfSol becoming the preferred instrument in the conflict resolution matrix in Africa? (Kasaija, 2011; Muna, 2011). For purposes of this research, the guiding AfSol platform is informed by the 2009 decision adopted by the AU Heads of State and the Government of Tripoli on the question of “Eliminating Conflicts in Africa and Promoting Sustainable Peace.” To this end, the AfSol notion is constructed around the three pillars of commitment to finding lasting solutions; preparedness to share norms and values and finally, the integrated and inherent characteristics of the conflict dynamics in the neighbouring state that have the ability to poison regional stability and, therefore, resulting in the sub-regions staying in power beyond the frustrated and departing external partners from elsewhere. AfSol is also integrated within the AU APSA pillars as a necessary alternative to flagging international interest in the prosecution of protracted conflicts.
Data presentation in this paper is organised in two sections, followed by analysis and recommendations. The discussion begins by examining the contemporary crisis that broke out in Juba, South Sudan, during the third week of December 2013 and culminated in the accompanying intervention by IGAD. This is followed by a review of the crisis in Maseru, Lesotho, that reigned from mid-2014 to July 2015 leading to SADC’s response from 3 September 2014 until the perceived misdemeanours of the new regime in July 2015. The third section then attempts to integrate lessons learnt from the two case studies, focusing on the utility or otherwise of AfSol as a guiding concept, before making recommendations.

This paper argues that while there are inherent advantages in AfSol, such as proximity, legitimacy and commitment, these attributes are however, undermined by the policy and structural weaknesses of the umbrella structure under which RECS are expected to exist, that of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). In a clear demonstration of this local ownership, member states provide own resources without reimbursement when undertaking recovery intervention in crisis states. For instance, the most recent and comprehensive ten-year assessment of APSA found out that sub-regional member states such as Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda versus Sudan (Khartoum) are still fighting each other or ready to do so. The same is true of the challenges of competing RECs such as the East African Community (EAC) whose members also have membership in IGAD. Practice has shown that countries will then pick which REC to work with depending on own interests and where they would not be challenged or compelled to justify participation. Worse, in the Maghreb, North Africa, even after a decade, the above report found no political will to have ASF structures in place (AU 2010 Assessment Study: 18, 22). This absence of military capacity cohesion is reflected in the manner that each of the RECs is able to respond or otherwise to a crisis in a neighbouring state.

South Sudan

The SPLM, after more than two decades of protracted armed struggle, won the right to establish a new state in a popular referendum of January 2011 in which 99% of the people voted for secession (The Guardian 30 January 2011). The Movement assumed office in the new state of South Sudan on 9 July 2011. Faced with an imminent election in October 2015, the SPLM decided to hold a National Liberation Council Conference (NLCC) to elect its representatives. On 6
March 2013, the SPLM’s Political Bureau announced plans to hold the 3rd NLCC in Juba by the end of the year. On the agenda were three basic documents to be considered for adoption. The first was a revised constitution of the party, aimed at transforming the Movement into a political party. The second sought to define the code of conduct and guiding relations of party cadres to uphold the image and integrity of the party. The final document was a prelude to the elections – the party’s draft manifesto designed to draw mass support for the SPLM in the impending national elections of 2015.

Soon after the NLCC statement, Vice President, Dr Riek Machar, promptly announced his intention to challenge for the party leadership at the convention. Machar had earlier challenged the leadership of Dr. John Garang de Mabior when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 8 January 2005. When this raised ethnic tensions, at the time when the Movement was preparing to enter into government, IGAD sub-regional leaders had succeeded to compel both leaders to postpone the obviously divisive contest until after attaining the prized political goal. A quiet agreement had been reached to share power and only after attaining independence would contestation be entertained. In practice, this, therefore, meant that Machar’s position was a negotiated one - that was part of finding an internal solution for the interim. However, Garang, barely three weeks after he had been installed as the First Vice President of Sudan, was killed on 30th July 2005 in a helicopter crash on his way from Kampala, Uganda. According to the one time Secretary-General of the SPLM, Pagan Amum, the leadership based in the New Site, moved swiftly to elect a new leader in order to close the power vacuum. Significantly, they did not elevate Machar to the presidency of the party. Instead, the new decision propelled one of the closest allies of Garang, Salva Kiir, a military commander into the Chairmanship of the SPLM (China Daily: 2 August 2005). It is, therefore, true to say that the sudden death of Dr. John Garang de Mabior opened up, yet again, the unresolved leadership question.

The negative reaction to Machar’s announcement to contest the leadership of the party was swift. In order to maintain clarity and brevity on the identification of the conflict characteristics, just weeks after Machar’s announcement, on 15 April 2013, President Kiir publicly announced the stripping of “all delegated powers and positions” of Machar. Next, on 23 July, suspecting that Machar may have supporters amongst key cabinet members, the President dismissed the entire body making the announcement on state television. He also followed this by suspending
parliament - effectively concentrating power under his stewardship.

This event failed to intimidate some senior officials such as the party’s Secretary General, Pagan Amum and Garang’s widow, Rebecca Nyandeng-Garang. These and other former cabinet ministers, the former detainees, now known as the “Group of 13” (G13) pledged their loyalty to Machar on the issue of succession. The G13 also held a series of press conferences at which they announced their preparedness for a showdown at the NLCC, challenging what was perceived as unilateralism by the President Kiir. The important point was that the crisis was now characterised by a unilateral rule by decree leader with no cabinet, government or neutral, senior state officials of the public sector in support. Finally, as the above was playing itself out, the impact of the political fallout was most manifest in the security establishment. This now appeared to be operating with only partisan forces, ready to willingly coerce and compel loyalty to the presidency (ICG Africa Report 2015, No. 228: 1).

In the pogromme that followed, part of the evidence focusing on preparation for civil war emerging was that in 2012, the four governors of Greater Bahr al-Ghazal where President Kiir comes from, launched an initiative to raise a militia force under the auspices of what they perceived as threats coming from Upper Nile and Sudan (Khartoum). A force of approximately 12,000 gathered for training as reported by the President’s Guard Commander, Major General Manial Chanoug, when interviewed by the AU team after the crisis. This new militia became known in Dinka language as the Mathiang Anyuoor, Dut-ku-Beny, meaning, “Rescue the President.” From this force, a unit of approximately 300 men had been hastily brought into Juba from Lira, by elements of the National Security Services (NSS). On arrival in the city, the Mathiang militia was co-located with the presidential Tiger Battalion based at Giyada. With a partisan force ready to take orders from the leading political elite, the identified characteristics now facilitated transgress into civil war.

This style of raising forces in South Sudan was consistent with SPLM/A practice during the armed struggle period and afterwards. In response to the intransigence to disarmament of these forces after independence in July 2011, GOSS had adopted an umbrella strategy allowing all militia into the tent while rewarding their ethnic and regional-based commanders. Related evidence shows that in the two-year period of 2011-2013, for the 8 million populations, a security establishment of
over 300,000 forces had been assembled. This was divided as 125,000 regulars and 175,000 militias while 100,000 were absorbed into the civil service (Sudan Radio Tamzuj, 30 March 2015).

**Events leading to the Pogroms**

As the Congress drew near, on 6 December 2013, the G13 held a joint press conference in Juba, at which they denounced the Kiir administration for harbouring undemocratic tendencies and preferring unilateralism. At the opening of the NLCC on 14th December 2013, President Kiir started his speech with a blistering attack on Riek Machar, accusing him of defection from the SPLM and joining the “enemy”- Khartoum - as well as committing crimes of ethnic cleansing against the Dinkas, in 1991, in the Jonglei State (Human Rights Watch 1994). On the latter accusation, Machar had admitted to have been responsible and asked for forgiveness. However, this now appeared to have not been forgotten or accepted. Isolated, publicly humiliated and not given an opportunity to state their case, Machar and the G13 then boycotted the conference on the following day, 15th December 2013. That evening, President Kiir appeared on State Television, dressed in full battle dress and continued in the same vein, berating those who had absconded from the meeting, accusing them of treason and attempting to carry out a coup. Later that evening, the presidential address acted as a trigger as armed units broke cover from government military barracks proceeding to “known Nuer residential areas” where house to house extra-judicial killings began. (Okello 2015: 133-136; Interim Report on Human Rights Crisis in South Sudan, the Human Rights Division of UNMISS, 21 February 2014). The above documents all recorded approximately 225 people, mainly Nuers, losing their lives by 16 December 2013. A further 300 to 450 Nuers rushed to Police Stations seeking refuge. However, the pursuing Mathiang Force is reported to have followed, firing indiscriminately, killing several scores and injuring hundreds. This trend continued on the 17th and by December 18th, had left in its wake, carnage and “ethnic cleansing.”

Machar and most of the G13 as well as the internally displaced ethnic Nuers fled back to their original counties such as Malakal in Upper Nile, capital of Jonglei, Bor as well as the northern city of Bentiu in Unity State. This was the point at which the UN Security Council held an emergency session in parallel with similar efforts by IGAD from 19 December 2013. In the escalating civil war between Kiir and Machar, it was soon evident that the former had a bilateral military agreement
with Kampala, Uganda while it also emerged that the latter enjoyed war materiel and diplomatic support from Sudan (Khartoum). Not only did this influence the manner in which the war was being fought but it also reduced the protagonists to proteges in a wider conflict theatre. Furthermore, this poisoned the meetings of IGAD where some had begun the gathering by calls for the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) to leave South Sudan. This did not help and severely diminished the potential for substantive intervention by IGAD.

Sudan Case Study Observations

The first observation in the South Sudanese case study is the existence of tensions, flaws and historical grievances between combative political actors. In other words, the 2013 Juba crisis had deep structural and historical linkages that go back to the 1991 massacre of the Dinkas by the Khartoum-supported Riek Machar’s forces and it appears that this has not been forgotten. On the part of the SPLM/A, although it seems the Movement has welcomed sub-regional militia leaders’ intervention in 2005, mainly for purposes of perpetrating the armed struggle, come independence, the deep suspicion and almost abhorrence of each other could not be reconciled (ICG Africa Report, 2015: 12). This was made worse by the still fledgling leadership structures of the liberation movement that did not enjoy a robust constitution and guidelines for succession.

A further characteristic was the move to suspend government structures by the incumbent leadership. Kiir was quick to strip Machar of government and party responsibilities, suspend the cabinet as well as the legislature in order to consolidate power. This also included suspending the party’s SG.

Thirdly, the case study reveals the existence of participating external parties: Uganda and Sudan. Not only did this embolden parties to seek more extreme views but also accorded the same increased capacity to perpetrate the civil war. In finding a lasting solution, the external interests have to be taken into account.

Some of the external partners are not states but multi-national companies. According to the Radio Tamazuj, citing submissions to parliament for 2013 on 30 December 2014, “the government in Juba had entered into significant debt with international oil companies to close the revenue gap after the war-related disruptions of oil exports from Abyei. At one point, the oil fields, pipelines and
extraction facilities had been burnt and stopped production. In the aftermath, Juba’s national budget, a sum of USD$ 3.376 billion was disbursed as follows: $884m. to Khartoum as pipeline fees and debt servicing; the second major item of expenditure was, “$781m. to Oil Companies that provided loans and cash to the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) between January 2012 to April 2013 as alternative to the resources lost when the conflict between Juba and Khartoum shut down Abyei oil exports.” In fact, this sum is taken by Sudan before releasing the rest of the oil revenues as the commodity reaches the international market through Port Said controlled by Khartoum (Sudan tribune 19 November 2014; Radio Tamazuj, 30 March 2015). This meant that 1.6b. was spent on external commitments leaving a paltry 1.7b. for the rest and most importantly, financing one of Africa’s largest armies per population count.

Historically, in the three short years after independence, South Sudan has failed to enforce effective DDR and move towards SSR and therefore remained weak and fragile as a state (Clapham 2001; Buzan 1991: 97-101 cited in Agir, 2012: 5). The provision of security within the sparse and remote regions had not been possible. As Nizar Messari has warned:

> when a state represents a solution to the security of one group in the population then (that development) constitutes a source of threat to another group because of its exclusive tendencies (Nizar Messari 2002: 416 cited in Agir 2012: 5).

This point reflected the reality of South Sudan’s insecurity, compounded by its inability to disarm and rehabilitate thousands of armed militia after 2011 and now forced to recreate a new civil military relations template of partisan forces against Neur and perceived supporters of Machar. In practice, the war had reduced South Sudan to a vassal state, dependent on external well-wishers. This could be translated into influence of external players on national policy and the ability to compromise and acquiesce in the internal feud.

Furthermore, the tendency to suspend competitors from government and the ruling party, disabling the cabinet, setting aside the constitution and the legislature, dismantling the existing public sector – especially the armed forces - for purposes of creating another are actions that are not only aimed at destroying the existing structures but, much more importantly, also to reconstitute the same but peopled
and commanded by partisan individuals, who owe their loyalty to one person – the President.

Why is it important to consider AfSol on the conflict in South Sudan? Since 19 December when the IGAD Heads of State and Government descended on Juba, that mission lacked impartiality, neutrality and cohesion as Uganda and Sudan were interested parties, already deeply involved with factions that later broke into the competing civil war. In the intervention by IGAD in the crisis of South Sudan, the only tangible achievement appears to be the CoH agreement reached on 9 January 2014. Beyond this, the sub-regional body failed to make an impression. In late 2015, the United States and other powers called for the two parties to reach a coerced agreement, compelled by threats of sanctions and the possible reference of the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). After much haggling, Uganda began to withdraw its forces while Sudan was engaged in a broader dialogue with the United States to reach a rapprochement on international sanctions in which aspects of its role in Juba was also a footnote.

These almost spurious aspects can be cited as the achievement of AfSol in the deeply divisive and protracted conflict between Riek Machar and the SPLM-In-Opposition (SPLM-IO) and Silva Kiir representing the SPLM and government as well as a third component of those who remained in Juba and were detained during the December 2013 clashes. This group is now known as the SPLM former detainees, adopted their name as SPLM-Leaders. While each of the three factions has managed to gain international recognition as well as supporters from some of the countries in the Horn and IGAD, complex and protracted negotiations to reach an amicable settlement between the three remains work in progress as we write. Against that background, it is therefore difficult to cite AfSol as having provided an alternative mechanism to conflict resolution in the South Sudan crisis.

Lesotho - The Kingdom in the Sky

In May 2014, Lesotho experienced an unprecedented political reorganisation when a major faction of the recently ruling LCD, with 12 seats, led by its former secretary general, Metsing, joined forces with Thabane of the ABC, with 26 seats, and Thesele Maseribane of the Basotho National Party (BNP) who had secured 5 seats. These were from the 80 constituency-based elected seats. Based on this, wafer-thin majority, Thabane was propelled into power as Prime Minister with a wafer-thin 61
majority in the 120 seat parliament after adding the 40 non-constituency seats. This left former Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, who in February 2012 had suddenly broken from the LCD after refusing to step down as leader and establishing a new party, the Ntsu Democratic Congress (DC) (after the initial founder, Dr Ntsu Mokhehle) (Makoa 2004: 100-101). On his abrupt departure, the LCD’s secretary general, Metsing then took over leadership of the party. Hence, the first coalition government in the history of Lesotho was as a result of serious infighting in the long-reigning incumbent governing party, the LCD that had been in power since May 1998.

Within two years of the coalition government on power, the Coalition suffered setbacks. The main reason was the dual focus of Thabanes administration. The first was the fundamental reform of the state and its institutions and the second was an attempt to rid the state of corruption. The anti-corruption drive had unearthed serious corrupt practices by the DPM, Metsing and the former LCD, Minister of Natural Resources, Moleleki. The latter was a close ally of the former PM Mosisili. In reforming the state institutions, Thabane had succeeded in replacing the Police Commissioner, with Tsoona, seen as able and willing to take instructions, but had failed to dislodge the Army Commander, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Tladi Kennedy Kamoli. Under siege, the former LCD members were forced to reconcile by June 2014. Going forward, Metsing and his former leader, Mosisili reached an understanding to mount a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in Thabane and constitutionally dislodge him from power. The 41 seats available to the DC and 12 from LCD were sufficient to produce a healthy majority government.

However, following the characteristics that we witnessed in South Sudan, Thabane moved to suspend parliament – using his prerogative to prorogue the legislative assembly. He also proceeded to suspend the Deputy PM, Metsing and several of his ministers from cabinet and government. Fourthly, on 29 August 2014, Thabane relieved the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt Gen Tladi Kamoli of his command through an executive order assented to by King Letsie II (Government Gazette Notice No. 64). At the same time, the PM announced the promotion and appointment of former Brigadier, now Lt Gen Maaparankoe Mahao as the new Lesotho Defence Forces Commander. After this, the stage was set to arrest or arraign those found to have committed corrupt practices whilst serving in government.

The following night, on 30th August 2014, military units launched the sixth
military coup, targeting the PM’s residence at State House; the capture and forced disarmament of the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police Headquarters and all the urban stations. Once inside the Police HQ, the soldiers ransacked the place looking for files and in the process, shot and killed Sub-inspector Mokheseng Ramahloko, who was responsible for the keys to the Armoury. Next day, the military announced that they had confiscated 250 guns and rifles from the police, “ostensibly” weapons that were on the point of being distributed to youths supporting the ABC in order to create instability (BTI Country Report, 2014; Makoa, 2004; Matlosa Neville, 2003).

Coup or No Military Coup? A SADC Perception

After the military coup of 30th August, soon followed by the official statement by DPM Metsing that he was now in charge, SADC reaction was surprising. The body was unwilling to acknowledge its reality, seeking instead to engage all parties while partially restoring Thabane to power. The appointed mediator, Cyril Ramaphosa then visited Maseru in the company of the fugitive PM Thabane who was now under close armed guard by SADC forces, protected in his own country from the local, still belligerent security establishment.

A political solution was reached in October 2014 when all the parties signed the Political Facilitation Agreement. At the core of this agreement was a snap election to be held at the end of February 2015. It is instructive to note that this agreement had been preceded by the Windhoek Agreement at the end of July that was soon ignored by all the parties when they returned to Lesotho. The implication of this was that, the Lesotho political elite appear to view and react to South Africa and the rest of SADC differently. The former is able to exert more direct political, economic and even security pressure, while the rest can only offer symbolic remonstration. In suggesting a snap election as the exit for its intervention, SADC intervention hoped this would be the panacea.

Furthermore, against the background of security challenges and the unprecedented open clash between the army and the police, a complimentary Security Facilitation Agreement was reached during the third week of October. The agreement compelled the three commanders, Kamoli and Mahao of the Armed Forces and Tsoona of the Police to distance themselves from the political process until after the elections. Kamoli was destined to leave for Kampala – and refused, while Mahao – curiously for this comparative case study, relocated briefly to Juba, South Sudan, and Tsoona left for Algiers in Algeria.
Evaluating SADC Intervention in Lesotho - September 2014 to July 2015

An important feature of the evaluation is to measure compliance against the Agreements reached between Lesotho and SADC. One of these was the security agreement that Kamoli ignored in the run up to the snap election. SADC appeared unwilling or not ready to have in place the necessary carrots and sticks to ensure enforced compliance. Subsequent evidence revealed that Kamoli remained in total control of the army. For instance, on 13 February, barely a fortnight before the scheduled election of 28 February, the Army wrote to the beleaguered PM Thabane “advising that for national security reasons, it was going to deploy forces countrywide.” Alarmed at the implications and insubordination, Thabane rushed to SADC, reporting the persistent and pervasive role of the military in politics. An exasperated SADC held an emergency meeting on the issue. The result was that SADC ordered that the LDF be quarantined in the barracks for the period of the elections, until 30th March 2015. Aware of the existing policing gap, SADC authorised the immediate deployment of 475 police, drawn from the 12 mainland Member-States. In practice, each member state, on its own costs, agreed to second approximately a platoon-sized police contingent to the electoral process in Lesotho. This action and related decisions reflected the degree of ownership, commitment and shared values that SADC possessed and exercised in its intervention in Lesotho. Holding a free and fair democratic election in Lesotho was upheld by SADC. Viewed the long-term effect and against the background of skewed civil-military relations, this was a critical point in which the country was ripe for extensive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR) facilitated by SADC at that point and even after the elections to result in a lasting solution. However, this opportunity was missed.

The snap election result produced a conundrum. Thabane lost to his nemesis, Pakalitha Mosisili of the DC even after securing 50% of the 40 seats. Pakalitha was also able to put together a strong coalition of 7 parties that left the LCD, Metsing holding onto his DPM post. In the new appointments that emerged, the mercurial Monyane Moleleki was now appointed Minister of Police-Home Affairs after the Commissioner; Khothatso Tsoonaa was dismissed on allegations of corruption.

As the new government was being put together, members of the political opposition fled fearing assassination. The first to go on 11 May was the ABC leader, Thomas Thabane who cited credible threats that had forced him to seek refuge in South
Africa. Two days later, on 13 May, Maseribane of the BNP also fled the country. Finally, on 26 May, the leader of a newly established political party, the Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL) Ms. Keketso Rantso had to physically fight off armed attackers from her residence after her guard outside the residence had been shot at and forced to flee. Moments later, Rantso hurriedly packed a bag and fled across the border into South Africa. More chillingly, the flight of the political opposition leaders followed the assassination of a known prominent businessman and financial backer of the ABC, Thabiso Tsosane. Tsosane was shot dead by unknown gunmen after meeting Thabane. Afterwards, the government appeared reluctant to pursue an investigation to find out who carried out the attack. This prompted the US Ambassador in Maseru, Mathew Harrington, to issue a statement citing security deterioration and lapses in Lesotho. On 14 May 2014 when SADC closed its office signalling completion of its intervention, Mosisili reinstated Kennedy Kamoli as CDF. A week later, on 21 May, Mosisili demoted Lt. Gen. Maaparankoe Mahao back to the rank of Brigadier (Lesotho Times, 28 June 2015).

Soon afterwards, Lesotho was thrown into a deeper political and security crisis. The reinstated CDF, Kamoli, launched a ferocious campaign against Mahao and several officers in the LDF perceived to have been or continue to be against his command on allegations of treason. Within weeks, over 56 Senior and middle ranking officers had been “kidnapped-tortured” at the notorious Makoanyane Barracks before being hauled to the courts in humiliating manacled wrists and leg-irons (Jordan 2015). At approximately 3 pm on 25 June 2015, a military unit, driving in a convoy of three vehicles, blocked, shot and killed Mahao. In the preliminary reports sent to the UN by Mahao’s brother from testimony gathered from the witnesses who noted the conversation between the troops as they were reporting over the radio after the shooting to headquarters:

“Re mo fumane. Re mo thuntse. Ke na le Sajene Makara [We found him. We shot him. I am with Sergeant Makara’] (Statement by Mahao’s two nephews who were present when the shooting occurred on 25 June 2015 submitted to the media and the United Nations by Mahao’s brother: Prof Nqosa Mahao, Vice Chancellor of Roma University, Lesotho).(Quoted Sunday Express, 28 June 2015)

This event plunged the Mountain Kingdom into political and security instability and embarrassed SADC who called for the safe return of all three politicians
currently hiding in South Africa. Next, SADC directed that pathologists and a
technical team be dispatched to Lesotho immediately to ascertain Mahao’s cause of
death. (Sunday Express 28 June 2015) The Extraordinary Summit, condemning the
brutal killing of Mahao, called on the military in Lesotho to immediately stop the
campaign against officers who had allegedly committed treason. An independent
Commission of Inquiry into the state of events in the Kingdom was authorised.
Shocked at the deteriorating security situation in Lesotho, SADC Member States
comprising South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Lesotho and Zimbabwe,
pledged four million independent inquiry (Lesotho Daily: Zihlangu: 9 August
2015). Furthermore, an Early Warning Oversight Committee on Lesotho was
also established. This was made up of two representatives of each of the Member
States cited above, drawn from political representatives, the army, intelligence and
police. The action taken by SADC in its intervention in Lesotho has been viewed as
intrusive, raising the ire of the ruling party in Maseru. However, the level of crisis
has continued. For instance, even as the SADC Commission of Inquiry was holding
its consultations, engagement with the political opposition in exile continued and
the commissioners had to travel to South Africa to conduct meetings.

The reality in the Lesotho case study was that, although the parties in conflict,
after the coup, appeared to be willing to engage with SADC, in practice, those
in power have simply brushed aside any advice and continued to entrench its
hold on power. There has been let up in the threats on those in exile, comprising
officials being returned from foreign embassies, senior public sector officials
that have remained outside the structures of the new government and a highly
reformed and politicised army with a new police responsible for internal and
external security of the new, highly militarised state. It is, therefore, true to argue
that the crisis in Lesotho has not been resolved through the intervention of the sub-
regional initiative or AfSol.

What lessons can be drawn from the two case studies to inform the AfSol
intervention mechanisms?

There are at least five significant lessons that emerge from the analysis of the
comparative case study of the political and military crises that have gripped South
Sudan and Lesotho since 2013 and 2014, respectively.

The generation of perpetual rulers - The first lesson learnt is that incumbents
in Juba and Maseru are not prepared to relinquish political power even under democratic norms. When challenged, they adopt violent and emotional reaction towards competitors. In practice, they are unwilling to observe either party or national constitutions. The important lesson here is that Africa has a generation of firsts amongst equals – a class of leaders who cannot countenance change and are not prepared to put in place leadership succession plans beyond their rule. President, Silva Kiir, Dr Riek Machar and Prime Ministers, Pakalitha Mosisili, Thomas Thabane and DPM, Metsing, once faced with the prospect of relinquishing power, have invoked the disabling of conventional structures. All the leaders reveal that the use of democratic notions of succession is alien in their pursuit of power retention. Hence, the life and times of parliaments in Africa being transient, has huge implications for the usefulness of AfSol as this is based on the principles of commitment, ownership and forged, shared values to bring peace and security to the two countries.

It is also true that these two African states have not been successful in conducting DDR and SSR and are, therefore, saddled with partisan forces that lack the important national characteristics. Hence, the quasi-armed national forces have no compunction to turn their weapons on citizens culminating in civil war.

**Weak and fragile governments susceptible to marginalisation and implosion** - The second lesson is the fragility of institutions that are susceptible to manipulation by the incumbents when they suspend the constitution, deny political opponents the opportunity to hold public office, and suspend parliament in order to rule by decree. In reality, government is reduced to rule by a dominant faction.

**Politics and military power** - An important observation and lesson learnt is that of political actors depending solely on the support of the military in order to stay in power. In Juba and Maseru, the competing leadership has shown that unilateral political power is dependent on the military. As President Silva Kiir openly stated, a year later, in November 2014, “Mathiang Anyouur saved Juba when the army was not there,” asking rhetorically, “ok, if I didn’t bring Mathiang Anyouur from Bahr el Ghazal, would you be staying here in Juba now?” Significantly, it also emerged later that neither Kuol Manyang from the Ministry of Defence nor the SPLA General Staff under General James Hoth Mai had authority over the militia group that sparked the mass killings. Instead, the Generals admitted that the militia group, Mathiang Anyouur, “was tied to top politicians and was paid
from the president’s office, significantly, after the army refused to provide for their salaries and wellbeing.” (Radio Tamazuj Exclusive 9 March 2015).

In Maseru, SADC was alarmed at the brutality and violence of the military against political opponents, killing key figures within the country such as Thabiso Tsosane – a prominent financier of the ABC and the late Army Commander, Mahao. The rest of the political opponents were forced to flee the country (Bongiwe in Lesotho Times 2 July 2015; Mohlobi in Lesotho Times 5 July 2015). In both case studies, typical characteristics were the subsequent expulsion of all senior officials in the public sector, officers and other ranks from the state structures and the recruitment and “strengthening the same with perceived loyal cadres.” In the case of the military, this has resulted in the most partisan force to be holding national arms. In Lesotho, the perceived impunity was noted when the new Minister of Defence, Tseliso Mokhosi, attempted to water down the SADC terms of reference for the Commission of Inquiry. In this, Mokhosi, in an apparent reference to assure the military from future prosecution, pointed out that the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Mahao’s death would be conducted under the laws of Lesotho.

Furthermore, the final product would be submitted to the Prime Minister and subject to his discretion on the way forward. (Bongiwe in Sunday Times 5 July 2015). Significantly, Mokhosi added that, “evidence in the Commission’s Report is not for purposes of prosecution.” That official statement clearly provided relief to the soldiers involved in the series of assassinations and other atrocities committed on behalf of advancing the factional political agenda of the now ruling clique.

**AfSol’s sub-regional intervention and its limitations** - While AfSol, as a concept that emerged in 2009, is concerned with the “Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace”, implementation through interventions by the AU and its RECs has so far not succeeded in producing the desired results, at least based on the two case studies examined here.

**The pervasive role of external players** - The presence of minerals, exportable fresh water and significant hydrocarbons has spawned the interests of new and powerful external players from state and non-state commercial undertakings. The presence of the new actors in the resource-endowed conflict states have transformed the dynamics of finding lasting solutions with factions attempting to capture the state with the support of external supporters. In the interactions noted, corruption has
reared its ugly head in both South Sudan and Lesotho. As we saw, in South Sudan, the National Budget of 2013-2014 presented to parliament acknowledged receipt of substantial sums as loans by government from commercial actors in the wider international community when revenues from Abyei were disrupted (Sudan Tribune, 19 November 2014). This was on the basis of guaranteed payments to be made once the state stabilized. The same is true with fresh water, diamonds and other export commodities extracted from Lesotho by multi-national companies and enjoying access to the lucrative United States’ markets. However, their presence and influence has now part of the conflict matrix and resolution without which no solution is possible. The same is true of Lesotho, now a diamond mining country with access to the United States market through the preferential African Growth and Opportunities (AGOA) Act that has allowed Asian entrepreneurs to set up shops in Lesotho.

**Conclusions**

African conflicts have continued to be complex, protracted and defying conventional and traditional mechanisms to resolve. The post-2009 attempts to introduce the notion of AfSol appeared a panacea for a brief moment. However, implementation has come up against deeply entrenched local interests and the existing realpolitik. In the comparative case studies of South Sudan and Lesotho, depicting crises in 2013 and 2014 respectively, key lessons associated with AfSol have been identified. The three most significant are: a) the generation of incumbents not willing to relinquish power and allow democratic processes to take root; b) the leaders’ penchant to render the executive, cabinet, governmental and legislative marginal while concentrating power in their hands; c) the creation, by the leaders, of partisan military capacity for power retention. Stated differently, the conduct of governance has remained rooted in the one-party-state dominant era. Hence, only after this generation has passed, through natural attrition can proper and equitable solutions be found. The discussion also noted the inherent structural weaknesses within the RECs that are also part of the AU’s APSA. To this end, while intervention in South Sudan included strengthening military factions, this, fortunately appeared not to be the case in Lesotho. In practice, both conflicts have defied the attempts to rely on the notion of AfSol, in spite of its proximity advantages to bring about lasting solutions.
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A Case for African-promoted Peacebuilding Strategies with Specific Reference to AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in South Sudan

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Abstract

This paper reports the findings of a study that scrutinized the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Juba Peace Process and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan to: 1) reach value judgments on the potential of African solutions to resolve the ongoing conflicts on the African continent; and 2) disaggregate the role of both African and non-African actors in promoting the effectiveness of these solutions. Using evidences from relevant reports and related literature, the study contends that, in concurrence with past authors on the subject, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts have potential for capitalizing on the values those parties in conflict situations share, thereby promoting ownership of and commitment to peaceful resolution. Notwithstanding, the study also reports that these efforts have been associated with constraining limitations, adding that interventions by multi-national organisations are supposedly undertaken to address these limitations. Therefore, the paper argues that interventions into peacebuilding efforts by non-African organisations are to be seen as having pros and cons. Contending that, despite their known shortfalls, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts give better promise of more sustainable peace; the paper propounds—for relevant organisations and policy persons—actionable recommendations towards enhancing the prioritisation and effectiveness of African-promoted peacebuilding strategies.

Keywords: Sustainable peacebuilding; AMISOM; South Sudan

Introduction

Traditionally, peacebuilding efforts on the African continent have attracted the input of local, national, regional and multi-national organisations. Scholarship on these efforts (e.g. Schreiter, Appleby and Powers, 2010) suggests that the effectiveness of these efforts depends on a multiplicity of variables, including the nature of the conflicts and the nature of the interventions that the peacebuilding

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organisations implement. An apparent justification for the intervention of these organisations in peacebuilding efforts is that it is part of their mandate to do so (cf. Bourantonis, 2007; Dallaire, 2009). However, a small but growing body of literature (e.g. Mamdani, 2010; AfSol, 2014) suggests that, in some instances, the involvement of certain actors in peacebuilding processes exacerbates rather than alleviates conflict. Indeed, this realisation forms a major part of the call for African-promoted peacebuilding strategies for resolving ongoing conflicts on the continent. In particular, organisations like AfSol argue that African-promoted peacebuilding strategies will emphasize shared values in the conflict situation(s) and, subsequently, achieve ownership and the commitment of the parties involved in the conflict situations (AfSol 2014). In as much as this argument is credible, however, review of related literature leads to the conclusion that evidence supporting it is anecdotal. Accordingly, there is a need for quality data and analysis demonstrating the efficacy and effectiveness of home-grown peacebuilding strategies in addressing the ongoing conflicts on the continent—to promote the prioritisation of these strategies.

This paper reports on the findings of a recent study that attempted to respond to this need, taking the case of AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan. Starting with an analytical exposition of the conflict situations and respective peace processes, the paper scrutinizes the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the peace processes. This is with the conclusion that, in concurrence with literature on the subject, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts carry the potential for capitalizing on the values those parties in the conflict situations share, thereby promoting ownership of and commitment to the peace processes. Notwithstanding, the study also reports that the strategies have been associated with constraining limitations, adding that interventions by multi-national organisations beyond the continent are supposedly undertaken to address these, among other constraints. Therefore, the paper argues that interventions into peacebuilding efforts by non-African organisations are to be seen as having pros and cons. Contending that, despite their known shortfalls, African-promoted peacebuilding efforts give better promise of more sustainable peace, the paper propounds—for relevant policy persons—actionable recommendations towards enhancing the prioritisation and effectiveness of African-promoted peacebuilding strategies. To scrutinize the efficacy and effectiveness of home-grown peacebuilding strategies in addressing
the ongoing conflicts in Africa, the study posed several guiding research questions:

1) What is the setting of these peace processes?

2) Who are the facilitators of these peace processes?

3) Who are the actors in these peace processes?

4) What is the content of these peace processes?

5) What are the successes of these peace processes?

6) What are the failures of these peace processes?

7) To what extent are the successes and/or failures of these processes attributable to their setting, actors, facilitators and content?

The key justification for selecting these processes is that they each attempt to resolve conflicts that are protracted and significant in many ways. Secondly, the peace processes, just like the conflicts to which they attempt to respond, have attracted the participation of a multiplicity of stakeholders, the inference being that they provide particularly useful cases for pinpointing the deserving place of African-led responses to the ongoing conflicts on the African continent. Specific attention was paid to the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the peace processes because these provide workable parameters within whose framework the role of African solutions to African problems can be scrutinized (cf. Mamdani, 2010).

The discussion that this paper builds disaggregates the potential for African solutions to resolve conflicts on the African continent. Moreover, by following a systemic analytic approach, the study also highlights the deserving role of non-African actors in promoting the success of the African solutions. That way the study may promote efforts of African organisations that stand for AfSol.

Related Literature and Knowledge Gap

In responding to the questions raised above, reference was made to related literature (i.e. Collier, 2002; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2001 and 2002, 2002; Hoglund, 2001; Kriesberg, 1989; Manson and Fett, 1995; Nduwimana, 2013; Pillars, 1983;
Rothchild, 2000; Villaveces, 2003; Walter, 2002; Zartman, 1989) to identify relevant parameters and variables within whose framework the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts may be appraised.

Darby and Mac Ginty (2001; 2002) explain five features that define a (successful) peace process. First, the protagonists in the conflict situation must be willing to negotiate. Second, the key actors must be included in the process. Third, the negotiations must address the central issues in dispute. Fourth, the negotiators must realize that they cannot use force to achieve their objectives. Fifth, the negotiators must be committed to a sustained process. Carefully considered Darby and Mac Ginty’s views are plausible because these conditions are necessary in peaceful conflict resolution. From this theoretical point of departure, it is important to examine the African Peace Processes to see if they integrated these factors in their attempts. However, survey of literature relating to the Juba Peace Process, AMISOM and the South Sudan Peace Process indicates that no thorough scholarly scrutiny has been done on the processes to determine the extent to which they typify the aforementioned features of effective peacebuilding processes. This study was conducted to fill this gap. The significance of filling the gap derives primarily from the understanding that although Darby and Mac Ginty (2001; 2002)’s views are plausible and corroborated by other authors (e.g. Villaveces 2003, Nduwimana, 2013), a host of authors (e.g. Kriesberg 1989) note that contenders on either side of intractable conflicts tend to resist possible solutions, exhibit inclination to harm and involve conflict intensifying features instead of being inclined towards negotiating as recommended by Darby and Mac Ginty (2001; 2002).

Nduwimana (2013) argues that peace processes would be more successful if they have clearly defined and robust mandates. Incidentally, Nduwimana goes on to highlight a dichotomy between UN and AU-sponsored Peace Processes that is relevant to the present study. He notes that conflicts on the African continent have presented a serious dilemma for the UN in relation to its philosophy of peacekeeping. The AU is more flexible when it comes to its mandates and tactics. This being the case, it is reasonable to think that the nature of mandate in the peace processes might have had implications for the effectiveness of the processes.

According to Zartman (1989), peace processes are likely to be more successful if the conflict situations being addressed have reached a hurting stalemate—when the parties in a conflict are going nowhere, and when the cost, both human and
economic, of pursuing the conflict begins to mount. For example Zartman (2001) argues that warring parties can present pain, fatigue and boredom from being at war and lower their benefits from war. Incidentally this view is in concurrence with that of Darby and Mac Ginty (2001 and 2002) who argue that there should be willingness to negotiate from the parties. In the context of the study—which was concerned with the effectiveness of the Peace Processes in Somalia, South Sudan and Northern Uganda—Zartman’s views point to the need for interrogating whether the conflicts had reached a hurting stalemate and how this related to the effectiveness of the Peace Processes.

The decision to negotiate or not is also determined by the perceived costs and benefits of a unilateral victory or a negotiated settlement (Villaveces (2003). Zartman (2001) further argues that both the political reform and hurting stalemate are the two main components that change the behaviour and incentives of parties. The prospect of an inclusive political reform, accommodation and devolution can reduce the benefits of war and increase chances of negotiation yet the mutually hurting stalemate can get the process started by pushing parties to listen to incentives and negotiate. Both types of incentives require being credible and mediation of a third party may provide credibility to the incentives. From this perspective, this study sought to establish whether the LRA rebellion, the South Sudan conflict and the civil war in Somalia had reached a mutually hurting stalemate and how this influenced the effectiveness of the respective peace processes.

Manson and Fett (1995) argue that a rational calculation over the utility and cost of war is important to reach a peaceful settlement. Although warring parties may not act out of rationality throughout the peace process (they could be influenced by emotions, for instance), the likelihood that they agree to a settlement rather than continue to fight will vary depending on each party’s estimate of its probability of victory. It also depends on the parties’ expected payoffs from victory versus those from a settlement, the rate at which it absorbs costs of conflict and its estimate of how long it will take to achieve victory. They argue that the probability of a peaceful settlement being reached will depend on the duration of the conflict, size of government army, uncertain effects of the negotiation settlement, casualty rates and the role of third parties.

From an economic perspective, Collier (2002) argues that civil wars occur where rebel organisations are financially viable, mostly in countries with low income, low
growth and economies based principally on the export of commodities. Hence, the way to end the conflict depends on how public policies reduce the economic risk factors, change the pattern of the economy, and diversify production and international cooperation to reduce the incidence of illegal trades and sanctions making the economic and military circumstances of rebellion more difficult. The greater the benefits of war economy, the less chances to initiate a negotiated and peaceful settlement. Villaveces (2003) argues that a successful peace process is influenced by the presence or absence of outside mediation or third parties. This is corroborated by Rothchild (2000) who argues that parties may regulate the use of coercive and non-coercive incentives in the process of prevention and resolution of a conflict. This is also in consonance with Walter (2002) who suggests that third parties have an active role in terms of mediation, verification and coercion to create a credible commitment between the parties.

Hoglund (2001) argues that a peace process is a changing and fluctuant process and one of the issues that alter its dynamics is the existence of violence during the peace process. The violence might be part of the strategy of the parties to achieve their goals or might be the outcome of dissidences and differences within the party. Incidences of violence have different effects on the negotiation depending on who uses violence, timing and targets. She suggests that violence by parties inside a peace process is more likely to dislocate the negotiations than violence by parties who are outside the peace process. This type of violence is seen as lack of commitment toward the peace process and may lead other parties to withdraw their support to negotiations. This is in consonance with Pillars (1983) who suggests that the use of violence might be expected to increase in the final phase of the negotiation process when the settlement is close to its establishment. This being the case, it was important to study the incidence of ongoing hostilities during the peace processes, to try and understand the impact that they had on the effectiveness of the peace processes, if any.

We also sought to investigate the role played by third parties in the peace processes and the mission in Somalia. Literature indicating that third parties influence the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts points to the need for establishing the role that these third parties played in the processes as well as the ways in which these roles influenced the overall effectiveness of the processes. However, review of the literature shows that with exception of reporting the involvement of the third parties in the said peace processes, the impact that this involvement imposed on
the effectiveness of the peace processes has not been scrutinized. The present study sought to fill this gap, among others, by looking beyond the sheer involvement of the third parties to interrogate the impact of the involvement on the successes and failures of the peace processes.

**Conceptual Underpinning**

Figure 1 delineates the relationship between sustainable peace and the attributes of peacebuilding processes identified in the foregoing literature.

![Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the Study of Efficacy and Effectiveness of Peace Processes in Africa](image)

In Figure 1, sustainable peace is expressed as a function of successful peaceful resolution of conflicts. The foregoing literature indicates that, in turn, successful conflict resolution will depend primarily on five factors (i.e. willingness of the warring parties to negotiate; state of the conflict; perceived financial viability of the conflict situation; the mandate and role of third parties in both the conflict and peace processes; and relevant public opinion).

However, when critically considered, each of these factors would benefit significantly from ownership of and commitment to pertinent peacebuilding
processes. In turn, the ownership and commitment would benefit from the prevalence of shared values (among the warring parties and even third parties). Therefore, in investigating the efficacy and effectiveness of the South Sudan peace process, AMISOM and Juba Peace Process, attention was paid to these factors and to the cross-cutting issues of shared values and ownership of peacebuilding processes and the subsequent commitment to the processes that these enlist. In so doing, the study endeavoured to scrutinize when these factors are optimized for the benefit of the peacebuilding processes so as to pinpoint the critical success/failure factors in the peace processes examined. This was done in the hope that the resulting analysis would clarify what African actors should and can contribute towards peaceful resolution of African ongoing conflicts.

Methodology

Evidence was gathered primarily from two secondary sources: 1) reports on the AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan; and 2) related literature. A key justification for using the sources is that both the respective conflicts and peace processes are well subscribed in the literature. The gap in these secondary sources only relates to the fact that it mostly reports on the happenings in the conflicts and peace processes albeit without a keen effort to scrutinize these happenings to highlight their implications for the possibility of peaceful resolution of the conflicts. The data were assumed to be reliable and of a satisfactory level of quality because they were already validly published (e.g. in refereed academic journals and by respected organisations like the African Union and United Nations). A documentary review checklist was used to categorize the evidence culled from the secondary sources used. The checklist was structured to cater for the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of the peace processes. Information on the conflict situations, including at the time the peace processes were going on, was also captured and eventually subjected to content analysis using NVIVO 10. Thereafter, the themes identified were discussed and conclusions and recommendations reached.

Findings and Discussion

Information about the setting, facilitation, actors, content, successes and failures of AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan is summarized in Table 1.
The information shows that the three peace processes succeeded albeit to different degrees. Even though none of the respective conflicts has been fully resolved, the current state of the conflicts shows that the protracted conflict in Somalia is not only continuing but actually expanding to other countries in the region (i.e. Burundi, Kenya and Uganda). This variation in performance of the peace processes suggests that, indeed, the setting, facilitation, actors, and content are candidates for examination—to reach value judgments on critical success factors in peacebuilding efforts on the continent.

Regarding the actors and third parties in the peace processes, Table 1 shows that the protagonists in the conflict situations fall into two broad categories playing three different roles. The categories are African leaders/organisations (e.g. IGAD and AU) and non-African actors (i.e. United Nations, European Union, TROIKA, Switzerland, Finland etc.). The roles the African leaders play are to mediate these conflicts and to contribute troops (in the case of peacekeeping missions). On the other hand, the non-African actors play the role of funding/financing, providing military and technical support and observing the peace processes to give it credibility. It is noteworthy that the peace processes involved the warring parties as suggested by Darby and Mac Ginty (2002) in their discussion of the features of successful peace processes.
Table 1: Implementation and performance of AMISOM, the Juba Peace Process and IGAD’s interventions in the ongoing crisis in South Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU (with military and financial support from the EU and US)</td>
<td>• Peace enforcement and stabilisation mission</td>
<td>• Recognized, but weak, central government structure supported and sustained</td>
<td>• War is still going on</td>
<td>• Setback by perception of colonialist occupation (perceived as alien agenda to foil Islamic State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD-led peace effort</td>
<td>IGAD (with financial support from TROIKA)</td>
<td>• Peace talks (demanding for signing of a peace agreement, forming a transitional government of national unity headed by Salva Kiir)</td>
<td>• Warring parties brought to negotiating table</td>
<td>• All cessation of hostilities agreement were not observed</td>
<td>• Ignored root causes of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreement for TNUG signed</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreement facing challenges in implementation</td>
<td>• Ignored demands of warring parties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Arusha Peace Process | South Sudan Inter-Party Dialogue (i.e. Government of South Sudan, SPLM/A in Opposition and CSOs) with [non-intrusive] financial support from Switzerland and Finland | • Peace talks | • Inter Party Dialogue agreement signed  
• The two warring sides have already agreed to jointly establish a national unity government | • Agreement still has not been reached on power sharing in the unity government | • The warring parties were sitting alone and had a chance to address the root causes of their conflict  
• Third parties participated as funders and observers |
| JUBA Peace Process | South Sudan, South Africa, Kenya and Mozambique Donors contributed funding through the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UN (OCHA) | • Peace talks | • Truce signed and observed  
• Five separate agreements were signed that provided a framework to address historical grievances, facilitate disarmament and demobilisation, promote reconciliation and establish accountability for crimes committed during the war | • Final peace accord not signed | • Setback by ICC indictment of top leadership of LRA |
The evidence gathered further indicated that in instances where the non-African actors tried to participate directly in the conflict situations (e.g. Somalia), the conflict worsened and the non-African actors eventually withdrew. Conversely, in the case of the Arusha Peace Process where IGAD, the LRA and AMISOM were involved, the non-African actors participated primarily as funders (Troika, Switzerland, Finland) and as observers. Yet, it ought to be noted that the negative impact of the non-African actors on the peace processes, notwithstanding their participation seems to give credibility to the respective peace processes. Other organisations (e.g. the United Nations) have also been involved because their mandate focuses on peacebuilding everywhere including on the African continent. In addition, it is important to note that both the funding and the legal mandate of these third parties are required in the peace processes (cf. Villaveces 2003; Rothchild 2003; Walter, 2002).

Table 1 shows that, in all the three conflict situations, the respective peace processes registered some successes. The Juba Peace Process to resolve the LRA conflict was a very big achievement because it was seen as a realistic opportunity to end the protracted conflict peacefully. Previously, there were indications (including from President Y. K. Museveni) that the government of Uganda was inclined towards a military solution to ending the conflict. Incidentally, the LRA was also reported to be shunning efforts at peaceful resolution of the conflict and was criticized for abusing ceasefires under the auspices of the 1993 peace processes to regroup and rejuvenate its supplies. However, in the Juba Peace Process, five (5) separate agreements were signed, providing a framework to address historical grievances, facilitate disarmament and demobilisation, promote reconciliation and establish accountability for crimes committed during the war. This peace process also led to the return of peace in Northern Uganda and the government managed to resettle about 70,000 IDPs back into their homes and communities.

On the other hand, the IGAD-led South Sudanese peace process managed to bring the SPLM and SPLM-in-opposition otherwise trapped in a gruesome military showdown, to the negotiating table. Indeed, the warring parties signed five cessation of hostilities agreements (Table 1) consistent with Darby and Mac Ginty (2002) indication that peace processes will be more successful if the protagonists in the conflict situation are involved in the process and are willing to negotiate. Third, the negotiations must address the central issues in dispute. Unfortunately,
the cessation of hostilities agreements were not observed and they were all short lived. On the contrary, the Inter-Party Dialogue in Arusha managed to have the different factions of SPLA reconcile their differences with the SPLM party. It was hoped that a final peace agreement would be signed but the talks collapsed in March 2015. Although the peace talks ultimately collapsed—as skeptics feared they would from the start—it is interesting to note that the African mediated peace process succeeded in securing reconciliation of the different factions in the SPLM.

With the exception of AMISOM, the peace processes shown in Table 1 took place outside the countries where the conflicts were domiciled. This is a notable observation especially when it is taken into account that past efforts to resolve the same conflicts were held within the same countries. Incidentally, review of related literature shows that there is evidence of several peace processes led by Africans themselves (e.g. the Nairobi Peace Accord of 1986 between the NRA rebels and the Uganda government, the Arusha Peace Process and the Burundi Peace Process).

In as much as the Arusha Peace Process did not achieve its objectives, as many feared it would not from the start, the negotiations seemed to be successful (for instance, in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table and securing their commitment to resolve their factions) because the warring parties addressed their own differences. This corroborates Darby and Mac Ginty (2002) view that peace processes will be more successful if the warring parties are directly involved in the peacebuilding effort. Further, considering the conflicts are on the African continent, this finding appears to justify African solutions to African problems. When the government of Uganda and the LRA rebels were engaging with each other, the Juba peace process proceeded and was seen to be on track to eventual peaceful resolution of the LRA rebellion until the ICC declared that it was upholding arrest warrants issued against the leaders of the LRA. There were indications, at the time of the Juba Peace Process, that the LRA rebellion against the government of Uganda had reached a hurting stalemate (cf. Zartman 1989), so the eventual failure of the process is to be seen as loss of a rare opportunity to end one of the longest and most gruesome conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Conversely, AMISOM is seen as a particularly costly and unsustainable operation the achievements of which is difficult to maintain as reported by authors like Nduwimana (2013) notwithstanding. A key hindrance to the effectiveness of the mission is connivance of sections of the grassroots with al-Shabaab, apparently due to negative perception
of the role of third parties, notably the United States, which was seen by some of the warring parties as fighting a cultural imperialist war against Islam.

These observations give credence to the conclusion that peace processes on the continent have been more effective when the warring parties are the key players in their own peace processes. In turn, this conclusion appears to justify “African solutions to African problems” as a model for the resolution of the ongoing conflicts in Africa. This being the case, it is useful to point out that the results of this comparative examination of the case peace processes studied vindicate suggestions by authors like Mays (2003), Battle and Cousin (2011) and Oyinlola (2014) that efforts to resolve the ongoing conflicts on the African continent should prioritize “African solutions”. Yet a persevering question that is relevant to the determination of the place of African solutions to the resolution of conflicts on the African continent relates to the continuing involvement of non-African actors in peace processes in Africa. Why have non-African actors continued to be involved in peace processes when it is now widely recognized that ownership of peace processes, shared values and commitment, might be optimized using African solutions?

Our analysis appears to speak to the rationale underlying the persevering involvement of non-African actors in efforts to resolve conflicts on the African continent. The evidence in Table 1 shows that in all the peace processes studied, non-African actors facilitated the processes financially. An apparent justification for this kind of involvement is that peace processes require financial resources and most African actors, including the AU, do not have these resources. Table 1 also shows involvement of multilateral actors like the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs. It is important to note that peaceful resolution of conflicts like those witnessed on the African continent is part of these organisations’ mandate (see, for example, Villaveces 2003; Rothchild 2000; Nduuwimana 2013; UN 1971; 1991) and that authors like Walter (2002) endorse, as constructive, the involvement of third party actors in peacebuilding processes. Even more importantly, it is to be noted that the participation of these organisations in peace processes is widely seen as endorsing the credibility of the processes, an attribute that ought to be commended.

The argument that involvement of non-African actors is, in fact, to be seen as positive intervention that suitably compliments efforts by African actors points to
an important question though: why the concern for African solutions to African problems? This question begs substantiation of the rationale for African solutions to African problems. The present study highlights three points that provide justification despite the positive contribution of non-African actors to peace processes on the continent.

First, the study shows that the peace processes did not succeed in resolving the conflicts fully, hence the need for further solutions. Second, the findings in Table 1 show that, in some instances, the involvement of non-African actors (e.g. the ICC in the Juba Peace Process) presented a stumbling block to full peaceful resolution. Third, Table 1 shows that when African actors led their own peace processes, they faced their differences and exhibited ownership of the processes thereby achieving more effective outcomes. In particular, examination of the three peace processes (Table 1) suggests that problems mainly arise when the non-African actors’ involvement deprives the warring (African) parties’ ownership of the peace processes and, subsequently, face their own challenges as well as capitalize on their shared values to build the commitments that peaceful resolution requires.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

The findings and discussion in Section 3 support three main conclusions that have implications for the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the African continent: 1) Peace processes are more effective when led by the (African) warring parties and supported by relevant African actors, hence, the case for African-promoted peacebuilding strategies. 2) Non-African actors promote peace processes in Africa by providing required financial support and credibility. 3) In some instances, the involvement of non-African actors (primarily through the provision of financial support) has foiled the success of the same peace processes that these actors seem to promote (financially) because it affects warring parties’ ownership of the processes and, consequently, lessens commitment to peaceful resolution. In turn, upon concurrent interpretation, these conclusions point to a major conclusion: African-promoted peace processes carry greater potential for successful resolution of conflicts on the continent.

However, this potential needs to be complimented with the financial resources and credibility that the peace processes require if they are to be successful. Providing these resources and building the said credibility would effectively substitute the
role that non-African actors are currently playing in the ongoing peacebuilding processes on the continent, leading to effective African solutions to African problems. This being the case, it is recommended that African governments, the African Union Commission, United Nations and similar organisations devise sustainable means of funding peace processes on the continent and promote recognition of African solutions to African problems among pertinent stakeholders at the local, regional and international levels. Organisations like AfSol also have an important role to play in making this possible.
References


Abstract

This article entitled “African states’ engagement in Security in Central Africa: challenges and prospects for cooperation between the AU and ECCAS” analyses the perception and issues of peace and security dynamics in Central Africa. It also explores the coordination between the AU and ECCAS by questioning its operational efficiency vis-a-vis the local constraints and crucial challenges in the region. Assuming that States in Central Africa do not offer a shared/relevant vision on issues of peace and security, it is given that the lack of political will mitigates any opportunity of mutual cooperation where Africa can produce its own solutions for its peace and security challenges. Yet, while Eastern and Western African states are highly preoccupied to finding endogenous solutions to security challenges, the Central Africa Region lags behind in mobilizing around common challenges thus the wish for a harmonization/capacity building of already existing institutions. With regards to the knowledge and practice of AfSol, this chapter brings three major contributions that build upon existing achievements: (1) the inventory of endogenous solutions susceptible of capitalizing on the consolidation of peace in Central Africa; (2) incentives for decision makers in Central Africa for a more active engagement for peace and (3) the establishment of a platform of discussion between academic circles, pan-African structures of integration and political decision makers.

Keywords: Central Africa, Intervention, Peace, Security, Development.

Résumé

L'engagement des États africains selon laquelle les pays d’Afrique centrale n’offrent pas une vision pertinente des questions de paix et de sécurité, il est généralement admis que l’absence de volonté politique handicape toute opportunité de mutualisation des efforts à travers lesquels l’Afrique pourrait produire et diffuser ses propres réponses aux questions de paix et de sécurité. Or, contrairement à l’Afrique orientale et occidentale, fortement préoccupée par la recherche des solutions endogènes aux problèmes de sécurité, l’Afrique centrale tarde à se mobiliser autour des enjeux communs ; d’où le souhait d’une harmonisation des institutions existantes. Au regard des contours liés à la connaissance et à la pratique de l’AfSol, ce chapitre apporte trois contributions majeures susceptibles de capitaliser les acquis existants : l’inventaire des solutions endogènes susceptibles de capitaliser la consolidation de la paix en Afrique centrale ; l’incitation des décideurs de la région Afrique centrale à plus d’engagement pour la paix et l’établissement d’une plate-forme de discussion entre les milieux académiques, les structures panafricaines d’intégration et les décideurs politiques.

Mots clés : Afrique centrale, intervention, paix, sécurité, développement.

**Introduction**


d’autonomie sécuritaire de l’Afrique.

Ce chapitre poursuit trois objectifs principaux:

• Montrer les difficultés d’appropriation nationale des réponses sécuritaires élaborées par les structures régionales, panafricaines et internationales;

• Montrer l’efficacité d’une coopération/concertation formelle entre l’Union africaine et les CER;

• Montrer le rôle des spécificités locales (langue, culture, climat, etc.) dans l’articulation des réponses sécuritaires et l’efficience des actions sur le terrain.

Ce faisant, la tenue du deuxième atelier de l’AfSol nous a autorisée à nous pencher sur l’engagement des pays africains en matière de sécurité en Afrique centrale, non sans se préoccuper de déterminer les questionnements principaux devant guider notre réflexion à savoir : Comment les entités nationales perçoivent-elles et s’approprient-elles les enjeux de paix et de sécurité en Afrique centrale? Quelle harmonisation UA-CEEAC et quelle efficacité opérationnelle en attendre au regard des contraintes locales et des défis cruciaux en Afrique centrale?

Dans l’optique de centrer les regards et d’analyser l’articulation des réponses (diplomatiques, politiques, stratégiques et militaires) en rapport avec la pluralité des menaces sécuritaires en Afrique centrale en rapport avec l’AfSol, nous proposons de nourrir la réflexion autour de quatre axes : le cadre politico-institutionnel de la gestion des problèmes de sécurité (I), les contraintes locales liées aux opérations de maintien de la paix (II), les cas pratiques d’opérations de maintien de la paix en Afrique centrale (III) et l’apport de ce chapitre dans la conceptualisation et l’application de l’AfSol (IV).

I Évolution du cadre politico-institutionnel (régional et sous-régional) de gestion des problèmes de sécurité

A. Cadre institutionnel régional : garanties et limites du protocole du CPS

Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS), organe central de l’Architecture de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (elle-même issue de la mutation du Mécanisme de prévention, de gestion et de résolution des conflits de l’OUA), a été créé au

Dans un souci d’efficacité, l’UA (article 3-1 de l’Acte constitutif) décidait à Maputo, en juillet 2003, de l’établissement d’une plate-forme de collaboration avec les Communautés économiques régionales (CER), dans l’optique de la création d’une Force africaine en attente (FAA) dont l’opérationnalisation était prévue en 2015, et plus récemment la Capacité africaine de réponse immédiate aux crises (CARIC). Les CER (5 brigades issues des 5 sous-régions), aux multiples avantages comparatifs, fondée sur le principe de subsidiarité en matière de maintien de la paix, constituent les organes centraux de prévention et de gestion des conflits de l’UA, au niveau sous-régional. Au plan structurel, chaque force régionale comprend trois composantes classiques : une composante civile (60 personnes par région), une composante police (720 agents de police et 5 unités de police constituées par région) et une composante militaire (300 à 500 observateurs militaires et des unités terre-mer-air d’environ 5 000 hommes par région).

B. Cadre institutionnel sous-régional : le protocole relatif au COPAX

Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Afrique centrale (COPAX), créé par décision n° 001/Y/fev. du 25 février 1999 à Yaoundé, est l’organe opérationnel de la CEEAC. C’est aussi le principal outil de prévention de paix en Afrique centrale. Investi d’une mission de paix, il obéit à une structuration circonstancielle en fonction de la particularité de la situation. Le Protocole y relatif, adopté à Malabo le 2 février 2000, crée divers organes de mise en œuvre des objectifs de la structure régionale dont:

- La commission de défense et de sécurité -CDS- (article 13), organe consultatif composé des chefs d’État-major, des chefs de police, des experts des ministères des affaires étrangères/relations extérieures, des experts des ministères de la défense et de l’intérieur;

- Le Mécanisme d’alerte rapide d’Afrique centrale -MARAC- (articles 21 et 22)

5 La création de la CARIC a été annoncée le 27 mai 2013 à l’occasion du cinquantième anniversaire de l’UA tenu à Addis-Abeba.
dont la mission est la collecte, au niveau des États membres, de l’information stratégique pré-opérationnelle ;

- La Force multi-nationale d’Afrique centrale -FOMAC- (article 23), chargée de la planification stratégique prévisionnelle et opérationnelle des opérations de maintien et/ou de consolidation de la paix. Le protocole relatif à sa création remonte au 24 février 2000 ;


En définitive, la FOMAC est le bras armé du COPAX. C’est une force non permanente de 4 800 hommes, constituée des contingents nationaux, mobilisée par la conférence des chefs d’État pour des missions de paix, de sécurité et d’assistance humanitaire (article 24). Son déploiement est motivé par la saisine de la conférence des chefs d’État et de gouvernement par un État membre, l’Union africaine ou l’ONU (article 26). Toutefois, l’interprétation juridique du protocole y relatif n’offre pas une saine articulation/connexion des organes du COPAX.

II Contraintes locales, engagement et hypothèque procédurale et opérationnelle des OMP africaines

A. Contraintes locales d’ordre politique et disparités des effectifs déployés

Les États membres de la CEEAC sont moins collaboratifs en matière de maintien de la paix en Afrique centrale. La Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui (MISAB), créée en février 1997 sous commandement gabonais, constituée de 796 soldats n’était constituée qu’à 37% (296 en valeur chiffrée) des soldats en provenance de la CEEAC ; soit 149 soldats pour le Gabon et 147 pour le Tchad. Le reste des troupes, soit 63% (500 soldats), provenait des pays de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (114 soldats pour le Burkina Faso, 113 pour le Mali, 153 pour le Sénégal et 120 pour le Togo). Le 2 octobre 2002 à Libreville, suite à la décision des chefs d’État de la CEMAC de déployer un contingent de 350 soldats en RCA dans le cadre de la FOMUC (Force multi-nationale en Centrafrique), seuls trois pays avaient honoré cet engagement. Le Gabon avait ainsi déployé 146 soldats, le Congo 126 et la Guinée Équatoriale 31.7

Plus tard, la Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique (MICOPAX), organe opérationnel de la FOMAC, constituée de 2 694 hommes (en décembre 2013) inégalement répartis entre les États membres, était érigée en Mission internationale

7 Le Cameroun avait justifié sa non participation par le conflit de Bakassi qui lui exigeait une forte présence militaire sur le théâtre des opérations.
L’engagement des états Africains de soutien à la Centrafrique (MISCA) sous égide de l’UA. En février 2014, sur un effectif prévisionnel de 6 000 hommes (militaires et policiers) de la MISCA autorisé par la Résolution 2127, les pays de la CEEAC avaient apporté une contribution de l’ordre de 4 595 hommes ; soit 864 pour le Congo-Brazzaville, 850 pour le Rwanda, 850 pour le Burundi, 792 pour le Tchad, 517 pour le Cameroun, 517 pour le Gabon et 205 pour la Guinée Équatoriale. Les contributions des effectifs par pays ont certes évolué, mais on note une grande disparité entre les contributeurs majeurs, moyens et mineurs.

À l’observation, l’engagement des États membres de la CEEAC dans les opérations de maintien de la paix en Afrique centrale, progressif, est soumis à plusieurs conditions. L’équilibrage numérique des effectifs entre les États membres n’étant pas exigé, les effectifs fluctuent en fonction des contraintes et enjeux suivants :

- La densité démographique du pays et les effectifs militaires (Gabon et Guinée Équatoriale) ;
- Les contraintes de la géopolitique interne ou la passivité diplomatique des dirigeants (Cameroun) ;
- Les restrictions qu’imposent les législations nationales car pendant longtemps le Cameroun est resté figé au principe de la non ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des États ;
- L’expérience acquise lors des opérations antérieures (Rwanda, Burundi et Angola) ;
- L’expression d’un leadership sous-régional (Tchad, Congo-Brazzaville et Angola) ;
- La contiguïté territoriale avec le pays d’intervention, par souci d’enrayer l’exportation transfrontalière des menaces ;
- Le poids des alliances interétatiques (Tchad-Cameroun et Tchad-RCA) ;
- Le gain financier car le taux standard payé par l’ONU aux pays ayant déployé des contingents de casques bleus est de 1 028 dollars mensuels par soldat (soit un peu plus de 500 000 FCFA) ;
- Les bénéfices technologiques ;
- Le rayonnement diplomatique du pays etc.

Fondamentalement, ces contraintes limitent la capacité de la CEEAC à se prendre
en charge militairement et réduit l’efficience de la collaboration de l’UA avec les CER, notamment des brigades régionales en attente. Bien plus, l’existence de deux communautés en Afrique centrale constitue une hypothèque considérable dans l’articulation des réponses sécuritaires et dans la répartition des postes de responsabilité dans ces structures. Pourtant, depuis 2013, le Comité de pilotage chargé de la rationalisation des communautés économiques régionales en Afrique centrale (Copil/CER), financé par la BAD, tente de rapprocher la CEMAC et la CEEAC en vue de créer une communauté économique unique.

B. La complexité des mécanismes de financement des OMP africaines

L’Union africaine peine encore à autofinancer ses actions, et donc les opérations de maintien de la paix à sa charge, en l’absence des mécanismes autonomes de financement. Cela peut s’expliquer par les inégalités au niveau de développement. Celles-ci, expression des niveaux de développement encore non harmonisés, paraissent durablement affectées la capacité africaine à mettre en œuvre une véritable politique de financement des actions en faveur de la paix. Ces difficultés avaient été ressenties en RCA, lorsque l’UA n’avait pu boucler le budget de la MISCA (403 millions USD) au février 2014. Car, la conférence des donateurs, tenue à Addis-Abeba, n’avait mobilisé, à titre de promesses, que 315 millions USD ; soit 100 millions USD pour les États membres de la CEEAC, 1,5 millions USD pour le Nigeria, 1 million USD pour l’Afrique du Sud et 500 000 USD pour l’Éthiopie.

Il est souhaitable que l’Union africaine soit appuyée par des donateurs privés africains, en sus de l’application des mécanismes innovants de financement décidés en janvier 2015. Une plus grande solidité/fluidité institutionnelle et infrastructurelle de la CEEAC et un fonds permanent de gestion des crises pourrait également être envisagé pour résoudre le problème de lenteur dans le déploiement militaire, en attendant la mise en place de la Force africaine en attente (FAA).

Dans l’espace CEEAC, le budget de fonctionnement est pourvu par la contribution communautaire d’intégration (CCI), prélevée par les douanes et trésors des États membres pour le financement des activités de la structure, notamment celles du COPAX. Mais, ce dispositif, certes appréciable, s’avère inefficace parce les États

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8 Il s’agit de la levée des taxes sur les billets d’avion en partance ou en provenance de l’Afrique (10 dollars US par voyageur), sur les séjours dans les hôtels ou taxe d’hospitalité (2 dollars US par client), sur le tourisme et sur la messagerie téléphonique.

9 S’agissant de la CEEAC, la BAD apporte, depuis 2013, un appui financier dans le cadre de l’appui au renforcement des capacités institutionnelles de la CEEAC (PARCI-CEEAC)
membres ne sont aucunement soumis aux contraintes. Le mécanisme de financement de l’UEMOA,10 à ce titre, paraît être la meilleure alternative pour la CEEAC. Voilà pourquoi, en prélude au déploiement des 8 700 soldats au Cameroun contre Boko Haram, les chefs d’État du COPAX, réunis à Yaoundé le 16 février 2015, ont fait la promesse de mettre en place une aide d’urgence de 50 milliards de FCFA.

C. Les défis opérationnels des OMP africaines


La cohabitation de plusieurs structures d’intégration en Afrique centrale, notamment la Communauté économique et monétaire d’Afrique centrale (CEMAC) et la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC), obstrue la capacité opérationnelle de l’Afrique centrale à déployer efficacement une OMP. Bien que, dans le cadre de la coopération UA-CER, la CEEAC ait été retenue, cette dernière souffre d’une absence de solidité infrastructurale et institutionnelle. Aussi, note-t-on une absence d’interchangeabilité opérationnelle entre les CER, alors que les conflits africains, pour la plupart, présentent des caractéristiques complexités : flux des réfugiés, trafic des stupéfiants, contrebande (médicaments, carburant, véhicules et pièces détachées), trafic des documents d’identité et des êtres vivants, trafic de bétail, insécurité foncière etc. Ainsi, ils se diffusent horizontalement en prenant des formes diverses. Ceci exige une coordination et un échange d’informations entre les CER dans l’optique d’accroître leur efficacité opérationnelle. Mais aussi, la maîtrise des spécificités culturelles et anthropologiques de la sous-région est un indicateur de réussite, une opération en terre inconnue étant humainement très dangereuse. En clair, l’impératif préalable consisterait à faire évoluer le format doctrinal d’une simple OMP vers un format plus rigoureux de Peace building intégrant des approches multidimensionnelles/  

10 Ce mécanisme de financement se décline au prélèvement communautaire de solidarité (PCS), soit 1,5% (1% pour l’UEMOA et 0,5% pour la CEDEAO) des taxes douanières prélevées par chaque État membre.
multisectorielles. Autant dire que le format d’intervention, politico-militaire de préférence, ne doit pas être taillé sur mesure, c’est-à-dire qu’il doit être particulier en fonction du caractère complexe ou non de la situation sécuritaire.

La CEEAC, espace majoritairement francophone (9 pays sur 11 dont le Cameroun, le Tchad, la RCA, la Guinée Équatoriale, la RDC, le Gabon, le Congo-Brazzaville, le Rwanda et le Burundi), offre ainsi un atout qui mérite d’être capitalisé. La spécialisation des contingents en fonction des contraintes climatiques et des habitudes alimentaires pourrait permettre également de juguler les changements de circonstance et d’accroître la capacité des troupes sur le terrain. Le rapprochement entre la CEDEAO et la CEEAC, deux régions simultanément touchées par la piraterie maritime, est, à cet effet, une initiative salutaire. Cette synergie est susceptible d’optimiser les réponses sécuritaires en assurant leur interopérabilité. Enfin, une redéfinition du cadre institutionnel régional, un engagement politique plus vigoureux des États et une adaptation du format opérationnel aux mutations sociales et à l’enchèreissement des menaces, sont opportuns. De même, les procédures de mise en action du dispositif militaire devraient pouvoir bénéficier d’un allègement du cadre normatif de gestion des crises, encore très lourd.

III Décloisonnement des enjeux et rentabilité des OMP en Afrique centrale : cas illustratifs (RCA, Cameroun)

A. De la FOMAC à la MISCA : les défis des OMP africaines

La CEEAC n’a pas une expérience cumulative en matière de maintien de la paix si ce n’est en RCA. Bien avant la crise en cours, les États membres avaient consenti à déployer des troupes dans le cadre de la MISAB (février 1997), de la FOMUC (2 octobre 2002-12 juillet 2008) et de la MICOPAX I (juillet 2003) et II (31 mai 2013) et de la FOMAC (décembre 2013).

Or, face à la détérioration de la situation humanitaire et la multiplication des affrontements armés en Centrafrique, le CPS décidait, le 19 juillet 2013, du déploiement de la MISCA, entérinée par la Résolution 2127 du Conseil de sécurité.

11 L’efficacité d’une action militaire dépend aussi de la maitrise des causes locales de la crise et devrait être accompagnée d’action politique.
12 Ce rapprochement s’est matérialisé par la tenue, à Yaoundé les 25 et 26 juin 2013, du sommet conjoint CEEAC, CEDEAO et CGG. A l’issue de ce sommet, plusieurs décisions ont été prises : la création à Yaoundé (depuis septembre 2014) du Centre interrégional de coordination de la sécurité maritime dans le golfe de Guinée (CIC), l’élaboration d’un code de conduite relatif à la prévention et la répression des actes de piraterie.

En effet, bien que circonscrit au départ à la RCA, le conflit centrafricain s’est diffusé dans la sous-région à travers un afflux des refugiés en mars 2014 dont 130 187 au Cameroun, 55 533 en RDC, 87 000 au Tchad et 14 108 au Congo-Brazzaville. Pensées dans les limites géographiques nationales, les réponses sécuritaires de la CEEAC (notamment le déploiement militaire) n’ont pas intégré des paramètres susceptibles de transférer le conflit dans les autres pays de la sous-région. L’insuffisance des effectifs -et surtout de la composante police (560 policiers anti-émeute en mars 2014 et 1800 prévus par la résolution 2149)-, la non prise en compte du format civilo-militaire, l’insuffisance de la logistique etc. ont réduit l’efficacité de la MISCA. Bien plus, le manque de fonds a détéint sur l’efficacité opérationnelle de la MISCA et son commandant, le Général congolais Jean Marie Michel Mokoko, l’avait relevé.

B. L’exemplarité de la coopération CBLT-CEEAC-UA contre Boko Haram?

L’inflation des exactions de Boko Haram, depuis plusieurs mois, a provoqué une mobilisation des instances africaines au rang desquelles la Commission du bassin du lac Tchad, la CEEAC et l’UA. En effet, après plusieurs incursions meurtrières de la secte islamiste d’origine nigériane au Cameroun (et plus récemment au Niger et au Tchad), les ministres des affaires étrangères de la CBLT et du Benin, réunis à Niamey le 20 janvier 2015, décidait de mutualiser leurs efforts. Quelques jours plus tard, le 29 janvier 2015, le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’UA, réunie en sa 484e session, en appui aux efforts des États de la CBLT et du Benin et en réponse à la requête de la réunion ministérielle de Niamey, autorisait le déploiement de la Force multinationale mixte (FMM). Cette Force est composée de 8 700\(^{15}\) hommes (dont 2 000 éléments de police et de gendarmerie et le personnel civil) fournis par le Nigeria (3 200 soldats), le Tchad (3 500 soldats), le Cameroun (2 450 soldats), le Niger (750 soldats). Prévue pour douze mois renouvelables, la FMM s’est

\(^{14}\) Celle-ci portait, notamment, sur la coordination stratégique, la mise en place du quartier général, le cadre juridique, le chronogramme de transition de la MICOPAX à la MISCA, la mobilisation des ressources et du soutien logistique etc.

\(^{15}\) Ce chiffre pourrait être dépassé.
vue assignée plusieurs tâches : la coordination opérationnelle, la protection des populations civiles (réfugiés, populations déplacées etc.), l’éradication de Boko Haram et groupes affiliés etc. La déclaration de Yaoundé, issue de la session extraordinaire de la conférence des chefs d’État du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Afrique centrale, tenue le 16 février 2015, mentionne l’échéancier et les modalités de déploiement de cette force. La nomination et l’installation, en septembre 2015, du général nigérian Iliyasu Isah Abbah (commandant de la Force) et des généraux camerounais Valère Nka (commandant en second de la Force) et Bouba Dobekréo (commandant du 1er secteur militaire basé à Mora au Cameroun) dénote d’une appropriation progressive de la lutte contre Boko Haram.

À l’analyse ex ante, la coopération/mobilisation CBLT-CEEAC-UA à l’échelle politique et institutionnelle au sujet du groupe terroriste Boko Haram, est réussie. Mais, la matérialisation des diverses actions nécessite une collaboration CEDEAO-CEEAC et une volonté politique toujours plus affirmée. Enfin, l’option militaire devrait s’accompagner, dans les pays touchés par le phénomène (Niger, Nigeria, Tchad et Cameroun), des réponses politiques et socio-économiques, sans omettre le volet humanitaire, au regard du nombre croissant de déplacés internes et des réfugiés dans les pays sus-cités. Pour cela, les zones d’influence de Boko Haram doivent rapidement être réinvesties par les autorités des pays riverains, afin que des infrastructures utiles y soient réhabilitées: routes, centres de santé, écoles, petites industries de transformation des produits piscicoles, etc. Le maillage administratif et sécuritaire doit y être rétabli de manière plus permanente, dans une perspective sous-régionale, etc.

Au total, un partenariat plus étroit entre l’UA et les CER (et donc la CEEAC) est susceptible d’accroître l’efficacité des OMP en Afrique centrale. Les préalables politiques, dans le cadre du déploiement de la FMM, paraissent réunis. Toutefois, intervient le sempiternel problème de financement et de la logistique. Car, mis à part les 17 milliards de FCFA (environ 30 millions USD) mobilisés en juillet 2015 par les pays concernés (pour un montant préalable de 50 milliards de FCFA), la FMM fait face au déficit de la logistique. Aussi, note-t-on une coordination assez lentement des états major nationaux qui pourrait compromettre l’efficacité opérationnelle attendue.

IV Les réponses sécuritaires de l’UA/CEEAC et le cadre pratique de l’AfSol

A-Rapport aux piliers de l’AfSol (l’engagement, l’appropriation et les valeurs partagées)
L’Afrique centrale (CEEAC) offre plusieurs issues similaires au premier pilier de l’AfSol à savoir l’engagement:

- La prise de conscience progressive, par l’opinion nationale africaine, de la nécessité d’une redéfinition des axes de coopération avec le Nord (Occident). Ceci exige une valorisation de la culture et de l’identité de l’Afrique et des Africains. La multiplication des ONG africaines, des instituitions de recherches (Think Tanks) et universitaires en Afrique participe à la mise en place de cet engagement.

- La volonté plus constante de plusieurs leaders politiques d’Afrique centrale. Dans ce registre, la montée en puissance du Tchad au Sahel et le binôme Tchad-Cameroun et Tchad-Niger contre Boko Haram est appréciée, autant que la puissance interactive du Rwanda dans la géopolitique africaine.

- La diversité des acteurs de médiation témoigne également d’un engagement plus accru en faveur de la paix en Afrique centrale. Les médiations libyenne, gabonaise et congolaise au sujet des crises centrafricaines en sont un témoignage. Il faut espérer que des actions similaires, preuve d’un engagement plus affirmé, se multiplient et se consolident.

- La reddition des groupes rebelles centrafricains et des ex-chefs d’État (François Bozizé et Michel Djotodjia), obtenue à Nairobi le 14 avril 2015, après moultes tergiversations et dénonciations, est le pic d’une initiative africaine réussie qu’il importe de partager.

- Il importe également de capitaliser les traits culturels et les convergences historico-géographiques de l’Afrique centrale. Les ethnies transfrontalières, les festivals frontaliers (à Kye-Ossi au Cameroun à la frontière Cameroun-Gabon-Guinée Équatoriale), les mariages entre communautés transfrontalières méritent aussi d’être valorisés pour en faire des occasions de promotion de la paix.

B. Débat et questions posées à l’issue de l’intervention

Le contenu de ce chapitre, compte rendu de notre intervention lors du second atelier de l’AfSol, fait revivre les principaux commentaires et questions posées dans l’optique d’animer le débat. Au décompte final, après présentation, deux intervenants ont campé le décor en posant des questions. Le premier intervenant, étudiant en Doctorat à l’IPSS (Albert MBIATEM), s’est offusqué de l’irrégularité du chef de l’État du Cameroun aux sommets et grands rendez-vous africains avant de
solicited des éclairages sur les réponses camerounaises aux problèmes de sécurité (à l’intérieur du pays et aux frontières). Par la suite, il a demandé à être édifié sur les éléments mesurables et quantifiables capables de permettre à la CEEAC de vaincre la secte islamiste Boko Haram. Le deuxième intervenant, Sebastiano Rwengabo, a sollicité des éclairages sur le rapport entre l’Union africaine et les CER ainsi qu’une critique des actions de la CEEAC en faveur de la paix en Afrique centrale.


C. Contribution majeure du chapitre à la pratique de l’AfSol

Au regard du cadre conceptuel et en rapport avec les piliers de l’AfSol, ce chapitre met en lumière plusieurs valeurs qui méritent d’être capitalisées, consolidées, divulguées et évaluées.

Premièrement, la volonté politique, expression de l’approbation des chefs d’État et autres décideurs de haut niveau, constitue le premier leitmotiv de l’engagement des États pris individuellement et collectivement. C’est le premier facteur psychologique en faveur de la paix tant les protagonistes se sentent liés par le droit de réserve. Cette volonté agissante a été à l’origine des sommets au sujet de la République Centrafricaine ainsi que la mise sur pied des opérations de maintien/interposition/restauration de la paix à travers la MISAB, la FOMUC et de la MICOPAX.
Deuxièmement, les efforts de sortie de crise expérimentés en Afrique centrale par la CEEAC ont occulté les mécanismes traditionnels de gestion de crises et de médiation. Mise à part l’implication de Monseigneur Dieudonné Nzapalainga (Archevêque de Bangui) et de l’Imam Oumar Kobine Layama (président de la Communauté islamique centrafricaine), l’Afrique centrale n’offre par encore une prise en compte des autorités religieuses et traditionnelles dans l’inventaire et la promotion des solutions afro-centrées aux questions de paix et de sécurité. De la sorte, les avancées observées en Afrique de l’Ouest, dans le cadre du partage des valeurs et de l’appropriation telles que promues par l’AfSol, devraient pouvoir être expérimentées en Afrique centrale par la CEEAC.

Troisièmement, l’urgence de la fédération des énergies. Celle-ci pourrait procéder de l’harmonisation des structures existantes en Afrique centrale. Ici, il s’agit pour une meilleure perspective, soit de muer toutes les structures en une seule soit de rendre formelle les plate-formes de discussion et de collaboration. Dans ce cadre, ce chapitre offre l’occasion de questionner la pertinence et la matérialisation des solutions proposées par les trois structures couvrant l’espace sous la menace de la secte islamiste Boko Haram à savoir la CEEAC ou CEMAC, la CEDEAO et la CBLT. Pour cela, le plan quinquennal projeté par la CBLT pourrait lui offrir une meilleure visibilité, accroissant sa capacité à se positionner comme une structure d’articulation des questions de sécurité et de développement situé à la charnière de la CEDEAO et la CEEAC.

Quatrièmement, les centres d’écoute et de promotion de la paix et de la sécurité méritent d’être créés ou réhabilités à l’effet d’instaurer un climat de paix. En effet, les valeurs de paix, de communion, de solidarité, de fraternité ou les espaces/occasions de dialogue, ne paraissent pas profondément ancrés dans les habitudes juvéniles. Car, la tranche sociale jeune (environ 57% de la population totale de l’Afrique centrale) est identifiée comme très exposée au phénomène de banditisme, de fondamentaliste (Boko Haram), de brigandage, de piraterie maritime, de violence injustifiée (anti-Balaka et Séléka en RCA), etc.

Cinquièmement, la recherche de l’autonomie financière de l’Afrique en matière de paix et de développement, butant à une dépendance extérieure très outrecuidante, mérite d’être réévaluée. De la sorte, l’AfSol, au regard des principes directeurs de son action et en multipliant le plaidoyer, doit pouvoir convoquer la solidarité africaine comme alternative salutaire. L’entraide ou la solidarité, fortement convoquée par des Anthropologues et Historiens africains, exprimée minimalement à travers la
mobilisation de 50 milliards FCFA à Yaoundé (février 2015) pour lutter contre Boko Haram, doit être étendue à toutes les classes sociales désireuses d’accompagner l’Afrique.

Conclusion

L’inflation de la violence, des crises et des conflits asymétriques en Afrique centrale offre l’occasion de questionner la capacité des États à répondre efficacement aux urgences sécuritaires dont l’Union africaine est le pilier central. Car, à l’observation, l’efficacité et la pertinence des réponses sécuritaires de la CEEAC sont tributaires de la promptitude de l’UA à déclencher son dispositif juridique. Bien plus, la plateforme de collaboration décidée à Maputo, n’offre pas de visibilité, encore moins une solidité institutionnelle et infrastructurelle. À l’heure de la volonté de plus en plus exprimée et de l’engagement irréversible de l’UA à trouver des réponses africaines aux conflits internes, une collaboration plus accrue et une mobilisation plus affirmée des États membres des CER sont opportunes. La coopération UA-CEEAC en Afrique centrale (notamment en RCA et cours au Cameroun), dénote d’un retour gagnant de la structure continentale en matière de gestion prévisionnelle et opérationnelle des crises. Toutefois, sur la longue durée, l’Union africaine gagnerait à diversifier les sources africaines de son financement. Aussi, les CER et/ou les États membres gagneraient-ils, dans ce sillage, à respecter les règles d’engagement des troupes et les obligations financières vis-à-vis de l’Union.
Bibliographiques


Economic Integration as a Peacebuilding Strategy in the Horn of Africa with Particular Focus on Ethiopia and Its Four Neighbours

Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe

Abstract

The quest for peace is a longstanding objective of national governments and development partners in the Horn of Africa. Political negotiations between conflicting parties and the promotion of regional economic integration spearheaded by the sub-regional economic communities are among the most prominent attempts by member states and their partners with the objective of promoting regional peace. However, peace is still illusive in the region. This paper suggests the adoption of an incremental peace project spearheaded by limited sectorial cross-border cooperation. It summarizes the main theoretical approaches to cross-border cooperation and provides a summary of the current political environment of the region, highlighting its defining features. It further reviews the European Union experience, for comparative reasons, which may inform us the way forward, based on the key lessons from that experience.

Keywords: Cross-border cooperation, Liberalism, Realism, Supranational, Intergovernmental, and Hybrid approaches

Introduction

Located in the Eastern part of the continent, the Horn of Africa consists of Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Drought, famine, civil war and state failure have long been the defining features of this region. Most of the problems have a dominant transnational/regional character. Social and economic problems in a country have intended as well as unintended spillover effects on neighbouring countries. For instance, pastoralist conflicts in the region are not strictly limited to national boundaries although most of these communities are divided by the political boundaries of the states. The impact of conflicts caused by policy failures, exacerbated by climate change and natural resource degradation, transcends national boundaries. The region has repeatedly

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witnessed direct violent conflicts and proxy wars\textsuperscript{17}. One can also see that in a complex environment where such wars take place between states, the impact of violence in one country seldom stops at its own borders.

The objective of the paper is to examine cross-border cooperation as a regional peace project in the Horn of Africa. Key objectives are to succinctly discuss theoretical approaches to economic integration with an empirical evidence from the European Union, highlight the key features of the Horn of Africa conflicts, discuss whether cross-border economic cooperation will serve as a peacebuilding project in the region, and highlight the preferred approach when and if such a project is feasible.

With these objectives, the paper in discussing conflicts in the Horn, preferred to focus mainly on investigating Ethiopia’s experiences with its neighbours\textsuperscript{18} as such a delimitation allows to have a focused and in-depth discussion on the matter. The nature and form of each of the cross-border conflicts in the Horn are varied but they all are similar in having a regional aspect connecting to at least two or three of the neighbouring states. It is from this perspective that this paper intends to investigate whether cross-border economic cooperation could be utilized as a way of promoting a regional peace project in Ethiopia and its neighbours. The paper limits its discussions to a specific area of integration, namely economic integration, as any discussion of all aspects of regional integration would require more space and goes beyond the limits of this article. The paper will also include a high-level review of the European experience, since this provides us with a comparative experience of a successful regional peacebuilding project. The paper has five sections:

The first section reviews the literature addressing the different approaches to cross-border cooperation. The second section looks at the experience of the European Union covering its genesis through a focused discussion of the key historical milestones in the process, and summarizes the major enabling factors for the success of the EU project. The third section covers the challenges of borders taking Ethiopia’s unique border challenges as an example and highlighting the regional

\textsuperscript{17} For example, the Ethio-Somali wars of 1977 and 1982; the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998; the Eritrean Support to Ethiopian armed opposition groups and the Ethiopian support to Eritrean armed opposition groups; The support of Uganda for the SPLA and the support of Khartoum to the LRA can be cited as examples of wars and proxy wars.

\textsuperscript{18} Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan are Ethiopia’s neighbours.
dimension of all its conflicts, recognizing their individuality. The fourth section presents an indicative proposal to the way forward for the Horn of Africa in light of the EU experience. The fifth section is a conclusion.

**Theoretical Perspectives on Cross-Border Cooperation**

States with integrated and interdependent economies are less likely to get into conflict. With more integration and interdependence, the stakes to maintain peaceful relationships grow and more space is created for peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts among states. Trust and understanding of each other’s interests and priorities develop in the process of integration and a bottom-up demand-driven pressure for peaceful co-existence develops in such a process.

Although there are several theoretical approaches to economic integration, these reviews focus on the three main approaches to cross-border peacebuilding, namely: the supranational approaches, the inter-governmental approaches and the hybrid approaches.

**The Supranational Approaches**

The supranational approaches are approaches that emphasize the role of economic factors in encouraging cross-border cooperation. These approaches assume that all actors (including state owned enterprises, multi-national corporations and non-governmental organisations), driven by maximizing self-interest, act rationally and are considered to reasonably follow the logic of economics to address their interests in this interdependent world. There are functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches within this category.

Functionalists suggest that the significance of borders between states decreases when power is shared over a range of functions for cross-border cooperation in order to address common economic problems. Such cooperation and functional integration becomes essential as states begin to recognize that the material needs of their nations cannot be satisfied without cooperation (Tannam, 1999: 9).

The reduced capacity of states to meet and satisfy complex human needs locally and an increasing cost of war push states to cooperate with each other by establishing supranational bodies or institutions to meet the complex and various needs of their citizens (Kurt, 2009: 45). As a result states are increasingly forced to delegate
more responsibilities to functional institutions, for example, international trade is unthinkable without an international banking system.

Functionalist approach rejects the emphasis on political aspects of cooperation as elites and politicians, for fear of losing sovereignty, rather tend to entrench borders and deepen opposition among domestic interests to their erosion. It rather suggests that the focus should be on a bottom-up approach which encourages economic interdependence between communities, continuously erodes the border divisions and, over time eliminates political conflicts that emanate from narrow ethno-centric perspectives.

Without opposing the key role of economic cooperation as a driver of political integration, neo-functionalists emphasize the need for supranational institutions to create a policy environment for economic cooperation. The concept of ‘spillover’ is central to the neo-functionalist approach. It assumes that effective economic cooperation encourages political integration. Hass, who is regarded as the ‘father’ of neo-functionalism, notes that “certain kinds of organisational tasks most intimately related to group and national aspirations can be expected to result in integration even though the actors responsible for this development may not deliberately work towards such an end” (Harry and Angus, 2008:56). Differing from the functionalist approach, neo-functionalism recognizes the role of elite activity at a supranational level in creating a policy environment for economic cooperation.

In summary, functionalist approaches call for a peace and security project which focuses on enlarging the economic space through the expansion and empowerment of functional institutions. No direct reference is made by the elite groups to peace and security and/or calls for peace and security-related negotiations and political processes (Moller, 2008:30). They both call for a deliberate neglect of political negotiations and instead advocate a rather ‘bottom-up’ approach, achieving peace without explicitly stating that this is the objective. This might be true in nations with dynamic economies having greater value-creating capacity like the industrialized nations but difficult in weak economies with little value-creating capacity and the power of the states is unchallenged.

The economies of the Horn of Africa countries, for example, are based on basic agriculture and natural resource exploitation and create very little value. There is
insignificant functional integration observed and the role of states in stimulating such cooperation seems to be fundamental thus making the functionalist approach less likely to work.

The Intergovernmental Approaches

In contrast with the functionalist approaches, the intergovernmental approaches stress the role of sovereign governments in managing international relations. These approaches are based on a realist understanding of state power as something that establishes and maintains an individual state’s control over other states (Tannam, 2004:2). States are not equally affected by each other’s behaviour; stronger states are less affected by the behaviour of weaker ones and are more capable of influencing the behaviour of others. As a result, states focus on maintaining their autonomy and develop a strong drive for power and maintain their autonomy as much as possible.

Building on the realist conception of power, neo-realists see power as expanded beyond military power including additional capabilities such as economic power expressed in terms of possession of raw material resources, the ability to control markets, the possession of sources of capital and the existence of competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods (Strange, 1982: 482). Neo-realism also realizes the decreasing national economic autonomy as a result of the increasing interdependence of the modern world and appreciates the increased power and importance of supra-national intergovernmental settings. Once created by the consent of states, supranational rules and institutions influence the conduct of the states in terms of their relationships (Buzan, 1993: 334).

The realists recognize that a crisis in a major economy affects other states, no matter how tightly they manage their own national economies. Any cross-border cooperation agreements that states enter into are dependent on their calculations of how to protect their national values; therefore, economic cooperation between states is only possible to the extent that it meets these requirements. Neo-realists, without reneging that the key source of power resides with the sovereign nation state, recognize the increasing role of supranational institutions in influencing state relationships.

These approaches clearly recognize the power calculations of sovereign states, while
falling short in terms of recognizing the role that strong states and international institutions play in influencing the decision making power of other sovereign states, an influence that is achieved by providing normative frameworks, incentives and sanctions related to the implementation of the norms. The power of functional supranational institutions, particularly in weaker economies, is significant as the economies of those weaker states rely very much on foreign funding in the form of soft loans, grants and development cooperation agreements. In such situations, supranational institutions have the potential to share the sovereign power of the states, as well as their autonomous decision making capacity.

The Hybrid Approaches

The third category can be summarized as hybrid approaches (Tannam, 2004:7). These approaches are a hybrid of neo-functionalism and neo-realism and include liberal institutionalism, consociationalism and multi-level governance approaches.

Liberal institutionalism recognizes the growing interdependence of the world and the growing role and importance of international regimes in setting norms and rules. It focuses on the distinct nature of international intergovernmental bargaining in a multilateral regime and realizes the existence of problems that can only be solved by cooperation in the interdependent world (Moravcsik, 1997: 515). International regimes not only set norms and rules but also enforce them by imposing sanctions on states found in violation of those norms and rules and by incentivizing those who operate in accordance with them. Its understanding of the power of international regimes is similar to that of neo-functionalists except that it tends to differ in its viewpoint of the focus states make to maximise their autonomy as it recognizes them as increasingly focusing to conform to the international norms and rules.

Consociationalism is similar to liberal institutionalism in all aspects except that this approach assumes members of an international regime to be part and parcel of a single ‘sovereign’ entity that co-exists on the basis of consociations made between the conflicting interests of its members. It regards states as members of an entity in which they are destined to co-exist despite their differences in interests and priorities. There is an assumption that they will be willing to compromise in relation to their second and third priorities so that they can achieve their main priority, as much as the situation of the whole entity allows for this. The focus of this approach is on the bottom-up process where lessons from domestic state
actions are transferred to a multilateral setting, which makes it different from liberal institutionalism.

Multilateralism considers the emergence of sub-national and regional units as an essential part of the wider policy network, including state and multilateral policy networks. This approach places more emphasis on more active local and regional action and increased local-regional cooperation in cross-border relationships. This reality forces the supranational, national and regional-local levels to interact in order to produce increased cross-border cooperation on certain issues where common interests are perceived to exist.

In summary one can see that none of the approaches discussed so far is invalid as they all contribute to regional integration when used in a particular context. On the other hand, cross-border cooperation that leads to regional integration is a complex matter and no single approach is sufficient to achieve it as when a particular context that called for a particular approach changes the choice of strategy requires adapting to the new situation and change. One can, therefore, regard the use of hybrid of approaches as an effective way of dealing with regional integration. The following section covers the practical experience of the European Union and connects it to the practicalities of the Horn of Africa and tests the varying approaches.

**Comparative Experience: The Case of European Union**

The European experience of integration is a typical one that could inform the Horn of Africa’s challenges for integration. The region comprises several sovereign countries and conducting a review of the EU experience makes sense as it has brought together several sovereign states. The history of European inter-state wars is also similar to the existing turbulent relationships of the countries of the Horn making it proper for a comparative study.

**The European Union as a Peace Project: Literature Review**

Present day Europe is an outcome of the partitioning and repartitioning that took place over a long period of time covering the years between the two world wars (MacMillan, Holbrook and Hampton, 2003: 22). Historically, Europe was the world’s bloodiest continent; it is a continent where the long Napoleonic-wars and most of the two world wars took place. It is also a continent that lived in
the tension and conflict during the cold war period. Today, however, Europe has been transformed into a peaceful region within which war has almost become inconceivable, despite the ethnic tensions that led to the further repartitioning of the Eastern European countries and ended with the creation of new states. This review focuses on how Europe managed this transformation and attempts to identify the key enabling factors that contributed to this change.

The First World War left Europe with huge human and economic losses and people from all parts of the continent were weary. This resulted in the quest for peace in Europe which continued for many years and involved numerous negotiations between states. The most prominent one was the Paris conference which began in April 1919 and attempted to bring together the four big powers of the time at a roundtable conference for peace. The conference ended in 1920 with the creation of new boundaries to the European nations and to the rest of the world. People hoped that whatever happened next would not be as bad as what they had just experienced. Nevertheless, sustainable peace was not achieved and two decades later, Europe again found itself in conflict with the outbreak of the Second World War (MacMillan, Holbrook and Hampton, 2003: 23).

It was only after the creation of the EU that sustainable peace reigned at the heart of Europe and continued to expand into the troubled parts of Eastern Europe. The development of the EU has been a long process, involving several developments and negotiations between the member states. Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA This review focuses on the key milestones in the development of the EU including the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the treaty establishing the European Economic Commission (EEC), and the Single European Act (SEC) and the treaty of the EU.

The ECSC was the first supranational institution and the motivation behind its formation was the desire for peace, as was made clear by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, in his famous declaration of 9 May 1950.19 The treaty was signed in 1951 and brought France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg together as a single Community. The ECSC was organized with the aim of facilitating the free movement of coal and steel and free access to sources of production. A joint High Authority composed of independent persons

appointed by the governments was created to supervise the market so that respect for competition rules and price transparency were addressed in the community.\(^\text{20}\)

The treaty further illustrated that the decision to establish the ECSC was not only economic but also political, as these two raw materials were the basis for industrial growth and military power. The anticipation was that the collaboration could open the avenue for the elimination of war by paving the way towards European integration.

The implementation of the ECSC laid the ground for the EEC by opening up the markets for these products in the countries of the community. The EEC treaty was signed in Rome in 1958 and aimed to create further co-operation on a range of economic and trade issues, from agriculture to overseas aid, from commerce to taxation. It also included the signing of a treaty to encourage cooperation in the use of Atomic energy. The EEC laid the foundation for an ‘ever closer union’ by establishing European government bodies, enabling free movement of goods, capital and people, and promoting the concept of cohesion by encouraging countries to support each other and grow at a similar rate.\(^\text{21}\)

The EEC encouraged its members to further develop their level of integration, as witnessed in the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. The new act declared the creation of a single European internal market, which comprised an area without internal frontiers and in which free movement of goods, persons, services and capital were guaranteed. The act also included a move away from consensual modes of decision making to a qualified majority approach, as indicated in Article 16 of the act (SEA, 1986).\(^\text{22}\) The SEA became the last stepping-stone in the move towards the integration of Europe and was followed by the Maastricht treaty, which gave birth to the new European Union in 1992.

The EU was established as a result of various internal and external developments. The internal development was instigated by member states, which were encouraged by the success and wanted to build on the achievements of the SEA and take it to a higher level. The external development was the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the prospect of German reunification, an event that led to a commitment to reinforce the Community’s international position in response to

\(^{20}\) Summary of EU legislation, 2010


\(^{22}\) The Single European Act (SEA), 1986
the new political and economic environment. This treaty introduced the concept of European citizenship, reinforced the powers of the European parliament and launched an economic and monetary union.

Institutionally, it created a union consisting of three pillars: the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and mechanisms for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This treaty replaced the EEC with the EC and paved the way for political integration. The new treaty clearly surpassed the original economic cooperation objectives and brought forth a raft of political goals, including: strengthening the democratic legitimacy of EC institutions and improving their effectiveness; establishing economic and monetary union; developing the community in relation to its social dimension; and developing a common foreign and security policy.

The level of integration of the founding members not only deepened the union but also attracted new members, and the community gradually expanded from six founding members to 28 countries. The development gap among the members was narrowed by the EU and through it European integration was accelerated. New members below the European average were supported by the union. The policy framework provided a space for the creation of the association of communities and on either side of the borders, the local regional authorities which were established to promote or facilitate cooperation in areas of common interest, and also contributed greatly to the process of giving voice to the border communities in relation to European policy making.

The success of the EU resulted from the development and implementation of a multi-faceted approach. The dynamism of the economy required functional integration, and this was addressed through the creation of the ECSC. The need for inter-governmental negotiations linked to the development of high level policies was addressed by the development of the All European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which later became the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It involved multi-level governance through the recognition of the regions. In short, the process involved the development of hybrid approaches and it was the complementarity of those approaches that brought about sustainable peace in Europe.

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23 Summary of EU legislation, 2010
24 Summary of EU legislation, 2010
There were four enabling factors that characterized this development. The first was the presence of shared values and norms among the founding states. In the absence of a sufficient degree of congruence in relation to values and norms, states find it difficult or impossible to resolve or transcend their major disputes, achieve cohesion and act with a common purpose in crisis situations (Nathan, 2003: 3). The second enabling factor was the existence of dynamic economies which demanded functional integration. The fragmentation of their coal and steel production and markets exposed them to exploitation on the part of the international cartel, which aimed to achieve high profits by dividing national markets through the entrenchment of restrictive practices, an economic dynamics that called for an integration of the production and marketing of coal and steel and resulted in accelerated growth in the national economies. This achievement provided the motivation which enabled the states to agree to the partial ceding of autonomy to the ECSC.

The third important factor was the presence of a stable balance of power and the military presence of the US, which provided security guarantees and nuclear deterrence (Moller, 2008: 1).25 This situation improved the trust among member states and motivated them to partly relinquish their autonomy in return for cooperation. The fourth enabling factor was the role of France and Germany, the two strongest European states at the time, which was crucial in ensuring the success of the EU. They underwrote the costs of maintaining the regime (e.g. by providing access to their own markets) rather than by resorting to coercion (Draper, 2010: 11).

In conclusion, the current state of peace within the EU has been achieved as a result of the long process that started with the establishment of the ECSC. The European experience has been successful because the good will of the initiators was supported by a number of other enabling factors. The key enabling factors for the success of the project were: the presence of shared values and norms among the founding states; the existence of dynamic economies which demanded functional integration; a stable balance of power and the military presence of the US, which provided security guarantees and nuclear deterrence; and the existence of strong states capable of underwriting the costs of maintaining the regional institution.

The ancient civilization of Ethiopia was centered mainly in the northern Abyssinian territory, with its boundaries expanding or shrinking, depending on the balance of power that existed between the ruling elites. Though there had been earlier attempts to create a unified and centralized empire, this enterprise only became successful at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. During the reign of Emperor Minilik II, most of the treaties that define current boundaries were signed. The then African boundaries were established by handing out territory in order to suit the imperialist powers (MacMillan, Holbrook and Hampton, 2003:372). Neither the former traditional administrative boundaries nor the interests of the populations of the frontier areas were considered during the process of boundary making, Anthony addresses this reality in the following way:

The only logic of African boundary making, which can be discerned in the record, is that untidy form of historical rationality which derives from the interests and objectives, primarily of course, the interests of certain European nation states which had temporarily become dedicated to territorial empire in Africa; where sometimes African rulers were able to play minor roles in settling actual boundaries. The populations of the frontier areas were envisaged, if at all, only as dim and inarticulate presence in the background—which did not mean that they were unable to influence the manner in which the imposed boundaries subsequently operated… (Asiwaju, 1985:25).

The establishment of Ethiopian boundaries was rather different than the process that was followed in other parts of Africa. Unlike most of Africa, Ethiopian boundaries were drawn through negotiation of the big powers with the rulers of Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the power and controlling capacity of the negotiating parties remained the key factor in boundary decision making and never considered the settlement patterns of communities and their traditional administration. Furthermore, the continued focus of development around the capital left the

26 A study of IGAD boundaries by the International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) of Durham University (2008) elaborates that the Ethio-Djibouti boundary was confirmed by a treaty signed between the Ethiopian and French governments in 1953; the Ethio-Eritrea was confirmed by the treaties signed with Italy in 1900, 1902, 1908 and later by the delimitation decision of the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission in 2002; the Ethio-Kenya boundary was confirmed by the treaties signed with the British empire in 1907, notes exchanged in 1947 and the Ethio-Kenyan treaty of 1970; the Ethio-Somalia boundary was confirmed by the treaties signed with Italy in 1907, 1908 and the tri point with Kenya in 1970; the Ethio-Sudan boundary was confirmed by the treaty signed with the British empire in 1902 and the exchange of notes with the government of Sudan in 1972.

27 The Afar Sultanate, for example, included Djibouti and the Eritrean Afars
divided border communities as peripheries excluded from the benefits of state services, the exception being in relation to taxation and some border control arrangements. Ethiopian cross-border cooperation with its neighbours should, therefore, be seen in the context of the poorly defined and problematic boundary making process.

Along the poorly defined borders of Ethiopia, there is a proliferation of human traffickers and illegal movement of migrants. In addition, these areas are centres of illicit trade and organized crime such as drug trafficking. Ethiopia’s trade with its neighbours is small, almost non-existent, and its defining feature is a competition for international markets, rather than cooperation. There is little or no infrastructural connectivity, thus discouraging inter-state trade and cross-border economic collaboration. The following part of this section covers cross-boundary relationships between Ethiopia and its neighbours and also summarizes the key challenges.

**The Borders of Ethiopia bring it into Contact with Diverse Conflict ‘Systems’**

Violent conflict is one of the defining characteristics of the Horn of Africa. And yet, none of the conflicts is isolated from one another. The major conflict systems that connect Ethiopia to its neighbours are as follows:

A. The Somali conflict system: After securing independence in 1960, Somalia had an elected government which served for nine years before Mohammed Said Barre seized power in 1969. Barre ruled a united country up until its break-up in the early 1990s. His dictatorship not only failed to provide economic and political benefits for Somalis, but also embroiled it in conflicts with its neighbouring states. Under Barre, the country fought two wars with Ethiopia and continued an uneasy relationship with the rest of its neighbours up until the collapse of its central government in 1991. In addition to fighting an all-out war with Ethiopia, the Somali government also supported groups fighting the central government in Ethiopia, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) being one of them.

Since the early 1990s, Somalia has been divided into different ‘lands’ under the governorship of warlords. This statelessness has made Somalia a safe haven for violent extremist groups such as Al Itihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Al Qaeda-associated group, al-Shabaab. Attempts to assist the Somalis to form a
government by the frontline states have not been coordinated in one direction; they can rather be characterised as ‘contending’ approaches where different countries supported different solutions.

Ethiopia, as the first victim of AIAI operations, engaged in what it called ‘fighting terrorism’ activities, sending its defence forces into Somalia from time to time in order to fight terrorism. With the creation of the different ‘lands’, and in line with its preferred governance structure, Ethiopia pushed for the formation of ‘a federated Somalia’. Kenya and Djibouti feared a ‘federated Somalia’ as it might be seen as setting a bad example with a negative impact in relation to the ethnic tensions in their respective countries; they argued in favour of a ‘unitary government’, while Eritrea used the situation as a catalyst for waging a proxy war against Ethiopia. To say the least, the support has been uncoordinated and sometimes conflicting.

B. The Sudan conflict system: The Sudanese civil war, which some label as the longest running civil war in the world, formally ended in July 2011 with the creation of the world’s newest nation—the Republic of South Sudan—facilitated through a UN monitored referendum. Regrettably, the Sudan conflict system continues to bother the region. Khartoum and Juba still need to complete negotiations on demarcating their border, including an agreement regarding the fate of the oil rich Abyei region. Furthermore, a newly organized SPLA North launched an insurgency war in the Nuba Mountains right after the referendum and has since created a coalition with the Darfur rebels under a new name, the Alliance of Sudan Revolutionary Forces. The internal stability of the newest country, South Sudan, is also fragile and is on the verge of being a failed state following the recent division of SPLM leadership and related civil war.

Although in the pre-1991 period (when Ethiopia was under a military junta) Ethiopia and Sudan provided support to each other’s enemies, Ethiopia is currently the only neighbouring country that is seen as being neutral, and is even regarded by both Sudan and South Sudan as a mediator. Ethiopia is seeking some sort of stability in (and between) the two Sudan’s, since it shares a border of over 1,000 km with the two, and is inhabited by divided and mostly traditional communities. The interests and interventionist approaches of the neighbouring countries and the international actors appear at its best as uncoordinated and at its worst diverse and divided.
C. The pastoralist regions conflict systems: The Horn of Africa region houses over 40 per cent of the world’s pastoralist population. Arbitrarily drawn boundaries divide each pastoral community into two or three states, hindering the effective and full utilisation of available resources through the limits placed on migration/movement, a defining trait of pastoralism that has resulted in heightened competition over natural resources. This problem, coupled with differing and sometimes contradictory policies on either side of several borders, causes continuous low-intensity conflicts that claim thousands of lives each year.28

These clusters include: 1) The Karamoja cluster which connects South Ethiopia, North West Kenya, North East Uganda and Eastern South Sudan; 2) The Somali cluster, a cluster that connects North Eastern Kenya, South Eastern Ethiopia, Western Somalia and Western Djibouti; 3) The Afar cluster, a cluster that connects Ethiopia with Northern Djibouti and Eritrea; and 4) The Nuer-Gambella cluster, a cluster that connects Western Ethiopia with Southern Sudan and the North Eastern part of the Republic of South Sudan.

D. The Eritrea conflict system that affects the whole region: Eritrea is an extremely militarized state in the region. It is a state that has engaged in violent conflict of various forms/levels with most of its neighbours in the Horn and beyond. For example, Eritrea has fought with Yemen and Djibouti over the Hanish islands and the Doumeira Mountains respectively, in addition to the all-out war with Ethiopia over border claims. Eritrea has also engaged in an open policy of regime change in Khartoum. In addition, it has been in conflict with Saudi Arabia over maritime boundaries.

The state does not have a constitution, has never had elections and has never issued a budget decree, thus allowing the president to run the country’s finances as his personal estate. The state seems to have designed its survival strategy by nurturing a ‘siege’ mentality in its citizens and by providing support to any element that creates instability in the region. Its war mongering has detracted it far from its liberation war promises of providing good governance and development, forcing the population into exile. In fact, more than a quarter of Eritrea’s population (28 per cent) has left the country. This figure continues to rise at an alarming rate.29 It

is a state under a UN sanction for its destructive role in Somalia and destabilizing character in the region.

In conclusion, the boundaries of the states of the HoA divide communities forcing them to live in an environment of interrelated conflict system. Each of the conflicts is related to the other making it difficult to understand one conflict without reference to others. Understanding this regional dimension is important in order to contextualize the common regional themes and challenges discussed in the following sections of this paper.

1. Massive and Continued Migration

The 2011 World Bank publication, Migration and Remittances Fact-book, states that Eritrea produced a total of 941,200 emigrants, a figure which constitutes 28 per cent of its population, and receiving only 16,500 immigrants. Somalia produced 812,700 emigrants, 8.7 per cent of its population, with only 22,800 immigrants from neighbouring countries. Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia follow in the order of ratio of migrants to their population.

A total of 3,812,100 citizens in the Horn of Africa have left their countries, according to the report. A substantial number of the migrants are educated with leading examples of Kenya, Eritrea and Somalia, losing 38.7 per cent, 34 per cent and 32 per cent of their tertiary-level educated citizens, respectively. Migrants are similar to ‘nomads travelling without any rights on their backs’ (Mostov, 2008:111). Once they have left their countries, migrants are not only denied their basic rights but also become vulnerable to all types of abuse.

2. Organized Crime

There is a massive proliferation of organized crime in the form of human trafficking, piracy and urban violence in Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries.

A. Human trafficking: As indicated in the US State Department report on Human Trafficking, countries of the Horn do not fully comply with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in terms of prevention,
protecting victims and prosecuting traffickers. It is estimated that migrants in East Africa pay an average of 1,500-2,000 USD to traffickers and bribes to police officers and other government officials from transit countries. Estimates show that trafficking generates as much as 40 million USD per year in the region. The impact of human trafficking affects not only the victims and their families but also undermines the states and their institutions through their involvement in corruption and illicit actions.

B. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Decades of statelessness, combined with toxic waste dumping and illegal fishing, have made the life of the Somali residents in coastal areas unsustainable, thus creating a favourable breeding ground for pirates. The increasing number of pirate attacks in this area has led to the establishment of a military presence in an internationally recommended transit corridor in the Gulf of Aden. However, pirates have adopted tactics that now allow them to attack targets up to more than 1,000 nautical miles off the Somali coast. In the first three months of 2011, International Maritime Board reports (Plotch et al, 2011) indicated that almost one hundred vessels in the region had been attacked, with 15 successful hijackings, involving approximately 300 hostages.

As a result of these crimes, insurance premiums on merchant vessels calling at ports in the Horn are increasing, a phenomena that seriously impairs the already weak economies of the Horn. It has also had an impact on the governance and regulatory environments of the surrounding countries as ransom money to pirates is somehow transiting through the structures of the frontline states. According to the aforementioned report of the IMB, the amount of ransom money, which currently stands at an average of 5 Million USD per ship, is increasing and hostages are being detained for longer periods as pirates hold out for ransom payments.

C. Drug abuse, trafficking and urban crime: There are no statistics on the extent of drug abuse and trade in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, it is clear that the country’s strategic geographic location in the Horn of Africa, good quality road and rail transport connections with neighbouring Djibouti, air links to West Africa, Asia and Europe and long unpatrolled borders with all five of its neighbouring countries, make it a prime target for drug trafficking.

According to the 2013 report of the UN Office on Drug (UNDOC), cannabis is the most common drug used in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda, although the abuse of
heroin is also increasing. Heroin and Mandrax are smuggled into Uganda mainly from the Indian sub-continent. Cocaine and Cannabis resin are brought in from South American countries and Sudan. The same report also indicated that heroin (originating from Pakistan) was the most abused drug in Kenya.

Urban crime is at a low rate in Ethiopia but visibly significant in Kenya. A 2006 World Bank Study indicated the pervasive insecurity felt by Nairobi residents. More than sixty per cent of households feel unsafe, with no gender differences.

More than a quarter (27 per cent) of households was involved in a criminal incident in the year before the study. This study also indicated that Kenyan businesses spend seven per cent of their sales revenue on security, including infrastructure and personnel; another four per cent on insuring property; and two per cent on neighbourhood security.

D. The growing threat of religious extremism: The 1990s saw a new wave by Salafi Jihadi militants, mainly AIAI, especially in Kenya. They established links with al-Qaeda to produce “a distinct puritanical theology and a potent political narrative” The impacts of this expansion are now being felt, as demonstrated in the fight to control the hierarchies of the Mejlis in countries such as Ethiopia. The 6.2 per cent Muslim population of Kenya has been exposed to various forms and strains of radical Islam in the past few decades. The most recent wave is supported, financially and also intellectually, by al-Shabaab. The same ICG report indicates that the help Kenya provided to the TFG of Somalia in attacking al-Shabaab’s strongholds seems to have further complicated the situation.

3. Cross-Border Economic Cooperation in the Region

Our discussion on the conflict environment of the Horn clarifies the regional dimension of the problem. There is a clear need to bring regional efforts together to address the dire need for security and stability in the region. Despite divergences in

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35 The supreme national religious authority for Islam religious affairs.
the perceived and actual interests, most states in the Horn attempt to establish some sort of cross-border framework. However, the cross-border economic cooperation is limited to minor trade between cross-border communities and mostly driven by the shared interest of managing local conflicts and the security of the border areas.

Inter-state trade is insignificant despite the agreements to increase it. For example, Ethiopia buys only 1.8 per cent of its total import from Sudan and only 0.4 per cent from Kenya and none from the other Horn of Africa countries. Its exports to Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya are 4.8 per cent, 3 per cent and 0.2 per cent respectively. Sudan buys only 3.1 per cent, 0.9 per cent and 0.8 per cent of its total imports from Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya respectively. Only 1.6 per cent of Sudan’s exports are directed to Ethiopia and none to the rest of the Horn of Africa countries. Kenya only has significant trading partnerships with Uganda and Tanzania, accounting for 47.5 per cent of its exports; Uganda only has significant trade with South Sudan (14.3 per cent) and Kenya (9.5 per cent), a total of 23.8 per cent of its exports reaching these two countries, and has none with the other Horn of Africa countries. There is no available data on Eritrea’s imports and exports. But, it is expected to be insignificant since Eritrea is far away from reaching any level of cooperation with its neighbours.

The key reason for low regional trade is directly related to the internal economies of the states: most of the export commodities are primary products, for example, coffee is the major export for Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. In a similar vein, horticultural products are major export commodities from the Horn, with Kenya and Ethiopia competing in the flower market and Uganda and Kenya competing in the tea market. The competition is not limited to the export market but also to imports of consumer items, capital goods, technology, and knowledge intensive products from the international market. The minimal internal value creation capacity is very much influenced by the low level of infrastructure and infrastructure connectivity, low technological development, little or no access to capital and weak governance, including a weak regulatory environment.

The lack of interdependency could be viewed as a cause, and also a consequence of the grave problems in the Horn of Africa. The weak interdependency could be discussed in terms of trade, infrastructure connectivity and weaknesses in the delivery of state services at their connecting points. Currently, there are a number of on-going energy grid system connectivity and marketing projects but their impact has yet to be seen.

In summary, although the region has a great potential for growth and development, it is currently defined by conflict systems that have contributed to the proliferation of human trafficking and all sorts of organized crime. Existing cross-border cooperation agreements are only limited to immediate borderland trade and security issues. There is very little infrastructure connectivity and the interdependency of the economies is weak as observed in the data provided on inter-state trade. Thus, managing cross-border cooperation leading to economic integration remains to be a key challenge to the peace and stability of the region.

**Moving Forward: Discussion and Conclusion**

Most states in the Horn of Africa claim to be in democratic transition, with the exception of Eritrea and Stateless Somalia. They also declare that the market economy is a guiding philosophy in relation to their economies. Despite these declarations, however, there are significant differences in norms and values. Sudan, for example, is not secular; Islam is the state religion. The countries are also at different levels of democratisation. The region also has a recent history of inter-state wars through direct and proxy wars. Therefore, it is clear that the norms and values of the states are divergent and represent an impediment to meaningful cooperation.

There is no balance of power between the member states. None of the states is strong enough to be a regional hegemon. Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya are each prominent in different dimensions of power but none of them is strong enough to achieve regional domination. As a result, states tend to maintain a high level of autonomy and remain slow in vigorously working for a viable degree of regional cooperation.

However, recently, there is a growing opportunity for limited regional economic integration in relation to the energy sector and there is also a growing political
pressure for the establishment of a regional body to manage the shared use of water resources in the region. Such collaboration could help to improve the mutual trust and confidence of the states and motivate them to seek peaceful coexistence and develop a peaceful neighbourhood through an expansion of interdependence.

Inconsistent supplies of energy as well as its high cost are major impediments to the industrialisation of the states in the Horn. There is a considerable disparity in their respective capacities and potential to provide cheap and sustainable energy. In 2009, the Union of African Electricity Producers, Distributors and Conveyors (UFDEA) reported that the average tariff of electricity in Ethiopia was $0.053/Kwh, making it the cheapest in the region when compared to $0.097/Kwh in Sudan, $0.12/Kwh in Kenya and $0.22/Kwh in Uganda. The electricity tariff in Djibouti is the highest in the world, along with that of Gabon.

Unlike other countries in the region, Ethiopia’s main potential source of energy is hydro-electric power, which makes costs cheaper than elsewhere. On the completion of the four major dams in three years’ time, Ethiopia is expected to have the capacity to produce over 10,000 MW. Most of the international rivers in the region begin their life in Ethiopia and the country has the potential to produce over 45,000 MW of hydroelectric power, making it the major potential in the hydropower industry in Africa.

Motivated by this potential, Ethiopia is seeking to develop a market for its energy exports and the neighbouring countries are, in turn, looking for cheaper energy sources. This convergence of interests has led Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan to enter into power purchase agreements with Ethiopia. As part of these agreements, power-grid connectivity projects have been launched and the Ethiopian grid system is now connected with Djibouti and Sudan, the one with Kenya being under construction. The bilateral nature of this type of cooperation will hopefully develop into some sort of supranational and regional mechanism, with the objective of regulating power generation and marketing in the region. Such a regime will not only provide reliable and cost effective energy, but will also promote peace by enhancing the interdependence of the states.

The management and sharing of the international water course, the Nile, is another

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39 UFDEA: Comparative Study of Electricity tariffs in Africa. (UFDEA commissioned study, 2009):7-8
crucial issue where regional cooperation is required. The waters of the Nile have an impact on ten countries of Eastern Africa. The sharing of the Nile water was traditionally governed by the agreement (signed in 1929) between Egypt and Britain, which represented Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika [now Tanzania] and Sudan (Tesfay, 2012:276). The treaty allocated all the water to Egypt and Sudan, leaving no share to any other riparian states. Egypt and an independent Sudan renewed this agreement in 1959.

Despite demands for an equitable use by upper riparian states, political tension around the issue was muted. Egypt’s military dominance, along with the civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, meant that the use of the water by the upper riparian states was negligible. But demands for a fairer share have resurfaced as population growth, frequent droughts and increased scarcity of resources have impacted on the economy (Tesfay, 2012:272). Negotiations over the previous ten years led to the Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement (NCFA), signed in May 2009 by most of the riparian states with Egypt and Sudan rejecting it. Furthermore, the Eastern Nile states of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have engaged in negotiations on the Grand Renaissance Dam over the Blue Nile River. The overall situation indicates that a time for a new regional regime on the use and management of the Nile water seems to have arrived.

The advent of such a cooperative regime would mean that the zero-sum game of lower riparian states engaging through proxies will get a win-win alternative. Once they secured a guarantee for their equitable share of the waters, the interest will be on how to increase the water volume through environmental rehabilitation and the reduction of waste through evaporation and other harmful practices. This will, therefore, be a motivation for the lower riparian states for a collaborative framework to jointly manage and resolve conflicts in the region.

The advent of a power production and marketing regime in the region will force the states to centre the peripheries as the grid systems will pass through and motivate them to address the human security needs of those communities. The upcoming of a regional regime to manage shared water resources will also bring the peripheries of the states into attention as many of them are settled around the river bank of the major basins and developing the water basins cannot be done without including the development of those communities.
Mechanisms to encourage regional cooperation, created as part of the IGAD, have the potential to serve as a platform for policy harmonisation and this is likely to impact on the synchronisation of values and norms. Technical and financial support from international organisations and development assistance partners can also play an important role in this regard. Such policy harmonisation is vital in managing the complex conflict systems of the region. For example, coordinating the policies on the control and management of small arms can mitigate vulnerability that may come as a result of a one-sided disarmament. Cattle rustling and subsequent conflict that may come out of destocking can also be mitigated through the harmonisation of programmes on animal health protection and drought mitigation.

African solutions for African problems means African-led initiatives owned and implemented by Africans. Africa, while designing its own approaches to address its problems, should learn not only from its own experience but also from that of others. The European long and incremental integration process is a useful model that provides important lessons for peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa. However, calling Africa to begin from where Europe is standing and advocating for zero tariff and free trade area in the absence of any shared and similar economic policies are impractical. The most practical way of promoting integration is to work on functional sectorial integration while working on policy harmonisation side by side.

Cooperation in the production and marketing of energy can serve the cause of peace without the need to directly engage in political negotiations. A regional agreement on the management and use of the Nile waters might also ease tensions among member states. These two developments could well contribute to building trust and confidence between the states. The IGAD platform could serve as a basis for policy dialogue eventually leading to a congruence of norms and values. The three parallel developments could provide a viable way of securing sustainable peace in the region.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has been to examine whether or not cross-border cooperation could represent a helpful approach in promoting the long-term peacebuilding process in the Horn of Africa. The paper has reviewed literature on the different approaches to peacebuilding between states. The defining feature
of the Horn of Africa in terms of cross-border peace has also been covered as part of the discussion. The paper has also covered the EU’s integration process and reviewed the genesis of the current level of European integration and the key enabling factors that have impacted the process. Further, it has investigated the Horn of Africa environment in terms of successful regional integration and suggested that the ongoing electric power generation and integration projects might represent a way forward in terms of long-term peacebuilding.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be concluded that the selective single use of any of the different approaches in the peacebuilding process is unlikely to produce effective peace. It is only if the approaches are used in a complementary fashion that they have the potential to produce the desired results. One can see that the best approach to regional integration in the circumstances of the Horn of Africa is the hybrid approach to integration. Indeed, Europe’s success was partly due to the use of the different approaches in a complementary way. The Horn of Africa might well learn from this experience and adopt something similar. It would do well to make use of IGAD as a platform for multilateral state level political negotiations while encouraging local-level initiatives in the border regions. Current energy integration projects should be encouraged and managed through a regional supranational mechanism that accommodates the interests of all the players while curbing the danger of states competing for domination.

This paper has focused on economic integration as a peace project and has not dwelt in any detail on the options for promoting state-to-state political negotiations through a regional platform. The following questions could possibly be addressed by future research initiatives: What are the driving forces that encourage states to be members of these regional organisations? Is the proliferation of regional organisations an asset or an obstacle to regional integration? What are the driving factors for states to become members of multiple regional communities?
References


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The Single European Act (SEA), 17 Feb, 1986.


AMISOM and African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security Challenges

Sabastiano Rwengabo

Abstract
The success of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) seems to vindicate emerging scholarly and policy optimism regarding Africa’s potential to solve its peace and security problems through Africa-centred responses. To explain this African-led intervention’s success—despite Africa’s apparent institutional and resource limitations and in the context of the 1992-93 US-led Operation Restore Hope’s failures—this desk-based inquiry underlines the commitment, shared values, and ownership that typify AMISOM. I advance an “African-Centred Solutions” (AfSol) perspective that is rooted in Afro-optimist analyses which, basing on Africa’s past dealings with foreign actors, argues that “borrowed fists” cannot solve [most of] Africa’s security problems. Evidently, unlike non-Africa-centred interventions, AMISOM relied on the AfSol approach whose pillars—genuine commitment, shared Pan-African values, and a sense of ownership—engendered its success by incentivising states to withstand the Mission’s costs and to tirelessly mobilise foreign support. Throughout, Africans incorporated and reflected AfSol principles, by: initiating the Mission-building upon IGAD’s efforts; persisting amidst the Mission’s human, resource, and politico-security costs; involving both local and foreign Somalis; and integrating disparate intervention programmes into a single, AU-sanctioned Mission. AMISOM’s success underscores the need to harness Africa’s potential to address its peace and security challenges.

Keywords: AfSol, AMISOM, IGAD

Introduction
This is an inquiry into the puzzling success of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peace support operation (PSO) initiated and led by African states and international organisations with apparent incapacity to succeed where more powerful western actors had failed. From its 1991 state collapse up to the deployment of AMISOM, Somalia had no stable functioning government. But after establishing AMISOM as “a peace enforcement mission mandated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations” (Nduwimana, 2013:3),
the Transitional Federal Government/Institution (TFG/I) was constituted and enabled to govern the country from 2008. With functioning TFIs, the parliament elected Somalia’s president more than once, and the “first permanent president” was elected in 2012 (Fisher, 2013) to lead the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Through steady engagement of the cessationist groups, support for the referendum, and technical endeavours, Somalia’s security forces, which had disintegrated, have been reconstituted and are undergoing training by AMISOM trainers (AU, 2014).

AMISOM restored peace and security, repulsing al-Shabaab from their strongholds. This pacification allowed Somali leaders to engage different stakeholders over the conflict. AMISOM forces sustained a military presence and undertook counter-radicalisation programmes (AU, 2014). These achievements are slowly restoring Somalia’s state sovereignty (Fisher, 2013). No previous intervention registered these successes, a reason why radical groups like al-Shabaab became strong. Progressive politico-security sanity returned to Somalia only after the AMISOM. Why? To explain this phenomenon, this desk research maintains that AMISOM’s “African-Centred Solutions” (AfSol) approach to the Somali question engendered the observed success by creating incentives for withstanding capacity limitations, persistence amidst the mission’s mounting costs, and integration of hitherto disparate intervention efforts into a single, more effortful, Africa-sanctioned, Mission. This puzzling phenomenon is demonstrable.

The Puzzle of AMISOM’s Success

AMISOM’s achievements are puzzling because initial expectations that African states and organisations could succeed where more powerful actors had failed were dismal. UN and US interventions during the 1990s, “exacerbated rather than mitigated the problems, let alone solve them” (Moller, 2009:i; Menkhaus, 2007). Ethiopian intervention, December 2006-January 2009, also “produced utter chaos and a severe humanitarian crisis” after which Islamist extremists established control over Somalia. Moreover, the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), “was unable to deploy successfully” mainly because it lacked funding: the neutrality of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) was questionable as most of the potential TCCs neighboured Somalia. IGASOM “was also seen as a US-backed western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement” (Nduwimana, 2013:11). These failures made it appear as though Somalia had crossed the Rubicon Point
of politico-security rescue, thereby diminishing regional and continental hopes in AMISOM.

Nevertheless, AMISOM’s successes seem to underscore Africa’s hitherto underrated capability while re-echoing pan-African conviction that an AfSol approach can reliably solve Africa’s peace and security problems (Touray, 2005). A major 1990s foreign-intervention failure in Somalia was the US-led, UN-sanctioned, multinational United Taskforce (UNTAF) which followed a UN Humanitarian and Ceasefire Monitoring Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-I) that ended in December 1992. The UNTAF, a US-led Mission codenamed “Operation Restore Hope”, lasted till 4 May 1993, failing from an “alien place lacking civil order and legitimate political institutions” (Crocker, 1995:2). The UNTAF’s successor, UNOSOM-II, also wound up in 1995, leaving Somalia ungoverned (Clarke, 1997). These intervention botches climaxed with US distancing itself from African conflicts: “the Clinton administration’s refusal to respond to the genocide in Rwanda…” (Clarke and Herbst, 1996: 70) signalled to Africa that western ‘fatigue’ left Africa to fend for itself. Somalia progressively worsened: by 2007 AMISOM-related pessimism was judicious because Africa lacked UNTAF’s capabilities; the west was half-hearted about Somalia due to “Western military overstretch, advice that external intervention was likely to be treated as hostile by several armed groups, and the absence of a clear pathway from large-scale military intervention to exit and sustainable Peace” (Bellamy, 2011:6; Moller, 2009).

Further to western withdrawal, initial AU response itself was dismal, making Somalia difficult to salvage for four reasons: first, IGASOM was discussed between 2002 and 2004 but by 2006 it had not deployed because of disagreements between the AU and IGAD on one hand, and with the UN on the other; fragmented role of regional organisations; funding limitations; the UN’s failure to lift the 1992 arms embargo on Somalia; and other limiting factors internal to Africa (Mays, 2009: 3-17). Second, only Uganda and Burundi contributed troops while more powerful countries like South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria looked on. Third, Somalia’s conflict had become structural and uninviting: By 2002 the UN was pessimistic as Kofi Annan stated that “Somalia was still too dangerous for the [UN peacebuilding] Mission to deploy” (Page 2003:186). Groups like al-Shabaab reportedly hobnobbed with the fearsome al-Qaeda, thus fusing Somalia’s crisis with global terrorism that seemingly defies Africa’s potential. Fourth, AMISOM personnel were caught in a “complex insurgency of clan and Islamist opposition” which had been “the
culmination of a series of political miscalculations and misjudgements on the part of Somali and external actors since 2004” (Menkhaus, 2007: 357). Amidst this “humanitarian catastrophe” (ibid), AMISOM initially seemed “unable to bring peace”, deployed “only 6,000 of its mandated 8,000 troops”, and became “a party to the conflict” (Bellamy: 6). AMISOM’s failure appeared more imminent than its future reality proved to be. The game-changer in AMISOM, however, was the determinate desire on the part of the now frustrated African actors mainly in IGAD to rely on an Africa-centred response to the Somali crisis. This resolve is expressed in Resolution 2073 of the AU Peace and Security Council (AU, 2007).

AMISOM, “the only peace operation launched under AU command and control” and the “biggest and most complex peace operation ever conducted by the AU” (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 2), initially faced limitations of troop commitment, suffered many personnel losses (ibid : 3), and exposed the AU’s material, financial, and bureaucratic limitations. Nevertheless, the mission has scored military, political, and state-building successes. A multi-pronged criterion can be used to demonstrate this success: First, AMISOM has engaged key stakeholders on possible solutions to the conflict, thereby bringing different factions to negotiating table. Second, AMISOM helped restore minimum political-governance structures, instituting the Federal Government as a permanent central-state authority in 2012, replacing the TFG. Security was restored for government officials, humanitarian service-providers, and people (Segui 2013). Effective engagement of the UN led to supportive UN Security Council resolutions (Table 2) extending AMISOM’s mandates and enhancing its international support (AU, 2012 and 2014). Third, AMISOM engineered state restoration processes by training Somalia’s security forces mainly from Jazeera Training Center, undertaking police training, extension of state authority via confidence-building, providing political goods (AU, 2014), and facilitating negotiations between competing groups. Finally, al-Shabaab’s military advances of 2005-2012 were reversed through Operation Indian Ocean, Operation Eagle, Battles of Gashandiga, Mogadishu, Kismayo, Elwark, and others (Mooulid, 2011; AU, 2012 and 2014). By 2012 AMISOM was very promising despite expectations to the contrary, because African actors, under AMISOM, had overcome the previously fragmented approach (Mays 2009) and put the whole Mission under the AU; effectively engaged the international community (Fisher, 2012); and exhibited persistence amidst the initial challenges they encountered in Somalia. Consequently, “The overall political developments in Somalia
remain encouraging, with evidence of progress in the State formation process, constitutional review, and preparations for elections by 2016” (AU, 2014:2). Considering Somalia’s condition before the operation, previous failures between 1992 and 2006, and the initial challenges of AMISOM, these successes are puzzling.

Explaining the above puzzle contributes vitally to understanding and managing Somalia’s and Africa’s peace and security challenges. Such an effort underscores AMISOM’s key ingredient which previous interventions lacked; stresses AfSol’s potentialities in addressing Africa’s security issues; rekindles Africa’s need to trust in and develop its peace and security potential; and builds on other Africa-centred successes especially in West Africa (Draman and Carment, 2001). Possible explanations for AMISOM’s successes may include: the foreign support thesis; intervening states’ selfish interests (Fisher, 2012; de Waal, 2009); and the war-state-making thesis (Tilly, 1990). These explanations are, however, inadequate for they cannot methodologically and empirically link past failures in Somalia to AMISOM’s successes. I will analyse these viewpoints before stressing the AfSol approach. Caveat: saying that AMISOM succeeded by no means implies that Somalia’s insecurity has been erased quite the contrary (Anderson and McKnight, 2014). “Success” is herein measured based on a multi-pronged criterion stressing the failure of previous interventions mainly, Operation Restore Hope and IGASOM; AMISOM’s achievements vis-à-vis pre-AMISOM politico-security and humanitarian conditions; restoration of the state; and comparison with equally successful PSOs in Africa, particularly in West Africa where regional intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone rescued states from collapse (Pitts, 1999; Draman and Carment, 2001). While AMISOM, unlike ECOMOG, found an already-collapsed Somali state, “ECOMOG’s efforts in Liberia have helped the region as a whole” by providing “a rapid but positive learning experience for the peacekeeping nations of West Africa, improved regional stability, and an emerging regionally-based conflict management capacity” (Draman and Carment, 2001:iii). AMISOM’s successes, while not an end to Somalia’s deep-seated politico-security challenges, constitute building blocks upon which Somalia will be rebuilt.

The rest of the chapter begins with conceptual and methodological issues, by, first, outlining research methods, and then conceptualizing AfSol. The empirical section focuses on AfSol and AMISOM’s successes. It begins with an outline of the background to AMISOM, its initial setbacks, its fatalities, and demonstrates the
relationship between each of AfSol principles and AMISOM’s success. Thereafter, I outline potential counter-arguments, and the implications of AMISOM’s successes for the AfSol approach. The conclusion sums up the main arguments and makes research and policy recommendations.

Conceptual and Methodological Issues

The analysis employs desk research. The main data sources are IGAD, AU, UN, and states’ official documents, speeches and reports by public authorities, and scholarly/research publications on AMISOM. I synthesise these data into evidence of AfSol, my independent variable, and categorise the data along AfSol’s pillars. An empirical and more in-depth inquiry would have offered more rigour. However, I reveal that AMISOM remains work in progress and so do futuristic studies related to it: this is not an evaluation of AMISOM but an inquiry into the relationship between AfSol and AMISOM’s achievements.

The chapter reveals that AMISOM’s successes, 2007-2015, result from the “AfSol” approach used in the Mission. To say that AMISOM’s successes result from the AfSol approach is to indicate that they were rooted in Africa-centredness unlike previous futile interventions (Moller, 2009). I appreciate possible concerns regarding the conceptual, methodological, even empirical, basis of the AfSol approach, as well as states’ and foreigners’ interests in PSOs. Yet, the AfSol’s conceptual clarity remains work-in-progress (IPSS, 2014). While conceptualisation is key to social sciences (Sartori, 1970), specifying AfSol’s measurable indicators–beyond its pillars herein used–requires more work and time. Using AfSol’s pillars as its indicators tentatively solves this conceptualisation problem. The tenability of “Africa-centred solutions”, which are devoid of foreign control/direction, seems challenging for a developing-world politico-economic space. Which approach(es) fit(s) AfSol and is(are) generalisable across cases and experiences eludes determination. While reconciling states’ and foreigners’ interests and AfSol requires more work, I need say that interest convergence informs international politics. At least “African states benefit in specific ways from being seen to contribute to ‘African solutions to African problems’” (Beswick, 2010:739). This indicates minimum convergence of interests as happened during the 1960s in the creation of the OAU/AU (Tieku, 2004).

Second, “a single template for intervention, could produce dangerous over-
simplification” (Cliffe and Luckman, 1999: 29); AfSol by no means makes a one-size-fits-all remedy. Instead, it stresses learning from other experiences and relying on African solutions to avoid a misreading of African contexts that bedevilled Africa during the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, UNTAF (Cliffe and Luckman, 1999), and Libya. Finally, the AfSol approach utilises “crucial cases” (Gerring, 2007) that exhibit Africa-centred success to draw reliable conclusions, a key element in my conceptualisation.

Conceptualising AfSol

The AfSol approach builds on Afro-optimist viewpoints which stress Africa’s potential to best understand and manage African affairs. The approach is rooted in the works of earlier pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah, and contemporary Afro-optimists like Omar Touray (Touray, 2005). Kwame Nkrumah, for instance, argues that once Africa unites politically and economically, it will secure a niche in a competitive world and survive neo-colonialism (Nkrumah, 1963). Such unity, he proposes, should include “a common defence system with a single military high command” as a means to security self-reliance (Touray, 2005:637). Nkrumah’s call sowed seeds of present-day security cooperation evidenced in the Common African Defence and Security Policy (Vines, 2013; Touray, 2005; AU, 2002). Thus, AfSol combines idealism, realism, and political pragmatism that foreground Africa-initiated solutions. It stresses Africa-centredness, which arose from three sources: historical exploitation–slave trade, colonialism–which evoked a realisation that Africa must unite and determine its politico-security and socio-economic destiny to escape perpetual exploitation and marginalisation (Nkrumah, 1963); Cold War apathy to Africa’s insecurity that “brought home to African leaders the imperatives of self-reliance and allowed them for the first time to see sufficient gains in collective security” (Touray, 2005: 637); and experiences like US withdrawal from Somalia, Rwanda’s 1994 “betrayal” (Melvern, 2009), and inadequate response to the crisis in Darfur. These lessons forced Africa to strive for self-reliance, including considering a shift from non-intervention to non-indifference policy (Bah, 2009:2 69-71; Williams, 2007). This desire for self-reliance sowed AfSol’s seeds.

AfSol stresses that Africans should assist one another, instead of relying on “borrowed fists” (IPSS, 2014) to solve Africa’s peace and security problems. Foreign assistance should supplement African initiatives since foreign interventions can be misguided, detached from reality, lack genuine commitment, or be driven
by interests that hardly benefit Africa (Touray, 2005). AfSol involves three key pillars: commitment; shared values; and ownership. These pillars, combined, led to “AMISOM successes” evidenced in: (i) the pacification of the country and consequent restoration of peace and security for most parts of Somalia, (ii) restoration of governance structures evidenced in the presidency and parliament, and (iii) restoration and facilitation of state building processes through training Somalia’s military and police forces.

Figure 1: AfSol and AMISOM’s Successes

The main mechanisms through which AfSol led to AMISOM’s successes (Fig. 1) are: incentives and persistence. Incentives may be difficult to measure, but proximate evidence consists in the expressed desire to intervene and “remain seized of the matter.” Persistence is traceable from withstanding a costly intervention, engaging the international community for resource and institutional support, involvement of non-military aspects of the intervention, and state building endeavours. One may empirically argue that changed thinking at the AU, from non-intervention to non-indifference; AMISOM’s peace-enforcement and achievable mandates, which previous interventions lacked; and its political, reconciliatory, stabilisation, protection, and state building approaches explain AMISOM successes (Nduwimana, 2013). These factors fall within the AfSol because it was not impossible for interventions like Operation Restore Hope to acquire peace-enforcement mandates except that it was controlled by different actors with non-African interests. It took changed thinking at the AU, that African peace and security problems require African solutions, which engendered relevant diplomatic engagements leading to success. AfSol principles incentivised states to withstand resource and capacity limitations that would have stifled the Mission. It also sustained resource-mobilisation momentum in and beyond Africa to

- Africans develop the capacity (institutional, resource, politico-diplomatic, techno-scientific) to identify, examine, and originate solutions to Africa’s peace and security problem(s) through consultations, investigations, experience sharing, and strategic analysis

- Africans rediscover—and adapt—relevant indigenous or traditional conflict-resolution measures to Africa’s different post-modern peace and security challenges

- Africans mobilise and utilise resources, technology, and knowledge, to solve peace and security problems, seeking needful foreign assistance, but assuming central responsibility and accountability for these solutions.

- Africans avoid over-reliance on foreigner-imposed solutions/decisions to design and implement security solutions—hence collaboration with, not dependence on, foreigners.

- Convergence of states’ interests and political will to address insecurity. Not that states’ interests cannot conflict but that a mechanism for securing minimum interest convergence is developed to solve peace and security problems.42

Pan-African self-help is central to AfSol ideals and practice. Common values and beliefs in Africans’ shared destiny overtake selfish interests. Not to say all values are anti-conflict, or that rational self-interest is inherently conflict-generating, but that some value-systems and practices may be used to discourage violent conflicts. Accordingly, AfSol IS NOT:

- Afro-separatism or Afro-self-isolation—Africa’s desire, even attempt, to delink itself from the world when solving our peace and security problems—as though living in autarchy

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42 Example: Rwanda and Uganda, with security interests in DRC, did not contribute troops for the Neutral Intervention Force under the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region. However, they agree with other Regional States that insecurity in the DRC should end through, inter alia, neutralising “negative forces” there.
• Ideational, ideological, or politico-diplomatic rejection of interdependence with the wider world, ideas, or values that can help Africa. Interdependence inheres in human relations. AfSol stresses mutual interdependence and respect amidst Africa-centred security efforts.

• Finally, AfSol does not contradict—but reflects, foregrounds, underscores, operationalises, and augments—pan-Africanism. This is achieved by tackling security hindrances to pan-African desires like African unity, peace and security, socio-economic and techno-scientific progress, and respect for the African person.

The foregoing specification of what AfSol is and is not can be summed up into three pillars—commitment, ownership, and shared values (Fig. 1) – which can be measured and tested by examining how and why, together, they impact specific African peace and security interventions.

Table 1: Conceptual/Measurable Indicators of AfSol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AfSol Pillar/Indicator</th>
<th>Clarification</th>
<th>Testable Evidence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Responsibility for each other and for Africa’s P&amp;S problems</td>
<td>Public statements promising response to the P&amp;S problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guarantee of unconditional involvement</td>
<td>Finding <em>common ground</em> for unity of purpose and action – institutional commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant choices/decisions/actions that validate/evaluate P&amp;S achievements and limitations.</td>
<td>State and institutional commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Proactive readiness to take central responsibility</td>
<td><em>Africans-initiated</em> solutions that show inclusiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claim over moral and legitimate reason to be involved</td>
<td><em>African-controlled</em> processes, and finance ownership/contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claim to share pain with affected societies</td>
<td><em>Africans-defended</em> choices and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Values</td>
<td>Regional and Continental Principles</td>
<td>Evoking shared ideals and principles like Pan-African brotherhood, self-reliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-cultural and ideational commonalities</td>
<td>Readiness to sacrifice for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reference to shared historical experiences</td>
<td>Interests’ convergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reference to common ideas and principles</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 outlines AfSol as a conceptual category with its pillars as measurable indicators. In multi-actor environs, Commitment implies actors’ willingness,
indicated by their promises, their decisions, and their actions. This includes readiness to sacrifice for and liberate troubled states, followed by resolute involvement in the mission regardless of costs. Evidence of this readiness includes joint efforts at organisational level, showing institutional commitment at the AU and IGAD levels; states’ engagement of one another to undertake the Mission (Fisher 2012); and consistency in Mission-related choices and actions shown in actual deployment of troops. Commitment also involves promises to respond to the problem whether or not that problem affects the actor directly or indirectly. In security affairs, when actors show willingness to address others’ security problems, the former are committed (Table 1). When states address issues in a joint institutional environment, they show institutional commitment.

Commitment problems may arise when rational actors think they might benefit from non-cooperative behaviour in future (Powell, 2006). This requires guarantees of unconditional involvement that signify commitment. Such guarantees may be made through interstate bargains or negotiations that generally typify international security-cooperation agenda setting (Rwengabo, 2014). Finally, actors’ consistent choices and actions on a specific issue indicate commitment. States which consistently help other troubled states over time are committed to this cause. Official assertions expressing the need to help insecurity-afflicted states, decisions that follow pronouncements, and their actual execution demonstrate commitment. Rhetoric or pronouncements differ from action—but rhetoric plus action equals commitment. We need evidence that states expressed willingness, made relevant decisions, and actually intervened, unilaterally or in concert with others, in Somalia. States should then own the Mission.

Ownership entails readiness to take central responsibility, when action is required, in pursuing the common good. This includes claim over moral and legitimate justification for one’s involvement; and claim to share pain with affected societies. While actors’ selfish involvement may be cloaked in legitimising rhetoric, the degree of involvement and costs withstood measure ownership. States need not hide their real, legitimate interests whenever these interests are at stake (Rice, 2000) as happened in Somalia and Kenya. But the degree of involvement is seen in inclusiveness - is a state ready to get involved beyond unilateral participation? The inclusiveness of African initiatives, African-controlled processes, and African-defended choices can be seen in states’ wiliness to sacrifice unilateral measures
at the altar of joint interventions. When Africans initiated AMISOM, hitherto disjointed interventions became joint (Fisher, 2012). Evidence of ownership includes the inclusiveness of the initiative: AMISOM involved as many interested African parties as possible. It also includes African-controlled processes: Africans arrogated to African actors decisional and operational control over AMISOM. Ownership, finally, is seen in African-defended choices: state and organisational standpoints on AMISOM are evident.

Critiques may argue that AMISOM is foreign-funded, hence not Africa-owned. The AU has funding limitations. These challenges forced Africa to seek outside funding for AMISOM. For instance, following IGASOM’s failure to take off following its authorisation by the AU PSC (AU, 2005, PSC/PR(XXIX)), the IGAD authorised its then Chairperson, Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni, to solicit external funding: “IGAD turned to the European Union and dispatched officials to Scandinavian countries, Italy, and the Arab League for assistance” (Mays, 2009:8-9), leading to subsequent EU funding (Vines, 2011: 279-280). Is AMISOM ‘co-owned’ due to foreign funding? I argue that donors did not fund an inexistent initiative. Instead, I consider such funding “support for” and not “foreign ownership of” the Mission, which reflects AfSol’s notion of interdependence. Self-reliance is not inimical to interdependence.

Shared Values are principles that are common to all or most actors within the system. Commonalities like belonging to Africa and pan-Africanism are examples43, but their reflection in Africa’s instruments makes them shared by IGAD and AU member states. Shared values are rooted in historical experience, like slavery and colonialism, identity, geographical contiguity, and convergence of ideologies and interests (IPSS, 2014). Reference to shared experiences reflects and even propagates shared values. Reference to common ideas and principles like democratic freedom, human rights, pan-Africanism, and Ubuntu signifies shared values. Evidence of shared values includes the extent to which actors evoke shared ideals and principles like African brotherhood, solidarity, tolerance or collective security in dealing with one another; actors’ readiness to sacrifice for those values; and convergence of actors’ interests—that is, subjecting selfish interests to common pursuits–on the issue. While interests may converge among actors without shared values, interests converge more easily and differences are easily resolved between

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43 Consider liberal democratic values in some western societies, Confucian values in some Asian societies, or Weber’s “protestant ethic” in west-European capitalist societies.
actors sharing common values and identity (Bially-Mattern, 2001). This affinity eases dealings with one another, neutralises conflicting interests, and minimises tensions where actors’ interests clash (ibid). This is the basis of the principle-and-procedure value system.

The Principle and Procedure-based shared value system stresses international principles, such as respect for state sovereignty concurrent with cooperative security. Examples include the maintenance of peace and security through “effective collective measures” as espoused in the UN principles, and delegation of the UN’s security-promoting responsibility to regional-international organisations (ROs) (UN, 1945, Ch. VIII) in recognition of regional specificity. This regionalism vindicates the relevance of Pan-African values that inform such AU principles as “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly with respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2000, Art 4(h)); and “promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union” (Art 4(k)). The procedure by which these principles are operationalised is reflected in the AU’s peace and security instruments (AU, 2002a and b), as well as the practical shift from non-intervention to non-indifference (Touray, 2005; Williams, 2007; Bah, 2009; Vines 2013). Other procedures include cooperation between the AU, UN and Africa’s ROs. Thus, pan-African solidarity and the principle of “promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union” informed AMISOM.

The forgoing principles reflect African states’ belief in interconnections, shared historical experiences like slave trade, colonialism, and post-colonial marginalisation (IPSS, 2014); and Africa’s common peace and security destiny. Evidence of shared values consists in actors evoking shared ideals/principles, like African brotherhood, solidarity, tolerance or collective security, in dealing with one another; actors’ readiness to sacrifice for those values; and convergence of actors’ otherwise disparate interests on the issue in reflection of AU principles. African states’ did express desire to solve a problem they considered to be “closer to home”, hence ideationally enmeshing themselves in a common destiny (Fisher, 2012).

The AfSol approach, fusing these pillars, created incentives for African states to endure the mission’s costs and circumvent their capacity limitations in order to sacrifice for Somalia: “You would be shocked to learn that, maybe, it is up to 3,000
AMISOM soldiers that have been killed during these years when AMISOM has been there. Uganda and Burundi have paid a tremendous price” (UN, 2013). AfSol allowed African actors to consistently mobilise resources, and to steadily fight on despite human, political-security, and resource costs. One need not demonstrate these mechanisms beyond showing how AfSol naturally led to AMISOM’s success.

**AfSol and AMISOM’s Successes**

In this section I demonstrate why and how AfSol led to AMISOM’s successes. After a brief background to AMISOM, I outline the operation’s initial challenges to be followed by the examination of the relationship between AfSol and AMISOM’s successes. This analysis is important because Somalia’s insecurity which had defied UNOSOM-I, UNIFAF, UNOSOM-II, IGAD’s reconciliation efforts, and IGASOM had surprisingly given way to established state authority in Somalia by 2014 (AU, 2014). These developments are attributed to AMISOM.

**Background to AMISOM**

Somalia’s state collapse in 1991 engendered insecurity and a humanitarian crisis which progressively alarmed the international community. By 2005, this insecurity threatened regional and international security while attempts, since 1992, to fill the politico-security void had been fruitless. Lengthy diplomatic engagements, among and between African actors and the rest of the international community, and background intelligence not worth detailing here, resulted in a decision in which the AUPSC created AMISOM on 19 January 2007. On 21 February 2007, the UNSC (Res. 1744) approved AMISOM with a 6-month mandate to support Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), build Somali security structures, and support the war against al-Shabaab. Ever since, the UNSC has passed several resolutions extending AMISOM’s mandate (Table 2).

Unlike other troubled African states which retained minimum authoritative control over their governance domains amidst ongoing armed conflicts, political instabilities, personal rule, and coup d’état (Roessler, 2011), Somalia’s state collapse of the 1990s exemplifies “complex political emergencies” (CPEs) (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999). This approach is useful for it reveals that in CPEs, state failure and total breakdown of politico-security order are visible, as happened during the

---

44 Most fragile African countries faced armed conflicts, coups, and other instabilities but remained functioning during the 1990s, including: Uganda, Zaire/DRC, Rwanda-Burundi, Nigeria, and others.
1994 Rwanda genocide, the Sudan-Darfur crisis, and the 1990s Liberia instability. The Somali crisis is rooted in post-Cold War western relegation of Somalia, a country which initially received Soviet support amidst political conflicts that led to President Abdirashid Shermarke’s assassination in October 1969, followed by Maxamed Siyaad Barre’s coup d’état of 1969. Barre declared “Scientific Socialism” in Somalia, thus aligning with the East, but fell to armed opposition in 1991 (which had started in 1988) coincident with the “Fall of the Berlin Wall”, a major incident in Cold War politics in which most developing-world states had been ensnared. This state collapse bred ethno-political violence between armed clan-based fighting groups that ushered in Somalia’s prolonged anarchy (Clarke and Herbst, 1996).

The version of ethno-politics that typified clan conflicts in Somalia was unique in that it involved intra-ethnic infighting between ethnic Somalis. These armed clan antagonisms were so acute that by 1992 the country had been torn apart, plunged into anarchy, with attendant ineffable human/civilian suffering. Somalia became a route for illicit small arms and light weapons (SALWs), transnational contraband, a piracy stronghold, and a terrorism safe haven. The resulting insecurity alarmed the international community, which issued an arms embargo on Somalia (UN 1992). In response to this anarchy and civilian suffering, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992, which created the Unified Task Force (UNTAF) with responsibility to provide relief/food protection services.

Famed “Operation Restore Hope” (December 1992-May 1993), UNTAF had around 28,000 American troops out of about 38,000 from more than 20 countries (Perito, 2008). During the 3-4 October 1992 “First Battle of Mogadishu”, Somali mobs (reportedly supporting warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid, whom the US pursued ostensibly on grounds that he defied the disarmament of clan fighters) dragged Staff Sgt. William Cleveland’s body through Mogadishu streets. This alarmed the US whose soldiers killed hundreds of Somali civilians and militiamen while suffering 18 killed and about 70 wounded (Dauber, 2001a and b): “News of the causalities and images of gleeful Somalis abusing American corpses prompted revulsion and outrage at home, embarrassment at the White House, and such vehement objections in Congress that the mission against Aidid was immediately called off” as the US public demanded withdrawal (Bowden, 1999: 333). Bill Clinton, then US president, ordered withdrawal of US forces, ending UNTAF. As US forces withdrew, General Robert B Johnston turned over command to General Çevik Bir of Turkey as UNTAF became UNOSOM-II (Clinton, 1993). These other
foreign forces under UNOSOM-II also withdrew in 1995. UNTAF had reflected biases in disarming clans and neglected Somalia’s intricate clan politics that required prior political engagement. Boutros-Boutros Ghali himself had apparently preferred a military approach and evoked Chapter VII of the UN following the apparent failure of diplomatic efforts (Sorbo, 1997), but the military solution was not sustained long enough to fruition due to limited commitment and lack of a sense of ownership for the problem at hand. The withdrawal of foreign missions without providing alternatives left Somalia in a political-security abyss.

In 2002, African actors under IGAD undertook reconciliation efforts. IGAD established TFIs which lasted 2004-2012. The endeavour, however, did not prevent the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), “an Islamist coalition of moderates and extremists”, from extending its control over south-central Somalia. By 2006 Somalia was down the abyss of statelessness. Meanwhile, the UIC’s offshoot, Harakat al-Shabaab, quickly gained prominence due to its claimed links with al-Qaeda (Fisher, 2012: 416). Africa could not stand by and watch ungoverned/ungovernable Somalia engender insecurity for its neighbours. Following the IGASOM’s futile attempts to replace Ethiopian forces then defending Mogadishu, the AU realised the need for wider and deeper African involvement especially after the UN failed to take responsibility for the mission (Segui, 2013). The AU Peace and Security Council made “decisions on the deployment of a peace support mission in Somalia” (AUPSC, 2007: 2). The final resolution creating AMISOM was passed on 19 January 2007 and on 21 February 2007, the UNSC (Res. 1744) authorised the deployment of AMISOM forces. Though the UNSC passed supportive resolutions, central to AMISOM are African states and ROs (Bruton and Williams, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNSC Resolutions</th>
<th>Key decisions and links</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2177 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at UNSC’s 7268th meeting, 28 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2167 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at 7228th meeting, 28 July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2158 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at 7188th meeting, 29 May 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2142 (2014)</td>
<td>Adopted at 7127th meeting, 5 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2125 (2013), 18th November 2013</td>
<td>Adopted at 7061st meeting, 18 November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2124 (2013), 12th November 2013</td>
<td>UNSC Extends AMISOM Mandate. Requests Increase in Troop Strength</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date (Year)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2111 (2013), 24th July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2102 (2013), 2nd May 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2093 (2013), 6th March 2013</td>
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<td>Resolution 2077 (2012), 21st November 2012</td>
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<td>Resolution 2073, 7th November 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2072 (2012), 31st October 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2067 (2012) adopted by the SC on 18th September 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2060 (2012) adopted by the SC on 25th July 2012</td>
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<td>Resolution 2036 (2012), 22nd February 2012.</td>
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<td>Resolution 2010 (2011), 30th September 2011.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 1976 (2011), on 11th April 2011.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 1964</td>
<td>adopted by the SC on 22nd December 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1950, 23rd November 2010.</td>
<td>Condemned piracy off Somali coast and called for ROs and states to assist the TFG in tackling the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1918, 27th April 2010.</td>
<td>Resolved that failure to prosecute suspected pirates was undermining the international community’s efforts in tackling the vice. Member states called upon to criminalize piracy under their domestic laws and to consider prosecuting suspected pirates apprehended off Somalia’s coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1916, 19th March 2010.</td>
<td>Extension of the MGoSE’s Mandate. Mandate also expanded to investigate transport routes used in the violation of Eritrea and Somalia arms embargoes, and economic activities generating funds for its violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1897, 30th November 2009.</td>
<td>Condemned acts of piracy off Somalia’s coast and called upon ROs and member states to support the war against piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1872, 26th May 2009.</td>
<td>Called upon all Somali parties to support the Djibouti Peace Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1863, 9th July 2009.</td>
<td>Renewal of AMISOM’s mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1851, 16th December 2008.</td>
<td>Authorized the use of force to condemn piracy off Somalia’s coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1846, 2nd December 2008.</td>
<td>Authorized states and other regional bodies/ROs assisting the FTG to enter into Somali territorial waters and combat piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1844, 20th November 2008.</td>
<td>Called upon states to prevent individuals threatening Somalia’s FTG and AMISOM from entering into or transiting their territories. Member states would freeze economic resources or assets controlled by these individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1838, 7th October 2008.</td>
<td>Called upon countries to deploy naval vessels off Somali coast, and fight piracy by all means necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1831 adopted by the SC on 19th August 2008.</td>
<td>Renewal of AMISOM’s mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 1816, 2nd June 2008.</td>
<td>Authorized willing states and ROs to join forces with the FTG and combat piracy and armed robbery incidences off the Somali coast.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 reveals supportive UNSC resolutions that show institutional commitment at the UN level, which legitimised AMISOM’s continuity. These resolutions followed African engagement that started with African states, IGAD and the AU (Fisher, 2012; AUPSC, 2007), for the UN’s involvement had been fruitless during the 1990s and Somalia was considered “too dangerous” for western intervention (Page 2003:186). Contrary to claims that western donors feared the UIC/al-Shabaab’s increasing influence, they lobbied IGAD and the AU with promises of training, military equipment, and technical assistance if Africans intervened in Somalia (Fisher, 2012: 416-7); IGAD had masterminded the TFG’s formation while the UNSC only came in to approve of the AUPSC decision of 2007. Hence, African agency, which is central to AfSol, informed initiatives that metamorphosed into AMISOM. Countries contributed troops and progressively augmented the efforts of Ugandan-Burundian troops.

| Resolution 1814, 15th May 2008. | Resolved that United Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and Somalia UN country team would continue supporting the peace process. Called for enhanced support for TFI’s, aimed at developing a constitution and paving way for elections in 2009. |
| Resolution 1811, 29th April 2008 | Extension of the MGoSE’s mandate by six months. |
| Resolution 1801, 29th February 2008. | Extension of AMISOM’s mandate by six months. AMISOM authorized to take necessary measures aimed at providing security to key infrastructures. |
| Resolution 1772, 20th August 2007. | Extension of AMISOM’s mandate by six months. UNSC also agreed to take action against parties threatening AMISOM, the FTG, and the Somali peace process. |
| Resolution 1766, 23rd July 2007. | Extension of MGoSE’s mandate, tasked with enforcing an arms embargo on Somalia. |
| Resolution 1744, 20th February 2007. | Authorized establishment of AMISOM within six months, tasked with protecting the TFG. Enforcement of an arms embargo on Somalia. |
Figure 2: AMISOM Troop Contributions, 2007-2014


Figure 2 shows states’ troop contributions since 2007. It reveals that initially, Uganda and Burundi took the mantle of the initial 6,000 troops that deployed in Somalia. This was a much smaller number than the task at hand required. However, as progress started to become visible over time, more states contributed troops. Kenya also joined AMISOM in 2012. This is not to say that AMISOM did not face initial setbacks.

**AMISOM’s Initial Setbacks**

Besides the earlier IGASOM’s failures and the reluctance of African states to contribute troops to supplement Uganda’s and Burundi’s initial contributions, AMISOM faced considerable setbacks beyond its involvement in counter-insurgency operations (Bruton and Williams, 2014). First, by 2009 AMISOM had had limited impact in Somalia as its deputy force commander was killed in a suicide bombing in September 2009, bringing AMISOM fatalities by then to 60. Initial budgetary constraints were haunting AMISOM. Western interest had waned; only did the EU Council, on 23rd April 2007, and with encouragement from the US, amended its joint action on AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to include a
military support element to assist AMISOM (Vines, 2011:279). Second, though the number of fatalities is difficult to arrive by, partly because TCCs were unwilling to release actual figures of battle- and operation-related deaths ((Bruton and Williams, 2014), “AMISOM became one of the world’s most dangerous peace operations. Measured by the number of fatalities per peacekeeper deployed, AMISOM is probably the most deadly peace operation ever conducted in Africa” (Williams, 2015): Williams estimates that more than 4,000 troops died. In 2013, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, in a press conference, estimated up to 3,000 AMISOM soldiers killed (UN, 2013a), but the UN withdrew this number the following day (UN, 2013b). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), a reasonably reputed source, estimates 13,384 battle-related fatalities involving all parties to Somali’s conflict (Melander, 2015). The Armed Conflict Event and Location Data Project (ACLED) recorded 3,485 AMISOM-related fatalities between 2007 and 2014 (see Raleigh, et al., 2010). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that between 1st January 2009 and 31st December 2013, AMISOM suffered 1,039 fatalities: 200 in 2009; 300 in 2010, 94 in 2011; 384 in 2012; 261 in 2013, and 69 in 2014, bringing the total to about 1,108 (Williams, 2015). This is by no means a small estimate of AMISOM’s cost to TCCs.

Though it remains difficult to estimate the exact number of battle-related deaths, it is reasonable to argue that most of these deaths occurred because AMISOM was more than an ordinary peacekeeping operation: it has an extended mandate, and engages in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations (Bruton and Williams, 2014). It partook in state building processes aimed at restoring state structures and minimum control for the Somali state (Williams, 2013). This showed “renewed determination of the IGAD countries to take steps required to effectively address the situation”, including “the promotion of a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict in Somalia, the persistence and escalation of which constitute a serious impediment to Africa’s efforts to promote peace, security and integration, as well as a serious threat to international peace and security” (AU, 2008, POW/PR(IV)).

45 While retracting this claim, the UN (2013b) stated: “The casualty figures used by the Deputy Secretary-General were an estimate based on information from informal sources; dissemination of exact casualty statistics is solely the responsibility of the African Union and the individual troop contributing countries. The focus of the Deputy Secretary-General’s remarks was to express his, and indeed the entire UN system’s admiration for the remarkable work AMISOM has done, at great sacrifice, over the past several years. Their efforts have been instrumental to the recent progress made in the security situation and underpinned the successful political transition in 2012 in Somalia”
Figure 3: Estimates of AMISOM Fatalities

6IPRI Estimates of AMISOM Fatalities

Source: Williams (11 Nov. 2015)

In addition to the above fatalities, Uganda and Kenya have suffered al-Shabaab terrorist counter-attacks (Rwengabo, 2014). These terrorist attacks targeted civilians and socio-economic infrastructure, which may not be counted alongside AMISOM-related losses. Besides, AMISOM estimates, which remain undisclosed as all sources rely on estimates (Kelley, 2015; Bruton and Williams, 2014), exclude Ethiopian and Kenyan losses suffered during these countries’ unilateral interventions in Somalia. Therefore, to say that AMISOM has been a successful operation in no way implies scot-free fighting in a troubled landscape. It shows that the AfSol principles of commitment, ownership, shared values, constitute the resolve with which TCCs approached the Somali crisis. Through persistence, inclusiveness, and use of integrated approach–mechanisms which are empirically demonstrated in the coming sub-sections–AMISOM covered ground that previous fragmented interventions failed to trample upon.

Commitment and AMISOM’s Successes

AfSol’s first pillar, Commitment, was vital to AMISOM’s founding and successes. African leaders who seemed to have been willing to liberate Somalia pronounced themselves on this difficult decision. Political and diplomatic engagements followed these state-level choices through IGAD and beyond. TCCs, initially
Burundi and Uganda, expressed willingness, decided to, and actually intervened by deploying security forces there (Fisher, 2012). At the institutional level, a major decision followed by action was the creation of an AU Commission on Somalia and a technical evaluation mission—the Military Staff Committee—on the proposed deployment of an AU Mission in Somalia. IGASOM had exhibited similar institutional commitment. The Committee held consultations with the TFG on the planned deployment of a peace support mission in Somalia, 13-15 January 2007. The Commission and the Staff Committee reported to the AUPSC. Following the report, the AUPSC authorised “the deployment of AMISOM, for a period of 6 months with the mandate (i) to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia” (AU, 2007: 2). These decisions and actions signify AU-level institutional commitment. Following these decisions, AU member states were asked to contribute troops to what came to become AMISOM. Burundi and Uganda’s response to this call led to the deployment of the first 6,000 troops in Somalia (Bellamy, 2011: 6). This commitment engendered the persistence needed for AMISOM’s success.

Preceding institutional commitment was state-level commitment. Following resistance from Somali groups to IGASOM and other constraints to its deployment (Mays, 2009), IGAD deliberately decided, in 2006, that countries that neighbour Somalia should not intervene directly. Sudan and Uganda were willing to deploy should the international community support the mission by, among others, lifting the arms embargo on Somalia as IGAD had been persuading the UN to do (Mays, 2009: 10). Where previous IGAD’s efforts at forming the TFIs in August 2004 and the Djibouti Peace Process were consistent choices and actions showing institutional commitment, Uganda, not neighbouring Somalia, was willing to deploy under IGAD. Kampala, like many western actors and other IGAD states, reasoned that Somalia was degenerating into terrorist hands. Through IGAD and unilaterally, Kampala brought to western attention, Fisher argues, the imperative of pacifying Somalia through joint efforts beyond Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention. When the mandate was given, and the AU took over the mantle, Uganda and Burundi were the first to deploy troops. Fisher (2012) reasons that Kampala’s efforts were intended to hoodwink donors who were then concerned about politico-
It appears Kampala’s consistent suggestions cannot be reduced to the 2005-2007 period because it was already part of IGAD’s processes: “This initial suggestion by Kampala of what would later become AMISOM very much sought to depict a Ugandan intervention as part of a fight against global terrorism and drew heavily on already established donor perceptions of Uganda as a key ally in the GWOT [global war on terror]” (Fisher, 2012: 417). If there were “already established donor perceptions of Uganda as a key ally in the GWOT”, need Uganda have altered donors’ perceptions? This contradiction indicates that like fellow IGAD states, which were at the centre of IGAD initiatives, Uganda was committed to the pacification of Somalia. This commitment was expressed through lobbying foreign support. These consistent choices were actuated when Uganda deployed UPDF troops, police, and civilian officers under AMISOM, and remains the largest troop contributor in Somalia since 2007 (Williams, 2013).

If Uganda was deluding the west, what did Burundi and Kenya hope to gain? Kenya might have had national security interests, not Burundi. These interests in and by themselves are, however, hardly distinguishable from general regional interests expressed by Ethiopia and Uganda, and indeed by other IGAD states that had been involved in the Somali crisis. According to Bruton and Williams (2014: 55–9, 61–2) and Anderson and McKnight (2014:4), three factors explain Kenya’s Operation Linda Nchi in Somalia: the persistent refugee inflows to Kenya from Somalia which worsened famine in Kenya’s north-eastern region and turned it into a food-security problem; increasing regional security concerns, “fuelled by Ugandan and Ethiopian concerns”; and “the threat posed to Kenya’s economy by the destabilization of the coastal regions through Al-Shabaab activities.” Another factor can be added: the encouraging “AMISOM’s success against Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu in August 2011” (Anderson and McKnight, 2014:4). They trace Kenya’s intervention from 2009 and hold that with US and French support, the intervention was aimed at creating a satellite region in Jubaland (ibid : 4-5) wherefrom the war against al-Shabaab might be connected with AMISOM in a move to pacify Kismayo-Lamu and kick-start mega-development projects connecting south Sudan, northern Kenya, and Ethiopia to the Indian ocean. Port Lamu would become an oil terminal. If this claim is true, then the motive transcends Kenya’s specific national interests and fuses with the global oil politics. Perhaps Kenya’s
intervention was indirect because IGAD had decided against direct intervention from neighbouring states, and Ethiopia was also withdrawing. The International Crisis Group also alludes to the terrorist threat, the refugee crisis, and the desire to secure and establish a buffer zone in Jubaland. The kidnapping of tourists in Lamu and Dabaab seems to have acted as the Rubicon Point for Kenya (ICG, 2012:1-3; Johnson and Tierney, 2011).

If the aforementioned were exclusively Kenya’s selfish national interests devoid of a regional and international component, then it remains difficult to distinguish the two kinds of interests. It surfaces, clearly, that closer to home and other AfSol-linked motivations ought to be considered. Fisher admits, of Uganda: “domestically, the Ugandan government has maintained that its intervention was premised on considerations closer to home”46 (Fisher, 2012: 418). “Closer to home” is even more relevant to Kenya and Ethiopia, which directly neighbour Somalia. These states argued that Somali insecurity, terrorism, and proliferation of SALWs threatened their security and tourism industries. State interests seem to have converged under IGAD as Museveni once said: “IGAD specifically requested us to provide troops to be deployed in Somalia long before the UN and the African Union got involved. The contribution of the Government of Uganda to the stabilization of Somalia has cost Uganda lives of gallant soldiers” (Museveni, 2008). This indicates that Uganda was fulfilling its responsibility under IGAD, indicating institutional and national commitment. Even if such contribution might reap pecuniary benefits for the UPDF, it involved clear costs that Uganda was willing to pay. If this can be justified in Uganda, then Kampala’s interest lay in more than “managing donor perceptions” (Fisher, 2012) or pursuing selfish interests when for many years, as a member of IGAD, the country had been involved in efforts to end the Somali crisis.

### Table 3: AMISOM Troop Strength as of 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Est. Number of Troops</th>
<th>Period of Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Since 2012 (initially a unilateral intervention in Oct. 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 Ethiopian Intervention was controversial. “On 21 March 2007, a Somali mob dragged the bodies of Ethiopian and TFG soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu and set them on fire. Over the next two years, outrage over Ethiopian atrocities—particularly the systemic use of rape—prompted more than 20 members of Minnesota’s Somali diaspora to return to Mogadishu to fight the Ethiopian and TFG forces.” (Brutoin and Williams 2014:11).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>Since 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Williams (2013)

In addition to these troop contributions (Table 3), there was an additional “two 140-strong Formed Police Units (FPUs) from Uganda and Nigeria” (Williams, 2013: 2), which makes AMISOM an IGAD, AU, and UN affair. While some states, mainly Ethiopia and Kenya, had intervened unilaterally, IGAD, the AU and UN developed a “new Concept of Operations for AMISOM” to encompass these initial unilateral interventions. Following a Memorandum of Understanding, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone pledged to join AMISOM (ibid, 2-3), thereby integrating hitherto disparate interventions into a single AU- and UN-sanctioned mission. What initially was an uphill task for AMISOM’s fight against al-Shabaab and its allies in Somalia now acquired greater military and politico-diplomatic support, reflecting broader commitment.

The above state and institutional commitment incentivised states to “remain seized of the matter” (AU, 2007: 2), and to persist amidst the operation’s costs. Unlike previous foreign interventions, which were informed by populist policy choices in the US—mainly the hope that Operation Restore Hope would quickly disarm Somali warlords and their fighters, capture and possibly kill Aidid, restore order in Somalia, and thereby increase Clinton’s popularity at home (Clarke and Herbst, 1996; Bowden, 1999)—AMISOM was based on the realisation that Somalia needed a lasting politico-security solution. Steady, consistent, and costly engagement was necessary to rescue the Somali state, hence the AU’s realisation of the need to “create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction, and development in Somalia” (AU, 2007:2). With such an objective in mind, AMISOM either succeeds or the TCCs and Somalia’s neighbours suffer the blunt of al-Shabaab counter-attacks. Beyond the aforesaid desire to end Somali insecurity, stabilise and reconstruct the country, pan-African interests which indicate Ownership, also informed states’ interest in the Mission.

Ownership and AMISOM’s Successes

Africans can claim ownership of Somali’s crisis for several reasons: (i) it is “closer to home” for Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda which suffer Somalia-originated
SALWs and terrorism (Rwengabo, 2014); (ii) Africans pay for Somalia’s crises through refugees, terrorist hide-outs, a stain of an unending conflict on the psyche of IGAD leaders, and strain on their economies; and (iii) African states have learnt lessons from persistent conflicts and this creates incentives for reversing protracted conflicts such as the one in Somalia. Ownership also entails willingness to bear costs and to claim minimum legitimacy. Africans bear the responsibility for and cost of the intervention for specific reasons: First, Kenya claimed retaliation against al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory and the group’s involvement in kidnapping of tourists (Williams, 2013: 3; ICG 2012; Anderson and McKnight, 2014). Even if one argued that Kenya sought to create a satellite region in Jubaland, it appears the geo-political considerations and interests involve other countries too. Second, Uganda claimed that Somalia was turning into a terrorism safe haven, threatening its security through SALWs proliferation and terrorism, indicating “the evolving anxieties of regional insecurity, fuelled by Ugandan and Ethiopian concerns” (Anderson and McKnight, 2014: 4). These states participated in IGAD initiatives to promote regional security, to mitigate the kind of threat exemplified by the July 2010 terrorist bombing in Kampala. Third, African states claimed ownership of the regional initiative, mainly through IGAD and the AU (Museveni, 2008), and sharing pain with Somalis. Were these selfish interests could be distanced from regional interests, it might be helpful to consider that states need not hide their real, legitimate, interests as did Kenya and Ethiopia. To say that African states were deployed in Somalia on pan-African grounds is not to say that they had no specific national interests in the mission but that such interests can be subsumed within the pan-African ideals that have informed Africa’s international politics as espoused in the principle of self-reliance within the AU (Bah, 2009; Touray, 2005).

Inclusiveness also shows ownership: evidence of inclusiveness consists in AMISOM’s involving multiple actors. When IGASOM failed to take off in 2005-6, IGAD states accepted to engage the AU and UN in the 1992 arms embargo (Mays, 2009). They passed on the mantle to the AU through which they sought foreign support. The AU, then, assumed AMISOM leadership and appealed for other TCCs to come on board (Fisher, 2012; Bruton and Williams, 2014). This expanded the mission beyond IGAD. IGAD and the AU member states defended this involvement on pan-African grounds. They also involved Somalis in the mission (AMISOM, 2012 and 2014), making it further home-grown. Though one might argue, for instance, that Kenya’s Jubaland project; the training and facilitation
of Azania, a rebel group led by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (aka Mohamed Abdi Ghandi); or support to Sheikh Ahmed Madobe’s Ras Kamboni Brigade (Anderson and McKnight, 2014: 4-5) were schemes in proxy warfare, in which surrogate forces were to fight Kenya’s war, one needs to critically examine the motives behind these proxies: the refugee crisis, terrorism, and regional geo-security considerations. It would appear, then, that regional actors were desirous of involving Somalis in the fight against al-Shabaab, indicating inclusiveness of the mission. When Kenya joined AMISOM, it acquired a broader regional, continental, and international mandate to supplement a broader mission.

Ownership carries a high price: Bruton and Williams write:

“AMISOM would not have occurred and certainly would not have endured without the commitment and perseverance of several thousand soldiers from Uganda and Burundi and their political leaders. Both countries proved willing to take on a risky operation and mandate and suffer large numbers of casualties without withdrawing” (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 3).

Willingness to “suffer large numbers of casualties without withdrawing” reveals a sense of ownership, which was absent in previous, especially UNTAF operations, for they were non-African and lacked the innate justification to pay such a high price. Though Bruton and Williams believe these states’ unwillingness to reveal their actual numbers of casualties feeds suspicion that the numbers were high, this in no way erodes the essential element of AfSol, namely, Africans’ willingness to pay a high price for Somalia (Museveni, 2008). AMISOM’s risks became especially higher when Ethiopian forces withdrew in 2009, leaving TFG forces unable to contain al-Shabaab. This gave AMISOM larger-than-previously-experienced counter-insurgency operational demands. The resulting gap called for more training of Somali troops, in Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, to augment the number of Somali security forces (Bruton and Williams, 2014). Uganda further endured costs when the al-Shabaab bombed Kampala in July 2010 in which 74 people died (Fisher, 2012). Recently, the crashing of combat helicopters left 9 Ugandan men dead (Matsiko, 2012). Kenya has also suffered several retaliatory attacks since its deployment in Somalia. None of these countries has reconsidered its involvement following these costs.

Yet, when the US-led ‘Operation Restore Hope’ faced the realities of the conflict in 1993, the US withdrew because its public and leadership lacked a sense of
ownership for Somalia’s problems: ironically, President Clinton described the mission as a success (Clinton, 1993). It is level-headed to argue, basing on Africans’ readiness to pay a high price, that Africans own the mission regardless of foreign/EU/US support. Africans, more than foreigners, have the moral justification to withstanding the PSO’s costs. Hence, instead of revulsion and outrage that erupted in the US in 1993 (Bowden, 1999: 333), more determination and resolve followed Uganda’s and Kenya’s pains suffered in and outside the battlefield (Williams, 2015). States’ readiness to withstand the pain of the mission’s continuity led to AMISOM’s successes.

The final element of ownership is the claim of legitimacy under IGAD and AU security-cooperation principles. The TCCs claim moral obligation to intervene to improve regional security; close relationships between Somalis and other East Africans; the link between Somali crises and SALWs proliferation in East Africa; and countries’ desire to honour their IGAD, AU, and UN obligations (Fisher, 2012:418; Museveni, 2008). Honouring IGAD and AU obligations may reflect institutional commitment but it also entails ownership when we consider the desire to help others as a morally legitimate consideration. A wounded Ugandan officer, Maj. Duncan Kashoma, believes the UPDF is morally obliged to Somalia: “If you see what happened in our country [Uganda] before we liberated it, it was chaos, like in Somalia. I think that’s what gives us a reason to liberate our sisters and brothers in Somalia” (Damon, 2014). Wounded Kashoma’s belief that Somalis are “brothers” and “sisters” who deserve help to reverse the chaos afflicting their country reveals moral obligation, hence a sense of ownership. It is difficult to know whether a similarly wounded American soldier would conceive of the problem in a similar manner, or whether Uganda’s pecuniary interests, for instance, compensate for the human and security costs it has incurred (UN, 2013; Williams, 2015).

A similar viewpoint can be extended to Burundi. The country had benefited from an African initiative during the 1990s. A protection brigade was provided for its Hutu leaders in exile and in the bush, including President Pierre Nkurunziza. Under the arrangement, Africans used the concept of “immunité provisoire” (provisional immunity) for all stakeholders to allow them participate in dialogue (Rugunda, 2012). Tanzania and Uganda were involved in Burundi’s reconciliation process. A country and its leadership that previously benefited from other states’ assistance, Burundi feels morally obliged to reciprocate. This explains why Burundi justifies its involvement in Somalia on similar grounds. In fact, to enhance its
Ownership, however more qualitative and implicit than tangible and explicit it might be, informs states’ and organisations’ feelings of obligation. As Bah (2009) and Touray (2005) reveal, Africa is taking steady steps to own its peace and security problems. This initiative incentivises states and organisations to withstand costly engagements, and through persistence, achieve goals that previously eluded more powerful actors. IGAD retained ownership over the process, including the 2009 Kampala Accord, which extended former president Sharif Ahmed’s mandate by a year, until Hassan Sheikh, the first ‘permanent’ president of Somalia for nearly two decades, oversaw “the re-establishing of diplomatic ties with the US and the International Financial Institutions.” Hassan Sheikh used “these trappings of sovereignty” to reposition Somalia vis-à-vis regional and international players (Fisher, 2013: online), indicating a rescued Somali state. Considering “the AU’s growing commitment and competence in leading such missions and Western nations’ reluctance to pledge their own troops to them” (ibid, my emphasis), we are entering an era of African regional and continental ownership, “when neighbours are building or re-building neighbours” as has happened in Somalia (ibid) and did occur in Burundi and Liberia during the 1990s. Accordingly, “despite years of bloody fighting” with limited resources and “a significant number of casualties among soldiers”, an assessment of AMISOM reveals that a high sense of ownership was an important factor in stabilising Somalia. Without doubt, “The eradication of Al-Shabaab forces from the control of strategic areas and the protection of key Government … figures are among the most notable achievements of AMISOM” (Segui, 2013: 1) though contextual and structural challenges that remain may take long to resolve. Moreover, Africans reflect shared values of pan-African solidarity that informed their involvement.

**Shared Values and AMISOM Successes**

Shared values arise from common historical experiences like slave trade, colonialism, ideational and epistemic plunder, persistent psycho-epistemic destruction, as well as observable socio-cultural similarities between the Somalis
and other East Africans. For example, Euro-American affinity informed US-Europe security relations (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002), an affinity that is observable with Pan-Africanism: “Museveni himself has long held genuinely pan-African views and observers have often attested to his desire to be seen by continental counterparts as a regional statesman in the mould of Tanzania’s Nyerere” (Fisher, 2012: 418). Nyerere placed pan-African ideals above other interests like Mandela placed collective freedom above individual freedom. Delineating Uganda’s selfish interests from its pan-African pursuits is difficult given the beliefs Ugandan security officers themselves hold (Damon, 2013). After all, where national interests converge with regional interests, it is misleading to stress only national interests and forget regional ones. Regional interests are rooted in national interests of states forming a particular region, hence convergence of those interests. Critiques may dismiss some African leaders’ pan-African convictions, but these leaders’ consistency reveals Pan-African persuasions notwithstanding pressures that sometimes dilute these beliefs (Museveni, 2014; Fisher, 2012).

States also appealed to shared African principles, mainly the principle of “promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union” (AU 2000, Art 4k). Within this milieu, “African states benefit in specific ways from being seen to contribute to ‘African solutions to African problems’” (Beswick, 2010: 739). This indicates Africa’s emphasis on self-reliance with resulting solidarity with fellow Africans. Solidarity can be adduced from the AU’s initiatives to widen African involvement. The AUPSC stressed “the critical role of” countries of the region “in the overall efforts aimed at bringing about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia.” It strongly appealed to states “to demonstrate the necessary cohesion in support of the TFIs and their efforts” (AU, 2007: 2), provide logistic and personnel support, and “remain seized of the matter”. Initially, “logistic support for AMISOM” was to “be based on self-sustenance by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).” The AU Commission was tasked to “mobilize logistical support for the TCCs” and “funding from AU members states and partners to ensure that TCCs are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment” (ibid: 2-3). Besides foreign support, the AU stressed resource mobilisation, for AMISOM, from within Africa or by an African body. These solidarity-exhibiting decisions were rooted in the shared principle of self-reliance.

International decisions are useful in gauging internationally-shared values. This
occurs especially where decision-making or agenda in IOs is free from stringent inter-state bargains (Rwengabo, 2014). AU decisions on AMISOM involved non-stringent bargains and decisional unanimity among Africans on most issues. This reflects the shared conviction that Africa should address its problems. States’ persistence in implementing their decisions, once the Rubicon Point was reached (Johnson and Tierney, 2011), reveals this conviction. The conviction ignites actors’ resilience in implementing the joint/common decision: Uganda, for instance, did not withdraw its forces after the UN/AU refused to compensate it for the recent loss of combat helicopters and men enroute to Somalia (The Red Pepper, 2014; Tumwine, 2014). Ethiopia and Kenya had intervened unilaterally; Kenya later joined other TCCs because the AU had authorised AMISOM. This shows pan-African solidarity. States’ readiness to jointly sacrifice for AMISOM (Bruton and Williamson, 2014)—sacrifices which the US and other UNTAF members could not withstand though more capable than African states—demonstrates shared values. States’ interests seem to have converged under the common realisation that Somalia’s peace equals regional peace (AU, 2007; Anderson and McKnight, 2014). All told, shared values engendered AMISOM’s success.

How, then, did AfSol generally engender AMISOM’s success? I stress persistence, inclusiveness, and integrated approach which followed a change in AU thinking on when, where, and how to intervene (AU, 2007; Williams, 2007). These mechanisms have been demonstrated. In Somalia, an African solution was the only viable option amidst western disinterest and previous failures (Bellamy, 2011). This realisation created incentives for African states to “remain seized of the matter”, amidst heavy costs. For instance, “IGAD has been a key stabilising factor in the Somali conflict, and remains key to the very existence of Somalia. IGAD is the one organisation that has never abandoned Somalia” (Maalim, 2009: 1) even when IGASOM initiatives had earlier failed (Segui, 2013). Through persistence, AMISOM became adaptive to changed realities of the mission. As AMISOM expanded beyond Mogadishu, it faced an al-Shabaab force resorting to harassment of its supply lines and terrorist attacks. Open confrontation was no longer effective following AMISOM’s military victories over al-Shabaab. As AMISOM “entered a new environment where building cooperative political relationships between Somalia’s de facto governing authorities became more significant than projecting military power” (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 90), it embarked on reconciliation and state building processes. This new integrated approach also entailed involving local and foreign Somalis in
Persistence, inclusiveness, and an integrated approach informed the fight against the ICU/al-Shabaab, as integration of Kenyan and AMISOM forces into a single AU intervention force reveals. The AU’s effective engagement of the international community, especially the UN, its appeal for support from non-African sources, augmented intra-Africa efforts that were intended to widen and deepen African involvement. The UNSC’s mandate extensions legitimised AMISOM’s pacification campaigns in Mogadishu and other cities (AMISOM, 2012), all this resulting from Africa’s, notably Uganda’s, Sudan’s, and Burundi’s persistence informed by the desire to effect IGAD’s and the AU’s decisions on and actions in Somalia (Fisher, 2012; Mays, 2009). Had Kampala only desired to sugar-coat Uganda’s then ongoing constitutional changes, the regime would have lost interest after political changes took root. Yet, Uganda persisted, and worked with other states and organisations, despite rising human costs (Williams, 2015), the July 2010 Kampala bombings (Fisher, 2012), and the 2012 plane crashes (Tumwine, 2014). Uganda’s objectives, therefore, transcend regime selfishness.

From the foregoing, commitment, ownership, and shared values created incentives to withstand a costly intervention in which “al-Shabaab lost the war as much as AMISOM won it”, through, among others, “AMISOM’s own evolution” that resulted from increased troop levels and reduced civilian casualties in urban warfare (Bruton and Williams, 2014: 88). Kenya and Uganda suffered al-Shabaab’s counter-attacks and foiled several attempts but persisted (Damon, 2012). Burundi was compelled to make structural-institutional changes in its security architecture, in response to al-Shabaab’s threats, intensifying counter-terrorism cooperation with Uganda. To say that states had selfish security interests, in any case, is only part of the story: terrorism in East Africa predates the Kampala regime and the Somali crisis. Fighting terrorism has been ongoing since 1981 (Okumu, 2007; US Dept. of State, 2010; Rwengabo 2014). Somalia, then, becomes another experiment in “self-reliance within the framework of the” AU. This AfSol principle, which informed AMISOM’s success, underlies the changing African agency in international politics.

Possible Counterarguments

The world has recognised the importance of burden sharing, that is, of inclusive and integrated responses to insecurity, hence the observed enhancement of the
role of ROs in countering threats to regional and global security (Wulf and Debiel, 2009). UNTAF and IGASOM attempts may be seen in this light, AMISOM being a developed element of it. This may explain why no previous intervention recorded AMISOM’s successes. Notwithstanding this empirical reality, there are possible counter-arguments to my AfSol thesis. The first possible argument, the foreign support thesis, might hold that African solutions are insufficient without foreign support. Euro-American-financial, technical, and diplomatic-support is key. When the west relegated Rwanda genocide followed. Accordingly, only foreign support allowed AMISOM to succeed. Moreover, the USA, UK, and EU pledged US$68 million, and the EU hearkened the US’s appeal to look to Somalia (Vines, 2011). The USA, for instance, “has provided over US$185 million to support AMISOM as of 2011” (Fisher, 2012: 417). The AU itself and African states are donor-funded. Foreign support under the UN, instead of possible sabotage using UN veto power, led to AMISOM-supporting UNSC Resolutions (Table 2).

Second, the selfish-national interest thesis might build on rationalist theorising in International Relations to argue that TCCs had selfish interests in Somalia. According to this viewpoint, mainly national interests motivated these states (Tavares, 2011; Fisher, 2012). Kenya and Ethiopia did underline their national security and economic interests threatened by Somalia’s insecurity. Fisher argues that Uganda instrumentalised the Somali situation to hoodwink donors who were then concerned with politico-constitutional changes in Kampala. Were such interests minimal, it would have been difficult, one might argue, for states to pay a high price for Somalia.

Finally, pessimists may claim that al-Shabaab remains at large, Somalia remains fragile, and AMISOM suffers limitations (Segui, 2013). There is simply no success to celebrate, one might argue, because generally African states are still undergoing the Tillian war-state-making process (Tilly, 1990; Centeno, 2003) and lack authoritative control over their territorial domains (Herbst, 2000). Bruton and Williams (2014) underline the persistent challenges AMISOM has faced, originating within and without Africa, related both to AU capabilities as well as to difficulties of interest convergence. These challenges, which had stifled IGASOM (Mays, 2009), remain unresolved even as AMISOM has made tremendous successes.

The foregoing critiques are not without merit. Euro-American powers may have provided intelligence and logistical support as can be observed with EU
contributions (Vines, 2011). However, one needs to consider the initiatives that Africans, especially IGAD, undertook since 1993 to understand African agency in AMISOM. Neither the EU nor the US imposed such support nor demonstrated the incentive, persistence, and inclusiveness and integrated resolve that Africans demonstrated since 2007. Besides, the West’s money, intelligence, equipment/weapons, and diplomacy, during the 1990s did not reverse UNTAF-UNOSOM failures in which the US was directly involved. Second, were Africans unwilling to intervene minus foreign support as occurred during the IGAD-AU-UN debate over the 1992 arms embargo (Mays, 2009), Uganda engaged IGAD and the west in the issue. IGAD engaged the AU and UN (Fisher, 2012). Ethiopia and Kenya intervened unilaterally, Kenya first doing so through surrogate forces (Anderson and McKnight, 2014), but IGAD was the most persistent regional player: transcending its IGASOM challenges, the IGAD gave way to the AU, which led to a more successful African-led mission. One can say that institutional-ideational changes in African international politics since 2000, when the AU replaced the OAU, sowed seeds of Africa-centred responses to insecurity within which milieu the shared principle of self-reliance obtains and from which AMISOM’s success can be traced. Even if one considered donor support, the support falls under Africa’s resource mobilisation. AMISOM is one among many instances of Africa engaging the west in African initiatives: interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adibe, 1997; Tavares, 2011); AMIB (AU, 2014; Rugunda, 2012); and the regime on SALWs (Donowaki, 2004; Rwengabo, 2014) are added examples. Africa’s peace and security measures reflect African agency and regionalism converging at AU level especially since 2000 (Tavares, 2009; van Nieuwkerk, 2011). Thus, judging from the AMISOM process and experience, we are beginning to witness Africa’s politico-security effectiveness hitherto unseen under the OAU.

The selfish-interests argument downplays interest convergence, cultural and ideational forces that may inform political choices (Acharya, 2009), and the evidence thereof (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). Finally, while Anderson and Mcknight “warn against a complacent view that posits AMISOM successes as ‘victory’ without considering what the future of Al-Shabaab is likely to be” (2014: 3), Africans are better placed than non-African actors to understand and resolve African conflicts regardless of the complexities that defied US efforts due to “strategic miscalculations”, decisions and actions that reflected limited understanding of local context (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999: 28), and Somalia’s
uniqueness. I opine that AMISOM is successful because of the AfSol approach which previous interventions lacked.

**Implications of AMISOM’s Successes for AfSol**

AMISOM recorded some success due to the commitment, ownership, and shared values that Africans showed. This should inform analyses of Africa’s changing security landscape and policy responses to insecurity, with major implications for AfSol: developing and testing [politico-diplomatic, institutional, resource, techno-scientific] capacity for African self-reliance; productive engagement of the international community regarding Africa’s security challenges; the imminent decline of dependence on foreigners; and replicability of success lessons. Capacity development is an ongoing process of instituting a common African security policy following the realisation that Africa needs security self-reliance (AU, 2000; Touray, 2005). The APSA, whose design privileges the ASF’s Regional [rapid intervention] Brigades intended to rescue breakdowns of peace, is a commendable step toward security self-reliance (Franke, 2010; Vines, 2013). To achieve this, African states need political commitment to spearhead effective regional security cooperation (de Waal, 2009). In so doing, effectively engaging non-African actors augments the AfSol approach. By seeking UN support while retaining control over the Mission, Africa augments its efforts. Thus, African initiatives can acquire useful foreign support, leaving Africa more skilled and experienced without negating African commitment and ownership.

The notion of declining foreign influence underscores interdependence between Africans and non-Africans for mutual benefits instead of overdependence. Africa’s past frustrations with foreigners (Touray, 2005) engendered African-initiated measures that reveal AfSol in progress. This realisation demands replication of successful initiatives. Replicability is key to AfSol though “a single template for intervention” over-simplifies complex problems (Cliffe and Luckman, 1999:29). Nevertheless, avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach is not inimical to learning from successful practices like Gacaca (Schabas, 2005; Brehm, et al., 2014), South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process, and the East African Community’s mediation experience (Umbricht, 1989). Indigenous/traditional practices stress conciliation and forgiveness. Through them, Africans “are beginning to chart transformational paths for most of the African countries after centuries of predation by the slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism” (Rugunda, 2011: 2). Libya and Zaire revealed
that potentially disastrous western-directed solutions ought to be replaced with AfSol (ibid; cf Bellamy, 2011). These experiences, again, denude earlier pessimism about AMISOM amidst western non-interest in Somalia (Bellamy, 2011: 6). Learning from successful African-initiated and controlled processes is useful for rethinking existing conceptual and methodological approaches to understanding African agency in international politics.

Conclusion

The achievements of AMISOM defy initial western pessimism about Somalia and claims that African states suffering resource and capacity limitations and neopatrimonialism can hardly solve Africa’s security problems. The Mission vindicates the pan-African conception of African-centred solutions to Africa’s peace and security challenges following disappointing dealings with the outside world during the 1990s (Touray, 2005; Bah, 2009). AMISOM’s remarkable successes that are rooted in AfSol indicate Africa’s need to further develop and test its peace and security capabilities. Compared to non-African solutions, the AfSol’s key pillars of state and institutional commitment; shared Pan-African values; and a sense of ownership, created incentives for states to bear costs and sustain AMISOM’s momentum, leading to the observed military, political, state-building, and reconciliation gains. Africans incorporated/reflected AfSol through: (a) persistence amidst the human, resource, and politico-security costs of the intervention; (b) involving local and foreign Somalis; (c) integration of previously disparate interventions–Ethiopia, Kenya, and initial Burundi-Uganda deployments–into a single, AU-sanctioned, intervention; and (d) effectively engaging the UN system for support.

The aforesaid observations underline the need to develop AfSol as a theoretically testable research framework and promising policy choice. Venues for testing AfSol include: the ASF’s Regional Brigades; comparing the efficacy of African-centred solutions like AMIB and AMISOM on the one hand, and foreign interventions like NATO in Libya; and learning from successful indigenous/traditional conflict-resolution experiences like Gacaca. These practices are lived social institutions. They transcend legality and stress reconciliation and co-existence (Clark, 2010). Being “part of a well-structured, time-proven, social system geared toward

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47 I highlighted issues of measurement, AfSol’s replicability, level of analysis (sub-regional vs continental), and developing indicators of commitment, shared values, and ownership. A researcher must decide which qualitative and quantitative data to collect, and within-AfSol models to develop/test.
reconciliation, maintenance and improvement of social relationships”, indigenous conflict resolution measures inhere in African customs and traditions (Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo, 2015: 33).

In no way does AfSol claim that African solutions can solve all problems overnight, or that they are proof to manipulation as critics of Gacaca have underscored (Clark, 2010), or that miscalculations have not been made in Somalia and elsewhere (Menkhaus, 2007; Bruton and Williams, 2014). By no means do I imply that AfSol is beyond theoretical, methodological, and epistemological critique, or that when using AfSol all state interests will always converge. I only underscore the potential to harmonise national with regional interests in rescuing an out-of-hand peace and security situation like Somalia was. Where interests converge mutual benefits result. Through inter-state diplomatic engagements, as have been experimented in Africa, states’ security interests can converge.

Africa’s substantial donor-dependence ignites caution about praise-singing Africa’s potential. Nevertheless, AfSol consists in attempts to arrest this dependence by developing Africa’s capabilities. Appropriate AfSol-related policy measures include: state, regional, and continental/AU-level capacity development; reclaiming effective but otherwise underrated indigenous/traditional conflict management approaches; focused mobilisation of resources and technical capacity; promotion of policy-informing/applied research; reversing donor dependence; and garnering political will. Political will is necessary to subject national interests to continental interests. It requires effectively shifting from “non-intervention to non-indifference” (Williams, 2007). It entails relaxing Africa’s hitherto stringent “territorial integrity norm” (Zacher, 2001) and principles of non-interference in states’ internal affairs (Touray, 2005: 638). These measures provide a conducive political environment for real Africa-centred organisational and institutional change. By relaxing sovereignty concerns, Africans can secure interest convergence in peace and security affairs, thereby succeeding where foreigners fail.

AMISOM’s successes are not an endpoint in Africa’s peace and security efforts. Instead, the success constitutes Africa’s learning experience from an ongoing Mission. Anderson and McKnight (2014) reveal al-Shabaab’s self-reinvention and how it extended the struggle to Kenya [and Uganda] through terrorist retaliation. Militarised counter-terrorism can be inadequate unless it is followed by political and psycho-social counter-radicalisation similar to what AMISOM is undertaking in
Somalia. Somalia’s multi-faceted challenges of restoring sanity after three decades of anarchy remain (AU, 2014; Segui, 2013). Yet, by enduring AMISOM’s costs and merging disparate intervention efforts, Africans defied indifference and apathy, and demonstrated shared readiness to address Somalia’s crisis. By reconstituting the Somali state and allowing it to acquire “trappings of sovereignty” and self-reassertion (Fisher, 2013), AMISOM evolved into a Somalia-centred solution to a decades-old politico-security crisis. These realities signify Africa’s evolving security architecture, vindicating the promise of effective AfSol when the APSA (Vines, 2013) becomes fully operational. Ultimately, AMISOM lessons need to be expounded, utilised, and made stepping stones toward sustainable AfSol.
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Ownership at Grassroots Level to Support Regional Commitments: The Case of IGAD and the South Sudan Conflict

Natukunda Rhoda Nkubah

Abstract

The idea of local ownership is regarded as an important pillar for the advancement of African solutions to the continent’s development challenges. While there is consensus as to its importance and demand among practitioners in the peacebuilding field and development in general; the concept still raises a number of questions related to its definition, scope, and feasibility. The paper seeks to analyse the notion of local ownership using the South Sudan conflict that broke out in late December 2013. IGAD’s swift involvement to resolve the conflict gave a sense of hope and commitment by regional leaders towards taking primary responsibility instead of waiting on external help to solve Africa’s peace and security challenges. Whereas external actors were engaged in the peace processes in Addis Ababa, IGAD took the lead as a mediator between the main protagonists. The repeated violations of cessation of hostilities agreements coupled with boycotting of peace talks were reflections of the ‘non-dialogue’ approach taken by the warring parties. In addition, IGAD’s warnings against these violations did not translate into punitive measures against the parties. During the peace process, the belligerent parties were reluctant to allow non-armed stakeholders to participate meaningfully; this revealed the disadvantaged position of civil society and grassroots organisations in relation to peace efforts undertaken at the regional level. Thus the paper recommends the establishment of a framework of guiding principles that would compel actors in peace processes to involve non-armed stakeholders as critical partners. These principles would contribute to concerted efforts that ensure the participation of the African citizenry in order to promote local ownership; a crucial aspect for supporting the commitment of regional leaders in resolving Africa’s peace and security challenges. Without enhancing the capacity of the African citizenry to contribute to and own solutions at the local level, the sustainability of such solutions might be undermined, however afro-centric they might be.

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Keywords: Local ownership, violent conflict, grassroots organisations, peacebuilding.

Introduction

A number of African countries have experienced violent conflicts over the last five decades, and these conflicts have had enormous impact on the continent’s economic, political and socio-cultural life. The nature of these conflicts has changed over time, especially with the end of the cold war; civilians now account for 80% of the victims in contemporary conflicts; and most of these conflicts are intra-state in nature (Kaldor, 2002; Melander et al., 2006). This makes their resolution a challenging task for actors involved both at the local and regional levels. The African Union (AU) and other regional bodies like East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have all been involved in conflict resolution efforts, some of which have been successful while others have failed to achieve the desired goals. In spite of the existing challenges, regional bodies continue to play an important role in conflict resolution on the continent, and their intervention in conflict situations cannot be underestimated. It is in light of this, that the paper discusses the South Sudan conflict and IGAD’s efforts to mitigate the conflict through diplomatic means.

The paper argues that IGAD’s intervention in the South Sudan conflict, which broke out in December 2013, demonstrated a commitment towards the aspiration for African solutions to Africa’s problems; with African leaders taking primary responsibility for solving the continent’s peace and security challenges. The work also discusses the importance of involving grassroots organisations and institutions in peacebuilding processes as a way of promoting local ownership of solutions to ensure sustainable peace. It then concludes that grassroots organisations play a significant role in post-conflict or transitional societies as far as peacebuilding processes are concerned, and should therefore be acknowledged and regarded as important partners in efforts undertaken by regional actors. The commitment of regional leaders to African solutions ought to be supported by local actors as innovators because they are either affected by or directly involved in the conflicts, and they have knowledge concerning the root causes of violence. This paper hopes to contribute to the on-going discourse on African-Centred Solutions by advocating for more visibility and legitimacy for grassroots movements or local civil society
organisations in peacebuilding processes undertaken by regional bodies.

**IGAD and the South Sudan Conflict**

IGAD’s involvement in Sudan dates back to its role in the negotiations to end the civil war between the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) in which it played a mediation role that contributed to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA provided for a referendum, which later paved way for the independence of South Sudan (Kammel, 2013; Young, 2007). South Sudan gained independence in July 2011, and this road to self-determination marked a new dawn for the people of South Sudan who had endured the cruelty of a protracted conflict spanning over two decades. The honeymoon for the newest state was, however, short-lived as political wrangles between President Salva Kiir and his former Vice President Riek Machar emerged, thrusting the country into violent conflict.

The fighting between government forces and forces loyal to Riek Machar along political and ethnic lines has left thousands of civilians displaced, hundreds dead, infrastructure destroyed, and people’s livelihoods ruined; the violence which started in Juba, later spread to Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states (Blanchard, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014). The 23rd extra-ordinary session stressed IGAD’s commitment to find an immediate solution to the crisis; and special envoys were appointed to lead the mediation process. The regional body called for peace talks, and a number of cessation of hostilities agreements were signed between 23rd January and 25th August 2014; however repeated violations of these agreements by both parties slowed down the peace process (ICRtoP, 2014; Sudan Tribune, 2015a). During the 27th extra-ordinary session, IGAD condemned the parties’ wilful violation of the agreements, and pointed out that their actions had aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the country.

Throughout the peace process, the warring parties exhibited a level of inflexibility, they repeatedly boycotted the Addis Ababa peace talks over a number of issues, some noteworthy others negligible (AFP, 2014; ICRtoP, 2014; Odera and Maasho, 2014). This reflected the non-dialogue environment in South Sudan that was incentivising the use of force as a means to address grievances (Wilson, 2014). Despite these challenges, IGAD pressed the belligerent parties to halt hostilities and return to the negotiation table amidst threats of imposing sanctions and other
punitive action against the parties hindering the peace process; and they complied.

The final peace agreement was signed on 26th August 2015 by the representatives of the SPLM-IO, former detainees, civil society organisations, regional bodies, and international organisations. The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) had reservations and was reluctant to sign the peace agreement; however President Salva Kiir later signed the agreement to avoid sanctions against his government (Sudan Tribune, 2015b). IGAD’s mediation role signalled a shift towards African leaders taking primary responsibility to tackle the continent’s peace and security challenges; a step in the direction of ‘ownership’ at the regional level. Accordingly the role played by IGAD ought be commended and supported from the grassroots to the national level.

Broad participatory approach in peace process is crucial for supporting reconciliation and attaining durable peace beyond the transition period. IGAD’s communiqué of the 26th extraordinary session stressed the issue of inclusivity whereby a multi-stakeholder approach would be employed during the negotiations, to accommodate the views of different sections of South Sudanese society. This position was initially agreed to by the warring parties, but they later abandoned it in pursuit of their narrow political interests and ambitions (Mabor, 2014). In spite of their differences, the government and SPLM-IO developed a unified position as far as blocking the participation of other non-armed actors was concerned, a reflection of the domestic environment in which civil society is stifled (International Crisis Group, 2014).

The South Sudanese civilian stakeholders were undermined during the negotiations, and also manipulated by the main warring parties (International Crisis Group, 2014; Tubiana, 2014), yet civilians are the first to bear the brunt of civil war; as empirical evidence shows that contemporary conflicts are increasingly becoming atrocious with over 80% of civil war victims being civilians (Kaldor, 2002, 2013; Mani, 2002; Melander and Oberg, 2004; Moore and Shellman, 2004). It should be noted that these non-armed stakeholders were reluctantly involved in the Addis Ababa peace talks, accordingly the quality of their participation was compromised; yet they sought to play a meaningful role in the peace process (Neha, 2014; Tubiana, 2014b). These stakeholders contribute to the generation of home-grown solutions crucial for reconciliation and sustainable peace; and are better positioned to implement the decisions of the peace process.
Societies affected by conflict should be reasonably involved in the search for solutions to address their humanitarian challenges and development needs. Practice demonstrates that grassroots entities in communities undergoing or emerging from violent conflict have always been sidelined, and their innovative potential undermined when they are simply regarded as ‘beneficiaries’ whose only role is to receive what is offered (Tubiana, 2014b). The commitment that leaders make at the regional level should create room for grassroots movements or organisations to participate and promote ownership at the local level. In the case of South Sudan, the citizens had a say during the referendum when they voted for independence, and it is in the same spirit that they should be consulted on matters concerning peacebuilding processes, their voices should be heard by the South Sudan leadership (Neha, 2014) and echoed at the regional level.

IGAD pursued an exclusionary process for the CPA (Young, 2007); this time round it sought a multi-stakeholder approach in South Sudan’s peace process; however, the primary parties opposed the notion of inclusivity. SPLM-IO claimed that the Civil Society Organisation (CSO) representatives from Juba were pro-government, and decried the absence of CSOs from the diaspora (Mabor, 2014; Sudan Tribune, 2014) viewed as sympathetic to their cause. SPLM-IO also opposed the participation of ‘former SPLM detainees’ because after their release (one of SPLM-IO’s demands), they insisted on participating independently in the peace talks instead of backing SPLM-IO. The government blocked the travel of opposition leader, Dr. Lam Akol, to Addis Ababa for the peace talks (Sudan Tribune, 2015d). The non-armed stakeholders did not participate as equal partners in the peace talks, the primary parties allowed them to participate in a consultative manner, and later reduced them to observers (International Crisis Group, 2015). The Addis Ababa talks demonstrated that CSOs can only be accommodated during negotiations if they can be co-opted or manipulated to do the bidding of the protagonists; this kind of inequity suppresses the capacity of CSOs to promote sustainable peace.

IGAD’s swift intervention in the South Sudan conflict and its persistence during the peace talks is commendable. The influence of external actors in the peace process cannot be underestimated; they provided financial resources and technical expertise to support the mediation process. These actors included China, Troika, AU, EU, and members of the IGAD Partner’s Forum (IPF); with the increased involvement of these actors, the IGAD-led process was transformed into the IGAD-PLUS mediation. Despite their individual interests, collectively, these actors had
the weight IGAD needed to compel the parties to sign an agreement (International
Crisis Group, 2015); for instance, President Kiir signed the agreement to avoid
UN sanctions against his government (Sudan Tribune, 2015b). While this kind of
involvement by external actors is inescapable (in the short-term) and asymmetrical
in nature (Reich, 2006; Schumann, 2014), it should not stop local actors and
regional bodies from articulating the kind of cooperation that would best serve the
interests of communities emerging from or experiencing violent conflict. The role
of regional bodies in the pursuit of African solutions to the continent’s peace and
security challenges is hindered by inconsistent leadership, shortage of financial
resources, poor institutional framework and political cleavages among African
countries (Khamis, 2008).

A Case for Local Ownership of Peacebuilding Processes

Literature on the concept of local ownership of peace processes and solutions
continues to stir up varied reactions among several actors in the field of peace,
security, and development in general. There is limited consensus on what really
this concept entails; much as different stakeholders are endorsing it. While a lot
is said about local ownership, practice demonstrates quite the opposite (Sending,
2010). Thus interventions in conflict and post conflict states ought to boost the
idea of local ownership. Some scholars view the concept of local ownership as
emancipatory participation, which supports indigenous and local custodianship
of peace processes in post conflict societies (Richmond, 2009; Wilen, 2009; Wilen
and Chaupax, 2011). Van Brabant (2010) asserts that the processes of creating a
realisation for local ownership are expensive and complex thus the analysis of a
conflict or its termination cannot be based on simple narratives or simple solutions.
The pursuit of simple solutions partially explains the attempts in peacebuilding
processes that are usually prescriptive, restricted to political elites, with limited
reference to socio-cultural background of the conflict. This tends to leave limited
or no room for local communities to meaningfully engage in conflict resolution
efforts.

Local ownership of peacebuilding processes can be perceived as efforts that are
locally conceived and led; this emphasises the need to listen to the voices of people
in the conflict region (Edomwonyi, 2003); the appreciation of solutions or benefits
by local actors irrespective of who invented them (Boughton and Mourmouras,
2002); and the legitimate participation of ‘locals’ at different levels (Van Babrant,
Local ownership is also viewed as a call for the withdrawal of external actors’ control of peacebuilding processes; however, this has implications as far as the issue of managing international assistance is concerned since external actors usually finance these efforts (Reich, 2006). Local ownership ought to be viewed as a comprehensive involvement of local actors in a wide range of activities that contribute to the prevention of violence and resolution of conflict.

Transformation at any level in society cannot rely on prescriptive solutions; the affected people must be involved in all processes. Olson et al. (2003) assert that:

No one can make anyone else’s peace. People and societies must create conditions and processes for achieving and sustaining their own peace. Practitioners can support, and work along people as colleagues, offer different perspectives, ideas and discuss options. But they cannot make peace in another person’s context. If the solutions do not come from the communities that are affected, they can mount to manipulation or attempted social engineering.

Accordingly for peace processes to be manageable and sustainable within the resource capacity of the community, local people have to be actively involved with limited external involvement that is context specific.

While the involvement of external actors in the early stages of post-conflict environment can be justified to a certain extent, the interventions, which are usually based on liberal democratic reforms tend to suffocate local participation in the long-run (Donais, 2009a; Schumann, 2014). Formal institutions collapse or are weakened by violent conflicts, yet they are the focus of these interventions. Informal or traditional institutions are resilient, they represent continuity and community stability; and play an important role in conflict resolution and local governance. Accordingly, a hybrid approach that engages these institutions would support local solutions that promote reconciliation (Donais, 2009b). Okach (2013) argues that policies which do not take into account or reinforce indigenous knowledge ignore informal institutionalism in peacebuilding processes and undermine local ownership. The capacity building efforts extended to certain local actors also undermine local ownership through the transfer of external norms and practices which ignore the context of specific conflicts (Sending, 2009; Van Brabant, 2010). Thus the practical problem of embracing and applying the concept of local ownership lies partially with the failure of external actors to appreciate that viable solutions can be and should be taken from the societies in which they intervene.
Cilliers (2004) asserts that, “[...] individuals and communities are not only bystanders and collateral victims of conflicts, but core participants in protection strategies and post-conflict peacebuilding”. In the same vein, Okach (2013) argues for the tapping of local communities’ potential to promote ownership and sustainable peace. However local actors are usually marginalised because of undue interference and control exhibited through financing externally-generated processes (Boughton and Mourmouras, 2002; Interpeace, 2010) and sometimes altering policies designed by local actors. This not only compromises local actors’ legitimacy to participate and own the peacebuilding processes, but also undermines their commitment to these efforts.

Some scholars assert that the concept of local ownership in peace and security is still unclear and as such viewed as a premature rhetoric which poses a lot of difficult questions (Bendix and Stanley, 2008; Diamond, 1999; Reich, 2006; Scheye et al, 2005; Shinoda, 2008; Saxby, 2003). However, these challenges should not be viewed as something insurmountable. Local ownership, if well managed, is important in the (re)building of social infrastructure (Edmwonyi, 2003), an aspect that has been given little attention over (re)construction of physical infrastructure and formal institutions. Logan (2013) argues that traditional institutions are important to communities. They are viewed as the custodians of invaluable knowledge, heritage, identity, and norms, which are important in the restoration of a community’s social fabric wasted by violent conflict. Thus efforts have to be put in place for local communities to explore what their cultures and heritage have to offer towards peacebuilding processes. Without their meaningful participation, externally generated solutions cannot be sustainable or they can have perverse effects. Furthermore, any external assistance rendered should be compatible with the communal ideals although some might not necessarily echo liberal-leaning views that most external actors advance at the expense of sustainable resolution of conflicts.

The importance of local ownership in post-conflict situations is generally related to the sustainability of peacebuilding activities by way of communities devising appropriate interventions with minimal opposition (Mateos, 2011; Van Brabant, 2010). In addition, locally conceived ideas, especially those that are derived from communal practices of societies experiencing conflicts tend to be culturally relevant (Donais, 2009a; Reich, 2006) and can be implemented with modest human and financial resources. When people are involved in peacebuilding processes, they
are empowered to hold their leaders accountable, thus establishing a mechanism of ‘downward answerability’ of leaders to the community, an aspect that was eliminated by colonialism (Logan, 2011).

Violent conflicts are usually characterised by a breakdown of formal institutions, and it is usually the informal establishments that keep the fragile social fabric together; these traditional entities are very enduring, and traditional leaders have popular support among citizens for they are an embodiment of a community’s identity and intransience (Logan, 2011). Therefore, contentions that emphasise the incapacity of indigenous grassroots institutions to manage and much so participate in peacemaking processes are quite disconcerting. External intervention can choke local capacity when actors insist on analysing conflict situations from biased, contemptuous and sometimes uninformed perspective regarding local realities. Reich (2006) argues that local ownership should involve a power shift that transcends current practices, and local actors should have the ultimate say at the different decision making levels. The input of local actors should be reflected in regional peace processes; IGAD, for instance, made efforts to involve non-armed stakeholders in the Addis Ababa peace process but was challenged by the principal parties; and civil society delegates were relegated to lobbying and observer status (Tubiana, 2014a). These delegates were excluded because SPLM-IO claimed that they were pro-government (Mabor, 2014).

Limited or lack of local ownership actually exacerbates ‘institutional dependency syndrome’, by undermining Africa’s capacity to improve its own institutions (both formal and informal) that take into account local realities; and this is worsened by the presence of conflict entrepreneurs (Allen and Schomerus, 2010). While some scholars have questioned the practicability of the concept of local ownership in development practice, the concept is very relevant especially in conflict and post-conflict societies. Local ownership is achievable when local problems are addressed using local solutions that use indigenous resources. When citizens are quick to respond to the peace and security challenges (Bendix and Stanley, 2008), then they can provide home-grown solutions with external actors playing a supportive role. Local ownership can be viewed as ‘acquired’ when local communities are only involved in the final stages of the processes; external actors conceive, design and fund programmes which are later handed over to local actors to manage (Donais, 2009a; Mateos, 2011; Reich, 2006). This, however, overlooks the political and socio-cultural complexities of local communities and weakens the commitment of local
According to Curtis (2013), peacebuilding processes are characterised by an interaction between the ideas and interests of external and local actors. As a result, local actors are in a position to alter the externally conceived ideas and fit into the indigenous post-conflict environment in which they operate. The alteration demonstrates the local actors’ aspiration to own the processes of peacebuilding in ways that can be best sustained, even in the midst of differing interpretations amongst themselves. Thus international actors’ involvement must be flexible in order to leave room for ‘repackaging’ of ideas to suit local environments. It is important to note that the crafting of African solutions takes a multi-dimensional and multi-actor course of action; for these solutions to be sustainable, the concerned communities should be at the forefront of these processes. Unlike the external actors, the communities of people referred to as ‘cultural neighbours,’ according to Gabbert (2014), will always be there to facilitate reconciliation after hostility, and create mutually beneficial platforms that promote complementarity and interdependency that transcend the transitional period. Sustainability should thus be based on genuine local participation and ownership rather than the durability of external interventions (Kasaija, 2012).

Sustainability of home-grown initiatives hinges on local communities’ ownership of strategies, resources and ideas, and their ability to alter solutions to adapt to changing environments. Sustainability also relates to local communities’ capacity to carry on with projects when external support is rolled-back because peace processes go beyond short-term crisis management.

**Local Ownership in South Sudan Peace Processes**

The violence, which broke out in Juba in December 2013, later spread to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states with insurgents fighting along ethnic lines (Blanchard, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014). Local communities have been severely affected by the conflict, and stakeholders at the grassroots level took on the challenge of finding lasting solutions to the conflict.

These local actors’ involvement in peace initiatives is of importance not only for the resolution of the conflict but also for ensuring sustainable peace (International Crisis Group, 2014). Innovative ways have been utilised by local civil society
organisations and traditional institutions to establish peace markets, village peace committees, women’s peace groups and youth peace initiatives to promote peaceful co-existence among different communities (Wilson, 2014), for purposes of exploring indigenous approaches to peacebuilding. These platforms provide for small but effective dialogue amongst different communities that are caught up in the conflict. At the grassroots level, one is able to collect narratives that citizens have concerning the causes and history of violence; and issues that need to be addressed to promote peaceful co-existence.

Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) have also played an important role in peacebuilding processes at the local level, for instance, the Church Leaders’ Mediation Initiative which is an inter-denominational platform was established to mediate and reconcile communities involved in the conflict. AU Commission of Inquiry (Col) report affirms the critical role of these organisations in peace and reconciliation initiatives. These leaders, for instance, participated in the Jonglei peace talks that led to the signing of a peace agreement between rebel leader David Yau Yau and the government of South Sudan in Addis Ababa (Sudan Tribune, 2014; Yugusk, 2014). The mediation process involved consultations between the local community and the rebel leader; and the community was engaged in monitoring the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement. In a way, the local community contributed to and had ownership of the peace process.

This community-based approach created room for other actors to participate, like the UNMISS delegates, church members, traditional leaders and a joint military team from both the rebel and government forces. The focus of the religious leaders’ involvement was to promote peaceful co-existence among the Jonglei state’s communities caught up in the conflict (Yugusk, 2014). The negotiation processes were upheld as promoting the standard of inclusivity, unlike the Addis Ababa peace-talks that sidelined CSOs. The Addis Ababa peace-talks have been majorly elite-driven, reduced from a multi-stakeholder process to a bilateral negotiation between the principal parties (Tubaina, 2014a); and there has been little connection between the hostile parties and the general population (International Crisis Group, 2014). The warring parties denied South Sudanese CSO representatives the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the Addis Ababa peace process. The behaviour of these actors was self-centred, CSOs had no forum to rectify the injustice because such negotiations do not set inclusiveness as a vital requirement to peace talks, and downplay the importance of civilian participation.
Civil society organisations in South Sudan established a coalition (Citizens for Peace and Justice [CPJ]) to lobby for the participation of civil society during the Addis Ababa peace-talks; the activists asserted that the peace-talks had to be inclusive in order to promote ownership and accountability. Their ‘inclusivity victory’ was short-lived; unlike the narrow political interests of the armed parties, CSOs demanded for general reforms to address the root causes of the conflict; their concerns were related to ending violence and bringing about reconciliation, justice and accountability (CPJ, 2014). When non-armed stakeholders are included in peacebuilding processes, it promotes ‘downward accountability’ and more so local ownership is enhanced.

**Recommendations**

Involving communities ensures that indigenous resources are strategically employed to find solutions for durable peace. These resources are not limited to finances; they include indigenous knowledge of conflict resolution mechanisms and cultural practices. Thus national governments ought to promote multi-stakeholder approaches, and enhance the capacity of local communities to work together with formal and informal institutions to generate innovative solutions. Re-building social infrastructure after conflict involves the participation of all sections of society. This calls for access to information about peacebuilding processes. People have to be availed with information in local languages and there should be media freedom to facilitate the flow of information between government and society. For instance, during the Addis Ababa peace talks, it was difficult for ordinary citizens to get reliable information about the process, and in areas like Lakes state, such information was not available in local languages (Daley, 2015). Having access to information relating to issues like transitional justice, and to resources like land can promote constructive engagement with affected communities and ensure accountability of leaders. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for instance, depends on access to information on the role played by different conflicting parties and their interpretation.

In order to promote home-grown peace initiatives that take into account local values, resources of South Sudan, the ownership of ideas, processes, strategies and outcomes should be emphasised by external and local actors. This is important for the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts in communities affected by the conflict. The capacity of CSOs should be enhanced to engage the government during
the national transitional phase. The civil society should be well positioned to monitor the reforms, for instance, in the security sector and hold the government accountable during the transition period.

**Responsibility to Involve non-armed stakeholders (R2i)**

This concept seeks to address the issue of exclusion, whether competitively or systematically, of non-armed stakeholders in mediation and negotiation peace processes. Current practice reveals that the grassroots organisations and civil society organisations are not empowered to participate meaningfully in peace processes. The IGAD-PLUS-led mediation revealed this injustice, when the warring parties blocked the participation of non-armed stakeholders. Some ended lobbying these parties because they lacked the legitimacy to participate independently. This recommendation seeks to create room at the regional level for the voice of the non-armed stakeholders to be heard without being at the mercy of the belligerents, who at times choose not to invite grassroots organisations to participate. Responsibility to involve embodies the values of ownership, justice, and fair representation, and is a reliable way to promote the participation of local communities in regional initiatives.

Addis Ababa peace process showed that armed parties can manipulate mediators into downplaying the importance of non-armed stakeholders. R2i gives the non-armed stakeholders a legitimate character, this ensures that they are not manipulated or co-opted or pushed about by belligerent parties; or limited to observer status in peace processes that have a great impact on the well-being of local populations in any given conflict situation. R2i would compel mediators and belligerent parties to accommodate non-armed stakeholders as a requirement to establish peace talks; the warring parties would have no influence on which actors are selected to participate; mechanisms would be employed to ensure transparency and accountability.

R2i is proposed as a set of guiding principles (soft law) to address the injustices experienced by non-armed stakeholders during peace processes; with the current status quo, the civil society and grassroots organisations cannot participate meaningfully. R2i would provide a feasible framework that authorises non-armed stakeholders to demand for official participation in peace talks and monitoring the implementation of peace agreements. R2i does not mean that governments
should relinquish their powers to civil society, but rather have the responsibility to create room for other actors at the negotiation table. As an innovative mechanism that would extend legal capacity or personality to non-armed stakeholders in peace negotiations, further research needs to be done into R2i to determine the modalities of its operation. While it may seem quite ambitious an idea, it would go a long way in tackling the issue of systematic exclusion of non-armed grassroots actors in peace processes.

**Conclusion**

The concept of local ownership in promotion of African solutions is important because it promotes legitimacy of peacebuilding strategies. When people are involved in peace processes, it builds trust in the government and mediation team. Every stage of the peacebuilding process represents an opportunity for local level actors to take the lead in setting the agenda, and implementation of peace agreements. In the case of the IGAD-PLUS-led mediation, non-armed stakeholders were sidelined, and a bilateral agreement was reached at the expense of genuine reconciliation and durable peace; this will affect the state-civil society relations negatively during the transition phase.

External actors played an important role as part of IGAD-PLUS to compel armed parties to sign the peace agreement, however, they will not always be there; accordingly there is a need to empower the grassroots organisations to support the initiatives of regional bodies as partners in Africa’s development. The Addis Ababa peace process revealed the disadvantaged position of the civil society, and this calls for a shift from conventional mediation to one that is more accommodative.

Establishing a culture of local ownership and inclusivity in peace processes both at the micro and macro levels is possible. Peace processes would be more complex, but societies would be guaranteed reconciliation and sustainability of peace. South Sudan’s grassroots organisations have the potential to contribute meaningfully to peace process; but they lack legal capacity to act independently. Thus R2i should be adopted as a set of guiding principles (soft law) to promote the legitimacy of non-armed stakeholders as equal partners with armed parties in peace talks.
References


with Ambassador Monica Juma’, Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, Vol. 6 (1), pp 100-102


Peter Karari

Abstract

Morality, trust, social ties, shared institutions, and social capital are in short supply after ethnic wars: ethnic identity is prominent; attachment to collective myths and symbols offensive to other groups is strong; avoidance is legitimate; minority returnees are not welcome; and disputants harbour deep-seated grievances. How can peace and culture of tolerance be nurtured in such a social milieu? (Oberschall, 2007:231).

The statement above represents the challenge of this research. Studies indicate that African conflicts are rooted in complex constructions and conjectures of the continent’s political economies, social identities, and cultural ecologies, each of which is derived from local, national, and regional historical experiences and patterns of engagement with an ever changing world system (Nhema and Zeleza, 2008). These conflicts threaten regional stability, destroy human lives as well as social and physical infrastructure, and place at risk minorities’ fundamental freedoms and human rights. Such a precarious state of events calls for timely and informed interventions to mitigate conflict protraction and virulence. Studies indicate that a civic culture of tolerance and respect for minorities is not conceivable without truth and justice in human affairs (Oberschall, 2007). Therefore, the proliferation of intrastate conflicts around the world has led to the emergence of transitional justice mechanisms which respond to legacies of collective violence and systematic human rights violations in a bid to establish the truth about the past, determine accountability, and offer some form of redress (Van Der Merwe, et al., 2009).

This study investigates the perception and/or experiences of the respondents about ethno-political violence, transitional justice, and peacebuilding in Kenya. Kenyan ethno-political challenge led to the formation of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (TJRC) and the intervention of the International Criminal

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Court (ICC) both of which are highly critiqued by a section of Kenyans for their inadequacy to address the Kenyan problem (Rugene, 2010; Barasa, 2009; Omtata, 2010). Indigenous approaches to peacebuilding, which are thought to be complimentary forces to the ICC and TJRC have their merits and demerits too. This study indicates that neither the dualistic model of TJRC and the ICC nor the Tripartite Hybridity of TJRC, ICC, and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding is adequate enough in facilitating transitional justice in Kenya.

To complement the gaps of the dualistic and tripartite approaches, this study has come up with an experience-based grounded model for transitional justice, peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Kenya informed by the expressed needs and the recommendations of the study participants. Apart from having the tripartite hybridity of TJRC, ICC, and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding, the new model emphasizes the importance of implementing institutional and policy frameworks that would address historical injustices and structural violence ingrained in the Kenyan system in order to mitigate ethno-political violence in the future. If well implemented, the new Kenyan model namely The JET LINERS-RIGS Grounded Approach for peacebuilding and conflict resolution is expected to nurture sustainable peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and transitional justice in Kenya.

Keywords: Responsibility to Protect, Kenyan, Darfur, International Relations Theory

Introduction

The failure of the principle of humanitarian intervention in Darfur, Rwanda, Kosovo, Iraq and other regions of the world in terms of political manipulation and application of double standards, indicates the need for a comprehensive re-evaluation of intervention as an approach for human protection. The failure prompted Canada and other like-minded actors to endorse the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in the UN General assembly of September 2000 (ICISS, 2001). This marked the emergence of the norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P), dedicated to finding some new common grounds on military intervention for the purpose of human protection. To help understand R2P, an overview of the principle of sovereignty and that of humanitarian intervention is essential.
Sovereignty as a Westphalian norm entails the autonomy of every state to run its internal affairs without external interference as entrenched in Article 2.1 of the UN Charter. Sovereignty is the foundation for self-determination of states and their people in relation to their own way of life and their relationship with foreign nations. However, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty attaches more importance to state security than to human security often resulting in mass atrocities and violations of human rights. This was the basis of the critique and re-evaluation of the principle of sovereignty by Canada and other like-minded actors in the General Assembly of September 2000 that eventually led to the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It became apparent that particular states were either perpetrators, unwilling or unable to offer human protection to their citizens. The failure of such states to offer human security warranted external intervention to facilitate human protection and marked the emergence of the principle of humanitarian intervention. More so, the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw an increase in ethnic and intrastate conflicts arising from structural factors such as ethnic geography, weak states, intrastate insecurity; political factors such as intergroup politics, discriminatory political institutions, elite politics and exclusionary ideologies; socio-economic factors such as discriminatory economic structures; and cultural/perceptual factors such as ethnic and cultural discrimination (Dodd, 2014). This further justified the need for humanitarian intervention as a core value for human security and protection. However, humanitarian intervention has been applied on double standards and lacked impartiality as witnessed in the case of Rwandan genocide and Darfur crisis. This led to the emergence of the norm of the R2P aimed at bridging the gaps prevalent in the principle of humanitarian intervention.

This study analyses the 2008 Kenyan crisis and the Darfur crisis (2003-2010) in the lens of R2P. I argue that R2P has not succeeded in its original goal of human protection. Instead, R2P, like the principle of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, has largely been compromised by strategic, political, and economic interests of the international community such as military cooperation, fight against terrorism, democratisation, financial investments, and access to natural resources. First, I will introduce the principle of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and R2P. Then I will discuss and analyse the Darfur and the Kenyan crises in the lens of R2P showing that the implementation of R2P is influenced by the actors’ strategic interests rather than human protection. Third, I will analyse R2P in the lens of
normative international relations theory. Here, I will show that R2P falls short of quality norm. Fourth, I will deconstruct the ideology of AfSol in the Lens of R2P and the Normative International Relations Theory to justify the need for AfSol’s reconstruction in order to effectively address the African problem. Finally, I will introduce and discuss the Jetliners-Rigs Approach for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution indicating how it can complement and bridge the gaps of the AfSol’s ideology of shared values, commitment, and ownership and the zeal for African identity. This discussion will end with some reflective discussion and conclusions.

**Sovereignty**

All members of the United Nations have an interest in maintaining an order of sovereign, self-reliant, responsible, yet interdependent states. In most situations, this interest is best served if all states, large and small, abstain from intervening or interfering in the domestic affairs of other states...The non-interference rule not only protects states and governments, it also protects peoples and cultures, enabling societies to maintain the religious, ethnic, and civilisational differences that they cherish (ICISS, 2001).

The above quotation illustrates the great importance attached to the principle of sovereignty. Sovereignty constitutes the legal identity of a state in the international law to execute overall jurisdiction within its territorial borders guided by its constitution and without external interference as entrenched in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter. Sovereignty as a responsibility has three implications:

First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible and accountable for their acts of commission and omission (ICISS, 2001).

However, in many parts of the world the structures of national authority have abused sovereignty and used it as an instrument for self-aggrandizement. Sovereignty has been used to mask gross violation of human rights around the world (Crocker, et al., 2007). It is important to note that the legitimacy of state sovereignty is derived from the sovereignty of the people; a state loses its sovereignty when it violates the sovereignty of its people. Sovereignty means responsibility for the citizens’ welfare. It is a social contract. The violation of citizen’s rights by a state dishonours
this contract. Failure of the principle of sovereignty and the principle of human rights and human security constitute the only foundations for the protection of vulnerable populations (Marten, 2005: 37). The UN Security Council (UNSC) has a mandate to maintain and restore international peace and security through recommendations and decisive measures in case of threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression as entrenched in Articles 39-51 of UN Charter. Therefore, the principle of the humanitarian intervention comes in handy to bridge the gaps exhibited in the principle of sovereignty (ICISS, 2001).

**Humanitarian Intervention**

The post-World War II (WWII) era has achieved great landmarks in the development of international human rights. Article 1.3 of the UN Charter is dedicated to promoting and encouraging the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions such as race, sex, language or religion. In 1948, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to promote human dignity and freedom of mankind. This was followed closely by the establishment of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. These principles proclaimed human rights as basic and fundamental for all human beings.

With the failure of conventional sovereignty, human rights became the template of states’ conduct in the fight against impunity. The rule of law is best conducted by independent judicial systems of sovereign states unless the national systems of justice are unable to address crimes against humanity thereby inviting universal jurisdiction (ICISS, 2001). The principle of human rights goes hand in hand with the principle of human security. Human security bridges the gaps in the Westphalian state centred security by focusing on people’s physical safety, economic and social well-being, respect for dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human and fundamental rights and freedoms (Ibid). However, humanitarian intervention has of late been critiqued by human rights activists for its double standards and political manipulation. The failure of humanitarian intervention as a tool for human protection led to the emergence of the R2P as a new norm aimed at improving human protection in crisis situations.
Responsibility to Protect

Sovereignty entails responsibilities as well as rights. States have the primary responsibility for their citizens, but in circumstances where states commit war crimes against their own citizens, the international community has an obligation and a duty to those citizens — a “responsibility to protect” (ICISS, 2001). The responsibility to protect is a new liberal peace initiative for military interventions meant for human protection and peacebuilding. R2P ensues when “major harm to civilians is occurring and the state in question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator” (ICISS, 2001:16).

Military intervention for the purpose of human protection is entrenched in various legal frameworks including: the fundamental natural law principles, human rights provisions of the UN Charter, UDHR, Geneva Conventions and additional protocols on international humanitarian law, and Statute of the International Criminal Court (Ibid). The R2P is based on the following principles: one, it decentralizes the intervention from the point of view of the affected communities rather than the interveners; two, it gives the primary responsibility to the target state and it is only when such a state is unable, unwilling, or is itself the perpetrator that the International community intervenes; three, R2P goes beyond the ‘responsibility to react’, it shoulders the burden of the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild” (ICISS, 2001:16-17).

R2P has six criteria for military interventions namely: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects (Ibid: 32). These criteria stipulate clear rules and legitimacy for military intervention with minimal human costs or institutional damage, and better prospects for sustainable peace (ICISS, 2001:11).

The Darfur Crisis

The Darfur crisis (2003-2010) was characterised by massive atrocities and violations of human rights (UN Mission, Sudan, 2005). In the course of this crisis, about 100,000 people were killed, more than 200,000 sought refuge in other countries, approximately 2,000,000 people were internally displaced persons (IDPs), and approximately 3,000,000 people, half of Darfur’s entire population, were in dire need of humanitarian assistance (UN Mission, Sudan, 2005). Other accounts
indicate that the actual statistics could be much higher than indicated considering the unaccounted cases in areas controlled by the government funded Janjaweed Militias (Coebergh, 2005).

While the Government of Sudan (GoS) has failed in its primary responsibility to protect, the international community has also turned a blind eye to the Darfur crisis (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005). The Darfur crisis emanates from the exclusion of Darfur from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Khartoum and Southern Sudan, competition for scarce resources between the farmers and pastoralists, racism between the Arabs and the Africans, proliferation of small arms, and marginalisation and vulnerability of the peripheral communities in Sudan (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2004). This has led to the struggle for power and the emergence of militias including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) (ICG, 2005). The Janjaweed has indiscriminately used superior weapons supplied by Russia and China for blanket bombing of unarmed civilians in Darfur resulting in gross human rights violations (De Waal, 2004). The 2005 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) describes the Darfur crisis as genocide and the GoS as having an intention to commit genocide. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2005) and HRW (2003), the hope for Sudanese peace has been the CPA which strives to address the distribution of resources, institutional reforms, and power sharing between the North and the South. However, at the centre of CPA are strategic interests of the powerful states which have compromised the R2P in Darfur (USAID, 2004).

The Darfur Crisis in the Lens of R2P

While the GoS, the Janjaweed and other affiliate militias have committed atrocities and failed to protect the people of Darfur, the international community has a moral duty to act by exerting political pressure on the GoS, protecting the civilians, providing humanitarian relief to the victims of atrocities, and rebuilding of the tattered sources of livelihood (UN, 2004). The silence of the international community is the greatest inefficiency in collective security and a great test for R2P in Darfur (Slim, 2004). While impartiality is the central pillar for human protection and while such should be executed efficiently and timely, the Darfur crisis has remained at the mercy of political, strategic, and economic interests of powerful nations while the victims continue to suffer (Ibid). Reports indicate that
despite early warnings by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), Amnesty International (AI), ICG, and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) about the inevitable crisis in Darfur, the international community maintained the conspiracy of not to see (AI, 2003). The entry of the international community and the international news media in Darfur occurred after a forced displacement of approximately one million people (ICG, 2005). The GoS media propaganda simplified the actual situation in Darfur by denying human rights activists, journalists and humanitarian agencies access to Darfur (Slim, 2004). Other impediments to R2P in Darfur include poor infrastructure, insecurity, harsh weather, bureaucracy, funding constraints, logistical challenges, poor coordination of humanitarian agencies, and the curfew by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) for the safety of UN workers (IASC, 2005). While most of these impediments could be addressed by the GoS and the international community, none took that responsibility; instead, the focus was on their strategic interests such as dominance in oil concessions and exploration. The deployment of humanitarian staff in Darfur has also been inefficient and slow; while it took two months for humanitarian agencies to deploy ten staff in Darfur, the same agencies were able to deploy a hundred people to cater for Tsunami victims in two weeks (IASC, 2005). This discrepancy indicates the failure of the principle of humanitarian intervention due to double standards applied by the international community in its implementation.

The implementation of R2P was also hindered by GoS manipulation of the principle of sovereignty. While the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has a direct responsibility to cater for the Darfur refugees outside Sudan, the GoS (perpetrator) evoked the principle of sovereignty to claim responsibility over the IDPs. The mission of R2P in Darfur has also been impeded by mislabelling. A variety of labels such as “humanitarian crisis” or “humanitarian emergency” has contributed to the diversion of attention from the root causes of the crisis such as resources, governance, and land (Straw and Benn, 2004). The Darfur crisis is not only humanitarian but also a political crisis which calls for a more focused and defined political intervention; it requires the political will of the GoS and continued pressure from the international community (Egeland, 2005). The failure of R2P in Darfur could also be attributed to the prioritisation of the North-South CPA agenda over Darfur (Slim, 2004). Again, this prioritisation is based on strategic interests. The international actors believed that the success of CPA would result in
power sharing, good governance, sharing of resources, and institutional reforms becoming a gate-way to the international actors’ interests in Sudan’s vast mineral deposits. They feared that putting pressure on Khartoum over Darfur could lead to the collapse of the CPA hence jeopardizing the actors’ strategic interests. Precisely, the CPA is too important to the west than the Darfur crisis which compromises the R2P. Evoking sovereignty, Khartoum has strongly opposed foreign military intervention and instead endorsed the African Union (AU) terming Darfur crisis as a domestic matter (Reuters, 2005).

Khartoum’s refusal of foreign military intervention is strongly backed by African countries under the banner of “African solutions for African problems” (AU Summit, 2004). This banner is defeatist in nature because the crisis in Sudan, like other crises that have occurred in Rwanda, Egypt, Libya, Burundi, Nigeria (Boko Haram), Southern Sudan, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, to mention but a few, has both domestic and international causes and implications. While AfSol’s banner seems to prevent international interventionism in African problems, it is hard to believe that there is a problem that can be entirely African in our contemporary globalized world. The R2P transcends Africanisation of solutions; it is about co-operative responsibility for human protection. To facilitate sustainable conflict transformation in Darfur, both the African states and the west must be involved actively. Despite the ‘Africanisation’ of Darfur crisis and the endorsement of the role of AU in the crisis by UNSC through resolutions 1556 and 1564 of 2004, the international community should be allowed to provide technical, financial, and logistical support to the AU Mission which is key in pressurising Khartoum to adopt a ceasefire (AU, 2004; DFID, 2005). The interests of the West in Darfur crisis are also embedded in the war against terror; with al-Shabaab in neighbouring Somalia; it is largely feared that a failed Sudan would become a haven for terrorists, therefore, compromising the strategic interests of the west (Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2005). This discussion shows that R2P in Darfur is affected by a multiplicity of actors’ interests and hence its success depends on collaborative action between all actors including the international community, rebels, AU, GoS, and most importantly, the people of Sudan. However, the required solidarity among various actors in Darfur crisis is elusive; for example, while the AU appealed for 6,000 soldiers for the peace mission in Darfur, only less than a third were deployed (UNSC, 2004). The vast mineral resources and especially oil has been the springboard for action or inaction by various actors
in the Darfur crisis. China and Russia continue arming the Janjaweed Militias in order to aggravate Darfur crisis and hence continue controlling the oil concessions and the arms market. Multi-national companies such as China National Petroleum Cooperation (China), Elf, Total, and Fina (Belgian and French), and Chevron (USA), have heavily invested in Sudan (Washington Post, 2004). The scramble for restructuring of Sudan oil concessions by the international community in the event of successful CPA is a challenge to the commitment to R2P.

As a result of the economic and strategic interests of the USA, Russia, China, Belgium, French and other actors in Sudan, the UNSC has had challenges with internal divisions, power brokerage, and vetoing over the Darfur crisis. It was not until 2004 that the UNSC succeeded in pushing for resolutions 1556 and 1564 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter declaring the Darfur crisis a threat to international peace and security and recommending the disarming of the Janjaweed, arms embargo, economic and diplomatic sanctions, and military action in the case of non-compliance (UNSC, 2005). Most of the international actors with strategic interests in Sudan, led by China and Russia, vetoed or abstained against these resolutions. The report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) describes this as a failure in the cooperative spirit of R2P (2005). The conflict between R2P and strategic interests of the international community has emboldened the GoS and the Janjaweed militias to continue the massacres of the people of Darfur (HRW, 2004). This calls for the UNSC to redefine the Darfur Mission and address strategic interests that have compromised R2P. All actors must monitor the compliance of the GoS and unite in the implementation of the agreed sanctions. Strategic interests in Sudan have led to divisions in the UNSC on recommendation by ICID to refer the case to the International Criminal Court. Actors in the Darfur crisis must shelve their strategic interests and invest in shared responsibilities in order to nurture the R2P (UN, 2004).

**The 2008 Kenyan Ethno-political Violence and the Responsibility to Protect**

US has a strong interest in the political stability of Kenya. Kenya is too important to fail. It is not me saying this; this is shared by the highest level of my Government, America’s ambassador to Kenya, Michael Rannerberger, 2009

The statement above indicates a change of language. In the case of Darfur, the international community assumed the conspiracy of not to see; in the Kenyan
situation the language changes to that of “too important to fail.” This reminds us of George Orwell’s satire in his Animal Farm (1946) thus, “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others…Four legs good, two legs better!” This lack of impartiality is a challenge to the ethics of R2P. Kenya has a history of ethnic violence (Anderson, 2002:531). Bloody ethnic clashes occurred in 1992, 2001, and 2008 (Mueller, 2008). But, it was after the 2008 disputed presidential elections that the violence almost spread into genocide with 1,500 people killed, 500,000 displaced, extensive pillaging and crimes against humanity committed (Karari, 2014). However, the speed at which the international community intervened in the Kenyan crisis differs with the reluctance to intervene witnessed in Rwanda and Darfur. To illustrate how “important” Kenya is, in only less than two months into post-election violence, more than thirty eminent people from all over the world flew to Kenya for mediation.

The international community led by USA, EU, UN, and AU literally camped in Kenya reiterating that the country’s stability was an asset to regional and global importance and that the world would not watch as it sank. This indicates a lack of impartiality in the execution of R2P; that R2P has been compromised by political, strategic and economic interests of the international community. Kenya is referred to as “America’s indispensable partner”; her economic, political and strategic importance is equalled to that of Egypt to the north, South Africa to the South and Nigeria to the west (Nation Newspapers (DN), 2010). Kenya is the base for the US war against terror in the Horn of Africa and part of Middle East. With multiple failed states in East, Central and the Horn of Africa, Kenya is important in the West’s war against terror. The failure of Kenya could open a new haven for terrorism, which is a threat to strategic and political interests of the West (Joel, 2004). The US Air Force is permitted to land military aircraft on Kenyan airports within 24 hours’ notice while the Kenyan ports along the Indian Ocean harbours the US Navy (DN 2010). In return, Kenya enjoys economic and military aid from the USA. The failure of Kenya would thus jeopardize American interests in the East and the Horn of Africa.

Having been among the most stable democracies and a haven of peace in East, Central, and the Horn of Africa, Kenya has been instrumental in brokering peace in the surrounding conflict laden countries such as DRC, Uganda, Somalia, and Sudan. The country is a home to over a million refugees from around Africa including Sudanese, Ethiopians, Ugandans, Somalis, Burundians, Rwandese, and
Congolese, among others (UNHCR, 2010). Kenya’s failure would thus endanger the lives of hundreds of thousand refugees living in various camps in the country resulting in a regional humanitarian crisis. Kenya’s access to the Indian Ocean makes the country the gateway to East and Central Africa’s landlocked countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC and South Sudan. The 2008 Kenyan violence severed humanitarian supplies, communication and trade with these countries, leading to a regional crisis especially in consumable goods and petroleum. It is popularly said that when Kenya sneezes, East Africa catches a cold (DN, 2010). Kenya is the regional economic hub and centre for major transnational road and railway routes. The annual US aid to Kenya is $1 billion out of a total of $5.6 billion to the entire African continent (Ibid). Kenya has a fibre-optic cable system “The East African Marine Systems” that extends from the United Arab Emirates, linking the country to the entire African region and benefiting the rest of Africa with access to fast internet (The Free Library, 2010). The Kenyan economy is so integrated to the larger Africa and the globe that any negative effect snowballs to the rest of the world. Kenya is considered as one of the “anchor states of Africa” — all the world major powers have robust diplomatic missions in Nairobi (DN, 2010). The largest US embassy in sub-Saharan Africa is in Nairobi. Alongside Vienna, New York, Rome, and Geneva, Kenya hosts the UN headquarters in Nairobi. Nairobi is the home to the UN-Habitat, UNEP, and a multiple other UN agencies accounting for Kenya’s twenty per cent foreign exchange. Kenya is also the African home of Bretton Woods institutions and a multiple other multi-national corporations, INGOs and NGOs. Conclusively, strategic interests formed the basis for selective intervention for human protection in Kenya indicating a lack of impartiality in the R2P. To what extent then does R2P qualify as a norm?

**R2P in the Lens of the Normative International Relation Theory**

The above discussion indicates that R2P has two faces; it is a norm and a policy agenda. As Viotti and Kauppi (2009) put it, norms prescribe what the world should be and what ought to be the right conduct, requiring people and states to act against their self-interests. Norms are socially embedded prescriptions that guide individual conduct and behaviour. Conformity to norms is influenced by internal motivations and sanctions. However a myriad of uncertainties surround the institution of norms. These include the emergence and internalisation of norms, the forces that influence conformity to norms, the process of enforcement of norms in social relations, and the sustainability of norms over time. These
issues are central to analysing R2P as a norm in international relations (IR). While the emergence of R2P was influenced by the need to protect human beings from acts of genocide and catalysed by the failure of the principles of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, its failure lies in strategic interests of actors (Slim, 2008). The lack of definitive sanctions against the international actors for their inaction, non-conformity or non-compliance discredits the quality of R2P as a norm. Various theories critique the qualification of R2P as a norm. While norms are shared expectations for appropriate behaviour among actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1988); not all actors have shared expectations related to Darfur. Actors in Darfur are motivated by self-interests and this disqualifies R2P as a norm. R2P was disqualified as a norm when the international community united to rescue Kenya from the brink of collapse but failed in the case of Darfur. However, a norm should be consistent in its social functions (Evans, 2007). The International Court of Justice (2007) indicates that the practice of R2P in Darfur deviates from the international frameworks of shared expectations. The main challenges of R2P as a norm are indeterminacy, the lack of definite criteria for action, and uncertainty of expectations. While the R2P clearly stipulates the role of state in the protection of citizens, that of the international community lacks specificity and clarity (Franck, 1990).

The determinacy of a norm is directly proportional to compliance pull. The stronger the compliance pull, the greater the motivation for the international community to act in solidarity towards the accomplishment of common goals (Mepham, 2006). The indeterminacy of the international community’s role in the case of Darfur reduces the compliance pull and hence increases the challenge in the implementation of R2P (Feinstein, 2007). The clear determinacy in the case of Kenya enhanced the compliance pull and nurtured the political will among the Kenyan leaders and the international actors. The question, however, is whether the Kenyan success can be attributed entirely to R2P or if it was a smokescreen by the international actors to guard their strategic interests. If the international community had no strategic interests in Kenya, it is doubtful if the Kenyan case could have been treated any differently from that of Darfur and Rwanda (Bellamy and Williams, 2009). Precisely, the question still lingers whether R2P is a norm or just another policy tool for the superpowers to guard their interests in the world (Barbour and Gorlick, 2008). However, this discussion has shown that the compliance of actors within the framework of R2P is motivated by self-interests.
This conflicts with the original goal that led to the emergence of R2P and discredits its quality and reliability (Symons, 2007). Conclusively, R2P requires restructuring to enhance its compliance pull and hence its performance. There is a need to explore other ideologies that could complement R2P. Such an ideology is AfSol. The following discussion analyses the relevance of AfSol in facilitating African-centred solutions for peace, security, and governance.

**AfSol in the Lens of R2P, Normative International Relations Theory, and the Jetliners-Rigs Approach for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution**


This was followed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the IPSS and the AU Peace and Security Department, in which the former “committed to train, research and promote African ownership by developing approaches better adapted to African realities” (IPSS, 2014). Based on the Tripoli Declaration, IPSS brought together a group of experts for a workshop on African-Centred Solutions to African Peace and Security Problems (AfSol) from 26th to 27th September 2014 with an objective of redefining and refining “the concept of AfSol through presentations and in-depth discussions and debates” (Ibid). Following this workshop, the experts came up with a common understanding in which the ideals of ownership, commitment, and shared values were seen as foundational in nurturing African-centred solutions in peace and security. However, the big question is whether the AfSol ideology is realistic, achievable, and/or implementable amidst socio-economic, political, and strategic interests and complex and diversified ethno-political and ethno-cultural identities.

**Critical Deconstruction of AfSol’s Ideology:** As we have seen in this discussion, the effectiveness of R2P has been compromised by strategic, economic, and political factors including the impartiality of the UNSC, the scramble for natural resources, war on terrorism, military investments, and media, among others. As
we proceed to nurture the ideology of AfSol, a major challenge would be how the three Pillars of AfSol namely; Commitment, Ownership, and Shared Values will overcome the aforementioned strategic, political, and economic forces that influence R2P. While the effectiveness of R2P could benefit from the ideology of AfSol, the challenge is how to ensure conformity and sustainability of compliance to AfSol’s Pillars amidst a myriad of strategic, economic, and political interests by African countries. Towards the deconstruction of AfSol, it is important to note that shared values, commitment, and ownership cannot be nurtured on a shaky foundation, instead, these principles require a fertile ground characterized by integrity, good leadership and governance, democracy, human rights, rule of law, socioeconomic empowerment, security, and peace, among others. Unfortunately, the reality on the ground indicates that Africa is embroiled in negative ethnicity, corruption, impunity, dictatorship, poverty, and dependency on foreign aid. The report by Transparency International indicates that nine out of the twenty most corrupt countries in the world are in Africa; all African countries, except four, have scored less than 50 in a scale of 0 to 100 as per the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2014 (IPSS, 2014). Further reports indicate that 80% of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of AU budget comes from external funding (Ibid). How then is AfSol’s dream of nurturing African identities and realities possible while we continue being dependent on foreign funding? Can “African Solutions” thrive under dependency? Remember, “He who pays the piper calls the tune.” The success of AfSol’s ideology requires sustainable socio-economic independence (UN, 2004).

While AfSol is committed to nurture approaches that are adapted to African realities, studies indicate that in the age of globalisation, social, economic, political, and technological interconnectedness cannot allow pure isolationism and/or independence (Cochrane and Pain, 2004). While Pan-Africanism ideology was a front against colonialism as a common enemy (Mazrui, 2008), do we have a common enemy or a common ground for unity and action facing neo-colonial Africa that warrants the ideology of AfSol? While AfSol’s principles emphasize on African identity and values, do we have identities and values universal to the entire African continent? And is the concept of having universal African values practical, possible, and/or feasible? Were African values not adversely eroded by colonial ideologies of divide and rule and later by neo-colonialism, modernism and globalisation? If the nation states of Africa themselves are embroiled in ethno-
nationalism rather than national identity, how is African identity even possible? Has AfSol swallowed more than it can chew? Is it not more feasible to start by addressing ethno-nationalism, nurturing national identities, and then moving on to African identity? Is the clamour for “African-solutions” not a smokescreen, a face-saving phrase, or a deviatory tactic used by African elites to cover impunity, evade prosecution, and sustain their selfish political interests? Instead of the narrative of “African Solutions” that seems to be misplaced and embroiled in myriad uncertainties, why don’t we embrace best practices (Yimer, 2015) that have worked elsewhere in the world and tailor them to our African context? But even then how can such best practices be nurtured without being compromised by selfish political elites?

AfSol also emphasizes on the embracement of home-grown approaches or African Traditional Methods (ATMs) indicating that the owners of local conflicts know best their solutions. While such an assertion could be true, studies indicate that indigenous mechanisms have been compromised by globalisation and modern superstructures (Karari, 2014). For example, the widely acclaimed Gacaca courts have been critiqued for violating the rights of the accused; politicisation and interference of the court process by the ruling regime; victimisation of political opponents by the ruling regime; destruction of evidence implicating supporters of the ruling regime; forced participation in the Gacaca process; and lack of official representation of the accused (Ibid).

AfSol’s Try Africa First initiative (IPSS, 2014) which seeks to encourage Africans to prevent and manage African conflicts by themselves is a great idea but what if it fails? Is there a Plan B amidst the clamour for isolationism and independence? If Try Africa First fails, will Africa revert to international interventionism or will it persevere to collapse under the banner of African Solutions. Is the framework for Africa to address its own challenges without resorting to external interventionism implementable, realistic, or even conceivable in our globalized world where the action or inaction of one party anywhere in the world affects the rest of the world? Will the international community sit and watch their citizens get affected by the inaction emanating from the call for African solutions?

The value of ownership proposed by AfSol is also a great idea but not without a few critiques. One would ask ownership for what? And how is this ownership going to be nurtured, sustained in Africa’s diversified value system? Ownership
would require active participation and involvement of all people and institutions at all levels but so far AfSol remains at the experts’ and AU levels. How is the AfSol "brand" going to trickle down to involve the people at the grassroots so that ownership can be nurtured? When the experts propose inclusiveness and accommodation of African diversity as a means of nurturing African identity, how do they plan to marry multiple diversities, identities, and value systems that characterise the continent? Are all African states interested in the proposed African identity? And even if the nation states may be interested, do the people that make these states care about an African identity? And how do we measure whether people are interested? By conducting a continental referendum? How many African states can even claim to have a national identity? Is it, therefore, not more practical to nurture national identities before moving on to continental identity? At the grassroots level, all that common citizens care about is the basic survival for their families (Karari, 2014). Will an African identity add value to the life of the commoners? For the AfSol brand to succeed, it needs to resonate with the expressed needs of the target groups.

From the aforementioned, AfSol’s greatest challenge remains to market and sell the AfSol brand and at the same time nurture a common ground that accommodates multiple identities and diversities that characterize the African nation states and the African people. AfSol experts argue that shared values between African Nation states would in the long run nurture a continental identity (IPSS, 2014). But what are those values that are shared between African nation states and would they be enough to nurture a compliance-pull towards an African identity? Do we also have some values that are not shared within the African nation states? If so, what are those values? If opposing or non-complimentary values exist, will they not impede the compliance-pull towards achieving an African identity? And how does AfSol plan to address non-complementarity of values and its effect on the compliance-pull? AfSol experts argue that shared history and geography constitute the basis of shared values (Ibid). But are we talking about pre-colonial or post-colonial shared history and geography? Was pre-colonial African geography not dismantled by colonial divide and rule? And if we are talking about post-colonial geography, what geography is this and how will it influence our shared values? While colonialism constitutes an example of Africa’s shared history, does it really nurture the compliance-pull towards African identity? Can AfSol bank its hope on shared geography and history as the background of nurturing African identity?
Africa might have shared history and geography, but times have changed, different African countries and people have their own priorities, expressed needs, ways of life, structure of leadership and governance. Therefore, shared history and geography do not guarantee African identity. If we find the answer to the how of nurturing a common African identity amidst the existing multiple diversities, priorities, needs, and complexities, then AfSol could be a great ideology.

**AfSol in the Lens of Normative International Relations Theory:** At this point, it is critical to evaluate AfSol as a norm based on Normative International Relations Theory. Norms are socially embedded prescriptions that guide individual conduct and behaviour (Viotti and Kauppi, 2009). Conformity to norms is influenced by internal motivations and sanctions. Therefore, AfSol prescriptions while not seen as sanctions should facilitate motivation to ensure active participation, commitment, and ownership of the AfSol brand by the target groups. AfSol must cope with the uncertainties exhibited in the institution of norms. For example, how will AfSol reinforce the internalisation of its values? How will AfSol influence conformity to its values, the enforcement, and sustainability of the same? How does AfSol address inaction, non-conformity or non-compliance to its values?

Studies indicate that norms are shared expectations of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1988). However, the reality is that all African nation states do not have shared expectations and/or identities. How then do AfSol’s three values qualify as a norm? How will AfSol facilitate compliance-pull to ensure shared values amidst the diversities of Africa nation states? If the embracement of AfSol’s values is compromised by socio-economic, political, and strategic interests, who will be answerable for it? In other words, where does the bulk stop? Who is responsible for implementing AfSol values? The main challenges of AfSol ideology as a norm are lack of a common ground, indeterminacy, lack of a definite criteria for action, lack of clarity, and uncertainty of expectations. AfSol’s implementation process and the roles of nation states, institutions, and the people at all levels lack specificity and clarity, an aspect that will definitely compromise compliance-pull. The determinacy of a norm is directly proportional to compliance-pull; the stronger the compliance-pull, the greater the motivation for action, commitment, ownership, and sustainability (Mepham, 2006; Feinstein, 2007). In the case of AfSol, what will motivate compliance-pull at governmental, institutional, civil society, and citizenry levels? Is AfSol yet another policy tool for African bureaucrats to further their political agendas, evade
prosecution, and avoid international interventionism? With all these uncertainties, how can AfSol nurture a common language, a collective African value system, a common ground and identity, cooperate compliance and rebranding that is acceptable to the African people and governments?

From the foregoing, the AfSol initiative requires rebranding in order to bridge the inherent gaps and uncertainties. Towards the rebranding of the AfSol initiative, this study proposes the integration of the Jetliners-Rigs Approach for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution (Jetliners Approach). The discussion below will apply the Jetliner concept to real situations and more so explain how the Jetliner idea can be made practical within the framework of AfSol.

Rebranding AfSol in the Lens of the Jetliners-Rigs Approach for Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

The Jetliners Approach is a holistic, integrative, and experience-based model for transitional justice, peacebuilding and conflict resolution derived from a 2012 study carried out in Kenya. Since violence and conflicts are complex, this model offers a grounded initiative that focuses on local dynamics and interventionism. This is in respect to the fact that our communities are central to the solution of their problems and hence the need to invest in cultural knowledge (Hurlbert and Mulvale, 2011; Lederach, 2005). To nurture African solutions for African problems, the following elements of the Jetliners approach need to be embraced: justice, equity, equality, and fairness; socio-economic empowerment; Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commissions; land policy; indigenous approaches to peacebuilding and conflict resolution; national ideology and identity; formal, informal and civic education; non-violent revolution/renaissance; security, safety and the rule of law; institutional and constitutional reforms; the International Criminal Court; good leadership and governance; and cross-community interactions, dialogue, and sharing.

Using the Jetliners approach, I argue that: (a) AfSol’s values cannot be nurtured in a vacuum, they need a fertile ground on which they can grow, develop, and get owned up by the African people; (b) AfSol’s values cannot exist alone, they need to link with the institutions of governance and embrace the expressed needs of target groups at all levels; (c) AfSol’s values cannot be nurtured within the corrosive environment characterised by impunity, corruption, bad leadership, ethnicity, poverty, and dependency. The Jetliners Approach looks at Africa as a
jetliner and AfSol’s principles of Commitment, Shared values, and Ownership as the three wheels of a jetliner. I argue that the effectiveness of AfSol’s principles of Commitment, Shared values, and Ownership needs to address historical and structural injustices through reinforcing the principles of the Jetliners approach. I also argue that the effectiveness of AfSol’s principles of Commitment, Shared values, and Ownership requires addressing the heavy chains of corruption, impunity, ethnicity, poverty, dependency, bad leadership and governance that continue to bedevil Africa. This Jet (Africa) does not only require the three wheels (the AfSol values) i.e. Shared values, Ownership, and Commitment to take off, but also other inputs including the pilot (good leadership and governance); the engine (socio-economic empowerment); aircraft servicing (institutional/constitutional reforms); flight attendants (cross-community interactions); safety demonstration (security, safety, rule of law and civic education), among other things.

The success of AfSol’s initiative requires networking and interdependence between African nations. The Multi-Track Diplomacy emphasizes the importance of intra-systemic relationships in determining pathways of communication, sharing of resources, and opportunities for mutual enrichment (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 156). Intra-systemic action would nurture social and political spaces for a safe flight to target destination i.e. African Identity. The Jetliners is a grounded peacebuilding model based on the belief that our communities are central to the solution of their conflicts. AfSol’s dream of nurturing African identity, therefore, requires the involvement of target groups, using their value systems to inform the solution, as well as looking at their problems as opportunities (Hurlbert and Mulvale, 2011; Weinstein, et al, 2010). Below is a discussion of various components of the Jetliners approach indicating on how they inform AfSol’s values and the vision of African identity.

**Justice, Equity, Equality, and Fairness**

African identity must be based on justice, equity, equality, and fairness. However, in many African countries, justice is skewed and it is influenced by power and exists for the highest bidder favouring those at the centre and marginalizing those at the peripheries (Hurlbert, 2011). Therefore, AfSol’s dream for an African identity should target to address historical and structural injustices that characterise its people. The jetliners model does not conceive the target groups as “passive passengers” but as “active passengers” able to productively engage the cabin crew
(leadership) on affirmative action that accommodates the dynamics and expressed needs of the African people.

**Socio-economic Empowerment**

Nurturing an African identity that embraces the AfSol’s ideology of shared values, ownership, and commitment requires reaching out to the marginalized groups, protecting life opportunities for future generations, and preserving the natural systems on which all life depends (Hurlbert and Mulvale, 2011). Neither AfSol’s dream of an African identity nor the principles of shared value, commitment, and ownership can be nurtured under deprivation (Ahere, 2012; Mkangi and Githaiga, 2012). Studies indicate that violence occurs when people’s human needs are denied or frustrated (Schirch, 2004: 22). To facilitate a compliance-pull towards African identity, the AfSol initiative and African governments must invest on socio-economic empowerment of the peripheral groups by liberalizing access to political power, basic services, and opportunities based on sound economic policies that accommodate complex diversities and differential development (MacGinty, 2008; Dayton and Kriesberg, 2009).

**Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commissions**

In Africa, the process of establishing truth about historical injustices is often compromised by political influences, repression, and subordination (Hinton, 2011). The top-down facilitation of this form of restorative justice disempowers the target beneficiaries and compromises trust-building, ownership, and legitimacy of the process (Woolford, 2009). African identity cannot be achieved when large sections of African population thrive under transgenerational trauma and injustices (Wilson, 2001). African identity and the embedded AfSol values should be founded on healing and reconciliation of the African continent and its people. AfSol in conjunction with the African governments, need to nurture spaces in which victims of historical injustices can tell their stories and obtain justice (Schirch, 2004). African identity requires accommodation of local experiences and priorities and restorative justice process that addresses historical and structural inequalities (Woolford, 2009).

**Land Policy**

The colonial displacement and post-colonial disproportionate land allocation and
distribution dispossessed huge sections of African population of their greatest source of identity—land (Ahere, 2012: 27-40). Conflicts relating to land are potentially explosive because they are non-negotiable and zero-sum (McGarry and O’Leary, 1993: 16). AfSol, in collaboration with African leaders should address land grievances through restitution, harmonisation of laws and policy on land tenure and ownership (Ndung’u, 2006). Restitution should not create a new wave of dispossession, rewarding some while depriving others; it must be balanced and committed to bringing satisfaction to both the victims and perpetrators of land appropriation.

**Indigenous approaches to Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution**

Indigenous approaches to peacebuilding as forms of transitional justice should be central to AfSol’s initiative because they are community-based, ritualistic, value-based, sustainable, and able to promote local ownership and hence identity. AfSol and African government need to invest in Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism entrenched in track two (unofficial diplomacy) of the Multi-Track Diplomacy which have gained importance in peacebuilding due to the complexity and intractability of intra-state conflicts (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 3-4). To nurture indigenous approaches, AfSol’s initiative should empower the community and invest in local innovation in addressing protracted conflicts. AfSol’s dream of African identity must be rooted in social knowledge, which is central to peacebuilding and conflict resolution (Lederach, 1995: 120).

**National Ideology and Identity**

In Africa, ethno-nationalism has compromised state-nationalism and identity (Wamwere, 2008). This indicates the challenge of even achieving AfSol’s dream of African identity. Ethno-nationalism is sustained by the benefits derived from being a member of a group which provides psychological distinctiveness for the in-groups and out-groups (Oberschall, 2007:4). Therefore, the embracement of a continental identity requires that steady supply of common benefits are maintained and sustained in order to nurture a sense of belongingness. In a critical perspective, however, Kimenyi (1997:41) observes that, “any idea that one can make a diversity of people into a nation by suppressing their identities and affiliations to which they attach their highest significance is simply a nonstarter.” National loyalty cannot instantaneously supplant ethnic loyalty; it has to be built on top of ethnic
loyalty by creating a system in which all the ethnic groups feel that there is room for self-expression (Ibid). Therefore, AfSol’s push for African identity should not supplant ethnic or national identity; it should endear and engage ethnic groups and nation states to embrace both local and continental values. Ethnic groups will share collective goods if they have similar tastes and preferences for such collective goods. AfSol’s initiative for African identity should invest in African collective symbols such as celebration of holidays, naming of streets, public monuments, AU flag, common currency, African passport and representative decision making processes (Oberschall, 2007: 6). Identity is not static; it is dynamic and under constant definition and redefinition. Therefore, transition from ethnic and national identities into African identity requires the capacity to understand and respect the role of identity framing as a means of protecting a sense of peoplehood and deeply felt demands across Africa (Lederach, 2003: 55).

**Formal, Informal and Civic Education**

AfSol and AU must invest in Track five of the multi-track diplomacy which indicates that research, training and education in peacebuilding and conflict resolution is key in policy formulation and action plans (Diamond and McDonald, 1996:70). Colonial and post-colonial preferential formal education policies created differential socio-economic development across ethno-political divide, giving some ethnic groups a head start while leaving others behind. Affirmative action should be embraced in education policies to ensure that peripheral groups are given opportunities to participate in education. Indigenous education is key in nurturing traditional values that hold the communities together (Lederach, 1995: 111). AfSol’s initiative must invest in elicitive rather than prescriptive models; elicitive education nurtures cultural knowledge that addresses expressed needs of the local contexts (Lederach, 1995: 55).

**Non-violent Systemic Revolution/Renaissance**

AfSol’s hope for African identity cannot be nurtured when large sections of the continent thrive under dictatorship and oppression. Track six of the Multi-track diplomacy — Activism — is key in changing institutions and policies through political action (Diamond and McDonald, 1996:87). Grassroots action and leadership are critical in opposing actions and policies that are oppressive and detrimental to peace and justice (Ibid). While a non-violent systemic revolution is
vital for transitional justice, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution in Africa, it is hard to achieve when the oppressive regime remains in power and in control of key resources. Therefore, effective non-violent systemic revolution in Africa requires AfSol to push for institutional reforms in order to guarantee spaces, safety and security for civil activists. “Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed” (Schirch, 2004: 67).

**Security, Safety and the Rule of Law**

African continent continues being under security dilemma. The security dilemma approach holds that violence thrives due to insecurity, threat to group identity, and deprivation (Toft, 2003:8; Rothman, 1992: 38). The AfSol initiative for African identity and values should nurture the conditions and guarantee for peace including security, dignity, rule of law, access to basic needs and an inclusive and democratic process across Africa (Wolff, 2006: 166). AfSol and AU should assess the expressed needs for safety and security and recommend enactment of policies that address such needs across different African nation states.

**Institutional and Constitutional Reforms**

Intra-state violence in Africa partly thrives because post-independence African regimes neither nurtured institutional arrangements that define relationships between ethnic groups nor developed social contracts that advance liberty and freedom (Kimenyi, 1997: 45). The choice of appropriate democratic institutions—forms of devolution or autonomy, electoral system design, legislative bodies, and judicial structures designed and developed through fair and democratic processes are vital ingredients in peacebuilding (Gimode, 2007:227). Institutional guarantees require constitutional and institutional reforms. AfSol’s philosophy must be founded on the realisation that dignity and social justice across Africa depends on recognising and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (Nasong’o and Murunga 2007: 52-53).

**The International Criminal Court**

While the ICC is applauded for its role complementarity and deterrence, it is also dismissed as an instrument of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism and as being embedded in the western ideal of the rule of law (Marten, 2005: 37). ICC is seen as a colonial or imperial court and a tool of western democratisation.
meant to nurture economic, political and strategic interests of the west (Gosnell, 2008). The ICC is also discredited for retroactive application of norms, political manipulations, selective and delayed justice, its inability to facilitate sustainable reconciliation and peacebuilding, and for violating the Westphalian principle of sovereignty often evoked to challenge the indictment of African leaders (Freeman and Gibran, 2004). However, the proponents of the court evoke the principle of the responsibility to protect and the complementarity principle that supplements weak judicial systems, therefore, nurturing human rights and security (Chataway, 2007). Therefore, the court cannot overly be dismissed; the AfSol initiative and AU need to facilitate extensive civic education about the meaning, mandate, process, selection criteria, and jurisdiction of the ICC. AfSol and the AU should liaise with the court to engage with opinion leaders, empower local tribunals, and embrace grassroots reconciliation and expressed needs, hopes and fears of the affected people. To fast-track African identity, AfSol and the AU should hasten the establishment of the African Criminal Court of Justice (ACCJ), African Security Council, and a Pan African Emergency Force dedicated to building a Pax Africana (Mazrui, 2008: 48). However, the fear is that Pax Africana could be a smokescreen to hide impunity, pardon dictators, and perpetuate human rights atrocities. While Pax Africa could be an option, ICC should be strengthened by addressing the grievances of member countries concerning its mandate and jurisdiction.

**Good Leadership and Governance**

In order to control African populations, the colonial regime used indirect rule rather than direct or participatory rule, therefore, encouraging ethno-social identities (Rothchild, 1997:7). The post-colonial regimes saw the emergence of African bourgeoisies who used the colonial ethnic card to benefit themselves while marginalizing the ethnic others (Ibid: 9). African democratisation requires restructuring and decentralisation of the institutions of leadership and governance (Nasong’o and Murunga, 2007:1). Central to AfSol, therefore, is to engage the AU and other stakeholder in addressing leadership and governance issues towards satisfaction of collective needs and embracement of geo-ethnicity and territorial identity (Danziger, 2005:113).

**Cross-community Interactions, Dialogue, and Sharing (S)**

While inter-group violence arises from social processes relating to structural
and historical injustices, cross-community relationships facilitate the discovery of commonalities, reconciliation, and rehumanisation of the ‘enemy others’ and the reduction of inter-group bias (Fisher, 2005; 2007). The creation of the insiders and outsiders has nurtured what has been referred to as the most dangerous four-letter word in the English language— THEM, one that has caused indefinable suffering and death of millions of people globally (Karari, 2014). Through research, education, and training, AfSol should invest in fighting THEMification. This can be done by applying the principle of the 4Cs (Ibid): being Conscious about ethnic prejudice, labels, and stereotypes; being Curious about the stories of other people; being Compassionate about breaking the cycle of the otherness; and Challenging the foundations of THEMification (Karari, 2014). The AfSol initiative should engage with the AU to encourage dialogue between disputants and retelling of stories in a bid to create a new understanding of the grounded realities, demystification of myths and stereotypes, and positive change that leads to de-THEMification (Schirch, 2004: 50). AfSol and other stakeholders can encourage de-THEMification through: cross-community tours, businesses, games and sports; exchange programmes; participatory theatre techniques and folklore projects; peace villages; peace caravans; integrative education system; common language; integrative housing policies; and outlawing discrimination (McGarry and O’Leary, 1993: 17). De-THEMification creates spaces for recovery, healing, and empowerment of the humiliated others which nurtures ownership, identity, and responsibility to community relationships. De-THEMification could be a great background for the take-off of AfSol initiative for African identity and values. AfSol initiative should embrace multi-track diplomacy which nurtures intra-systemic relationships and opportunities for collaborative action (Diamond and McDonald, 1996:156).

From the foregoing, therefore, African identity entails the cultivation and tolerance to that very elusive trait— the ability to accept diversity (Mazrui, 2008: 41). We must deviate from Afro-pessimism and Afro-phobia and simplistic stereotypes concerning the tractability of African conflicts by embracing the fact that such conflicts have complex histories; they exhibit multiple and multi-dimensional causes, courses, and consequences (Nhema and Zeleza, 2008: 2). The Jetliners model can inform policies in African nation states towards transitional justice, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution including the embracement of African values and an African identity. While the Jetliners model could provide a solution
for Africa, how will it be afforded, sustained, and maintained? This will be achieved through five main pillars namely: formulation of key policy frameworks to guide its institutionalisation, implementation, and sustenance (MacGinty, 2008: 92); cultivation of political will by investing in civic education at all levels, voting for leaders of integrity, embracement of the rule of law, addressing impunity and corruption, and ensuring that leaders take responsibility for their political decisions (Wolff, 2006: 173); coordination and networking that define cooperate peacebuilding values, relational skills, analytical skills, analytical tools, and processes (Schirch, 2004:83); funding to contribute to the exploration of critical areas of knowledge and action; and civic education that would nurture ownership of African values and identity (Diamond and McDonald, 1996:108).

Discussion and Conclusion

The Darfur crisis exhibits a failure to protect by both the GoS and the international community. This is partly because R2P as a new norm lacks determinacy, impartiality and a well-defined legal foundation. Precisely, the buck stops at no definite actor. The concept of “we have a moral duty to act” does not define the “we” and consequently R2P becomes a responsibility of no body. Despite the conflict between the principle of sovereignty and that of R2P, the 2004 UN Security Council resolution 1556/1564 on Darfur constituted enough reason for military action against Khartoum. Precisely, the international community dwelled on the conspiracy of not to see and focused on strategic interests. On the other hand, the GoS used ‘sovereignty’ as a smokescreen to cover the mass atrocities and human rights violations in Darfur. The UN High Level Panel report on “Threats, Challenges, and Change” indicates that the principle of sovereignty cannot be used to protect genocidal activities considered to be a threat to international security (2004). The inability of the UNSC to implement and guard the norm of R2P in Darfur threatens its credibility and gives a leeway for independent action which may be prone to abuse or driven by self-aggrandizement. The UNSC should thus be restructured to effectively cope with the challenges that hinder the implementation of R2P. The R2P failed in Darfur, but it was a success story in Kenya (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). While this study indicates that a multiplicity of factors contributes to the success or failure of R2P, it is the strategic interests that largely take the lead. The major powers feared that the intervention in Darfur could derail the 2005 CPA between SPLM and GoS (Bellamy and Williams, 2005). The failure of R2P in Darfur could thus be attributed to the conflict between the
original mission and the strategic interests of international actors. This affected the compliance-pull for action.

In contrast, the international response after the 2008 Kenya post-election crisis was overwhelming, harmonious, timely and well-coordinated making it the best success story of R2P in history (Steinberg, 2009). The Kenyan case demonstrated that R2P is not about military intervention but unfatigued commitment, involvement, participation and determination of the international community (Cohen, 2008). Ironically, the Kenya and Darfur stories indicate that the international community does not implement the R2P impartially. Instead R2P is driven by strategic interests. Consequently, those regions of the world that have less importance to international actors are neglected. This revelation discredits the norm of R2P as lacking independence and as a tool for manipulation to further the interests of its proponents. The UN Secretary General indicates that the success of the Kenyan case was due to timely, persistent and continuous pressure from the international community (AU 2008). The international community pressurized the Kenyan leaders using all means of threats, appeals, incentives, and reminders of their responsibilities. A major catalyst to the Kenyan success story could be explained by the fact that unlike Darfur, there were no disputes among the various actors during the mediation process. The international actors spoke the same language in addressing the Kenyan crisis. There were no dissenting voices as in the case of Darfur. The Copenhagen School theories indicate that common language is pivotal in facilitating R2P in terms of influencing compliance of actors (Stamnes 2009). The Kenyan case indicates that the host country’s cooperation and flexibility in conflict transformation, resolution and peacebuilding, are central to the success of R2P. Khartoum’s lack of political will and the dissenting voices of international actors is the undoing of R2P in Darfur. While R2P should be applied impartially throughout the world, this study indicates that the norm is applied selectively.

The strategic position of Kenya as a gateway to East and central Africa, a regional economic hub, a host of the UN offices, a home for major diplomatic missions in the world, a peace broker in the East, Central and Horn of Africa, a base for the West’s fight against terrorism and a military base for the USA, singles out its “importance” to the world. The selective nature in which R2P is applied in crisis areas around the world poses critical questions about its practicability as a norm. Theories recommend that the restructuring of R2P should address its three pillars namely: the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations from the four
crimes — genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as from their incitement; the international community’s responsibility to assist in the fulfilment of this mandate; and the international community’s responsibility to take timely and decisive action, in accordance with the UN Charter, in cases where the state has manifestly failed to protect its population from one or more of the four crimes (Harff 2003; Holt and Taylor, 2009). Key to these pillars is timely response to early warning signs (Heidenrich, 2001) because salvaging a country from collapse after violent conflicts as in the case of Kenya is a rare case (Saxer, 2008). If we revisit the six criteria for military intervention: the right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects, Darfur crisis qualifies for military intervention. However, the conflict between indeterminacy of R2P and the actors’ strategic interests has obscured such hope. The UNSC which has the right authority and primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as entrenched in Article 24 of the Charter of the UN has failed to authorize military intervention. While the Darfur crisis has led to gross human rights violations and atrocities and while all the less forceful alternatives as stipulated in Article 41 of the UN Charter have failed, the UN and the international community have also failed in the authority to implement the R2P. The Darfur crisis also qualifies as a just cause for military intervention. According to ICISS (2001), the just cause for military intervention should endeavour to halt or avert large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or to halt or avert large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape. Despite this clarity, the Darfur case has remained neglected as the main actors invest in strategic interests.

The right intention has also been compromised. The principle of the right intention is related to the primary purpose of military intervention, i.e, human protection. According to ICISS, the right intention can be achieved by inclusive or collaborative rather than unilateral interventions, support from the intended beneficiaries and support from other countries in the region (2001). In contrast, the case of Darfur has been compromised by unilateral strategic interests, lack of political will from the GoS and lack of support from the international community. The principle of last resort has also failed to be honoured. ICISS (2001) observes that the principle of last resort takes charge when every diplomatic and non-
military avenue for the prevention or peaceful resolution of humanitarian crisis has failed. In Darfur, a variety of diplomatic avenues, embargos and negotiations have been exhausted but the international community and the UNSC have failed to act. Military intervention in Darfur has high probability of reasonable prospects because Khartoum cannot withhold the military might of international actors in Sudan such as USA, China, UK, Belgium and France. Military action can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success, that is, halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered the intervention in the first place (ICISS, 2001). If there was compliance-pull and determinacy among international actors, military action in Sudan would succeed. From the foregoing, several observations can be made. The case studies of Darfur and Kenyan crises indicate that R2P lacks impartiality and that its selective application is based on strategic interests of the international actors rather than the original goal of human protection and security. This study has also shown that while the emergence of R2P was meant to bridge the gaps within the principles of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, this goal has been compromised by strategic interests of the international actors. It has further indicated that the success of R2P depends on multiple factors. In the case of Kenya and Darfur, such factors include natural resources, terrorism, regional politics, political will, militias, infrastructure, military investments, media, and economic reasons, among others. This means that a holistic and inclusive approach is required for successful implementation of R2P.

This study has also demonstrated that R2P falls short of a norm and is more of a policy agenda to further the interests of the west. R2P lacks consistency, determinancy, and impartiality and has failed to enforce sanction for non-compliance or violations. R2P has also failed in the implementation of its mandate in line with its foundational pillars and the six criteria of military intervention for human protection.

The paper has also critically deconstructed AfSol’s new brand of ownership, shared values, and commitment in the lens of the Jetliners approach for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. It has been indicated that AfSol’s initiative needs to be nurtured on fertile ground. For AfSol to be effective, this research recommends an integrative-cum-holistic approach in which active participation and involvement of the African people, civil society, institutions, and governments is embraced. The success of AfSol’s philosophy requires a grounded approach that embraces local dynamics, cultural knowledge, and the expressed needs of people and institutions
at all levels. The success of AfSol requires addressing the heavy chains of historical, structural, socio-economic, cultural, and political injustices that continue to bedevil our continent. AfSol’s brand must endeavour to bring everyone to the centre and address their expressed needs in order to nurture ownership, commitment, and shared values.
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